Expert Witness Profiler

Tag: Reliability

  • Fire Investigation Expert Witness Was Allowed to Opine on the Defective Candle

    Fire Investigation Expert Witness Was Allowed to Opine on the Defective Candle

    Plaintiffs Robert and Jill Motto brought this action to recover for property damage to their home arising from a fire allegedly caused by a defective candle manufactured and sold by Defendants Newell Brands and The Yankee Candle Company.

    During the litigation, Plaintiffs retained two experts, Roger Spadt and Dr. John Golder, to investigate the origin and cause of the fire. These experts concluded that the candle was the cause of the fire. Defendants disagreed and have moved to preclude both experts’ testimony, arguing that their opinions do not satisfy the minimum reliability requirements set forth in Federal Rule of Evidence 702.

    Fire Investigation Expert Witnesses

    Roger A. Spadt has over forty years of public and private experience investigating fires. He has worked as Assistant to the State Police Fire Marshal, was a Fire Marshal himself in a Lehigh Township fire
    company, and has been a private fire investigator since 2015.

    Want to know more about the challenges Roger Spadt has faced? Get the full details with our Challenge Study report.

    John J. Golder is a former ATF officer and current forensic fire investigator with a Ph.D. in forensic sciences and over a decade of experience investigating product defects, including candles.

    Get the full story on challenges to John Golder’s expert opinions and testimony with an in-depth Challenge Study.

    Discussion by the Court

    A. Roger Spadt

    Based on his investigation, Spadt concluded that the fire was caused by the candle, which he deemed “the only competent ignition source within the area of the fire’s origin.”

    Defendants argued that Spadt’s testimony is not reliable because he failed to follow industry guidelines for methodology in fire investigations. Specifically, Defendants argued that he failed to properly analyze the origin of the fire according to the scientific standards set forth in NFPA 921.

    1. Industry Guidelines for Fire Investigations

    The National Fire Protection Association published an industry guide for investigations into the origin and cause of fires, “NFPA 921.” NFPA 921 sets forth the scientific methods the Association recommends investigators use to determine the cause of a fire. This scientific method generally requires an investigator to “define the problem, collect data, analyze data, develop hypotheses, test the hypotheses, and select a final hypothesis.”

    The parties disagreed about the degree to which an investigator must follow every provision of NFPA 921.

    Defendants characterize NFPA 921 as “the universally accepted peer-reviewed comprehensive guide to procedures and techniques for fire investigations in the United States.” Plaintiffs have the better argument. The plain text of NFPA 921 makes clear that it is not an exacting set of rules. Section 1.3 states that “deviations from these procedures . . . are not necessarily wrong or inferior.” It explains that “every fire and explosion incident is in some way unique and different from any other,” therefore the guidelines are “not designed to encompass all of the necessary components of a complete investigation or analysis of any one case.”

    2. Application of Industry Guidelines by Spadt

    It is clear from Spadt’s report that he employed a scientific method that generally comports with the approach outlined in NFPA 921. Spadt collected data by examining the fire scene, taking photographs of the damage, creating a field diagram, and conducting witness interviews.

    Spadt also considered alternative causes of the fire, including by examining the home’s branch circuit electric conductors and a ceiling fan as potential induction sources, but ruled out these options because they were inconsistent with the physical evidence and witness interviews.

    Finally, even if Spadt’s processes did not adhere to NFPA 921 standards, they independently satisfy Rule 702 and Daubert. Spadt applied the “methods and procedures of science” (in this case, electrical engineering and fire science) to the physical evidence and witness interviews he reviewed in this case, so his opinion rests on “good grounds.”

    At bottom, the various issues Defendants raised with Spadt’s testimony are probative of the weight his testimony should be afforded, not the reliability of his methodology. Accordingly, the Court denied Defendants’ motion to preclude Spadt’s testimony.

    B. John J. Golder

    To begin with, Golder reviewed photographs of the fire scene and witness interviews and conducted a burn test on the same type of Yankee candle. He also determined that the fire was caused by the candle, “which had been burning for an extended period, causing the candle to reach flashover conditions due to the inability of the metal container allowing the heat to dissipate.”

    Defendants argued that Golder’s testimony is unreliable because it is not based on sufficient facts or data, not the product of reliable principles and methods, and his conclusions are based solely on unfounded speculation.

    1. Insufficient Facts/Data

    Defendants argued that Golder’s opinion that the candle reached flashover conditions that resulted in an explosion igniting the materials on the dining room table was reached “without evidence.”

    However, Golder based his report on a variety of evidence. He examined the candle’s remains, reviewed photographs and x-rays of the damage to the house, reviewed deposition testimony of witnesses in this case, and conducted a burn test on an identical Yankee candle. Golder also consulted candle safety standards and peer-reviewed literature and employed his knowledge of forensic science, fire dynamics, chemistry, physics, and origin and cause investigations. All of these inputs constitute “good grounds” for Golder’s opinion.

    2. Unreliable Methods & Application of Methods

    Next, Defendants argued that Golder’s opinion is not based on any scientific method but on mere speculation and his own ipse dixit.

    However, Golder relied on his expertise in fire dynamics, fire science, physics, and chemistry, and used that background to examine the candle’s remains, review photographs, x-rays, and deposition testimony, and conduct a burn test of an exemplar Yankee candle. He also consulted relevant literature on fire causation from candles.

    In the conclusions section of his report, Golder articulated how his scientific analysis informed his opinion. For instance, he explained that when a glass container is placed into a metal container, it is harder for radiant heat to dissipate away from the glass, meaning the container acts as a heat sink to re-radiate energy back into the glass and cause a flashover. A flashover can cause the flame height to increase, which can break the glass and cause the fire to spread to nearby surfaces. These explanations bridge the gap between Golder’s conclusions and his data and methods.

    3. Defendants’ Remaining Arguments

    Defendants raised several additional issues with Golder’s report. Namely, that (1) he failed to consider alternative causes of the fire; (2) the burn test he conducted on an exemplar candle and metal holder was not adequately explained and/or sufficiently similar to the circumstances of the fire; and (3) Golder failed to consider the role that Plaintiffs played in causing the fire.

    Since these arguments are more probative of the weight to be afforded to Golder’s testimony than the reliability of his methods or conclusions, the Court held that Golder’s conclusions met the minimum reliability requirements of Rule 702. 

    Held

    The Court denied the Defendants’ motion to preclude the testimony of Plaintiffs’ experts Roger Spadt and Dr. John Golder.

    Key Takeaway

    Courts considering Daubert motions in fire damage cases have found that similar investigatory processes satisfied NFPA 921. Thus, Defendants are wrong that any minor deviation from the guidelines renders Spadt’s investigation unreliable.

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Motto V. Newell Brands Inc.
    Docket Number: 2:24cv1338
    Court Name: United States District Court, Pennsylvania Eastern
    Order Date: February 05, 2026
  • The Law Enforcement Expert Was Allowed to Opine on Pennsylvania State Police Policy

    The Law Enforcement Expert Was Allowed to Opine on Pennsylvania State Police Policy

    The Defendants are Pennsylvania State Police Troopers accused of using excessive force when they served a 302 warrant on Plaintiff Carl Giuli based on his wife’s reports that Giuli was experiencing a mental health crisis. While serving the warrant, an altercation occurred in Giuli’s house involving Giuli and Pennsylvania State Police Troopers Joseph Montagna and Christopher Teetsel. Giuli sustained injuries in the course of the altercation which he alleges are due to the use of excessive force by Troopers Montagna and Teetsel.

    The Defendants sought to preclude Thomas Shea, the Plaintiff’s proffered use of force expert, on several grounds. In their motion, Defendants stated that Shea’s expert report is not appropriately considered by the jury on several grounds: 1) he was a municipal officer rather than a state police trooper as are Defendants in this case; 2) he uses “amorphous methodologies with no reliability”; 3) he “invades the province of the jury by declaring that excessive force was used and the testimony of the troopers is not credible”; and 4) his opinions about trooper training are not supported.

    Law Enforcement Expert Witness

    Thomas A. Shea III, D.Sc., CPP is a nationally recognized Law Enforcement and Security expert in policing best practices, security standards, and emergency preparedness, specializing in police operations, use of force, premises liability, negligent security, and related civil litigation issues.

    He started his career with the Long Branch Police Department in 1998 after serving honorably in the United States Marine Corps during Operation Desert Storm. During his career, Shea served as an agency police commander and on the Monmouth County Emergency Response Team (SWAT).

    After completing his police career in February 2017, Shea entered academia. Shea recently served as the director and founder of the Law Enforcement Executive Leadership program at Seton Hall University.

    He has published numerous academic and professional articles and a police practice book, created a law enforcement and security leadership higher education curriculum, and presented nationwide at professional conferences on security and policing topics.

    Get the full story on challenges to Thomas Shea’s expert opinions and testimony with an in-depth Challenge Study.

    Discussion by the Court

    A. Reliability

    The Defendants first asserted that Shea’s report consisted of inaccuracies and factual errors that cast serious doubt on the reliability of his opinion.

    The Defendants maintained that Shea’s reliability is doubtful because Shea did not use the New Jersey Law Enforcement Handbook in making his determinations despite his report saying that he did. Critically, Shea’s report stated that it was Defendant Montagna who pushed Plaintiff Giuli up against the refrigerator in the course of this incident; there is no allegation of this in the record, and Shea offered inconsistent explanations for why this factual averment appears in his report.

    The Court found that the inconsistencies found in his report and other matters that relate to the reliability of his opinions are properly the subject of cross-examination to the extent he is allowed to testify on those matters at trial.

    B. Credibility Determinations

    The Defendants next argued that Shea’s opinions regarding credibility are inappropriate. The jury has the exclusive function of appraising credibility, determining the weight to be given to the testimony, drawing inferences from the facts established, resolving conflicts in evidence, and reaching ultimate conclusions of fact.

    The Court agreed with the Defendants that “the case presented to the Court is one of credibility—ultimately the jury will have to determine if Defendants maliciously assaulted Plaintiff or if they used appropriate force after he attacked them.” Regarding the different versions of events offered by the Plaintiff and Defendants, Shea confirmed at the Daubert Hearing that the parties’ “stories differ in some aspects” and that he “intended to offer an opinion to the jury as to who they should believe or find credible.”

    Shea also acknowledged that he made other credibility determinations in the course of his report, including those related to the cause of Plaintiff’s injuries, and he believed that was “a typical purview of a use of force expert.” As a result, Shea was precluded from offering any opinions on credibility at trial. 

    C. Specific Opinions

    1. Compliance with Non-Relevant Standards

    Defendants asserted that the Plaintiff sought to admit Shea’s opinion regarding Defendants’ compliance with non-relevant standards. The Court found that Plaintiff has not shown that “prevailing national standards in the use of force” are relevant in this case or that the specifically identified President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing Final Report and Law Enforcement Best Practices: Lessons from the Field are relevant.

    Therefore, Shea was precluded from relying on these publications and testifying about standards promulgated therein, i.e., the goal of “avoiding the use of force if at all possible, even when it is allowed by law and policy” identified in The President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing and the “principles of de-escalation” identified in Law Enforcement Best Practices.

    Similarly, the Court precluded Shea from testifying about Plaintiff’s generically identified intent to elicit an opinion on “prevailing national standards in the field of use of force.”

    2. Pennsylvania Mental Health Procedures Act

    Plaintiff has not shown the relevance of the Pennsylvania Mental Health Procedures Act to the charge against the Pennsylvania State Troopers executing the warrant and has not shown how testimony about provisions in the Act would assist the trier of fact as required under Daubert.

    The Court held that Shea’s testimony about the Act at the Daubert Hearing made no direct connection between the Act and the facts of this case, opining generally that “what he took” from the Act is that “you have to take extra, extra precautions to communicate more thoroughly. You have to be more patient than you normally would during a call because lots of people going through these crisis events aren’t aware . . . of their actions and decisions.”

    This is not a State Police policy, it is not presented as a policy statement found in the Act or one that is applicable to officers issuing a 302 warrant. Therefore, the Court found that reference to the Act is properly precluded based on relevance and fit grounds.

    3. Compliance with Pennsylvania State Police Policy

    Defendants next took issue with Plaintiff’s proposed opinion as to whether Defendants were compliant with Pennsylvania State Police policy.

    Defendants specifically asserted that Shea “should be prevented from testifying as to whether or not Defendants complied with the PSP policy, as he has not established his opinion is any more reliable than a lay witness simply reading the Pennsylvania State Police policies and opining on whether or not they were followed in this case.”

    The Court found that Shea has a breadth of knowledge and experience in police practices and use of force which render him qualified to testify as an expert as limited herein. Further, Pennsylvania State Police policies are relevant for purposes of this case and an expert’s review of pertinent policies will assist the trier of fact.

    4. Compliance with De-escalation Policy

    Defendants relatedly contended that it did not appear that Shea based his opinion regarding de-escalation on Pennsylvania State Police policy; “rather he based his opinion on ‘Law Enforcement Best Practices: Lessons from the Field . . . [and] only on Plaintiff’s version of events as he made a credibility determination regarding the Defendants’ narrative.”

    It should be noted that an opinion based on Law Enforcement Best Practices is precluded and an opinion based on a credibility determination is also precluded. 

    5. Use of Excessive Force Language

    Finally, Defendants objected to the Plaintiff’s intention to elicit Shea’s opinion on whether the force used was “reasonable and necessary, with no mention of the word, excessive, no mention of the case law, no mention of factors.”

    The Court concluded that Shea is appropriately precluded from use of the words “reasonable” or “unreasonable” in rendering his opinion regarding excessive force. Testimony by Shea regarding reasonableness “would usurp the District Courts’ pivotal role in explaining the law to the jury.”

    Held

    The Court granted in part and denied in part the Defendants’ motion to exclude the testimony of the Plaintiff’s use of force expert, Thomas Shea.

    Key Takeaway

    The Court acknowledged that Shea’s report is problematic for multiple reasons, including those cited. However, focusing on Shea’s knowledge and experience summarized at the Daubert Hearing and set out in his Curriculum Vitae, the Court found that Shea has a breadth of knowledge and experience in police practices and use of force which render him qualified to testify as an expert.

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Giuli V. Montagna
    Docket Number: 3:23cv1785
    Court Name: United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
    Order Date: January 08, 2026
  • Valuation Expert Allowed to Opine on Economic Damages

    Valuation Expert Allowed to Opine on Economic Damages

    In this insurance bad faith case, Plaintiff James Won alleged that State Farm unreasonably denied his claim for business property damage and lost profits resulting from a fire that occurred at Won’s Tapioca Express store in Edmonds, Washington on September 11, 2021.

    Won disclosed Michael Jack of Soundpoint as a financial expert but the Defendant sought to exclude Jack’s testimony, alleging that the opinions of Jack that the Plaintiff disclosed before the discovery cutoff on October 5, 2025 “are irrelevant and unhelpful to the jury in this case.” 

    Valuation Expert Witness

    Michael Jack is a Certified Valuation Analyst (CVA). He has an Honors BS in Finance from Indiana University, an MBA from the University of North Carolina and is a graduate of General Electric’s Financial Management Program. 

    He has held leadership roles in finance, operations, technology, program management and product management in start-ups, mid-size fintechs and large financial services firms.

    Want to know more about the challenges Michael Jack has faced? Get the full details with our Challenge Study report.

    Discussion by the Court

    Initially, Defendant contested only the helpfulness of the opinions of Jack that were disclosed before the discovery cutoff on October 5, 2025.

    On August 06, 2025, Plaintiff disclosed Jack as a financial expert and shared a report from Jack dated July 29, 2025. That report expressed Jack’s opinion concerning the fair market value of Plaintiff’s business as of the date of the fire that precipitated the insurance claim that is at issue in this action. Jack’s report presented the fair market valuation—$501,000—as being offered “for the purposes of a calculation of economic damages.” However, the report did not directly calculate economic damages.

    However, on October 08, three days after the discovery cutoff, Plaintiff produced a second report from Jack. Conceding that the first report “is not a direct calculation of economic damages,” the second report offered a net economic damages calculation of $434,700. A third report from Jack, dated October 20, 2025, offered a calculation of “the total annual lost income to Won incurred from the closure of Northwest Tea Station . . . due to a fire in September 2021.”

    Defendant added that these post-discovery-cutoff opinions should be stricken and are essentially an effort by the Plaintiff to “change the heart of his case without giving State Farm an opportunity to fairly respond.”

    Analysis

    Given the totality of the circumstances, the Court allowed the reports from Jack that were disclosed after the discovery cutoff. Having allowed those reports from Jack, the Court has no doubt that Jack’s analyses, taken together, are helpful. Thus, the Court will deny Defendant’s Daubert motion and Defendant’s motion to strike. However, the Court did not accept Plaintiff’s argument that his post-discovery-cutoff disclosures were timely supplements under Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(e) given that Plaintiff has been aware since at least March 2025 that Defendant had requested a specific, itemized list of Plaintiff’s damages.

    Nor did the Court accept Plaintiff’s argument that his post-discovery-cutoff disclosures were “substantially justified” and “harmless” under Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c)(1). Therefore, the Court is willing to consider a motion by Defendant for reasonable expenses, including attorney fees, caused by Plaintiff’s failure to timely disclose a damages calculation.

    Held

    The Court denied Defendants’ Daubert motion to exclude the testimony of Michael Jack and strike his untimely expert report.

    Key Takeaway

    While Jack’s analyses are helpful, Plaintiff’s initial disclosures did not provide a “computation of each category of damages” as required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1)(A)(iii), nor did Plaintiff provide the “itemized list of damages” requested by Defendant in Defendant’s discovery requests.

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Won V. State Farm Fire And Casualty Company
    Docket Number: 2:24cv507
    Court Name: United States District Court for the Western District of Washington
    Order Date: January 07, 2026
  • Computer Science Expert’s Testimony on the Value of Data Admitted

    Computer Science Expert’s Testimony on the Value of Data Admitted

    This class action lawsuit arises out of Amazon’s practice of using smart-speaker technology (“Alexa”) to surreptitiously: (a) intercept; (b) eavesdrop; (c) record; (d) disclose; or (e) use millions of Americans’ voices and communications, all without their knowledge or consent. Such conduct blatantly violates Washington’s wiretapping law, which applies nationwide to Plaintiffs and all members of the Class.

    Defendants here, Amazon.com, Inc. and Amazon.com Services LLC (collectively, “Amazon” or “Defendants”), are therefore liable as a result of their egregious violations of the State Wiretapping laws – and are also liable for their violations of the Washington Consumer Protection Act (“CPA”), the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 (“Federal Wiretap Act”), and the Stored Communications Act of 1986 (“SCA”). Plaintiffs Kaeli Garner, Jodi Brust, Diane McNealy, Michael McNealy, Ricky Babani, Jeffrey Hoyt, Lorlie Tesoriero, Ronald Johnson, Selena Johnson and Caron Watkins (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) brought this action individually, and on behalf of a Class of similarly situated individuals, to redress those violations of law.

    Amazon filed a motion to exclude the testimony of Plaintiffs’ expert Jonathan Hochman. Defendants sought to exclude Hochman’s testimony that (a) a large collection of utterances or speech data has value and can be utilized for various purposes, (b) each individual user’s data has discrete value in and of itself, and (c) Amazon could have programmed Alexa to record only the voices of registered users.

    Computer Science Expert Witness

    Jonathan E. Hochman, PhD. has 35 years of experience in software product development, internet technology, online marketing, and cybersecurity. He is a Yale University graduate with four degrees in computer science. He currently teaches classes on computer privacy and is conducting research related to computer security, privacy, and distributed computing.

    Between stints as a student, Hochman founded companies aimed at assisting clients with internet marketing and internet security, developing secure and private user authentication options, and integrating systems to maximize data capture and efficiency. He has also served as an expert regarding online data collection practices, software development, marketing, e-commerce, and internet security. His most recent article and research involve the tension between maintaining large data repositories for machine learning and safe-guarding individual privacy.

    Fortify your strategy by reviewing a Challenge Study detailing grounds for excluding Jonathan Hochman’s expert testimony.

    Discussion by the Court

    A. Knowledge and Expertise

    Amazon argued that Hochman’s admitted expertise in amassing, handling, using, and analyzing data is not transferrable to this case because his experiences involved types of data other than voice data. The distinction is unexplained and is unclear in this context. The challenged testimony is being offered to show the ways in which large quantities of data are used to train and improve products (such as the Alexa device), to explain the means by which Amazon and other market participants value the data they use for such purposes, and to provide a basis for the jury to conclude that consumers have been injured by Amazon’s collection of the data. Whether that data is in the form of a key stroke or an utterance is not dispositive of the relevant legal analysis.

    Amazon also argued that Hochman lacks training and/or experience in economics and is therefore unable to assign a value to the data Amazon collects and uses. Hochman has not, however, offered an opinion regarding the actual value of the voice recordings at issue, either individually or en masse.

    Finally, Amazon objected to the opinions set forth in Section D.i. of Mr. Hochman’s report, namely that “it is technologically feasible for products to not record a voice that is not registered or recognized.” This opinion is based on Hochman’s interpretation of internal Amazon documents, his understanding of how Apple’s Siri virtual assistant works, and his work experiences with internet user authentication and identification through voice prints. The fact that he has not developed or created a voice print authentication system does not prevent him from opining that such a thing exists.

    B. Helpfulness

    Amazon argued that (1) proof that voice data has value to Amazon is insufficient to prove that Alexa customers were injured by Amazon’s taking of the data and (2) even if the collection and use of the data caused injury, Hochman has not proposed a damages model capable of measuring or calculating damages in the absence of individualized proof.

    Amazon does not dispute that it has a need for and values the voice recording data it collects. Before Alexa was capable of collecting the necessary utterances — i.e., before the product was fully deployed and in homes across the country — Amazon paid people to generate and contribute their audio data. Once Alexa became operational, however, Amazon opted to take, store, and use the utterances recorded by the system rather than pay users for that privilege. A reasonable fact finder could conclude that Amazon’s allegedly unfair acts deprived Alexa users of the opportunity to sell their voice data, thereby giving rise to an “injury to property” commensurate with the value of the taken data.

    While the collected data undoubtedly has a higher value to Amazon than it does to individual Alexa users, Hochman’s testimony is sufficient to allow the fact finder to conclude that, had Amazon not simply taken the voice recordings, a mutually agreeable price for the data could have been reached and the users were deprived of that value.

    Moreover, Hochman offers at least two common methods for establishing the value of the voice data Amazon took and used for its own purposes without compensation, namely (a) the fair market value of individual utterances or monthly subscriptions for the data and (b) the costs Amazon is incurring or has incurred to acquire non-Alexa voice recordings. 

    C. Regurgitation of Documents

    Amazon asserted that “most of Opinions 3 and 4” consisted of nothing more than quotations from Amazon’s documents and/or that the quoted documents require no expertise to understand and apply in this case.

    Amazon made no attempt to explain why Hochman should be precluded from relying on Amazon’s documents to support his opinions that the utterances Amazon has collected, individually and as a collective, have value.

    Held

    The Court denied the Defendants’ Daubert motion to exclude the testimony of Jonathan Hochman.

    Key Takeaway

    Hochman used his experience, education, and selected resources (including Amazon’s documents) to define the terms of art used in this litigation, to explain how Alexa works and improves with both positive and negative training data, to show why the data Amazon has been collecting has value, and to identify various choices Amazon made in furtherance of its efforts to collect voice data regardless of user privacy interests.

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Garner V. Amazon.Com, Inc.
    Docket Number: 2:21cv750
    Court Name: United States District Court for the Western District of Washington
    Order Date: January 05, 2026
  • Metallurgical Engineering Expert’s Testimony on Engine Failure Admitted

    Metallurgical Engineering Expert’s Testimony on Engine Failure Admitted

    This case arises from an accident involving a Robinson R44 II helicopter, registration N442VB (“Helicopter”), that occurred on the evening of December 30, 2021, in Levy County, Florida. The Helicopter was being flown at night by the owner-pilot, Ronald Hicks (“Pilot Hicks”), from a local friend’s residence to his private property. At the time of the accident, Pilot Hicks had less than ten hours of night flight experience in helicopters and was not certified under Instrument Flight Rules (“IFR”). Mr. Hicks, Shelly Kate Hicks, and their two children sustained fatal injuries.

    Defendants filed a Daubert motion to limit the opinion of Plaintiffs’ metallurgical expert Mark B. Hood.

    Metallurgical Engineering Expert Witness

    Mark Bruce Hood is a professional engineer in the field of metallurgical engineering. Over his career, Hood has analyzed hundreds of failures, including metallic failures.

    Get the full story on challenges to Mark Hood’s expert opinions and testimony with an in-depth Challenge Study.

    Discussion by the Court

    Defendant’s motion did not dispute Hood’s qualification to “render opinions on materials issues more generally.” It instead took issue with the reliability of one of Hood’s opinions—that the “collapse” of an “unidentified organic contaminant” caused a “critical loss of clamp-up force” and, ultimately, the helicopter engine’s failure. Specifically, Defendant argued that Hood failed to test this theory or provide peer reviewed literature supporting it. 

    Hood explained why this is the case here. He opined that that any debris that was between the gear and the crankshaft was “most likely lost during the original disassembly.” And he testified that, due in part to the lack of available evidence, certain testing was not possible, and certain testing techniques might not detect contaminants. 

    Though Hood’s failure to test his contamination theory is not determinative, this Court is not absolved of its gatekeeping function. While a close call, this Court found that Hood met the Daubert standard. Hood’s report explained why, based on a variety of evidence, he concluded that the helicopter’s engine was not under power when the helicopter crashed. He explained that one possible cause of a loss of torque in service is the failure to remove debris and foreign substances from the crankshaft. 

    Therefore, the Court is satisfied that Hood has demonstrated that his opinion is reliable. 

    Held

    The Court denied Defendant’s Daubert motion to limit the opinion of Plaintiffs’ metallurgical expert Mark Hood.

    Key Takeaway

    To the extent an expert relies “solely or primarily on experience, then the witness must explain how that experience leads to the conclusion reached, why that experience is a sufficient basis for the opinion, and how that experience is reliably applied to the facts.”

    In other words, “proposed expert testimony must be supported by appropriate validation—i.e., good grounds, based on what is known.” The Court cannot simply “take the expert’s word for it.” 

    Please refer to the blogs previously published about this case:

    Metallurgy Expert Allowed to Opine on Foreign Object Debris

    Accident Reconstruction Expert’s Meteorological Opinions Excluded

    Avionics Expert Allowed to Opine on Engine Failure

    Piloting Expert Was Allowed to Opine on Spatial Disorientation

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Law V. Avco Corporation
    Docket Number: 1:24cv3
    Court Name: United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida
    Order Date: November 04, 2025
  • Accounting Expert’s Testimony on Due Diligence Limited

    Accounting Expert’s Testimony on Due Diligence Limited

    Plaintiffs Sabby Volatility Warrant Master Fund Ltd. (“Sabby”), SZOP Multistrat LP (“SZOP”), Alto Opportunity Master Fund SPC Segregated Master Portfolio B (“Alto”), and Hudson Bay Master Fund Ltd. (“Hudson Bay”), purchasers of common stock of Quanergy Systems, Inc. (“Quanergy”) in a public offering that closed on November 2, 2022 (the “Offering”), brought suit against Defendants Kevin J. Kennedy, Patrick Archambault, Jim Disanto, Karen Francis, Tamer Hassanein, Lisa Kelley, Thomas M. Rohrs, and Tianyue Yu, all former officers and/or directors of Quanergy, for alleged violations Sections 11 and 15 of the Securities Act of 1933, for failing to take reasonable care that there were no material misrepresentations or omissions in the registration statement and prospectus for the Offering (the “Offering Documents”).

    Defendants argued that Plaintiff’s expert John Levy should be disqualified because his testimony meets none of the three requirements of Rule 702: Defendants suggested that Levy is not qualified to opine on the topics at issue; that Levy’s opinions are unreliable reflections of personal opinion; and that Levy impermissibly acts as a vehicle to deliver Plaintiffs’ preferred version of the facts and improperly assesses witness credibility, which makes his testimony unhelpful and therefore irrelevant to the factfinders.

    Accounting Expert Witness

    John F. Levy received a Bachelor of Science from the Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania and a Master of Business Administration from St. Joseph’s University. Thereafter, he spent nearly five decades working in corporate governance, finance, public reporting, auditing, and accounting.

    Levy has been a Certified Public Accountant in Illinois since 1978 and has nearly ten years of accounting experience at several large accounting firms; has been the chief financial officer of four companies and the chief operating officer of one company; has served on the boards of directors of fifteen public companies; has served as chair of the audit committees for eight companies, which required him to write and review public filings; was involved in one public offering in his role as a company officer and another in his role as an outside director; and has taught corporate governance for state accounting societies and other organizations since 2005.

    Get the full story on challenges to John Levy’s expert opinions and testimony with an in-depth Challenge Study.

    Discussion by the Court

    Qualifications

    Defendants argued that Levy “lacked the necessary expertise to opine on disclosure obligations or the level of investigation required to satisfy the reasonable investigation defense.”

    That Levy has limited previous experience with public offerings generally or with disclosure issues such as those at issue in this case specifically is insufficient to justify declining to qualify him as an expert.

    The Court held that Levy’s education plus his decades of business experience qualify him to opine on the level of due diligence customarily performed in connection with public offerings.

    Reliability

    According to the Court, Defendants’ criticism that Levy failed adequately to describe his methodology was misplaced: Levy’s methodology was to apply his experience to the facts of the case.

    As required, Levy’s conclusions are testable under Daubert in the sense that they are “provable (or disprovable) by equivalent testimony by experienced participants in the industry.”

    Defendants’ assertion that Levy “could not articulate specific examples” of times he conducted due diligence did not require excluding his expert opinions as unreliable.

    Relevance and Helpfulness

    Defendants argued that Levy’s testimony is merely “a vehicle for factual narrative” and includes “improper credibility assessments.”

    To begin with, Defendants’ argument that Levy’s report is nothing more than a recitation of the facts of the case is not persuasive in light of the fact-intensive nature of any analysis of the adequacy of due diligence. However, Levy explained that customary due diligence requires officers and directors to ask certain questions of counsel, and he opined that Defendants should have asked whether “the risk of failing to meet the $15 Million [Capitalization] Requirement should be included in the Offering Documents.” Levy goes on to say that his review of the record reflects that Defendants failed to ask that question; he therefore concludes that Defendants performed less-than-customary diligence.

    A jury does not need expert testimony to understand whether Defendants, in fact, asked questions of counsel about whether to include certain risks. Levy may not testify that the record reflects a failure by Defendants to ask their outside advisors certain questions; he may testify using “hypotheticals based on assumptions about testimony in the record.”

    Defendants’ assertion that Levy makes “improper credibility assessments” has force as well. According to the Court, Defendants are correct that Levy went “at least one step” beyond “reviewing and considering” testimony.

    Held

    The Court granted in part and denied in part the Defendants’ motion to disqualify John Levy from providing opinions.

    Key Takeaway

    Lack of extensive practical experience directly on point does not necessarily preclude an expert from testifying and a formal education in a particular field is sufficient to qualify a witness as an expert.

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Sabby Volatility Warrant Master Fund Ltd., Et Al V. Kennedy
    Docket Number: 1:23cv601
    Court Name: United States District Court, New York Southern
    Order Date: December 16, 2025
  • Preventive Medicine Expert Was Allowed to Opine on the Clinical and Operational Duties

    Preventive Medicine Expert Was Allowed to Opine on the Clinical and Operational Duties

    On January 28, 2021, Demetrius Nichols died while incarcerated at Menard Correctional Center. Plaintiff Diane Jones, Administrator of the Estate of Demetrius Nichols, filed this action against Wexford Health Sources, Inc., Dr. Mohammed Siddique, Ali Dearmond, NP, and Dr. Stephen Ritz, asserting wrongful death.

    Plaintiff retained Ryan D. Herrington, M.D., MPH to support her claims. Defendants filed a motion to exclude the testimony of Herrington.

    Preventive Medicine Expert Witness

    Ryan Douglass Herrington, M.D., MPH received his medical degree from the University of Virginia and a master’s degree in public health from the Ohio State University. He is licensed to practice medicine and is dual board certified by the American Board of Preventive Medicine in both public health/preventive medicine and addiction medicine.

    Get the full story on challenges to Ryan Herrington’s expert opinions and testimony with an in-depth Challenge Study.

    Discussion by the Court

    Herrington opined to a reasonable degree of medical certainty that: (1) from an asthma perspective, Nichols would have benefitted from earlier referral to otolaryngology; (2) Wexford practitioners’ repeated use of steroids for Nichols amounted to customary maintenance treatment for his nasal polyps; (3) Wexford’s custom of using steroids for nasal polyps was harmful for Nichols; (4) Wexford’s custom of using steroids for Nichols made it increasingly likely that he would suffer an asthma exacerbation; and (5) Wexford’s failure to provide Nichols a higher level of care on January 25, 2021 and on January 26, 2021 was a breach of the standard of care.

    Qualification

    Defendants argued that Herrington’s opinions should be excluded because he sought to opine on matters outside of his area of expertise and failed to review sufficient facts and data to form reliable opinions. Defendants further contended that his opinions are not grounded in reliable methodology. The Court disagreed.

    Herrington had the requisite background and experience to render opinions regarding the medical care Nichols received while incarcerated. He has over a decade of experience in correctional medicine, including as a former medical director of a state prison. Herrington testified that he was either directly or indirectly involved with every patient at those correctional facilities. His experience renders him qualified to opine regarding the clinical and operational duties at issue in this case.

    Reliability

    Defendants also argued that Herrington’s opinions are unreliable. In reaching his opinions, Herrington reviewed relevant case materials, including medical records and deposition testimony. He applied his extensive experience to evaluate the facts of this case and reached his conclusions regarding the medical care provided to Nichols. Herrington’s report includes a detailed methodology section in which he outlines and explains how he grounded his analysis in the medical records and treatment chronology. Herrington referenced numerous sources he relied on in formulating his opinions.

    Defendants’ disagreements with Herrington’s ultimate conclusions are not a justifiable basis to exclude his opinions. Defendants may certainly attempt to discredit Herrington on cross-examination or in their own presentation of the evidence. But their arguments go to the weight to be given Herrington’s testimony, not to its admissibility.

    The Court held that his opinions are relevant and will assist the jury with its analysis of whether Defendants’ care fell below accepted practice and caused or contributed to Nichols’ death. 

    Held

    The Court denied the Defendants’ motion to exclude the testimony of Ryan Herrington.

    Key Takeaway

    In sum, the reliability of data and assumptions used in applying a methodology is tested by the adversarial process and determined by the jury; the court’s role is generally limited to assessing the reliability of the methodology — the framework — of the expert’s analysis.

    Defendants’ disagreements with Herrington’s ultimate conclusions are not a justifiable basis to exclude his opinions.

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Nichols V. Wexford Health Sources, Inc
    Docket Number: 3:24cv796
    Court Name: United States District Court, Illinois Southern
    Order Date: December 03, 2025
  • Licensing Expert’s Experience-Based Opinion Admitted 

    Licensing Expert’s Experience-Based Opinion Admitted 

    The fiery dispute in this case comes on the wings of a disagreement about dragon-themed boot buttons. In April 2021, Plaintiff, Edward Beard Jr. (“Beard”), filed a complaint against Defendants Arik Helman (“Helman”)1Link to the text of the note; Son of Sandlar, LLC; Son of Sandlar, Inc., Sandlar Manufacturing, LLC; and Twisted World, LLC (“Defendants”) for direct copyright infringement, contributory copyright infringement, vicarious infringement, and breach of contract.

    Defendants filed a motion to exclude the testimony of Dr. Wesley Austin while Plaintiff Edward P. Beard Jr. filed a motion to exclude the testimony of Cari Freno and Julie Newman.

    Economics Expert Witness

    Dr. Wesley Austin is an Associate Professor of Economics at University of Louisiana at Lafayette and has been in that position for eleven years.  He also has worked as an expert witness in various litigation since 2009.

    Austin holds a Bachelor of Arts in Finance and a Master of Arts in Economics—both from the University of South Florida. He received a Ph.D. in Economics from the University of South Florida, as well. His Ph.D. studies focused on health economics and public sector and labor economics and statistics.

    Get the full story on challenges to Wesley Austin’s expert opinions and testimony with an in-depth Challenge Study.

    Art History Expert Witness

    Cari Freno is the chair of the art and art history department at Ursinus College. She has twenty-five years of experience “working with art materials and processes including drawing, carving, and casting” and has served as an art teacher since 2010.

    Freno has a Bachelor of Fine Arts from the University of the Arts and a Master of Fine Arts from Virginia Commonwealth University.

    Want to know more about the challenges Cari Freno has faced? Get the full details with our Challenge Study report.  

    Licensing Expert Witness

    Julie R. Newman is the Founder and CEO of Jewel Branding & Licensing, Inc. She has been a licensing agent for the past twenty-two years and represents artists whose artwork is used in manufacturers’ products. According to Newman, she “has developed licensing programs around the globe in categories such as health & beauty, stationery, apparel, gift, and home decor.” She holds a Bachelor of Arts in Finance from the University of Akron.

    Want to know more about the challenges Julie Newman has faced? Get the full details with our Challenge Study report.

    Discussion by the Court

    Wesley Austin

    The purpose of Austin’s “report is to estimate [Beard’s] economic damages/losses” from the alleged copyright infringement.

    Challenges to Austin’s Qualifications

    While Defendants did not explicitly question the qualifications of Austin, their entire argument is premised on their belief that he “lacks experience or expertise in negotiating or structuring licensing deals, which is critical for providing a reliable opinion on reasonable royalties in the context of copyright infringement.”

    While Austin has an impressive background in economics, he has no experience, knowledge, or training relating to licensing agreements of the kind at issue in this case.

    So, while he may be qualified to testify regarding general economic matters, he lacked the requisite qualifications to be admitted as an expert on economic damages of the more specific area of art licensing agreements.

    Challenges to Austin’s Reliability

    Much of the Defendants’ challenge to Austin’s proposed expert testimony focused on his alleged unreliability. They noted that the focus of Austin’s analysis is improperly focused on what Plaintiff would have demanded, not what the parties would have negotiated.

    The Court agreed. Austin’s analysis is entirely focused on what Beard would have wanted, not what Helman would have offered.

    Be that as it may, the Defendants’ concerns are chiefly with Austin’s methodology and lack of an independent investigation. 

    The lack of investigation is shown by the fact that there is no evidence in the information provided to Austin that Beard ever received an advance against royalties (AAR) on a per year or per product basis, nor that an upcharge for color variants using his products was ever given. While Plaintiff is correct in noting that there is a basis for determining that an AAR is possible, Defendants contention is that the type of AAR which forms the basis of both of Austin’s scenarios (one granted for that high an amount on a per year, per product, and per color variant basis) has no basis in the record provided to Austin. That, specifically, is what the Court sees as having no evidence in the record to support a basis for an economic analysis and one of the things Austin should have conducted an independent investigation into.

    Relevance/Fit of Austin’s Analysis of Loss related to the Boot Buttons

    As a final note on Austin, the Defendants pointed out that he included lost future income for the Dragon Boot Buttons in his report.

    On March 06, 2024, the Court stated that “Helman is a joint author of the dragon buttons, and he cannot be sued for copyright infringement.”

    Since that opinion was released, more than one and half years have passed and Plaintiff has not amended its complaint to include a claim for accounting for profits from the boot buttons—a remedy that remains as viable as it was when it was mentioned in that opinion.

    Unless and until that motion and amended pleading are filed, Austin’s proposed analysis relating to the boot buttons is irrelevant to the claims currently within this case. 

    The Court viewed Austin’s potential testimony, and will view any testimony proffered on this topic, irrelevant until the amended complaint is filed.

    Cari Freno

    The purpose of Freno’s report is to “provide an opinion of the visual qualities appertaining to the items related to this case.”

    1. Challenges to Freno’s Qualifications

    Defendants’ chief issue with Freno’s report is that she “references no scholarly sources, industry standards, or error-rate analyses to validate her approach.” That is, their main concern is that her expertise is not scientific, and therefore not reliable.

    Freno has established that she has experience working within the art field and that is a sufficient basis for her expert opinion.

    Defendants did raise the valid point that while Freno has established an extensive background in the field of art, she provided no evidence that she has experience in the fields of leatherwork or metalwork. Further, she provided no mention that she has ever had experience turning a drawing or model into a physical product like an applique or a metal button. Nevertheless, this experience could be inferred from her previous work, and excluding the testimony of Freno based on her qualifications is not warranted.

    2. Challenges to Freno’s Lack of Investigation

    Freno’s report made it clear that she relied extensively on conversations with Helman. Freno provided no indication that she ever independently verified what Helman told her and she told the Court, explicitly, at the Daubert hearing that she did not conduct an investigation into what Helman told her.

    Freno’s visual analysis concluded by describing the differences between the various designs. It was only based on her extensive conversations with Helman that she ultimately concluded which design was based on the other.

    The obvious reliance on Helman’s opinions cannot be ignored by the Court—especially when it is admitted that nothing was done to verify the information. Ultimately, Freno’s lack of an independent investigation into what was told to her ultimately renders her testimony as an expert unreliable.

    Julie Newman

    Newman stated that the “primary purpose of [her] report is to summarize a licensing arrangement that would be typical for Helman and Beard to enter into.”

    Newman spent around half of her report arguing that many of the points made in the information given to Austin’s were “misleading and not based in real world licensing agreements.”

    Challenges to the Reliability of Newman’s Opinion

    Plaintiff’s chief concern with Newman’s report is its reliability. He first pointed to the fact that she did not rely on “any peer-reviewed or scientific model” and only relied on her extensive experience in the licensing field to come to her conclusions.

    The Court disagreed. Plaintiff seemed to want a peer reviewed paper or universally accepted formula to provide the basis for an expert report, but that was not required. Far from pulling figures out of thin air, she based her opinion on more than two decades of experience working to create licensing agreements like the one that could have been made in this case.

    She concisely explained in her report how and why she reached the conclusion that a 10% royalty rate was likely and that this would lead to royalties owed in the amount of $400.

    Challenges to the Fit of Newman’s Opinion

    According to the Plaintiff, because the “report fails to explain how her licensing experience anecdotes align with the specific market for this particular Dragon Design, or the specific infringement scenario before the Court – her report thus failed the “fit” test.”

    Despite Plaintiff’s implication that there is a lack of fit due to the lack of science used in the report, all that must be done for the fit element is for the trial judge to determine whether the testimony has “a reliable basis in the knowledge and experience of [the relevant] discipline.”

    Here, Newman’s report has more than a sufficient reliable basis for her opinions—she has worked within the relevant field on the exact documents at issue for over two decades. The fact it is an experience-based opinion rather than a scientific based one, did not affect the ability of the expert to provide her report or testimony in this case.

    Finally, when Newman stated that she has worked with artists as “a licensing agent” for twenty-two years, she also explicitly stated that she has worked on several art licensing agreements. She set forth these anecdotes almost immediately prior to laying out her conclusion and explained how her conclusion is based on her prior experiences.

    Held

    • The Court granted Defendants’ motion to exclude the opinions and testimony of Dr. Wesley Austin.
    • The Court granted in part and denied in part Beard’s motion to exclude the expert testimony of Cari Freno and Julie Newman- the motion to exclude was granted as to Cari Freno but denied as to Julie Newman.

    Key Takeaway:

    Experience is a valid basis to provide an expert opinion. The scientific factors simply are not applicable, when the reliability of testimony from a practical expert depends heavily on the knowledge and experience of the expert, rather than the methodology or theory behind it.

    When an expert relies solely or primarily on experience, they must explain how that experience leads to the conclusion reached, why that experience is a sufficient basis for the opinion, and how that experience is reliably applied to the facts.

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Beard V. Helman
    Docket Number: United States District Court, Pennsylvania Middle
    Court Name: 4:21cv680
    Order Date: November 12, 2025
  • Law Enforcement Expert Allowed to Opine on the Reactionary Gap 

    Law Enforcement Expert Allowed to Opine on the Reactionary Gap 

    This suit involves the unnecessary use of excessive force by police officers against a black man suffering from a mental health crisis.

    On November 21, 2021, during a mental health crisis, Jabari Asante-Chioke encountered Louisiana State Police (“LSP”) Officer Nicholas Dowdle and East Jefferson Levee District (“EJLD”) Officers Jonathon Downing and Gerard Duplessis (collectively referred to herein as “Officer Defendants”

    Plaintiff, Malikah Asante-Chioke, individually, and on behalf of her father, Jabari Asante-Chioke, herein filed this action against the Defendants, accusing them of failure to use less-than-lethal methods in accordance with training and state and federal law, to subdue Mr. Asante-Chioke.

    Malikah Asante-Chioke filed a motion to exclude the testimony of John J. Ryan.

    Law Enforcement Expert Witness

    John J. Ryan has been actively involved in police practices and law enforcement since 1981.

    He was an active police officer for twenty years in Providence, Rhode Island. In the final year of his active career and since his retirement in June of 2002 from police services, he has been involved in police and law enforcement practices as a private consultant regarding law enforcement issues.

    Want to know more about the challenges John Ryan has faced? Get the full details with our Challenge Study report.

    Discussion by the Court

    I. Legal Conclusions

    Plaintiff sought to exclude Ryan’s statement in his report which provides, “It is well known that [if] [sic] an officer reasonably perceives an immediate threat of serious bodily harm or death against themselves, another officer, or any third party, the officer may respond with deadly force.”

    EJLD Defendants argued that a full reading of Ryan’s opinion will explain how this statement is based on Ryan’s “expertise in generally accepted [police] policies, practices, training, and industry standards.”

    While that may be the case, the Court held that Ryan’s statement is not couched in the appropriate terms.

    The Court will not exclude Ryan’s statements of applicable police standards and practices, nor his conclusion that Officers Downing and Duplessis complied with those standards. As the Court has explained, an expert may opine on whether officers complied with applicable police policies and procedures.

    EJLD Defendants argued that Ryan did not need to discuss relevant East Jefferson Levee District policies and procedures and the Court agreed.

    Lastly, Plaintiff argued that Ryan offered impermissible legal opinions because he opined that the EJLD Defendants acted reasonably. While reasonableness is an inadmissible legal conclusion, Plaintiff failed to offer specific examples from Ryan’s report where he opined on the reasonableness of the EJLD Defendants’ actions.

    II. The “Reactionary Gap”

    Plaintiff also argued that Ryan is unqualified to opine on the “reactionary gap” between when an officer receives a stimulus to stop or start firing and when an officer responds to said stimulus.

    EJLD Defendants argued that Ryan is qualified to opine on reaction time because he has spent numerous hours training officers in shooting scenarios, including conducting stimulus drills on a shooting range. The Court agreed with EJLD Defendants.

    Plaintiff also argued that, even if Ryan were qualified, his opinions on the reactionary gap will not help the factfinder because perception reaction times are common sense. However, the Court disagreed. In this case, Ryan may help the factfinder determine whether the Defendants officers’ actions to continue shooting Asante-Chioke were reasonable. Consequently, the Court refused to exclude Ryan’s testimony as unhelpful.

    III. Ryan’s Factual Interpretations

    Plaintiff also argued that the Court should exclude “Ryan’s opinions that merely recite defense counsel’s factual and legal narratives.”

    EJLD Defendants argued that Ryan’s opinions are not based on defense counsel’s factual and legal narratives, but instead are based on his view of the body cam, dash cam, and bystander video evidence. This Court agreed with EJLD Defendants. Throughout his report, Ryan utilized the available video evidence and deposition testimony to formulate his opinions. 

    Held

    The Court granted in part and denied in part Malikah Asante-Chioke’s motion to exclude the testimony of John J. Ryan.

    Key Takeaway:

    While a lay person may have a general understanding of perception reaction times, “a lay person typically would not have experience or knowledge about the time it takes an officer to react to a perceived threat or the absence of a perceived threat.”

    By opining that shooting officers take time to react to a stimulus to stop shooting, Ryan may help the factfinder determine whether the Defendants officers’ actions to continue shooting Asante-Chioke were reasonable.

    Please refer to the blog previously published about this case:

    Biomechanics Expert Was Allowed to Opine on the Source of Bullet Wounds

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Asante-Chioke V. Dowdle Et Al
    Docket Number: 2:22cv4587
    Court Name: United States District Court, Louisiana Eastern
    Order Date: November 21, 2025
  • Law Enforcement Expert Was Allowed to Opine on the Dynamics of Sex Trafficking

    Law Enforcement Expert Was Allowed to Opine on the Dynamics of Sex Trafficking

    Johnson is charged with three counts relating to sex trafficking or transportation of a minor for purposes of engaging in sexual activity: sex trafficking of a minor, coercion and enticement of a minor to engage in sexual activity, and interstate transportation of a minor for criminal sexual activity.

    On October 3, 2025, the government notified counsel for Johnson that it intended to introduce the expert testimony of FBI Special Agent James E. Hardie who is alleged to be an expert in sex trafficking involving minors.

    On October 14, 2025, Johnson filed the present motion in limine to preclude the government from introducing Hardie’s “so called ‘expert’ testimony.” He argued that Hardie’s proposed testimony is inadmissible because “it is not an area of any actual expertise,” and that “in effect, what the Government has proposed to do is elicit testimony from a law enforcement officer wherein the officer testifies that Johnson’s behavior is that of a sexual predator.”

    Law Enforcement Expert Witness

    James E. Hardie is a member of the FBI’s Critical Incident Response Group, National Center for the Analysis of Violent Crime, Behavioral Analysis Unit – 3. In that role, he is responsible for providing operational support to local, state, federal, and international law enforcement agencies investigating crimes against children, including sex trafficking.

    Previously, Hardie served in other roles within the FBI, including supervising a squad of FBI special agents who were responsible for conducting sex trafficking investigations, working as an FBI liaison to the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children (“NCMEC”), and investigating child and adult sex trafficking cases as an FBI special agent.

    Fortify your strategy by reviewing a Challenge Study detailing grounds for excluding James Hardie’s expert testimony.

    Discussion by the Court

    a. Scope of permissible testimony

    On one hand, the government painted Hardie’s testimony as more general and described it as including: “(1) methods and techniques used in the management and procurement of commercial sex and (2) common characteristics and factors of victims of sex trafficking.” Whereas Johnson maintained that Hardie planned to testify specifically to his “expert opinion that Johnson behaved like a sexual predator.”

    Having reviewed the statement of Hardie’s anticipated testimony, the Court
    found that his testimony included opinions of a general nature rather than opinions specific to this case, Johnson, or Minor Victim. However, to be clear, the Court agreed with Johnson that Hardie may not testify that “ Johnson behaved like a sexual predator” or that he “must be a sexual predator.” This testimony would be tantamount to Hardie providing legal opinion and usurping the role of the jury, which is impermissible.

    Again, considering Hardie’s proposed testimony as contained in the government’s notice, the Court has no reason to anticipate that Hardie will testify impermissibly.

    b. Qualifications, Reliability, and Relevance

    The Court found no support for Johnson’s suggestion that Hardie’s specialized knowledge is not a valid area of expertise or that his extensive experience cannot render him an expert pursuant to Rule 702.

    Based on Hardie’s qualifications, and like the other courts have found with respect to Hardie’s background testimony regarding sex trafficking, the Court found that Hardie’s testimony is reliable.

    The Court also found that Hardie’s testimony is relevant to the issues in this case and will be helpful to the jury. The “culture and dynamics of sex trafficking are ‘not the subject of common knowledge.’”

    For these reasons, the Court made a preliminary determination that Hardie’s testimony is admissible. Furthermore, after reviewing the above-cited caselaw, the Court found that a pre-trial Daubert hearing is unnecessary.

    Held

    The Court denied the Defendant Johnson’s motion in limine to preclude the testimony of James Hardie.

    Key Takeaway:

    Hardie’s testimony will assist the jury in understanding the behaviors and dynamics of trafficking victims and traffickers as well as assist it in assessing the credibility of the witnesses.

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: USA V. Johnson
    Docket Number: 2:24cr221
    Court Name: United States District Court, Louisiana Eastern
    Order Date: November 13, 2025