Expert Witness Profiler

Category: Insurance Expert Witness

  • Insurance Expert’s Testimony on Market Multiples Range Excluded

    Insurance Expert’s Testimony on Market Multiples Range Excluded

    The matter before the Court stems from Plaintiff USI Insurance Services LLC’s (“USI”) lawsuit against Defendants Alliant Insurance Services Incorporated (“Alliant”), William J. Havard III, Robert Engles, Jenise Purser, and Justin Walsh (collectively, “Defendants,” or without referring to Alliant, the “Individual Defendants”) relating to allegations that, among other things, they engaged in the improper solicitation of USI’s clients on Alliant’s behalf after resigning from USI.

    Defendants filed a motion to exclude certain trial testimony and the opinions of USI’s industry expert witness, Thomas R. Linn.

    Insurance Expert Witness

    Thomas Richard Linn has extensive experience in the insurance industry, having served as the Executive Vice President of Marsh, Berry & Company, Inc., one of the nation’s largest insurance agency consulting firms. Throughout his 22-year tenure at MarshBerry, Linn advised industry players on financial and organizational development and served as an intermediary to insurance-related mergers and acquisitions totaling more than $2 billion.

    Get the full story on challenges to Thomas R. Linn ‘s expert opinions and testimony with an in-depth Challenge Study. 

    Discussion by the Court

    Defendants objected to Linn’s testimony concerning (1) certain “market multiples” derived from other undisclosed insurance transactions and (2) opinions on the enforceability and interpretations of the restrictive covenants in the Individual Defendants’ employment agreements.

    Market Multiples

    USI planned to offer Linn’s testimony on the process for buying, selling, and acquiring books of business (“BOB(s)”) in the commercial insurance industry and the typical pricing for such assets. Linn opined that industry uses “multiples of revenue” as a rule of thumb to price of a firm or BOB and “multiples of EBITDA” to calculate the sale price. He further provided specific ranges of multiples for revenue and for EBITDA in which the range covers standard business risks in the insurance industry and unique, transaction-specific risks.

    Defendants attacked Linn’s factual basis for reaching the proffered multiples. According to Defendants, Linn based his multiples every transaction he worked on during his twenty-two-year career, including those concerning the sale of entire insurance brokerage firms and isolated BOBs.

    Defendants also pointed out that when their counsel asked him to identify specific comparable transactions involving the sale of BOBs underlying his multiples, Linn refused to identify the names, revenues, locations, and acquisition prices as confidential and indicted that he based the multiples on the “the judgment [he] . . . gained after 22 years of experience.”

    Linn testified that he spoke with partners who worked at his former company for “touch points and points of reference for which he used to form [his] opinion” regarding the status of the marketplace and current pricing multiples. These conversations related to the sale of entire brokerage firms, not BOBs, and Linn did not receive any information regarding any specific transactions.

    He further testified that asking about BOBs in particular was unnecessary because the valuation of a BOB incorporates a discount from the valuation of the entire firm, which remained the same since the time he was with the company.

    Analysis

    Though it is possible that business assets like BOBs may sell at some multiple that accounts for various discounts or premiums based on various performance and market-based factors as a matter of general principle, Linn opined to a specific range of multiples by applying that rule, i.e., the principle, to a set of unidentified facts.

    The proffered range of multiples is not a matter of general principle but rather a conclusion drawn from analytical reasoning based on Linn’s facts and experience. But Linn, however, refused to disclose the facts, i.e., the transactions, underlying the range, removing the Court’s ability to evaluate whether those transactions provide a sufficient factual basis to support his opinion.

    Linn indiscriminately included every transaction from his career without explaining how the various factors impacted his analysis to arrive at specific numbers that define the boundaries of the range. Consequently, Linn failed to link his experience in valuing BOBs with his conclusion on the range of multiples, and by never explaining how the relevant factors apply to determine a particular multiple, the Court is left with no basis to determine whether he reliably applied such factors to reach his ultimate conclusion.

    Additionally, by failing to explain how the particular factors apply to discount a BOB, Linn’s testimony on a range provided the jury with no guidance on how to determine the appropriate multiple within that range. Therefore, the Court excluded Linn’s testimony pertaining to the specific range of market multiples. This exclusion, however, is narrow because the Defendants’ challenge pertains to the ranges themselves and not the general principles underlying the sales process. Linn may testify to the other general market-based principles addressed prior to arriving at the specific multiple.

    Enforceability and Interpretations of the Restrictive Covenants

    The parties disputed whether Linn should have been permitted to testify that the restrictive covenants in the Individual Defendants’ employment agreements reflected industry standards and remained reasonable. Their disagreement focused on the relevance of his opinion to the covenants’ enforceability. They raised these arguments before the Court issued its summary-judgment ruling, which resolved the enforceability question. After that decision, any additional testimony became unnecessary and irrelevant.

    Held

    The Court granted the Defendants’ motion to exclude certain testimony of Thomas R. Linn.

    Key Takeaway:

    An expert must establish the reliability of the principles and methods, “along with the particular method of analyzing data thereby obtained, to draw a conclusion regarding the particular matter to which the expert testimony was directly relevant.” In other words, without more, Linn generated his proffered range of multiples based on mere ipse dixit.

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: USI Insurance Services LLC V. Alliant Insurance Services Incorporated Et Al
    Docket Number: 2:23cv192
    Court Name: United States District Court, Arizona
    Order Date: June 26, 2025
  • Insurance Expert’s Testimony on Industry-Accepted Claims Practices Admitted

    Insurance Expert’s Testimony on Industry-Accepted Claims Practices Admitted

    This case arises from a claim made by Richard Bernier under the underinsured motorist (“UIM”) coverage provided in his State Farm policy.

    Bernier was involved in a November 18, 2020 auto accident. He settled the underlying claim for the other driver’s limits of coverage and then sought the maximum available UIM coverage under his own policy of $50,000.

    Bernier’s expert, Mr. Stephen Strzelec, concluded that State Farm “arbitrarily reduced/discounted [medical bills] based on speculation and conjecture by the claim handler.”

    However, State Farm’s expert, Ms. JoAnna Moore, wrote that Bernier’s medical bills “should have been questioned . . . [because] there was no airbag deployment, only slight injuries were noted,” and Moore saw “no physician report tying Bernier’s rotator cuff tear, ulnar nerve injury, or cervical disc disease to the accident.”

    Bernier filed and served his expert report of Stephen Strzelec on December 13, 2024 and on January 7, 2025, State Farm filed its rebuttal expert report of JoAnna Moore “on issues relating to claim handling and specifically with regard to Stephen Strzelec’s report.”

    Bernier asserted that the eight numbered paragraphs in Moore’s report are a valid rebuttal but that the last two and a half pages are “an attempt to testify in Defendant’s case-in-chief” and should be excluded.

    Insurance Expert Witness

    JoAnna Moore is the Principal and Founder of J. Moore Consulting Services. For nearly a decade, Moore served on the Advisory Board for the Center for Insurance Studies, which is part of the Mihaylo College of Business & Economics at California State University, Fullerton. In that capacity, she has been a frequent keynote speaker during the University’s annual Business Week and guest class lecturer, as well as advising the center on curriculum and course offerings.

    In 2009 she received special recognition by the Center for her continuing support of insurance education. Moore is also a participating Advisory Board member of the Women’s Leadership Institute at Auburn University, Auburn, Alabama. She earned a B.S. Degree from Auburn in 1978 and is a member of the National Association of Professional Women (NAPW). 

    Get the full story on challenges to JoAnna Moore’s expert opinions and testimony with an in-depth Challenge Study

    Discussion by the Court

    The topics in Moore’s report are valid rebuttals of Strzelec’s report. Strzelec lays out what he asserts are claims-handling principals and standards, and analyzes State Farm’s handling of Bernier’s first-party underinsured motorist claim. For example, Strzelec lists all the UCSPA standards for insurance companies and asserts that, on top of the standards set in statutes and regulations, “internal standards of fairness by the insurer” help define the parameters required for every specific situation. In response to Strzelec’s assertions regarding standards for insurance companies, Moore detailed what she asserts is the “standard for claim handling.”

    First, Moore summarized what she argued is the applicable “reasonableness, not perfection” standard, and then she listed what she asserted, based on her experience, are “the reasonable and industry-accepted claims practices.” The Court held that this evidence is proper rebuttal evidence, as Moore addressed insurance company standards and practices, which is the same subject matter as the opinions in Strzelec’s report.

    Moore’s report provided “[a] list of things that Moore believes Defendant did correctly,” as well as her “personal opinion on whether Defendant acted reasonably.” These topics are on the same subject matter as the testimony of Strzelec in his expert report. In fact, Strzelec stated at the top of his “analysis and discussion” section that he was asked to “provide [his] opinions regarding State Farm’s handling of the first party underinsured motorist claims.”

    When Strzelec concluded that “State Farm failed to meet minimum industry
    standards for handling claims,” Moore listed the actions she argued demonstrated State Farm complied with industry standards, such as reviewing and utilizing contract language, seeking input from supervisory personnel, and providing appropriate claim note documentation.

    Held

    The Court denied Richard Bernier’s motion to exclude portions of JoAnna Moore’s expert report.

    Key Takeaway:

    Moore’s rebuttal expert report did not merely opine on the same general subject matter as Strzelec’s report. Instead, Moore’s rebuttal expert report properly rebuts and contradicts Strzelec’s expert testimony.

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Bernier V. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company
    Docket Number: 4:24cv2
    Court Name: United States District Court, Alaska
    Order Date: May 28, 2025
  • Experts Attempted to Present Legal Opinions Disguised as Industry Standards

    Experts Attempted to Present Legal Opinions Disguised as Industry Standards

    Defendants 1536 Blue Jay Way, LLC and Michael Herman (collectively, Blue Jay Way) have brought claims against Defendant LMID, Inc. and others for negligence and negligence per se related to the renovation of a high-end home.

    Plaintiff Travelers has been defending its insured, Defendant LMID, Inc. (LMID), in state court since June 2020.

    Travelers has brought this action seeking: (1) a declaration that it has no duty to defend LMID in the state court action; (2) a declaration that it has no duty to indemnify LMID; and (3) reimbursement for defense costs incurred.

    In January 2025, LMID and Blue Jay Way each disclosed an expert witness under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(2).

    LMID’s expert, Joseph Oliva, is an attorney whose practice focuses on insurance coverage disputes. Oliva was asked to provide an opinion on “whether the allegations [in] the complaint and/or extrinsic evidence (discovery) . . . constitutes an occurrence under California insurance industry standards and whether the claims against [LMID] fall within the scope of the definition of property damage.” In his report, he concludes that the claims against LMID fell within the terms of the policy and that Travelers is obligated to defend and indemnify in the underlying action. Blue Jay Way’s expert, Peter Schulz, is also an attorney with experience in insurance coverage matters. Schulz’s opinions relied on Oliva’s analysis and his review of Oliva’s report.

    However, Travelers filed a motion to exclude Oliva’s and Schulz’s testimony.

    Insurance Expert Witnesses

    Joseph Oliva is an attorney licensed and admitted to practice before all courts of the states of California, Texas, Arizona, and Nevada. He is a shareholder of the law firm of Joseph Oliva & Associates, P.C.

    Oliva has been retained as an expert on sixteen matters, provided testimony on four matters, three of which were California arbitrations and one Arizona State Court action.

    Get the full story on challenges to Joseph Oliva’s expert opinions and testimony with an in-depth Challenge Study. 

    Peter Schulz is an attorney at law, duly licensed and admitted to practice before all courts of the states of California. He is the sole shareholder of the law firm of Schulz Brick & Rogaski, APC.

    Schulz has taught in seminars attended by attorneys, brokers, and insurance claims adjusters in California. In 2023, he was a lecturer in a program sponsored by The Seminar Group entitled “Insurance in the Construction Industry,” where he presented on Cumis/Civil Code Section 2860 – Practical considerations for policy holders and for carriers.

    Want to know more about the challenges Peter Schulz has faced? Get the full details with our Challenge Study report. 

    Discussion by the Court

    Travelers moved to exclude Oliva’s and Schulz’s testimony on two grounds. First, it argued that the experts are not qualified to testify about insurance industry standards because they are attorneys who have never worked in the insurance industry itself. Second, Travelers contended that the experts’ opinions are improper legal conclusions. While the reports refer to “insurance industry standards” and “insurance industry practices,” Travelers contends that the experts’ opinions are in fact legal conclusions that rely on legal analysis.

    As an initial matter, the Court rejected Travelers’ overbroad argument that Oliva and Schulz are unqualified to opine on insurance industry standards because they are insurance lawyers.

    The fact that Oliva and Schulz are attorneys does not mean that they could not have acquired the requisite expertise to testify about insurance industry standards.

    But this motion is less about qualifications and more about the subject of the proffered opinions. Oliva and Schulz did not offer opinions on insurance industry standards that would assist the trier of fact; rather, they attempted to present legal opinions disguised as industry standards—much of it amounting to little more than legal briefing.

    Nowhere in the reports do the experts explain how their conclusions are based on their experiences or specialized knowledge from litigating insurance cases. Though the reports refer to some nonlegal materials—e.g., insurance bulletins and pamphlets—the Court held that those references appear to be intertwined with the experts’ legal analysis.

    It is unclear how the experts would be able to excise any legal analysis from their testimony, or how any nonlegal opinions would be based on their specialized knowledge from litigating insurance cases.

    Held

    The Court granted Plaintiff Travelers Casualty Insurance Company of America’s motion to exclude the testimony of experts Joseph Oliva and Peter Schulz.

    Key Takeaway:

    Basically, Oliva’s and Schulz’s reports engage in legal analysis, assessing cases and industry materials and applying the law to the facts of this case. In doing so, Defendants have not demonstrated that is it more likely than not that the experts’ knowledge “will help the [Court] to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.”

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Travelers Casualty Insurance Company Of America V. Lmid, Inc. Et Al
    Docket Number: 2:24cv1022
    Court Name: United States District Court, California Central
    Order Date: April 18, 2025
  • Insurance Expert is Not Allowed to Opine on Structural Design

    Insurance Expert is Not Allowed to Opine on Structural Design

    Plaintiffs, Michael and Karen Green claimed that they had sustained loss as a result of hail and wind. Defendant Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company issued them a homeowner’s policy but when Plaintiffs filed a claim for loss under the policy, it gave rise to this dispute because Nationwide apparently failed to reimburse all covered losses under the Policy.

    Nationwide sought to exclude the testimony of Plaintiffs’ retained expert witness, James Taylor, a licensed public adjuster.

    Insurance Expert Witness

    James Taylor has extensive knowledge about restoration and common practices in adjusting and handling claims in the insurance industry. He is licensed public adjuster, insurance appraiser, and IICRC-certified restorer with significant experience in insurance claims handling, loss assessment, and industry-standard compliance.

    He has worked in field of remediation since 2000, and as an insurance adjustor and appraiser since 2019. Taylor’s professional background includes experience in water intrusion and hail damage assessments and structural loss analysis. He holds a public adjuster license with multi-state reciprocity, including Missouri, and maintains IICRC certification in restoration practices.

    Get the full story on challenges to James Taylor’s expert opinions and testimony with an in-depth Challenge Study.  

    Discussion by the Court

    Nationwide argued that Taylor lacked the qualifications to opine on the Nederveld engineering report or offer credibility opinions regarding third parties. Plaintiffs countered that Taylor’s testimony concerned insurance industry standards and claims handling practices, not legal conclusions, and agreed he would not testify on the legal standard for vexatious refusal to pay under Missouri law.

    The Court found Taylor qualified based on his extensive experience as a public adjuster, appraiser, and restorer. The Court ruled that Taylor will be permitted to testify regarding insurance industry practices and standards in general, proper claims handling, how certain information affects claims decisions, and whether Nationwide’s actions deviated from insurance industry customs and practices.

    As for the Nederveld engineering report, the Court allowed Taylor to testify on how the industry uses such reports and why, as an adjuster, he finds it reliable or not, but ruled he could not offer opinions on structural engineering defects. Similarly, while he could not give unfounded credibility opinions about third parties like SeekNow or Sedgwick Claims, the Court permitted him to testify if their services or practices were consistent with insurance industry standards.

    Held

    The Court granted in part and denied in part the Defendant’s motion to exclude the testimony of expert James Taylor.

    Key Takeaway

    Taylor is not an attorney offering a legal opinion as to whether Nationwide complied with Missouri law. He is a licensed public adjuster and former restorer, and he is an expert in insurance industry practices and standards. He is offering opinions as to whether Nationwide’s handling of Plaintiffs’ claim was in line with practices in the insurance industry, which goes to the issue of reasonableness and is admissible.

    Case Details

    Case Caption: Green v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co.
    Docket Number: 4:23 cv 156 
    Court Name: United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri, Eastern Division
    Order Date: May 12, 2025
  • Appraisal and Valuation Expert is Qualified to Testify about the Value of the Porsche

    Appraisal and Valuation Expert is Qualified to Testify about the Value of the Porsche

    Joseph Falasco bought a non-functioning 1974 Porsche 911S for $10,000 and put a significant amount of time and money into restoring it, including the installation of a new engine and transmission.

    Falasco later filed a claim regarding the non-collision fire that destroyed Plaintiff’s 1974 Porsche 911S (the “1974 Porsche”) and ended up suing USAA for breach of insurance contract, bad faith, and unfair claims
    settlement practices.

    Falasco filed a motion to exclude the testimony of two of USAA’s experts— Roy Da Silva and Mark McGillivray.

    Insurance Expert Witness

    Mark A McGillivray holds a bachelor’s degree in business administration with a concentration in Finance from the University of Puget Sound and a master’s degree in Business Administration with a concentration in Marketing from the University of Illinois at Chicago.

    He also holds the Chartered Property Casualty Underwriter (CPCU) designation from the American Institute for CPCU and the Insurance Institute of America (The Institutes).

    McGillivray has over 41 years of experience in the Insurance Industry, primarily in claims roles. He held various roles at Allstate Insurance Company for over 35 years, including Senior Vice President in claims.

    Since 2019, he has worked as a consultant in the industry, participated in expert networks, and been retained as an insurance expert. He is also on the Board of Directors of Hancock Claim Consultants.

    Get the full story on challenges to Mark A McGillivray’s expert opinions and testimony with an in-depth Challenge Study.  

    Appraisal and Valuation Expert Witness

    Roy Da Silva is an experienced appraiser who specializes in classic cars. He founded and developed Source One Services to provide specialized services
    to the collector car markets.

    Want to know more about the challenges Roy Da Silva has faced? Get the full details with our Challenge Study report.  

    Discussion by the Court

    Motion to exclude the Expert Testimony of Mark McGillivray

    Falasco filed a motion to exclude the expert testimony of Mark McGillivray. The Court ruled that this motion is denied without prejudice as moot.

    It appeared that USAA intended to offer McGillivray’s testimony solely in support of its defense on Falasco’s bad faith and unfair claims settlement practices claims.

    Since the Court had already granted summary judgment on those claims, McGillivray’s testimony was no longer relevant to the remaining issues in the case.

    Motion to exclude the Expert Testimony of Roy Da Silva

    Falasco argued for the exclusion of Roy Da Silva’s testimony, implying it would not offer adequate assistance to the trier of fact.

    The Court held that Da Silva is qualified to testify about the value of Falasco’s Porsche. In other words, Da Silva’s expertise will aid the jury due to the complexity of the classic car market. 

    While Falasco may dispute Da Silva’s valuation or methodology, the Court held that such challenges concerned the weight and credibility of his testimony. These concerns could be addressed through “vigorous cross-examination and presentation of contrary evidence” at trial, allowing the jury to evaluate its significance.

    Held

    • The Court denied without prejudice as moot the motion to exclude the testimony of Mark McGillivray.
    • The Court denied Falasco’s motion to exclude the testimony of Roy Da Silva.

    Key Takwaway:

    Classic car appraiser Roy Da Silva’s testimony was admitted because his expertise was essential for assisting the jury in understanding the complex classic car market.

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Falasco v. USAA Cas. Ins. Co
    Docket Number: 4:23cv01054
    Court Name: United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas, Central Division
    Order Date: May 2, 2025
  • Insurance Expert Allowed to Testify Regarding Industry Customs and Practices based on Experience

    Insurance Expert Allowed to Testify Regarding Industry Customs and Practices based on Experience

    Plaintiff Jose Verdecia sustained injuries after falling through the ceiling of his home. He claims these injuries and other damages resulted from a misrepresentation by State Farm’s adjuster, Marvin Johnson, who allegedly instructed him to inspect the attic for damage, implying that his claim would be denied otherwise.

    To support his case, Plaintiff retained Earl Stigler as an expert. Stigler was prepared to testify about proper claims handling procedures and the standard of care expected from insurance adjusters.

    On November 7, 2024, Plaintiff served supplemental disclosures regarding Stigler’s testimony. One week later, State Farm filed a motion to strike Stigler, arguing the disclosures were late and the testimony failed to meet Daubert standards.

    State Farm later filed a supplement to its motion to strike, citing deposition testimony that it believes further supports the argument that Stigler’s opinions should be struck. State Farm argued that Stigler’s deposition revealed that Stigler’s report contained irrelevant information and opinions that were contradictory, rendering it unreliable.

    Insurance Expert Witness

    Earl Stigler became an adjuster in 1983. His experience includes serving as a field auto and property adjuster, an inside property damage adjuster, an inside casualty adjuster, and a senior casualty adjuster. Over the course of his career, he has adjusted more than 14,000 claims, demonstrating his expertise by successfully negotiating a $18.8 million property claim and a $3.25 million open head injury claim.

    Discover more cases with Earl Stigler as an expert witness by ordering his comprehensive Expert Witness Profile report. 

    Discussion By the Court

    Initial Arguments

    State Farm contended that Stigler’s report and testimony lacked a reliable methodology, could not be adequately peer-reviewed for his field, and constituted “ipse dixit” (unsupported assertions). They also argued that the report contained erroneous, conflicting, and irrelevant information, making it unreliable under Rule 702 and Daubert.

    Analysis

    Methodology

    The Court found Stigler’s methodology entirely reliable, deeply “grounded in his professional experience and training”, a career spanning back to 1983. His process involved a practical approach: reviewing the relevant records in this case and rigorously comparing them to “recognized practices in the industry that are generally accepted.” The Court recognized that Stigler’s decades in the insurance industry, coupled with his review of relevant materials, equipped him with intimate familiarity with these very standards. When State Farm declared that peer review of Stigler’s report is impossible, the Court reiterated that the rigid checklist of traditional Daubert factors doesn’t always apply. Not all Daubert factors need be met for expert testimony to be admissible. Stigler’s testimony does not involve scientific evidence and therefore any peer review need not be the rigorous scientific or technical review as might be necessary for purely scientific or technical testimony.

    The Court also disagreed that Stigler’s report constitutes mere ipse dixit. Again, Stigler need not cite to “recognized scientific or technical standards.”

    The Court found State Farm’s arguments concerning erroneous, irrelevant, and conflicting information similarly unavailing. All of the issues, including Stigler’s citation of the incorrect handling guidelines, can be discussed on cross examination.

    Held

    The Court held that Plaintiff’s expert, Earl Stigler’s testimony is reliable. Any issues concerning Stigler’s report or testimony may be discussed on cross-examination and are not grounds for exclusion.

    Key Takeaways:

    Courts across the country allow experts to testify regarding industry customs and practices based on experience. Stigler’s testimony does not involve scientific evidence and therefore any peer review need not be the rigorous scientific or technical review as might be necessary for purely scientific or technical testimony. State Farm was free to find its own expert in industry custom to review Stigler’s report and come to its own conclusions. Again, it is also free to question Stigler’s testimony or report on cross-examination.

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Verdecia v. State Farm Lloyds
    Doket Number: 7:23cv67
    Court: United States District Court, Texas Western
    Order Date: April 1, 2025
  • Financial Interest & Expert Testimony: When Conflict Arises

    Financial Interest & Expert Testimony: When Conflict Arises

    The Plaintiff, a synagogue and broadcasting station, filed an insurance claim with Defendant Philadelphia Indemnity Insurance Company for damage to their custom slate roof caused by a windstorm. They hired Peter Ridulfo of Claims Pro Public Adjusters to assist with the claim. Ridulfo’s compensation was a contingent fee, tied to the amount recovered in the insurance claim, including any damages won through litigation.

    The Plaintiff designated Ridulfo as a non-retained expert, intending for him to testify about the damages, the Defendant’s alleged unreasonable actions, industry standards, and his opinions on the Defendant’s duty and alleged breaches.

    The Defendant challenged Ridulfo’s expert testimony, arguing that his contingent fee arrangement created a direct financial interest in the case’s outcome, rendering his opinions unreliable.

    Insurance Expert Witness

    Peter Ridulfo is a public adjuster with specialized knowledge of claims handling practices and standards in the industry, as well as insurance and construction regulations related to repairs.

    Want to know more about the challenges Peter Ridulfo has faced? Get the full details with our Challenge Study report. 

    Discussion by the Court

    Plaintiff’s Position:

    The Plaintiff argued Ridulfo was testifying based on his observations as a public adjuster and that his expert testimony was merely to explain his actions. They claimed he was not a retained expert and was not being compensated solely for his opinion.

    Analysis

    Financial Stake

    The Court acknowledged Ridulfo’s contingent fee agreement, which explicitly tied his compensation to the litigation’s outcome.

    State Law & Contingent Fees

    Applying Colorado law, the Court noted the “settled principle” against contingent fees for expert witnesses, emphasizing the need for impartiality.

    Rule 403 Balancing Test

    The Court adopted a Rule 403 balancing test to weigh the probative value of Ridulfo’s testimony against the potential for unfair prejudice.

    Prejudice vs. Probative Value

    The Court concluded that Ridulfo’s financial interest created a significant danger of unfair prejudice, outweighing the probative value of his expert opinions.

    Cumulative Testimony

    The Court noted that the Plaintiff had disclosed three other retained experts who could provide similar testimony, minimizing the prejudice of excluding Ridulfo’s expert opinions.

    Fact Witness Testimony

    The Court allowed Ridulfo to testify as a fact witness, enabling him to describe his actions and observations during the claims process.

    Gatekeeping Function:

    The Court emphasized that excluding Ridulfo’s expert testimony was not a sanction but an exercise of its gatekeeping function to protect the judicial process’s integrity.

    Held

    The Court granted the Defendant’s motion to exclude the testimony of Peter Ridulfo.

    Key Takeaway:

    This case underscores the importance of expert witness impartiality and the potential conflicts arising from contingent fee arrangements. Courts will scrutinize expert testimony where a financial interest exists, balancing probative value against the risk of unfair prejudice. This decision serves as a reminder of the Court’s gatekeeping role in maintaining the integrity of the judicial process.

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Simchat Torah Beit Midrash V. Philadelphia Indemnity Insurance Company
    Docket Number: 1:23cv594
    Court: United States District Court for the District of Colorado
    Order Date: March 1, 2025
  • Legal Malpractice Expert Witness Failed to Identify a Measurable Standard of Care

    Legal Malpractice Expert Witness Failed to Identify a Measurable Standard of Care

    Plaintiff Ansur America Insurance Company (“Ansur”) filed this lawsuit alleging legal malpractice related to a product liability case filed in St. Clair County, Illinois after Defendants, James A. Borland and Quinn, Johnston, Henderson & Pretorous CHTD failed to properly manage the defense of the underlying case, resulting in Ansur being forced to settle for an unsupported and unprecedented amount. 

    Plaintiff alleged that Defendants did not meet the standard of care in representing Plaintiff in a tripartite relationship, where Plaintiff insured a company that sold the Underlying Plaintiff a shower stool that broke, causing her to fall and dislodge hardware recently placed by a surgeon in her spine.

    Defendants disclosed Joseph Bleyer as a legal malpractice expert witness and Daryl Douglas as an insurance expert witness. 

    Plaintiff filed a motion to exclude the testimony of Defendant’s experts Bleyer and Douglas.

    Legal Malpractice Expert Witness

    Joseph A. Bleyer is managing partner in the law firm of Bleyer and Bleyer, Marion, Illinois which is a law firm practicing extensively in litigation and defense in tort/negligence claims, constitutional claims of rights and litigation and defense of municipalities in both Illinois and the United States Supreme Court. He graduated from Southern Illinois University in 1986 and is presently licensed in the State of Illinois, United States Supreme Court, United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, United States District Court for Central Illinois, and United States District Court for the Southern District of Illinois.

    Get the full story on challenges to Joseph Bleyer’s expert opinions and testimony with an in-depth Challenge Study. 

    Insurance Expert Witness

    Daryl Douglas spent 20 years as the senior vice president and claims manager at national primary and excess carriers and international reinsurers. During that time, Douglas managed the medical malpractice and general liability exposures for insured hospitals, physicians, and nursing homes, across the country. He counseled insurers and reinsurers on liability and coverage issues, and successfully settled hundreds of catastrophic cases, both before and after trial.

    Douglas has built a national reputation handling some of the nation’s largest and most challenging mass actions and achieving highly regarded results along the way.

    Want to know more about the challenges Daryl Douglas has faced? Get the full details with our Challenge Study report. 

    Discussion by the Court

    Plaintiff’s Motion to Exclude the Testimony of Joseph Bleyer

    Bleyer is an attorney who has practiced law since 1986. He has never handled a legal malpractice case and has no particular knowledge, experience or training in the area of legal professional responsibility.

    While Bleyer has a great deal of legal experience, neither his report nor deposition testimony connect the dots between his generalized legal experience and the bases for his opinions and conclusions in the “often specialized and complex matters of professional responsibility”, including the applicable standard of care. 

    Moreover, the Court finds that Bleyer’s conclusions and opinions do not meet the Daubert standards for reliability. While Bleyer lists thirteen opinions in his report, his first opinion accurately summarizes the remaining twelve:

    “Based upon my experience and my review of the above transcripts and documents, I have formed the opinion, to a reasonable degree of professional certainty, that James Borland and Quinn, Johnston, Henderson & Pretorious Chtd. (collectively, ‘Defendants’) met the standard of care. Defendants did not breach their fiduciary duties required by Illinois attorneys in dealing with both Ansur and Signature.”

    The Court held that Bleyer failed to provide a sufficient basis and support for his opinions that the Various Defendants met the standard of care. Although given several opportunities to do so in his deposition, Bleyer failed to identify a measurable standard of care or the source of what he believes the standard of care is. Instead, his opinions are based solely upon his professional judgment, to be applied on a “case-by-case” basis.

    Plaintiff’s Motion to Exclude the Testimony of Daryl Douglas

    Douglas is a licensed attorney who has had practiced in an insurance claims department and has had various roles in the insurance coverage and defense fields. While Douglas has a both legal and practical experience in the insurance claims industry, as Plaintiff correctly notes, “he simply opines that he would have acted differently, without offering any analysis of ‘how his experience informs his conclusions’ or sufficiently linking ‘his expertise to his opinions’ as Daubert requires.”

    The Court held that Douglas defaults to a “case-by-case” analysis instead of a measurable standard of care. For instance, when asked what the standard of care was, he said “I think the standard of care depends upon the liability and exposure and circumstances and facts of each case.” When asked, repeatedly, how he would define a “high exposure” case that would necessitate additional attention from claims managers, he finally said, “there are number of things that create exposure to the insurance company that could result in a future payout, and they are going to be different in each case.” 

    At bottom, Defendants have failed to meet their burden of demonstrating that Douglas’ proposed testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods. Therefore, the Court finds that his testimony will not assist the jury in understanding the evidence or determining a fact in issue in this case. 

    Held

    The Court granted the Plaintiff’s motion to exclude the testimony of Joseph Bleyer and Daryl Douglas.

    Key Takeaways:

    • When an expert’s opinions are grounded solely on his experience, those opinions must be based on sufficient facts, data, and relevant standards, and must be the product of methodology that is generally accepted in the expert community. Bleyer’s methodology is nothing more than what he would have done under the circumstances presented. He did not cite to or attempt to apply the Rules of Professional Conduct or any other identifiable source for the applicable standard of care in his report or testimony.
    • Defendants have failed to meet their burden of demonstrating that Douglas’ proposed testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods because Douglas defaults to a “case-by-case” analysis instead of a measurable standard of care.

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Ansur America Insurance Company V. Borland Et Al
    Docket Number: 3:21cv59
    Court: United States District Court, Illinois Southern
    Order Date: February 23, 2025
  • Insurance Expert Witness’ Estimate Excluded Because Unknown Contractors Collected the Data

    Insurance Expert Witness’ Estimate Excluded Because Unknown Contractors Collected the Data

    Plaintiffs Gregory Hebbler and Marion Hebbler contracted with Defendant State Farm Fire and Casualty Company to insure their home located at 6009 Angler Drive, Picayune, Mississippi.

    On August 29, 2021, Hurricane Ida made landfall, purportedly damaging the residence. When Defendant conducted an on-site inspection and estimated the monetary damage caused by Hurricane Ida, it issued no payment because this figure fell below Plaintiffs’ deductible.

    Plaintiffs ultimately designated Rich Lyon as their sole expert witness, referencing a June 7, 2023, Estimate as his report, but they did not attach this Estimate to their designation. On July 1, 2024, almost three months after their expert designation deadline had passed, Plaintiffs submitted a supplemental designation, disclosing Lyon’s Supplemental Report.

    On August 19, 2024, Defendant filed the instant motion to strike Plaintiffs’ expert witness Rich Lyon.

    Insurance Expert Witness

    Rich Lyon is a licensed State of Louisiana Public Insurance Adjuster and Registered Insurance Appraiser. He is the owner and operator of Gulf Coast Adjusting, LLC. Gulf Coast Adjusting, LLC is a Louisiana-licensed and bonded company offering Public Adjusting, Insurance Claims Appraising, Insurance Claims Umpiring and Construction Estimating services throughout the states of Louisiana and Mississippi.

    Get the full story on challenges to Rich Lyon’s expert opinions and testimony with an in-depth Challenge Study. 

    Discussion by the Court

    A. Lyon’s reports

    1. The June 7, 2023, Estimate

    The June 7, 2023, estimate offered by Plaintiffs as Lyon’s initial expert report contains only damage estimates and includes no narrative language, explanations, or opinions as to causation. The Estimate valued the damage to Plaintiffs’ property at $144,661.05, with no amount specified for depreciation. The Estimate is based on a June 5, 2023, inspection that was conducted by an independent contractor hired by Lyon.

    2. The Supplemental Report

    In his supplemental report, Lyon for the first time offered an opinion as to causation, stating that Hurricane Ida caused the damage to Plaintiffs’ residence. This opinion is based upon “on-site inspections of the subject property, interviews with the property owner, . . . documentation provided to [him], [his] extensive work related to hurricanes [and] windstorms, and [his] accumulative experience in the construction and insurance industries gained over the past 25 years.”

    Lyon conducted an inspection of Plaintiffs’ property on June 24, 2024, which resulted in him revising the June 7, 2023, damage estimate downward to $75,707.42, again with no deduction specified for depreciation.

    B. Defendant’s Motions

    Defendant asked the Court to exclude the June 7, 2023, estimate because it was made by unknown independent contractors, such that the Court cannot test the reliability of its factual underpinnings or methodologies. Next, the Court should strike the supplemental report because it is not supplemental, but is in fact a new report, and was produced by Plaintiffs over two and half months after the expert designation deadline.

    1. Defendant’s challenge to the June 7, 2023, Estimate offered as Lyon’s expert report

    Defendant argued that Plaintiffs’ timely June 7, 2023, estimate is unreliable because it offered no causation opinions and because unknown independent contractors collected the data underlying the estimate and did the majority of the work creating it.

    Lyon affirmed under oath that both the inspector and estimators’ identities are protected by nondisclosure agreements, and he would not reveal them. Since Plaintiffs have not identified who conducted the inspection or created the Estimate, neither Defendant nor the Court can test the reliability of the data and methods employed in repairing it. On this record, Plaintiffs cannot meet their burden of showing that the bases and methodologies underlying the estimate are reliable, and the Court therefore rejected the June 7, 2023, estimate.

    2. Lyon’s Supplemental Report offering causation opinions

    Defendant next challenged Lyon’s supplemental report, disclosed after Plaintiffs’ expert designation deadline but prior to the close of discovery.

    It should be noted that Lyon’s supplemental report relies upon information gathered by an unknown independent contractor during the June 7, 2023, inspection, Lyon’s own inspection conducted on June 24, 2024, documentation provided to him, and interviews with Plaintiffs. With the exception of Lyon’s inspection, this information was available to Plaintiffs well before the expert designation deadline of April 9, 2024, and Plaintiffs have not offered any explanation why Lyon could not have conducted his inspection before the deadline. For these reasons, the Court concluded that the supplemental report is not supplemental but is in fact a new expert report, such that it could and should have been disclosed by April 09, 2024.

    Four factor analysis under Rule 37 to determine the proper sanction

    Starting with the fourth factor, the explanation for the failure to comply with the Court’s deadlines, Plaintiffs justify the late disclosure by stating that they paid out-of-pocket to repair their roof in July 2023.

    But Plaintiffs do not explain how the completion of these repairs prevented them from timely disclosing the supplemental report or why, if there was an issue, it could not be resolved in the nine months between the completion of repairs and the designation deadline of April 9, 2024.

    The third factor is the possibility of a continuance. This, according to the Court, weighs in favor of Defendant because the case is scheduled for Pretrial Conference next month and a continuance would only further delay this case, in essence rewarding Plaintiffs for failing to timely disclose the supplemental report without any justifiable explanation.

    The first factor is the importance of the witness’ testimony. Without Lyon, Plaintiffs cannot meet their burden of showing causation and Defendant will be entitled to summary judgment. But even where the expert testimony is significant, “the importance of such proposed testimony cannot singularly override the enforcement of local rules and scheduling orders.”

    Turning to prejudice, Lyon had the benefit of possessing Defendant’s expert report when he prepared the supplemental report, and Defendant’s expert’s ability to prepare his own report was impeded by not having access to Lyon’s supplemental report. Defendant would also be required to expend time and financial resources to prepare a response to Lyon’s new causation opinion, causing further prejudice. On balance, the Court held that this factors weigh in favor of excluding the supplemental report.

    The circumstances of this case warrant striking the Supplemental Report

    Plaintiffs argued that Defendant waived the right to challenge Lyon’s expert designation by failing to file its motion thirty days before the discovery deadline.

    The Court found that Plaintiffs attempted to frame Defendant’s argument as a challenge to the initial expert designation, when in fact Defendant is contending that the supplemental report itself introduces new expert testimony and is therefore not supplemental. This would mean that Defendant would have had to file its challenge to Plaintiffs’ disclosure no later than five days later. It would be unfair to permit Plaintiffs to violate their deadline for disclosing expert reports by almost three months, and then penalize Defendant for failing to file its motion to strike by the deadline because Plaintiffs served the supplemental report mere days before it passed.

    Held

    The Court found that Defendant’s motion to strike should be granted as to Plaintiffs’ expert Rich Lyon, and he will be excluded from testifying at trial. The
    Court also granted Defendant’s motion for summary judgment because Plaintiffs cannot make the requisite showing as to causation. Plaintiffs Gregory Hebbler and Marion Hebbler’s claims were dismissed with prejudice.

    Key Takeaways:

    • The Court excluded June 07, 2023, estimate offered as Lyon’s expert report because unknown independent contractors did the majority of the work creating it as a result of which the Court cannot test the reliability of its factual underpinnings or methodologies.
    • The supplemental report offered by Lyon is not supplemental but is in fact a new expert report, such that it could and should have been disclosed by April 09, 2024. It should be noted that Lyon’s supplemental report relies upon information gathered by an unknown independent contractor during the June 7, 2023, inspection, Lyon’s own inspection conducted on June 24, 2024, documentation provided to him, and interviews with Plaintiffs. With the exception of Lyon’s inspection, this information was available to Plaintiffs well before the expert designation deadline of April 9, 2024, and Plaintiffs have not offered any explanation why Lyon could not have conducted his inspection before the deadline.

        Case Details:

        Case Caption: Hebbler Et Al V. State Farm Fire And Casualty Company
        Docket Number: 1:23cv247
        Court: United States District Court, Mississippi Southern
        Order Date: December 18, 2024
        1. Insurance Expert Witness’ Testimony With Regard to the Contract Interpretation Claims Excluded

          Insurance Expert Witness’ Testimony With Regard to the Contract Interpretation Claims Excluded

          Plaintiffs (collectively, Allied World) are insurance companies that denied coverage to Defendant MNS Ltd., a retailer, for liability stemming from MNS’s settlement of a separate class action lawsuit. In the present lawsuit, two sets of claims are teed up: first, whether Allied World owes MNS a duty of coverage under the relevant insurance policies, and second, whether Allied World acted in bad faith toward MNS. The first set of claims involve legal questions of contract interpretation while the second set of claims are less specific and potentially raise a host of factual questions about the behavior of the parties and their agents. And the latter bad-faith claims are likely to be narrowed—or at least crystallized—once the legal questions of contract interpretation have been resolved. 

          MNS disclosed the expert report of David A. Gauntlett, an insurance coverage attorney. His report touches on both the contract interpretation claims and the bad faith claims.

          Allied World contended that Sections I, II, III, IV, and portions of Section VI of Gauntlett’s report should be stricken because they “appear to relate to Gauntlett’s coverage opinions, as opposed to his bad faith opinions.”

          Allied World argued that the report “flagrantly violates the sacrosanct principle of law that ‘an expert cannot testify to a matter of law amounting to a legal conclusion.’”

          Insurance Expert Witness

          David A. Gauntlett is the principal of Gauntlett & Associates and a 1979 graduate of Boalt Hall School of Law, University of California at Berkeley. Gauntlett is an expert in insurance issues, including the proper construction, meaning, and application of insurance policies, insurer’s investigation and handling of insured’s claims, and insurer’s bad faith.

          Get the full story on challenges to David A. Gauntlett’s expert opinions and testimony with an in-depth Challenge Study. 

          Discussion by the Court

          In Section I, Gauntlett begins his report with the open acknowledgment that it contains “legal research and analysis.” Section II is entitled “Allied World’s Problematic ‘Exhaustion’ Position.” There, Gauntlett argued that Allied World’s first amended complaint “misconstrued” the policy, and contended that “as defined by the policy and interpreted by applicable case law,” the policy must be read in Gauntlett’s preferred manner. In Section III, Gauntlett argued that in light of his preferred reading of case law, the policy’s “First Publication exclusion” should be interpreted as limiting coverage in a manner he proposes. In Section IV, he argues that while there is a dearth of case law on a point of interpretation, one “Hawaii case” supports his preferred reading and “a number of other cases are in accord.” He therefore opines that “Hawaii law will not enforce Allied World’s ‘exhaustion’ claim.” 

          And, finally, in Section VI, Gauntlett opines that “under Hawaii law,” MNS should be able to recover attorney’s fees and is entitled to prejudgment interest. 

          Anticipating this objection, Gauntlett writes in his report that Federal Rule of Evidence 702—the rule governing the admissibility of expert testimony—”is satisfied” because “legal analysis is a critical component of claims analysis.”

          The legal analysis in Gauntlett’s report cannot be viewed as merely laying the foundation for proper non-legal opinions

          The argument appears to be that because an insurer must understand the law when conducting a “reasonable investigation,” an expert too must “understand those same cases” to “evaluate whether the insurer’s conduct deviates so far from industry customs and practices as to run afoul of that case authority.” And in its briefing, MNS elaborates on this contention, noting that “the Court has not yet ruled that the provisions at issue are unambiguous,” and therefore, “insurance custom and practice is relevant to the issue of coverage and such insurance custom and practice is necessarily informed by the applicable cases.”  

          It is true that when passing references to legal terms are used merely to lay the foundation for an expert’s non-legal opinions, those legal references will not necessarily render the expert’s opinions improper.

          However, the legal analysis in Gauntlett’s report cannot be viewed as merely laying the foundation for proper non-legal opinions—such as opinions about industry custom or practice, the extent to which Allied World’s conduct may have deviated from them, or what participants in the insurance industry might typically understand policy provisions to mean. That is because nothing in any of the challenged sections of Gauntlett’s report—Sections I, II, III, IV, or VI—appears to actually offer any opinions of that non-legal variety. Accordingly, while it is sometimes appropriate for an expert to discuss legal materials to lay the groundwork for non-legal opinions about industry customs and practices, Gauntlett’s expert report cannot take refuge in that principle because his report—at least as far as coverage is concerned—merely discusses and critiques the case law and then simply stops there.

          The Court must also more broadly assess whether it is appropriate, under Rule 702, to allow the challenged opinions

          MNS rejoins that Gauntlett’s discussion of the case law would still be helpful to the Court in resolving the coverage issues—which MNS emphasizes are complex and not routinely encountered—and that the motion to strike may be denied for that reason alone. It is certainly true that a legal expert’s legal opinions often are helpful, which is why such experts file amicus briefs to express their legal views.

          But Gauntlett does not merely wish to express his views here as an amicus. Instead, he has submitted an expert report under Federal Rule of Evidence 702. The question for the Court, therefore, is not merely whether Gauntlett’s expert’s opinions might be helpful. The Court must also more broadly assess whether it is appropriate, under Rule 702, to allow the challenged opinions. And when, as here, an expert offers nothing but legal opinions, the answer must be no. 

          MNS offers a few other defenses of the report, but none are availing

          First, MNS argued that Gauntlett’s report “largely relates to bad faith issues,” and it points out that Allied World seeks only to strike the portions of the report concerning coverage issues. Although five of the report’s seven sections appear to contain largely legal discussions about coverage, MNS argues that “to support and explain his opinion that Allied acted unreasonably in denying coverage”—an issue that pertains to the bad faith claims—Gauntlett “necessarily must comment upon the allegations in the complaint, the terms and provisions of the Policy, and the relevant case law.” MNS’ argument offers a reason why the Court should leave the expert report in place for now insofar as the bad faith claims are concerned, but that reason does not support leaving the expert report in the record with respect to the coverage claims.

          Second, MNS contended that Gauntlett has previously been allowed to testify as an expert in at least two cases. But as MNS itself acknowledges, Gauntlett’s testimony in those cases, although touching on case law and legal standards, ultimately concerned the industry standard of care and an insurer’s alleged “bad faith handling of a claim.” However, Allied World is not challenging, at least at this stage, the propriety of Gauntlett’s expert report as to those issues.

          Third, and finally, MNS argued that there is no harm in allowing the expert report to remain in place because the Court will make its own decisions about the proper interpretation of the policy provisions, and it can consider Gauntlett’s report to whatever extent it thinks appropriate. But it would impose on Allied World the unwarranted cost of having to conduct a deposition of—and possibly additional discovery concerning—the expert, despite the impropriety of the expert’s legal opinions on coverage. 

          There is, therefore, no reason to wait to see what passages MNS might rely on in its summary judgment briefing; because none of the challenged sections move beyond legal opinions

          When a motion to strike expert testimony is filed in advance of summary judgment motions and this far in advance of trial, it is often prudent to deny the motions as premature. 

          In this case, however, the Court concludes it is appropriate to grant the motion to strike now. For one thing, Allied World makes a properly tailored request: it does not seek to strike the entire report, but merely the specific sections that it believes concern the coverage issues. For another, the Court need not strike any parts of the report as to the currently-stayed bad faith claims. 

          Held

          The Court granted Allied World’s motion to the extent it seeks to strike Sections I, II, III, IV, and portions of Section VI of David Gauntlett’s expert report in connection with the coverage claims that are currently being litigated. The Court does not, however, strike any aspect of David Gauntlett’s report as to the bad faith claims that are currently stayed. Whether Gauntlett’s report should be stricken in whole or part as to the bad faith claims is an issue that the Court need not—and, therefore, will not—resolve until the stay of the bad faith claims has been lifted. To the extent Allied World’s motion requested that this Court strike the challenged portions in connection with all claims, therefore, the Court denied that aspect of Allied World’s motion.

          Key Takeaway:

          Allied World does not seek to strike the entirety of Gauntlett’s report for both phases of the case, but only those aspects that appear to concern the contract interpretation or coverage claims that are currently being litigated. To that end, Allied World contends that Sections I, II, III, IV, and portions of Section VI of Gauntlett’s report should be stricken because they “appear to relate to Gauntlett’s coverage opinions, as opposed to his bad faith opinions.” 

          The legal analysis in Gauntlett’s report cannot be viewed as merely laying the foundation for proper non-legal opinions. Nothing in any of the challenged sections of Gauntlett’s report—Sections I, II, III, IV, or VI—appears to actually offer any opinions of that non-legal variety. Indeed, at the hearing on the motion, the Court directly asked MNS’s counsel whether he could identify any sentence in the challenged sections of Gauntlett’s report that did more than merely describe and critique case law. Counsel could not do so. Accordingly, while it is sometimes appropriate for an expert to discuss legal materials to lay the groundwork for non-legal opinions about industry customs and practices, Gauntlett’s expert report cannot take refuge in that principle because his report—at least as far as coverage is concerned—merely discusses and critiques the case law and then simply stops there.

          Case Details:

          Case Caption: Allied World National Assurance Company V. Nhc, Inc.
          Docket Number: 1:22cv469
          Court: United States District Court, Hawaii
          Order Date: December 05, 2024