This case arises from the fatal shooting of Caleb Slay by federal Drug Enforcement Administration (“DEA”) Agent Anthony Gasperoni. On November 2, 2020, Slay encountered DEA Agent Gasperoni and DEA Agent John Stuart. During the ensuing interaction, DEA Agent Gasperoni discharged his firearm, fatally shooting Slay. Slay’s mother, Tina Richardson, filed this case asserting numerous claims under federal and state law against the United States and DEA Agent Gasperoni for wrongful death. The parties timely designated expert witnesses in this case and now move to exclude the evidence and testimony of the other party’s expert.
United States filed a motion to exclude the testimony of Robert W. Johnson while Plaintiff Richardson filed a motion to exclude the expert testimony of Craig Allen.
Economics Expert Witness
Robert Walton Johnson has more than 30 years of experience as a court-qualified economic expert and over 40 years of experience in financial and economic analysis. He has been qualified as an economic expert in both state and federal courts across more than 30 states. Johnson holds a Master of Business Administration from Stanford University and a Bachelor of Business Administration in Economics from Baruch College.
He has directed and provided testimony on economic analyses for both plaintiff and defense clients in matters involving personal injury, wrongful death, wrongful termination, lost business profits, and antitrust cases. His professional background also includes Wall Street and corporate finance experience, including mergers and acquisitions, as well as roles as a securities analyst and portfolio manager.
Law Enforcement Expert Witness
Craig Allen is currently employed as the Director of Training and Senior Instructor with the Force Science Institute. He been a Police Officer for 30 years.
He has held positions within the Hillsboro Police Department ranging from Patrol Officer, Field Training Officer, SWAT, Undercover Narcotics Investigator, Detective, Patrol Sergeant, Training Sergeant, Lieutenant of Internal Affairs, Training Lieutenant, and Patrol Lieutenant.
Discussion by the Court
I. Defendant United States’ Motion to Exclude Expert Testimony of Robert Johnson
Johnson, a forensic economist, opined that the value of decedent Caleb Slay’s life is between $5,500,000 and $16,900,000, based on a “willingness-to-pay” methodology.
As Johnson explained in his expert report, the willingness-to-pay methodology values human life based on “how much people are willing to pay (or willing to give up in dollars) to avoid an increase in the risk of death,” rather than taking into account any information specific to the decedent (such as physical health, history of mental illness, drug use, familial relationships, education, etc.).
The willingness-to-pay model provided a value range for some general, average human life, rather than a value specific to a particular decedent. In addition to finding the willingness-to-pay methodology generally unreliable, the Court noted that Johnson’s report in particular has issues which cause his expert testimony to fall short of the Daubert standard.
Johnson relied on two studies that are both now over 20 years old. Johnson did not explain why these studies were chosen, whether newer studies exist, or whether other studies exist with further variations in estimates of the value of human life.
As a result, the Court found that Johnson’s expert testimony did not meet the standard under Rule 702 as amended and is inadmissible.
II. Plaintiff Richardson’s Motion to Exclude Expert Testimony of Craig Allen
A. “Force Science” Opinions
Plaintiff Richardson sought to exclude Allen’s opinions that rely on “force science,” arguing that “force science” is not a generally accepted theory in the relevant scientific community and Allen is not qualified as an expert in a recognized scientific field such as cognitive psychology or behavioral science.
Allen offered an opinion regarding the perception or reaction time of an officer responding to a threat, without opining about cognitive processes.
Upon review, Allen’s opinion regarding reaction time did not appear to cross the line into cognitive psychology, physiology, behavioral science, or any other purely scientific field. Moreover, Allen’s opinion did not merely rely on his experiences at the Force Science Institute but also on his 30 years of experience as a police officer, over 25 formal certifications, relevant organization memberships, and review of publications on the issue of police perception and reaction times. Thus, it appeared to the Court that Allen’s area of expertise included police reaction times based on his experience as a police officer, his training, and his research.
Plaintiff alternatively argued that Allen’s opinions relating to “force science” should be excluded under Rule 403 as unduly prejudicial. Plaintiff argued that the jury “may give force science too much weight over whether the DEA Agents Gasperoni and Stuart could have exercised other options, such as obtaining an arrest warrant based on probable cause.” First, the Court noted that this argument has little bearing on the specific opinion identified in the briefing—that is, Allen’s opinion that officer reaction time is longer when the officer must engage in decision-making. Second, the quoted language above is the entirety of Plaintiff’s argument that the Court should exclude this evidence under Rule 403. The Court is not persuaded that the value of the evidence is outweighed by any undue prejudice.
B. Eyewitness Testimony Opinion
Second, Plaintiff Richardson sought to exclude Allen’s opinions on eyewitness testimony, particularly his opinion elicited by Plaintiff Counsel in his deposition that “police officers involved in shootings can have specific, more precise memories of how the event unfurls as opposed to a lay witness watching the incident.” Plaintiff argued that Allen has no supporting education, credentials, or background in the field of memory and eyewitness testimony.
Here, Allen did not include any “eyewitness testimony” opinions in his report, and defense counsel states that they do not anticipate eliciting any such opinions from him at trial. Instead, the only reason Allen has opined on eyewitness testimony during the course of this litigation is because Plaintiff Counsel asked Allen in his deposition, “do you have some reason to believe that police officers who are active participants in a shooting incident would have better memories of the shooting incident than nonactive participants?” The Court is persuaded by Defendant United States’ argument that Allen should be able to respond to such questioning at trial, including providing his opinion, should Plaintiff Counsel again open that door.
As set forth above, the Court found Richardson’s motion to exclude eyewitness testimony opinion premature, as Allen has not included any such opinions in his report and defense counsel did not intend to elicit any such opinions on direct examination.
Held
- The Court granted Defendant United States’ motion to exclude the expert testimony of Robert Johnson.
- The Court denied Plaintiff Richardson’s motion to exclude the expert testimony of Craig Allen.
Key Takeaway
The Court joined the growing consensus among federal courts and concludes that the willingness-to-pay methodology generally is an unreliable way to measure the value of human life and did not satisfy the Daubert standard. Moreover, Johnson’s report in particular lacks sufficient explanation and support for his conclusions. The reasonable value of Slay’s life is within the purview and experience of the factfinder.
Case Details:
| Case Caption: | Richardson V. United States Of America |
| Docket Number: | 6:23cv3337 |
| Court Name: | United States District Court, Missouri Western |
| Order Date: | March 02, 2026 |
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