Expert Witness Profiler

Tag: Reliable

  • Emergency Medicine Expert Was Not Allowed to Opine on Sedation

    Emergency Medicine Expert Was Not Allowed to Opine on Sedation

    This litigation stems from the death of Charles Lamar Vanlandingham in September of 2019. Plaintiff alleged that Vanlandingham suffered a medical episode with seizure activity in the early morning hours of September 15, 2019, and Vanlandingham’s girlfriend called 911. According to Plaintiff, Vanlandingham started to improve in the time it took EMS to arrive. Following the seizure activity, Vanlandingham had apparently transitioned to a “postictal state” that can cause confusion.

    Although Vanlandingham was initially compliant with EMS upon their arrival, Plaintiff alleged that “EMS providers tried to force Vanlandingham onto their medical cot,” and when Vanlandingham did not comply, “[EMT] Tuttle ultimately tackled Vanlandingham onto the medical cot.”

    Once members of the Oklahoma City Fire Department arrived, Plaintiff alleged that the Firefighters used their body weight to pin Vanlandingham in the prone position for approximately three minutes before Oklahoma City Police Officer Brandon Lee arrived. Officer Lee then put handcuffs on Vanlandingham—still in the prone position—and placed his knee across Vanlandingham’s back.

    Plaintiff alleged that Vanlandingham was in this position, handcuffed, for approximately four minutes, during which time “no one checked Vanlandingham’s vitals or advocated for a position change despite Vanlandingham’s clear signs of respiratory distress.” “Without knowing Mr. Vanlandingham’s vitals and without performing any kind of medical assessment,” EMT Tuttle then administered midazolam (a sedative), and Vanlandingham went limp. CPR efforts were unsuccessful, and Vanlandingham died at the scene.

    Plaintiff’s claims are against Defendants City of Oklahoma City, Officer Brandon Lee, and American Medical Response Ambulance Service, Inc. (AMRAS). During discovery, AMRAS disclosed an expert report prepared by Molly A. Furin, M.D., M.S., who is board certified in both Emergency Medicine and Emergency Medical Services.

    In the present motion, Plaintiff contended that Furin’s offered opinions should be excluded under Fed. R. Evid. 702.

    Emergency Medicine Expert Witness

    Molly Ann Furin is board-certified in both Emergency Medicine and Emergency Medical Services (EMS) and has obtained a Master of Science in Disaster Medicine and Management.

    She has worked at a level 1 trauma center for the past 17 years as well as community Emergency Departments.

    Want to know more about the challenges Molly Furin has faced? Get the full details with our Challenge Study report.

    Discussion by the Court

    I. Timeliness of Furin’s Supplement

    Furin supplemented her expert report on May 20, 2025. In it, Furin did not expand the opinions listed in her initial report, but she did provide supplemental explanation of her education and experience in the emergency medicine field. Plaintiff contended that Furin’s supplement is untimely under Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(e)(2).

    Furin issued her supplemental report. However, Rule 26(a)(3) also refers to the deadline to file deposition designations, which has yet to expire. Accordingly, the Court found that Furin’s supplement of May 20, 2025, is timely under Rule 26(e)(2).

    II. Daubert Motion

    • Paramedic Tuttle and EMT Barnes performed an appropriate rapid assessment of Vanlandingham upon arrival, including checking blood glucose, and could not proceed with further evaluation and treatment because it became unsafe to do so. Evaluating for scene safety is one of the first skills taught in Emergency Medical Services, and the crew appropriately called for additional resources in a timely manner. Physical restraint of Vanlandingham was necessary at the time in order to prevent harm or injury to himself or crew members.
    • Upon the arrival of OCFD personnel, including Paramedic Morton, care was correctly transitioned to Paramedic Morton.
    • Paramedic Tuttle assisted the OCFD by drawing up and administering midazolam IM as requested. Sedation was paramount in order to further evaluate and treat Vanlandingham. Midazolam is a benzodiazepine, utilized for both sedation and treatment of seizures, and when administered intramuscularly takes a minimum of several minutes to take effect. Given the very brief time interval after administration, the midazolam had no causative role in Vanlandingham’s subsequent cardiac arrest.
    • When Vanlandingham sustained cardiac arrest, he was efficiently treated with high quality [Advanced Cardiovascular Life Support] care.

    Analysis

    First, the Court found that Furin’s initial report failed to clearly identify the basis for her opinions or explain how certain standards or her experience lead to the conclusions reached. Furin did not identify how her experience in the emergency medicine field led to her specific opinions.

    Next, Furin’s supplemental expert report did little to expand on the basis for her four opinions. Rather, Furin focuses on her qualifications to issue opinions regarding emergency medicine.

    Furin has largely failed—even after supplementing her report—to provide a basis for her opinions. Furin’s experience in emergency medicine, standing alone, is not sufficient to support her opinion that EMS “could not proceed with further evaluation because it became unsafe to do so.” Apart from explaining her experience in emergency medicine and providing examples of transitions of care, Furin’s supplemental report does not sufficiently explain how her experience (or knowledge of the industry standard) led her to opine that the transition of care in this case was “correct.”

    Next, Furin’s supplement did not provide a basis for her opinion that “sedation was paramount in order to further evaluate and treat Vanlandingham.”

    Although Furin stated that she “reviewed the patient care reports and documents provided to me, and is qualified to opine as to the quality of care provided when Vanlandingham sustained cardiac arrest,” Furin failed to provide any basis or reasoning for her opinion that the care provided to Vanlandingham was efficient and high quality.

    A portion of Furin’s third opinion was admissible under Rule 702 and Daubert because Furin has provided a sufficient basis for it. Furin can opine that—given her firsthand knowledge and experience with the administration and onset of midazolam—the midazolam could not have taken effect before Vanlandingham’s cardiac arrest.

    Held

    The Court granted in part and denied in part Plaintiff’s motion to exclude the opinions of Dr. Molly Furin.

    Key Takeaway

    It is fundamental that, if the basis for an expert’s opinions is to be tested for reliability, that basis must be identified in some fashion. Absent some identification of the basis for the expert opinion, there is little or no way to test it against any of the guidelines or factors involved in a Daubert analysis or to otherwise determine its reliability.

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Vanlandingham V. City of Oklahoma City
    Docket Number: 5:22cv209
    Court Name: United States District Court, Oklahoma Western
    Order Date: March 18, 2026
  • Fire Investigation Expert’s Specific Ignition-Source Opinion Excluded

    Fire Investigation Expert’s Specific Ignition-Source Opinion Excluded

    This subrogation action arises from a fire that occurred on April 10, 2022, involving a dump truck owned by Boggs Transport, Inc. (“Boggs”) and insured by Plaintiff Amerisure Insurance Company (“Amerisure”).

    The fire began in a parked dump truck identified as Truck No. 863 at Boggs’s facility in Pageland, South Carolina, and spread to four adjacent trucks, resulting in damage to five vehicles. At the time of the fire, Truck No. 863 had been upfitted with a tarping system manufactured and installed by Defendant and Third-Party Plaintiff Ox Bodies, Inc. (“Ox Bodies”). Amerisure, as subrogee of Boggs, initiated this action asserting claims against Ox Bodies arising from the alleged origin and cause of the fire. Ox Bodies denied liability and disputed both the location of the fire’s origin and the mechanism by which the fire ignited.

    In support of its claims, Amerisure designated two expert witnesses. Kenny A. McClure, P.E., M.S.M.E., CFEI, is offered as an expert in fire origin. McClure opined that the fire originated along the driver’s side of Truck No. 863, in the area of the battery compartment and associated electrical components mounted along the frame rail. Kevin R. Davis, P.E., is offered as an expert in fire causation. Davis opined that the fire was caused by an electrical failure associated with components of the tarping system, including a relay or controller installed as part of the Ox Bodies upfit.

    Ox Bodies filed a motion to exclude the testimony of both of Amerisure’s experts pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 702.

    Fire Investigation Expert Witnesses

    Kenny A. McClure, P.E., M.S.M.E., CFEI holds an Associate of Applied Science in mechanical engineering technology, a Bachelor of Science in engineering technology, a Master of Science in mechanical engineering, and designations as a licensed professional engineer, a certified fire explosion investigator, a certified fire vehicle investigator, and a certified fire and explosion investigator.

    Get the full story on challenges to Kenny McClure’s expert opinions and testimony with an in-depth Challenge Study.

    Kevin Ray Davis, P.E. holds a Bachelor of Science in Electrical Engineering, is a licensed professional engineer, and maintains professional certifications in fire and explosion investigation and vehicle fire investigation. He has also worked for more than fifteen years as a consulting engineer investigating fires and electrical failures.

    Want to know more about the challenges Kevin Davis has faced? Get the full details with our Challenge Study report.

    Discussion by the Court

    A. Kenny McClure

    1. Reliability of the Origin Opinion

    Defendant primarily argued that McClure’s testimony is unreliable because his defined origin area is allegedly inconsistent with Defendant’s expert’s electrical arcing theory.

    Defendant framed the issue as a logical dilemma: if McClure’s origin area excluded the arcing location identified by Defendant’s expert, then McClure allegedly failed to consider an obvious alternative ignition source. Conversely, Defendant argued that if McClure’s origin area included that location, the opinion is unnecessary because both parties’ experts would be describing the same origin area. The Court did not find this argument persuasive because it conflates the geographic scope of an origin determination with the identification of a specific ignition source.

    To begin with, McClure is offered as an origin expert, not a causation expert. His opinions concerned the location of the fire’s origin within Truck No. 863, not the specific mechanism of ignition. That distinction frames the Court’s Rule 702 analysis.

    Fire investigators commonly identify an area of origin rather than a single ignition point when the available physical evidence does not permit greater precision. McClure applied this methodology here, concluding that the fire originated “along the driver’s side of Truck 863 in the area where the battery compartment, conductors, and electrical components are mounted along the frame rail.” That conclusion was based on his examination of burn patterns, fire dynamics, and electrical artifacts observed during the investigation. The record reflected that McClure employed the systematic fire-investigation methodology described in NFPA 921. Ox Bodies did not challenge the reliability of that methodology itself. Accordingly, the Court concluded that McClure’s origin analysis rests on a reliable investigative methodology consistent with Rule 702.

    2. Defendant’s Relay-Knowledge Argument

    Ox Bodies also argued that McClure’s opinion is speculative because he did not account for the post-fire location or condition of certain tarping-system relays.

    The Court concluded that this argument improperly conflates origin analysis with ignition-source or causation analysis.

    Under NFPA 921’s scientific method, investigators commonly determine the fire’s area of origin before identifying the specific ignition source. An investigator’s inability to determine the precise ignition mechanism does not invalidate the origin determination so long as the origin analysis is based on observed fire patterns, electrical artifacts, and other physical evidence.

    Here, McClure’s testimony concerns the area where the fire began, not the precise electrical component that initiated it. Defendant’s criticisms regarding relay locations, therefore, go to the weight of the testimony rather than its admissibility.

    3. Helpfulness to the Jury

    Ox Bodies also contended that McClure’s origin opinion is so broad that it amounts to common knowledge and is unhelpful to the jury. The Court disagreed. Although the identified origin area is not confined to a single component, the opinion rests on specialized interpretation of burn patterns, electrical artifacts, and fire dynamics beyond the experience of lay jurors. Interpreting burn patterns, electrical damage, arc mapping artifacts, and other indicators of fire progression requires specialized training and experience. Jurors lack the technical background to interpret such evidence reliably without expert assistance.

    Accordingly, the Court found that McClure’s origin opinions are grounded in accepted fire-investigation principles and satisfy Rule 702.

    Kevin Davis

    1. Reliability of Davis’ Methodology

    Ox Bodies first argued that Davis’ opinions violated accepted fire-investigation methodology because he did not determine ignition temperature, quantify the duration of any electrical fault, or conduct testing to replicate the proposed ignition mechanism.

    The Court agreed that portions of Davis’ analysis lack sufficient methodological support. Davis did not perform testing to confirm that the specific relay installed on Truck No. 863 could produce sufficient heat to ignite surrounding materials. Nor did he quantify the ignition temperature or duration necessary to produce ignition under the conditions present in the vehicle. Davis also relied in part on exemplar relay testing and recall information involving different relay configurations and applications.

    Here, the record does not contain sufficient evidence connecting the exemplar relay testing or recall materials to the specific relay installed in Truck No. 863. Without testing, analysis, or other evidence showing that the relay in question was capable of generating sufficient heat to ignite the surrounding materials under the conditions present in the truck, the Court concluded that the methodology supporting Davis’ specific ignition-source opinion is insufficient under Rule 702.

    2. Application of the Methodology to the Facts

    The Court nevertheless found that Davis’ testimony is not wholly inadmissible. Davis’s report also included engineering analysis concerning the truck’s electrical system, including the condition of the wiring harness, the lack of circuit protection in portions of the tarp-system wiring, and the potential for energized conductors to create ignition sources within the electrical system.

    These opinions are grounded in Davis’s inspection of the physical evidence and his application of electrical engineering principles to it. Such testimony may assist the jury in understanding the electrical mechanisms that could have produced a fire in the relevant portion of the vehicle.

    Accordingly, Davis may testify regarding electrical fire mechanisms, wiring damage, circuit protection, and the potential for energized conductors to act as ignition sources within the electrical system of Truck No. 863. However, Davis may not opine that a specific relay or tarping-system component installed on Truck No. 863 was the ignition source of the fire.

    This limited exclusion reflects the Court’s obligation under Rule 702 to ensure that expert testimony rests on a reliable foundation while permitting otherwise admissible technical testimony that may assist the trier of fact.

    To the extent Davis discussed the circuit breaker during his deposition testimony, the Court found that those statements elaborate on the electrical-fault theory disclosed in his report and are not a new expert opinion requiring exclusion under Rule 26.

    Held

    • The Court denied Defendant and Third-Party Plaintiff Ox Bodies, Inc.’s motion to exclude the testimony of Kenny A. McClure, P.E., M.S.M.E., CFEI.
    • The Court granted in part and denied in part Defendant and Third-Party Plaintiff Ox Bodies, Inc.’s motion to exclude the testimony of K.R. Davis, P.E. 

    Key Takeaway

    Even assuming McClure’s origin area overlaps with the location proposed by Defendant’s expert, the testimony remains relevant and helpful because McClure explains the fire patterns, burn damage, and electrical artifacts that confine the fire’s origin to a particular structural portion of the vehicle. Such analysis assists the jury in understanding the physical evidence and does not become inadmissible simply because the parties’ experts may partially overlap in their conclusions.

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: American Insurance Company V. Ox Bodies, Inc
    Docket Number: 4:23cv2445
    Court Name: United States District Court, South Carolina
    Order Date: March 17, 2026
  • Marketing Expert Was Allowed to Opine on Trademark Dilution

    Marketing Expert Was Allowed to Opine on Trademark Dilution

    Plaintiffs Hyundai Motor Company and Hyundai Motor America, Inc. (collectively “Hyundai Motor” or “Plaintiffs”) are one of the largest automobile manufacturers worldwide, with vehicle sales in over 150 countries.

    Defendant Hyundai Technology is a manufacturer and seller of consumer electronics products including tablets, laptop computers/notebooks, desktop computers, monitors, digital storage, cell phones, and accessories.

    The Plaintiffs filed a trademark infringement suit against the Defendants for “using” the Hyundai name to sell their technology products.

    Defendants offered Mark Keegan‘s testimony to refute Plaintiffs’ allegations that Defendants’ conduct dilutes Plaintiffs’ HYUNDAI Mark. Plaintiffs filed a motion in limine to exclude the testimony of Keegan.

    Marketing Expert Witness

    Mark Thomas Keegan has over 23 years of experience conducting consumer research, including being deposed and testifying at trial. Keegan earned his juris doctorate degree from Brooklyn Law School, has certifications in marketing knowledge and principles, and has completed post-graduate programs addressing market research processes.

    Want to know more about the challenges Mark Keegan has faced? Get the full details with our Challenge Study report.

    Discussion by the Court

    Keegan concluded that Plaintiffs’ allegations of dilution by tarnishment with respect to Defendant Hyundai Technology’s product user reviews do not “materially impact relevant consumer perceptions of Hyundai Motor, and as such, do not substantively impact the marketplace in which Hyundai Motor operates.” Keegan’s opinion relied on a study he conducted involving 850 participants identified as “likely purchasers of the Defendants’ products” based on their prior technology purchases.

    Keegan stated that he designed his survey in accordance with a combination of guiding principles, including survey research conducted for litigation purposes, relevant treatises in the field, including those from the American Bar Association, and industry leaders in market research.

    Plaintiffs argued that Keegan’s survey failed to employ well-established or reliable methodologies and did not rely on a representative sample because, among other things, 41.8% of respondents were age 61 or older.

    The Court, however, found that Keegan’s opinions are relevant as they address “consumer impressions of the Hyundai Motor brand,” which is a central issue to the underlying case. The arguments made by Plaintiffs are all issues to be decided by the jury based on credibility and weight.

    Held

    The Court denied Plaintiffs’ motion in limine to exclude the testimony of Mark Keegan.

    Key Takeaway

    Expert opinion testimony is relevant if the knowledge underlying it has a valid connection to the pertinent inquiry. And it is reliable if the knowledge underlying it has a reliable basis in the knowledge and experience of the relevant discipline.

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Hyundai Motor Company V. Hyundai Technology Group, Inc.
    Docket Number: 8:23cv1709
    Court Name: United States District Court, California Central
    Order Date: March 06, 2026
  • Survey Research Expert Was Allowed to Opine on Customer Experience

    Survey Research Expert Was Allowed to Opine on Customer Experience

    State of Connecticut and Federal Trade Commission, sued Chase Nissan LLC, d/b/a Manchester City Nissan (“MCN) and multiple individuals, alleging that MCN, along with others, acted together to defraud thousands of consumers. The Plaintiffs alleged that the Defendants charged consumers for additional products or services (“addons”) that consumers never agreed to purchase. The Plaintiffs claimed that the Defendants effected unauthorized charges in multiple ways, including add-ons inserted into unaware consumers’ closing documents or charging consumers for add-ons that MCN told consumers were free.

    Plaintiffs’ expert, Dr. Jessica Broome, conducted a customer experience survey about add-on products or services offered at MCN (the “Broome Survey”).

    The Defendants argued that the methodology Broome applied to her survey was significantly flawed, and therefore, the results and conclusions were insufficiently probative.

    Survey Research Expert Witness

    Dr. Jessica Broome received a PhD in Survey Methodology from the University of Michigan, an MS in Applied Social Research from Hunter College of the City University of New York, and a BA in Sociology from Connecticut College. She has worked as a primary researcher for the past 24 years, designing and conducting quantitative (survey) and qualitative (focus groups, ethnographies, interviews) research for clients in a range of sectors.

    Get the full story on challenges to Jessica Broome’s expert opinions and testimony with an in-depth Challenge Study.

    Discussion by the Court

    Specifically, the Defendants argued that (1) the Broome Survey included misleading questions; (2) the Survey disclosed the FTC as the sponsor and the purpose of the survey; (3) that respondents were able to change their previous answers; and (4) that the population selected was underinclusive.

    A. Question A1 is Clear and Unambiguous

    Question A1 stated: “Did you agree to pay extra for any of the following add-on products or services when purchasing this vehicle?” Respondents were then presented with a list of eleven possible add-on products and services and, for each, asked to answer “Yes,” “No,” or “Not Sure.”

    Based upon the responses received to Question A1, Broome concluded that “Manchester City Nissan charged the vast majority of customers surveyed (88%) for at least one add-on that they did not agree to pay extra for or led customers to believe that the add-on was required rather than optional.”

    Broome further concluded, based upon respondents’ answers to Question A1, that “Manchester City charged a substantial percentage of customers surveyed (42%) for multiple add-ons that they did not agree to pay extra for or led customers to believe that the add-ons were required rather than optional.”

    The Defendants asserted that this is an ambiguous question and unclear about the very thing that the survey was trying to measure: whether consumers paid for an add-on product or service without agreeing to do so.

    When an unclear question is included in a survey, it may threaten the validity of the survey by distorting the responses or by error if the respondents do not understand. However, there is no indication that the questions were misleading or that the respondents did not understand the question.

    As explained by Broome, her team conducted two rounds of cognitive interviews to check the understanding of the questions. After a pretest respondent completed each survey question online or over the phone, the interviewer posed a series of follow-up questions, called “probes”, aimed at determining whether the survey questions were understood by respondents as intended.

    Additionally, small ambiguities in surveys go to the weight of the survey as evidence, not to its admissibility.

    B. Disclosure of the FTC as Sponsor is Consistent with Reliable Survey Methodology

    Second, the Defendants argued that the survey disclosed the FTC as the sponsor and thus is unreliable. The Defendants asserted that all the individuals who made up Broome’s survey population knew that the FTC sought the information regarding car purchases. The Defendants claimed that identifying the FTC as a sponsor injects potential bias into the survey by suggesting certain preferred responses.

    Courts from across the country have repeatedly accepted as reliable consumer surveys that disclose the FTC as a sponsor where the surveyor has taken steps to hide the purpose of the survey. Broome asserted that she took steps to hide the purpose of the survey. The invitation included no references to litigation against MCN and stated that the purpose was to learn about general car purchases over the past five years.

    The survey did not focus on MCN but showed a randomized list of four local dealerships. Additionally, the FTC may bring litigation before a consumer survey is published.

    C. Backwards Navigation is Consistent with Reliable Survey Methodology

    Third, the Defendants argued that the backward navigation allowed consumers to change their answers and thus is unreliable. The
    Defendants claimed that later questions could suggest certain conclusions regarding whether the consumer agreed to pay extra for the add-ons. Because the consumers had the ability to navigate backwards on the survey, the responses potentially could be skewed.

    The defense, however, presented no evidence that the backward navigation is a design flaw. The defense retained a survey expert to prepare a rebuttal of Broome’s work, yet they did not use their expert’s opinion in their motion. Plaintiffs argued that Broome utilized standardized and approved methodology.

    The Court held that Broome’s work is consistent with reliable methodology. Further, issues raised by the Defendant would go to weight rather than admissibility.

    D. The Survey Population Selected is Consistent with Reliable Survey Methodology

    Fourth, the Defendants argued that the consumer population was underinclusive; thus, the survey is unreliable.

    The Defendants asserted that the target population was adults who purchased a vehicle from MCN between January 2019 and December 2023 and were charged for at least one add-on. The defense claimed that Broome pulled potential participants from lists provided to her by the FTC for all add-on transactions at MCN, and this population excludes all customers who purchased a vehicle and did not purchase an add-on. They asserted that this population, by design, intentionally excluded customers who, if included, would have greatly decreased Broome’s numbers.

    Broome’s survey was not intended to represent consumers who were not charged for add-ons so there is no reason to include such consumers in the target population. Even if Plaintiffs were to expand the target population as suggested the methodology would find similar results. The Defendants’ argument that Broome should have surveyed all consumers is, therefore, without basis.

    The Court held that Broome’s survey is designed with methodology consistent with the Reference Guide on Survey Research and legal precedent regarding FTC surveys. In other words, Broome’s technique used reliable survey methodology.

    Held

    The Court denied the Defendants’ motion to preclude the testimony of Jessica Broome.

    Key Takeaway

    Broome’s survey followed correct methodology and legal best
    practices. Sponsorship by a governmental third party may not automatically suggest a certain kind of preferred response. Moreover, courts have repeatedly accepted consumer surveys that disclose the FTC as the sponsor.

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Federal Trade Commission V. Chase Nissan LLC
    Docket Number: 3:24cv12
    Court Name: United States District Court, Connecticut
    Order Date: March 16, 2026
  • Computer Science Expert Was Allowed to Opine on Minting Activity

    Computer Science Expert Was Allowed to Opine on Minting Activity

    Plaintiff Trenton Smith brought claims against Defendant Nelk, Inc. doing business as Nelk or Full Send, Defendant Nelk USA, Inc., Defendant Metacard LLC, Defendant Kyle Forgeard (“Kyle”), and Defendant John Shahidi (“John”) (collectively, “Defendants”) related to Plaintiff’s Metacard purchases.

    Smith alleged that Defendants made promises regarding the benefits of owning a the Metacard NFT (“Metacard”) that Defendants had no intention of delivering. These benefits were included both long-term investment value and ongoing “perks.”

    The ongoing perks described by Defendants included gym memberships, exclusive events and first access to new projects launched by Defendants. Defendants made these promises to induce individuals, particularly Defendants’ fan base, to purchase the Metacard, all while knowing they would not fulfill those promises and fully intending to enrich themselves. Plaintiff and the Class Members relied on Defendants’ representations in purchasing the Metacard, earning Defendants approximately $23 million in initial sales plus another approximately $4.3 million in royalties on re-sales.

    Defendants filed a motion to exclude the opinions of Jeremy Clark pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 702. 

    Computer Science Expert Witness

    Jeremy Clark is an associate professor at the Concordia Institute for Information Systems Engineering at Concordia University in Montreal, Canada. From 2019 to 2025, Clark held the National Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada/Raymond Chabot Grant Thornton/Catallaxy Industrial Research Chair in Blockchain Technologies.

    Clark holds a Ph.D. in Computer Science from the University of Waterloo, awarded in 2011, and he is a professional engineer with the Professional Engineers of Ontario. He has a decade of research expertise in digital assets (e.g., Bitcoin and Ethereum), blockchain, and related areas of cryptography, and 20 peer-reviewed papers on Bitcoin, Ethereum, digital assets, and blockchain technology.

    Clark has also testified on digital assets to the Standing Senate Committee on Banking, Commerce and Economy of the Senate of Canada, and to the Standing Committee on Finance of the House of Commons of Canada. Additionally, Clark has given over 50 presentations on digital assets to companies, government agencies, law enforcement, pension plans, and academic groups.

    Want to know more about the challenges Jeremy Clark has faced? Get the full details with our Challenge Study report.

    Discussion by the Court

    Defendants argued (1) that Clark failed to articulate a reliable methodology, and (2) that he is unqualified.

    First, the parties dispute whether Clark’s methodology is vague and underdeveloped. The Court found that Clark’s testimony was the product of sufficiently reliable principles because he explained the Mint process, how the Metacards were created and assigned to the original owners, and the unique addresses that purchased the Metacards.

    Clark began his review of the blockchain activity associated with the Metacard by examining “archives of websites affiliated with the NFT with the Internet Archive.” Clark relied on datasets curated and offered through the Dune Analytics tool, finding data about Metacard’s minting activity. 

    According to Clark, “minting is the Ethereum-based activity of creating the new token ID and assigning it to the owner’s address,” and the “address of the entity that created the NFT collection [here] is 0x9E . . . C731” (the “Metacard treasury”).

    And using this information, Clark can estimate the number of Metacard purchasers based on the number of unique Ethereum addresses that held a Metacard at some point, can trace the flow of funds between addresses related to these transactions, can separate out secondary sales following the Mint, and can trace royalties earned from Metacard transfers. For example, Clark described the transfer history of the Metacard treasury which deployed the NFT collection, the Ethereum flowing out of this address, and its eventual depletion.

    Second, Defendants argued that Clark lacked the qualifications to opine on class-wide damages. However, the Court found that Clark had sufficient experience with digital assets to offer his opinions.

    Held

    The Court denied Defendants’ motion to exclude the opinions of Jeremy Clark.

    Key Takeaway

    Clark’s explanation of the steps in his methodology, breakdown of his analysis, and description of the data he relies on provided sufficient assurance to the Court in its gatekeeping capacity that exclusion is not necessary on the basis of unreliable methods.

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Trenton Smith V. John Shahidi
    Docket Number: 8:25cv161
    Court Name: United States District Court for the Central District of California
    Order Date: March 09, 2026
  • Consumer Credit Expert Allowed to Opine on Mixed Files

    Consumer Credit Expert Allowed to Opine on Mixed Files

    This case involves alleged violations of the Fair Credit Reporting Act. Plaintiff Ronald Alexander Garcia Delgado claimed that Defendant Experian Information Solutions failed to use reasonable procedures when preparing consumer reports—mixing Plaintiff’s information with his son’s.

    Plaintiff hired an expert, Douglas Hollon, to help prove his case. Defendant Experian Information Solution, Inc. filed a motion to strike or limit the testimony of Hollon.

    Consumer Credit Expert Witness

    Douglas A. Hollon holds a Bachelor of Science in Business Finance. He has received FCRA certifications from the Consumer Data Industry Association, and he has earned additional certifications.

    He has worked in the consumer finance reporting industry since 2005, when he began working for Experian. His work for Experian spanned 14 years from 2005 through 2019 in the National Consumer Assistance Center—Experian’s main dispute processing center—where he helped consumers “resolve their issues” and “[p]rovid[ed] leadership advice to current supervisors.”

    He handled “escalated credit report disputes” submitted on consumers’ behalf by attorneys and government entities. He has also received “specialized training involving fraud (identity theft) disputes” and testified on Experian’s behalf as a Rule 30(b)(6) witness. In addition to his experience at Experian, he has studied “regulatory agency publications, case law, deposition transcripts, company manuals or publications, and other related documents,” contributing to his “extensive knowledge of other Consumer Reporting Agencies’ (CRAs) and Data Furnishers’ credit dispute operations.” Since 2020, Hollon has been the owner of Credit Experts of North Texas, LLC. Over the course of his career, he has “assisted tens of thousands of customers.”

    Want to know more about the challenges Douglas Hollon has faced? Get the full details with our Challenge Study report. 

    Discussion by the Court

    The Defendant challenged Hollon’s testimony on three grounds. First, Defendant challenged Hollon’s qualifications. Second, Defendant argued that Hollon’s opinions included legal conclusions. And third, Defendant challenged the reliability of Hollon’s methods.

    I. Qualifications

    Defendant’s qualification challenge targets Hollon’s ability to testify about Plaintiff’s economic and emotional damages.

    Plaintiff denied that Hollon offered testimony about the emotional distress Plaintiff allegedly experienced. The Court saw no reason to exclude testimony that Plaintiff did not intend to offer.

    As to non-economic damages, Hollon cannot testify about Plaintiff’s specific damages or their cause but may testify about the types of types of damages typically caused by errors on credit reports.

    II. Improper Legal Conclusions

    Defendant argued that some of Hollon’s opinions are improper legal conclusions.

    Plaintiff responded that Hollon will not use language such as “unreasonable, unreliable, inadequate, negligent, willful” or definitively state that particular conduct violated the FCRA. Instead, Plaintiff represents, Hollon will testify about “consumer reporting industry standards,” and “how a Defendant’s conduct or procedures comport with those standards.”

    Based on Plaintiff’s representations, the Court will not exclude Hollon’s testimony. If, at trial, Hollon offers legal opinions that contradict Plaintiff’s representations to the Court, the Court will take appropriate action upon objection.

    III. Reliability

    Defendant argued that Hollon’s opinions are unreliable because he has no methodology and his opinions are full of serious errors. Plaintiff responded that Hollon’s method is sufficiently reliable and that any alleged errors would be better explored through cross-examination.

    The Court agreed with Plaintiff. It is true that Hollon does not name a specific method. Here, Hollon’s testimony rests primarily on his 19 years of experience, which is permissible. Hollon’s experience and expertise led him to conclude that alternatives to Defendant’s procedures would prevent mixed files, and it is for the jury to decide whether his opinion is credible.

    Although Defendant identified deficiencies in Hollon’s testimony, the Court is unconvinced that exclusion is required.

    Held

    The Court granted in part and denied in part Defendant Experian Information Solution, Inc.’s motion to strike or limit the testimony of Plaintiff’s expert Douglas Hollon.

    Key Takeaway

    If the expert witness is relying solely or primarily on experience, then the witness must explain how that experience leads to the conclusion reached, why that experience is a sufficient basis for the opinion, and how that experience is reliably applied to the facts.

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Garcia Delgado V. Experian Information Solutions, Inc.
    Docket Number: 4:24cv637
    Court Name: United States District Court, Texas Eastern
    Order Date: March 10, 2026
  • Appraisal Expert’s Testimony on Deceptiveness Excluded

    Appraisal Expert’s Testimony on Deceptiveness Excluded

    The Plaintiffs in this putative national class action are insureds who filed “total loss” claims for the actual cash value (“ACV”) of their totaled vehicles under their automobile insurance policies sold by State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company or State Farm Fire and Casualty Company (collectively, “Defendants” or “State Farm”). Plaintiffs challenged State Farm’s application of a “typical-negotiation adjustment” (“TNA”) in the calculation of the ACV of Plaintiffs’ vehicles, which reduced Plaintiffs’ total loss payments based on the average difference between the list price and a lower price that a dealer would theoretically accept.

    Alleging that this methodology resulted in undervalued payments, Plaintiffs brought various claims, including breach of contract, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, fraudulent concealment, fraudulent inducement, unjust enrichment, and violations of the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act (“ICFA”) and various other state consumer protection statutes.

    Defendants filed a motion to exclude the proposed testimony of Jason Merritt, Plaintiffs’ expert on personal property appraisal.

    Appraisal Expert Witness

    Jason W. Merritt has appraised over a thousand vehicles to determine their fair market, or actual cash, value. He is certified through the Bureau of Certified Auto Appraisers to appraise vehicles, including total losses.

    Want to know more about the challenges Jason Merritt has faced? Get the full details with our Challenge Study report.

    Discussion by the Court

    Plaintiffs retained Merritt to testify about “what an appraisal is,” “how to use the comparable methodology to appraise a vehicle’s [ACV],” and whether State Farm’s (via the company Audatex) application of a TNA in the calculation of the ACV of Plaintiffs’ vehicles is “appropriate when appraising a vehicle using a comparable [“comp”] methodology.”

    A. Merritt’s Qualifications

    State Farm did not challenge Merritt’s experience with appraisals. Rather, State Farm suggested that Merritt is unqualified to opine on Audatex’s methodology for lack of knowledge about the technical inputs on which the Autosource valuation actually runs.

    Merritt’s extensive background in ACV appraisals made him appropriately qualified to opine on how Audatex’s methodology compares to other industry practice even without first-hand experience in the Defendants’ technical systems. State Farm’s grievances with how Merritt applies his experience to the facts of this case are better suited for cross-examination.

    The same cannot be said for State Farm’s arguments about any opinions Merritt may attempt to offer regarding State Farm’s alleged deceptiveness or deceitfulness in this case. Experts generally cannot offer legal opinions or conclusions, and the exceptions to that rule are not applicable here.

    Merritt is free to testify to his view that there must be a specific evidence-based reason for making value deductions in a proper comp appraisal, and that Audatex’s TNA deviates from that standard.

    The same goes for his emphasis on the TNA being “baked in” rather than “explicitly applied to the valuation of the insured vehicle” in a visible way, which may make it hard for a consumer to identify the use of the TNA on their vehicle’s ACV determination. That, however, must be the end of the road for his testimony.

    Merritt cannot veer into legal conclusions, including but not limited to observations about deception. Any opinions that do so should be excluded under Rule 702. The Court thus granted State Farm’s motion to exclude Merritt’s testimony to the extent that it speaks to legal conclusions such as deception.

    B. Reliability of Merritt’s Testimony and Methodology

    i. Merritt’s First Opinion

    Defendants argued that Merritt’s opinion that Audatex’s typical negotiation adjustment conflicts with typical appraisal standards is unreliable for three reasons: that Merritt 1) compares Audatex’s work to general principles and not specific appraisal standards, 2) has insufficient knowledge about how Audatex calculates its TNAs, and 3) operates from the false premise that a used vehicle’s advertised cash price always equals its ACV.

    State Farm’s second contention amounts to a recycled version of its arguments about Merritt’s qualifications, addressed above, and can be disposed of accordingly. Further, State Farm did not suggest that Merritt’s actual report—which thoroughly addresses all aspects of the Audatex methodology it intended to dispute—actually gets anything wrong about how Audatex operates, instead primarily taking issue with his lack of internal company knowledge about how the TNA “was developed or is calculated.”

    State Farm’s third contention also missed the mark: nowhere did Merritt’s report indicate that he believes “a used vehicle’s advertised price always equals its actual cash value,” as State Farm puts it. Merritt espouses advertised internet prices as “an objective criterion for determining what the comparable vehicle would sell for on a particular day to a buyer purchasing a vehicle outright, without providing a trade in, financing the purchase through the dealership, or buying optional warranties or service plans.”

    That leaves State Farm’s first argument: that Merritt should be excluded because he compared Audatex’s work to general principles and not specific appraisal standards. Merritt, however, clearly outlined the comp appraisal methodology against which he is comparing Audatex’s methodology—moreover, he found that Audatex is “consistent with” his general methodology aside from the application of the TNA.

    ii. Merritt’s Second Opinion

    Defendants also argued that Merritt’s opinion that Audatex’s methodology, absent the TNA, produces a sound estimate of a vehicle’s ACV is unreliable for three reasons: Merritt 1) once again operated from the false premise that a used vehicle’s advertised cash price always equals its ACV, 2) utilized insufficient intellectual rigor because he is litigation-driven, and 3) incorrectly assumed that he can remove the TNAs without impacting other variables in the Audatex Reports.

    The first of these contentions was addressed and disposed of in this Court’s earlier analysis. The second argument incorrectly aims to merge two distinct practices of Merritt’s: his work as an individual appraiser, and his testimony as to how insurance companies will often appraise cars. In his individual practice, Merritt has been called upon to perform vehicle-specific appraisal verification after an insurance company uses third-party software to determine ACV.

    The lack of individualized inquiry in his report does not derive from that methodology’s likeliness to “sound a death knell to certification,” but rather the fact that insurance companies themselves do not utilize it, presumably believing it would be a death knell to their own bottom lines. It is not impermissibly “litigation-driven” for Merritt to compare and contrast his individualized inquiry approach with the standardized algorithmic approach common to insurance companies.

    Finally, State Farm’s argument that Merritt incorrectly assumed that he can remove the TNAs without impacting other variables in the Audatex Reports is best suited for cross-examination. Merritt permissibly made reasonable inferences to reach his conclusions and ultimately “stayed within reliable . . . bounds” in so doing. The Court has found that Merritt’s application of his methodology to the circumstances of the case have met that threshold, in accordance with the 2023 amendments.

    Held

    The Court granted in part and denied in part Defendants’ motion to exclude the testimony of Jason Merritt.

    Key Takeaway

    From the outset, it is clear that Merritt familiarized himself with—and relied upon—the relevant facts of this case. Among other things, he highlighted the way Audatex comes to its ACV calculations and compares that to the “take-price” adjustment that some appraisers utilize, ultimately finding that Audatex’s approach is insufficiently specific compared to that approach. His explanation about a generally accepted vehicle valuation methodology will help a trier of fact decide a central issue in this case—whether it is appropriate to apply a TNA while appraising a used vehicle.

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Williams V. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company
    Docket Number: 1:22cv1422
    Court Name: United States District Court, Illinois Northern
    Order Date: March 09, 2026
  • Psychology Expert Allowed to Opine on EMDR Therapy

    Psychology Expert Allowed to Opine on EMDR Therapy

    Oriental Trading Company, Inc. (“OTC”) is a retailer of novelties and gifts. Plaintiff Keith Kirksey is an African American male who began his employment with OTC on or about June 1, 2017.

    According to Kirksey, during his employment, he experienced a series of racially targeted incidents including the placing of a noose in his workspace and the placing of a clown head with, what he perceived as, a noose around its neck where Kirksey would see it. He reported these incidents to OTC who indicated it would investigate. Kirksey was dissatisfied with OTC’s investigation, and its outcome, and thereafter felt unfairly targeted by OTC in retaliation for his reporting.

    Kirksey filed a complaint against OTC stemming from his employment alleging claims of race discrimination, retaliation, and harassment/hostile work environment as well as negligent infliction of emotional distress.

    In an effort to establish his claims, Kirksey engaged Jerry Authier, Ph.D. as an expert. Authier is clinical psychologist licensed in Nebraska who was retained to conduct a psychological evaluation of Kirksey. In an effort to rebuke Kirksey’s claims, OTC designated Timothy D. Loudon as an expert in the field of human resources and workplace investigations.

    OTC filed a motion in limine to exclude the testimony of Plaintiff’s expert witness Authier and Kirksey filed a motion to exclude the testimony of Loudon.

    Psychology Expert Witness

    Jerry L. Authier, Ph.D. is a clinical psychologist licensed in Nebraska. He has been practicing psychology in Omaha since 1973.

    He obtained his bachelor’s degree in psychology and doctorate in clinical psychology. Throughout his 50-year career, Authier was the director of behavioral science at the University of Nebraska and Clarkson Family Medicine and saw patients in private practice. Authier has authored various articles and books and presented at a range of conferences, primarily during his years as an educator.

    Discover more cases with Jerry Authier as an expert witness by ordering his comprehensive Expert Witness Profile report.

    Human Resources Expert Witness

    Timothy D. Loudon has a juris doctor degree, is licensed to practice law in multiple states, and has practiced labor and employment law in various capacities since 1981.

    Want to know more about the challenges Timothy Loudon has faced? Get the full details with our Challenge Study report.

    Discussion by the Court

    Authier

    OTC did not move to preclude Authier from testifying altogether but sought
    to limit his testimony to that of a treating provider. OTC primarily argued that Authier’s opinions should be excluded because the foundation of Authier’s opinions rest solely on information Kirksey (and perhaps his counsel) conveyed to him.

    Authier opined that Kirksey suffers from post-traumatic stress disorder, persistent depressive disorder with paranoid ideation, and generalized anxiety disorder. He further concluded that Kirksey’s negative psychological and psychiatric symptoms are attributable to Kirksey’s time working at OTC. In reaching these conclusions, Authier used a diagnostic interview, Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory, 2nd Edition (“MMPI-2”) and the Sachs Sentence Completion Test. Authier further opined that Kirksey would need weekly psychotherapy sessions for an indeterminate amount of time but “at least a year if not longer and possibly the rest of his life.”

    During his deposition, taken almost a year after his diagnostic interview, Authier testified that Kirksey did not participate in weekly therapy sessions with him. Authier stated that at the time he wrote his opinion he believed weekly therapy sessions would be the best way for Kirksey to recover from his symptoms.

    Authier further testified that he is not an expert in EMDR therapy but stated it might be of help to Kirksey, when done with a specialized provider, to work through some of the symptoms of trauma. Similarly, Authier testified that he is not licensed to prescribe medication but that “the research shows that [psychotherapy along with medication] is the best way to help people that are struggling with psychiatric and psychological symptoms.

    Analysis

    First, OTC argued that Authier’s opinions are irrelevant because the June 18, 2020, incident (of which Authier’s opinion relies) is outside the applicable statute of limitations for Plaintiff’s claims in this lawsuit.

    However, the Court found that Authier’s opinions regarding Kirksey’s conditions and the source of those conditions is wholly relevant to the ultimate issues in this case and his testimony would be useful to the finder in fact when deciding those issues.

    OTC sought to exclude Authier’s opinions as to EMDR therapy and psychotropic medications based on his qualifications. While Authier testified that he is not an expert in EMDR nor a medical doctor, his limited opinions on these two topics fall within his purview of a clinical psychologist.

    Authier did consider whether Kirksey’s symptoms could be attributable to other causes – such as childhood trauma. He determined based on his testing and clinical experience that this was unlikely. Moreover, when presented with records from a prior provider, Authier did not change his opinion.

    The Defendant did not identify any plausible alternative cause of Kirksey’s conditions, thus strengthening the Court’s conclusion that the methodology employed by Authier is reliable. In addition to the diagnostic interview, Authier had approximately 16 sessions with Kirksey which confirmed Authier’s impressions and diagnosis of Kirksey.

    Authier’s clinical impressions, based on his standardized diagnostic tools and his diagnostic evaluation, is that Kirksey is experiencing symptoms and those symptoms are tied to his time at OTC.

    Moreover, OTC sought to exclude Authier’s opinion relating to his original recommendation that Kirksey participate in weekly psychotherapy sessions, arguing it is speculative and unsupported by the facts. The Court found that this information may provide context to the testimony at trial.

    Loudon

    Loudon opined about OTC’s handling of each of Kirksey’s complaints. To sustain a claim against OTC for a racially hostile work environment, Kirksey must show (1) he is a member of a protected group, (2) he was subjected to unwelcome harassment, (3) the harassment was based upon race, (4) the harassment affected a term, condition, or privilege of employment, and (5) the employer knew or should have known of the racially discriminatory harassment and failed to take prompt and effective remedial measures to end the harassment.

    At the time of trial, the “promptness” and “effectiveness” of an employer’s response is a question of fact for the jury to resolve and a matter for the Court to instruct.

    Allowing Loudon to testify as an expert to the “adequacy” and “reasonableness” of OTC’s investigation would invade the province of the jury.

    Held

    • The Court denied Defendant Oriental Trading Company’s motion in limine to exclude the testimony of Plaintiff’s expert witness Jerry Authier.
    • The Court granted Plaintiff Keith Kirksey’s motion to exclude the testimony of Timothy Loudon.

    Key Takeaway

    With respect to differential diagnosis, opinion testimony is unreliable “only when an opponent points to a plausible alternative cause of the injury and the doctor offers no explanation for concluding that it was not the sole cause.”

    OTC’s attacks regarding the completeness of Authier’s methodology go to the weight and not the admissibility of his testimony.

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Kirksey V. Oriental Trading Company Inc.
    Docket Number: 8:24cv268
    Court Name: United States District Court, Nebraska
    Order Date: March 09, 2026
  • Polymers Expert Allowed to Opine on PFOS Sources

    Polymers Expert Allowed to Opine on PFOS Sources

    This case arises out of the contamination of surface waters and drinking water in Chattooga County, Georgia, with per- and polyfluoroalkyl substances known as “PFAS.”

    In essence, Plaintiff Earl Parris, Jr., alleged that the Defendants have contaminated his water with PFAS. Parris is a resident of Summerville, Georgia, who receives running, potable water to his home from the Summerville Public Works and Utilities Department.

    The City of Summerville—which has intervened in this case—used Raccoon Creek, a tributary of the Chattooga River, as the main source of its municipal water supply. Parris alleged that Raccoon Creek and—consequently, his household water—have been contaminated with PFAS by the Defendants. At present, Parris and Summerville jointly moved to exclude the opinion testimony of Defendant 3M’s expert, Maureen Reitman.

    Polymers Expert Witness

    Maureen Theresa Fahey Reitman, Sc.D. has been practicing in the field of polymer science and engineering for more than 30 years.

    She has a Doctor of Science in Materials Science and Engineering, with a thesis in the field of polymers, from MIT. She is also a licensed Professional Engineer in the state of Maryland and a Fellow of the Society of Plastics Engineers.

    Get the full story on challenges to Maureen Reitman’s expert opinions and testimony with an in-depth Challenge Study.

    Discussion by the Court

    Relevancy and Likelihood of Confusion

    Plaintiffs asserted that Reitman failed to identify any perfluorooctane sulfonate (PFOS)-containing products at the Mount Vernon Mill or the Trion Water Pollution Control Plant (“Trion Plant”) other than 3M’s product.

    The Court agreed with 3M that Reitman’s opinions as to other possible sources of PFAS and PFOS in the Raccoon Creek watershed are relevant to the issue of causation. Although it is 3M’s burden to establish the relevance and reliability of their expert’s opinions, it is ultimately the Plaintiffs’ burden at trial to prove the causal connection between their alleged injuries and the Defendants’ alleged actions.

    Here, 3M sought to introduce evidence undermining the Plaintiffs’ causation evidence by showing that there were other possible causes of the Plaintiffs’ injuries. Thus, the Plaintiffs’ argument that Reitman cannot determine “to what extent, if any, a participant in the global supply and use network for PFAS released a particular substance into the environment at issue” entirely missed the mark—the fact that Reitman is testifying she cannot make this determination is the whole point of introducing her testimony.

    3M intended to rely on this testimony to argue that the Plaintiffs cannot prove its product is the cause of the alleged PFAS contamination in the Raccoon Creek watershed.

    The Plaintiffs also sought to exclude Reitman’s opinions under Federal Rule of Evidence 403, arguing that her testimony about PFOS sources manufactured abroad will confuse the jury because such sources are irrelevant to their claims. Because Reitman’s testimony is relevant and will be helpful for the jury, the extraordinary remedy of exclusion under Rule 403 is unwarranted here.

    Reliability

    Plaintiffs asserted that Reitman admitted she does not have any data indicating PFOS sources besides 3M’s product are present in the Raccoon Creek watershed, yet she seeks to testify that other possible sources exist.

    However, Reitman’s report explains the reasons why the identification of PFOS and PFAS “in an environmental sample is not sufficient to identify the original source of production.” Further, she explains why this is true regardless of the characteristics in a sample associated with electrochemical fluorination (ECF), a process that 3M is known to have utilized in processing PFOS.

    And she provided testimony critical to 3M’s causation defense that the Plaintiffs have not provided an appropriate scientific basis for excluding other possible suppliers of the specific PFAS at issue due to the potential contributions of products associated with global supply chains.

    The fact that Reitman’s opinions may undermine the causation evidence the Plaintiffs intend to present does not make them unreliable; instead, the Plaintiffs’ concern goes to the weight and credibility of the evidence. The Plaintiffs will have the opportunity to cross-examine Reitman at trial, where their concerns will be more appropriately addressed.

    Held

    The Court denied the Plaintiff and Intervenor-Plaintiff’s joint motion to exclude the opinions of Maureen Reitman.

    Key Takeaway

    In the Court’s view, the Plaintiffs did not truly challenge the reliability of Reitman’s opinions, but instead challenged the content of her opinions. But the Court’s inquiry at this stage “must be solely on principles and methodology, not on the conclusions that they generate.”

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Parris V. 3M Company
    Docket Number: 4:21cv40
    Court Name: United States District Court, Georgia Northern
    Order Date: March 09, 2026
  • Valuation Expert Allowed to Opine on Stock Drop

    Valuation Expert Allowed to Opine on Stock Drop

    In this defamation action, Plaintiffs Techtronic Industries Company Limited and Techtronic Industries Factory Outlets, Inc. (“Plaintiffs” or “TTI”) sued Defendant Victor Bonilla (“Defendant” or “Bonilla”) for statements made about TTI and its business practices by Bonilla in two reports he authored and published on his website Jehoshaphat Research in February and June 2023.

    Bonilla filed a motion to exclude TTI’s expert Jeffrey W. Kopa, CFA under Fed. R. Evid. 702, arguing that Kopa’s qualifications and opinions failed to meet the standards required by Daubert and the Federal Rules of Evidence.

    Valuation Expert Witness

    Jeffrey William Kopa, CFA is a partner and managing director at AlixPartners in the Investigations, Disputes and Risk practice. He holds a Bachelor of Business Administration degree with an emphasis on finance and accounting from the University of Michigan and a Master of Business Administration degree and Master of Science degree in Finance from Indiana University School of Business. Kopa has developed an extensive litigation-consulting, financial, valuation, and investing practice over his past 20 years of professional experience.

    He has analyzed damages through his litigation-consultant services in a variety of areas including antitrust, audit malpractice, breach of contract, false advertising, intellectual property litigation, purchase price and transaction disputes, shareholder disputes, fraudulent conveyance, and preference actions. Kopa has experience examining damages and lost profits caused by alleged wrongful acts and has been qualified as an expert to present damages opinions and statistical analyses in state, federal, and bankruptcy courts. In addition to performing damages analyses, he has performed accounting investigations, assessed credit worthiness, advised creditors and board members, participated in capital raising efforts and worked to restructure and refinance companies.

    Get the full story on challenges to Jeffrey Kopa’s expert opinions and testimony with an in-depth Challenge Study.

    Discussion by the Court

    In his initial report, Kopa offered the following opinions:

    • The market for the common stock of TTI was open, developed, and efficient before and around the time of the Jehoshaphat Reports (“JR”) were publicly issued based on the results of standard market efficiency tests.
    • The share price of TTI’s common stock declined in February 23, 2023 and June 6, 2023, following the First Report and Second Report, respectively, and the negative abnormal return following the First Report’s publication was highly statistically significant.
    • Defendant profited from trading activity associated with the JR Reports.
    • TTI incurred approximately US$152 thousand in incremental professional fees to address the JR Reports.
    • TTI’s incremental compensation plans have a total attributable value to the JR Reports of approximately US$23.6 million.

    Defendant challenged Kopa’s second, fourth, and fifth opinions referenced above. Defendant noted that, with respect to the third opinion, Bonilla’s profits are not an item of damages that Plaintiffs may claim, but he did not otherwise challenge Kopa’s analysis or conclusion that Bonilla profited from trading activity associated with the reports.

    Qualifications

    Bonilla contended that Kopa offered no testimony on the salient issues that would be helpful to the jury, such as identifying which damages resulted from the alleged false and defamatory statements and whether the LTIP executive compensation program was necessary. This argument appeared to go to the last prong of the Daubert analysis and not to Kopa’s qualifications to offer a damages opinion in this case. As courts in this Circuit have noted, “the qualification standard for expert testimony is ‘not stringent’ and ‘so long as the expert is minimally qualified, objections to the level of the expert’s expertise go to credibility and weight, not admissibility.’”

    Given Kopa’s education, experience, and credentials, the Court found that Kopa is at least minimally qualified to offer damages opinions in this case.

    Methodology

    In formulating his opinions, Kopa utilized the methodology of an “event study” to analyze the impact of Bonilla’s reports on TTI’s stock. An event study is a statistical regression analysis that examines the effect of an event—such as the release of information—on a dependent variable, such as a corporation’s stock price. Kopa testified that he combined a quantitative analysis of the change in TTI’s stock with a qualitative loss causation analysis of TTI-focused news. 

    Bonilla argued that although Kopa purports to conduct an event study to show the connection between the First and Second Reports and the stock drop, he did not use any methodology to determine if the stock drops were due to the alleged false and defamatory statements, as opposed to being due to true statements or opinions in the reports.

    As event studies are a “common method” of establishing loss causation, the Court found Kopa’s methodology to be generally accepted in the scientific community and therefore reliable.

    Kopa also used the net present value technique, a commonly accepted methodology, to calculate TTI’s damages. Bonilla argued that Kopa’s analysis of the legal and accounting bills did not use an accepted methodology at all; rather, he just added them up. Bonilla complained that Kopa did not analyze whether the legal and accounting work performed was necessary.

    For the same reason, he challenged Kopa’s testimony about the executive compensation issue contending Kopa merely asserts a but-for test that is unscientific and unreliable. Whether or not the services were needed does not appear to be an opinion that Kopa is offering.

    Net present value analyses are an acceptable and common methodology used by financial experts. Basically, the Court found that Kopa’s causation assumption did not render his damages opinion inadmissible.

    Helpfulness to the Jury

    TTI contended that Kopa did not simply look at a stock market drop as Bonilla suggests. TTI represented that Kopa’s opinions are formed based upon a statistical causal analysis utilizing an event study. Bonilla’s arguments to the contrary in an effort to exclude the opinions go more to the weight the jury should give the opinions and not to their admissibility. Finally, Bonilla complained that some of the calculations are simple math calculations for which an expert is not needed. However, this is not a basis to exclude the expert.

    Held

    The Court denied Defendant Bonilla’s Daubert motion with respect to Jeffrey W. Kopa’s damages opinions.

    Key Takeaway

    Relevant expert testimony logically advances a material aspect of the proposing party’s case and fits the disputed facts.

    While performing simple mathematical calculations or conversion of money from Hong Kong to U.S. dollars may not necessarily require expert testimony, to the extent that Kopa is permitted to testify, his performance of these calculations and conversions will be helpful to the jury.

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Techtronic Industries Company Limited V. Bonilla
    Docket Number: 8:23cv1734
    Court Name: United States District Court, Florida Middle
    Order Date: March 06, 2026