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  • Correctional Healthcare Expert Not Allowed to Opine on Physical Symptoms

    Correctional Healthcare Expert Not Allowed to Opine on Physical Symptoms

    This action arises from the death of Gregory Neil Davis while he was incarcerated as a pretrial detainee at the Oklahoma County Detention Center. Plaintiff, as special administrator of the estate of Davis, alleged that numerous Jail and Medical Defendants acted with deliberate indifference to Davis’ serious medical needs in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment and were negligent under state law.

    Plaintiff filed three motions to exclude or limit the testimony of Dr. Paul M. Adler, Kathryn J. Wild, RN and Lori E. Roscoe, PhD.

    Correctional Healthcare Expert Witness

    Paul Morris Adler is a licensed medical doctor with a board certification in emergency medicine and a background in providing medical care in correctional settings.

    Discover more cases with Paul Adler as an expert witness by ordering his comprehensive Expert Witness Profile report.

    Nursing Expert Witnesses

    Kathryn Jean Wild, RN is a registered nurse and a Certified Corrections Healthcare Professional. She has decades of experience as a nurse in correctional settings. 

    Get the full story on challenges to Kathryn Wild’s expert opinions and testimony with an in-depth Challenge Study.

    Lori Elisabeth Roscoe, Ph.D., APRN is a nurse practitioner and Certified Correctional Health Professional with decades of experience in correctional healthcare, including with policy development, staff supervision, and administration.

    Want to know more about the challenges Lori Roscoe has faced? Get the full details with our Challenge Study report.

    Discussion by the Court

    A. Motion to Exclude Testimony of Adler

    Adler’s report largely consisted of factual narrative followed by his observation as to what the underlying facts show, including conclusions that there is “no evidence” or no “information or testimony” suggesting that Davis communicated his physical symptoms to anyone at the jail. These statements did not involve the application of scientific, technical, or specialized knowledge but instead expressed opinions that are “essentially factual matters as to which expert testimony is inappropriate and/or unnecessary.”

    When Adler comes closer to expressing an opinion that might be the proper subject of expert testimony, he fails to identify facts, data, standards, practices, or any other reliable principles that support his conclusions. For example, Adler opined that it is probable that symptoms began after August 9th and that an earlier medical exam would not have changed the outcome, but he did not adequately explain the basis of these opinions. Adler also speculates about what Davis knew and inappropriately weighs in on the credibility of a witness.

    Given the deficiencies in Adler’s report, the Court granted the Plaintiff’s motion to exclude the testimony.

    B. Motion to Exclude Testimony of Nurse Wild

    Plaintiff argued that Kathryn Wild offered several opinions that are outside the scope of her expertise and challenged the reliability and relevance of the other opinions.

    The Court found that Wild is qualified to offer opinions as to whether the medical staff responded appropriately and complied with applicable standards based on Davis’ clinical presentation. Additionally, although Wild is not an expert as to jail operations in general, her experience renders her qualified to offer opinions on how medical and nursing services operate in a correctional setting.

    Wild reached her opinions by reviewing medical records, deposition testimony, facility documentation and other evidence and then applying her experience in correctional health care. Further, and importantly, she identified the correctional health care standards that govern and the facts that supported her opinions.

    However, Wild’s report suffered from two deficiencies that render certain opinions unreliable or unhelpful to the jury. First, her opinion that the medical and mental health staff were not deliberately indifferent is an impermissible legal conclusion. Second, Wild’s report included factual narrative followed by conclusions that there is “no evidence” or “no documentation” that Davis verbalized or demonstrated pain or distress. These opinions did not involve the application of any specialized medical or nursing knowledge and were simply based on testimony from staff stating that Davis did not request help and the absence of any reports of pain in the medical charting.

    C. Motion to Exclude Testimony of Nurse Roscoe

    Plaintiffs have identified Lori Roscoe, Ph.D., APRN as an expert witness that will opine on standards of care and the care provided to Davis while he was detained.

    The Medical Defendants argued that she was unqualified to offer opinions as to whether the actions of a licensed professional counselor that saw Davis during his incarceration were appropriate. They also contended that her opinions regarding the scope of practice of a licensed practical nurse are unreliable.

    Although Roscoe is not a licensed professional counselor, she has experience in correctional healthcare operations and staff supervision. Her opinions are grounded in that expertise as they speak to when correctional healthcare staff should escalate care to another provider as opposed to the quality of the counseling provided by the LPC or the adequacy of the psychiatric treatment provided to Davis. The Court held that Roscoe’s experience and training are sufficient to render her qualified to opine on standards and practices for referring patients in correctional settings for additional evaluation and treatment.

    The Medical Defendants contended that Roscoe’s opinion that the LPN acted outside the scope of her practice by making diagnostic decisions, and specifically by attributing Davis’ change in condition to a mental health problem without referring him for a medical evaluation, is unreliable because she did not cite any authority to support her opinion. The Court agreed that Roscoe’s opinion that the LPN “exceeded the scope of her practice” or acted “far outside the scope of LPN practice” is not supported by sufficient facts or reliable methods and principles.

    Additionally, Roscoe’s deposition testimony indicated that the basis of her criticism of the LPN’s actions is not necessarily that she referred him to mental health, but that she did not also refer him for a medical evaluation given his symptoms.

    Although Roscoe’s explanation of the applicable standards could have been more detailed, the Court found that her opinion that the LPN’s actions deviated from accepted standards is sufficient to satisfy Rule 702‘s reliability requirements.

    Held

    • The Court granted the Plaintiff’s motion to exclude or limit the testimony of Dr. Paul Adler.
    • The Court granted in part and denied in part the Plaintiff’s motion to exclude or limit the testimony of Kathryn J. Wild, RN.
    • The Court granted in part and denied in part the Plaintiff’s motion to exclude or limit the testimony of Lori Roscoe, PhD.

    Key Takeaway

    An expert opinion “must be based on facts which enable her to express a reasonably accurate conclusion as opposed to conjecture or speculation.” The credibility of witnesses is generally not an appropriate subject for expert testimony.

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Simms V. Board Of County Commissioners For Oklahoma County
    Docket Number: 5:23cv780
    Court Name: United States District Court, Oklahoma Western
    Order Date: February 03, 2026
  • Legal Expert Not Allowed to Opine on Reimbursement Allocation

    Legal Expert Not Allowed to Opine on Reimbursement Allocation

    Plaintiff Navigators Specialty Insurance Company sued SVO Building One, LLC for reimbursement of $5.5 million (before accrued interest) paid in defense of claims that were not even potentially covered under the applicable insurance policy.

    SVO filed a Daubert motion to exclude the testimony of Navigators’ expert witness André E. Jardini.

    Law And Legal Expert Witness

    André Emilio Jardini specializes in complex litigation, and his experience in this area is wide-ranging and diverse, including trial work in insurance bad faith and coverage cases, employment and wrongful termination cases, intellectual property, business torts, and real estate litigation.

    In his career, Jardini has been the principal trial attorney in more than 50 lawsuits tried to jury verdict, each with exposure in the six-to-eight figure range. He also has been involved in environmental litigation, federal and multidistrict litigation, products litigation, and toxic tort litigation.

    Want to know more about the challenges André Jardini has faced? Get the full details with our Challenge Study report.

    Discussion by the Court

    Navigators proffered Jardini as an expert to opine on the proper reimbursement allocation for costs paid by Navigators in the Underlying Action.

    SVO contended that the Court should exclude Jardini because his report is unreliable and irrelevant, as Jardini “ignored the applicable standard for determining whether attorneys’ fees and expenses may be reimbursed to an insurer set forth by the California Supreme Court.”

    The Court agreed that Jardini is an improper expert under Rule 702 because his analysis incorrectly applied the operative legal standard and was thus irrelevant.

    Jardini’s report explained that he “identified services that were possibly partially related to a defamation claim. In making this analysis, he had in mind the overwhelming import in the case of the various trade secret claims as opposed to the defamation claim as shown by SVO.”

    But the standard is not simply whether attorney time is more likely than not related to defamation and it does not take into consideration the “overwhelming import” of a claim. Rather, the proper question is whether attorney time more likely than not “can be allocated solely to the claims that are not even potentially covered.”

    Jardini’s application of a standard of “overwhelming import” to his assessment of costs attributable to the covered claims plainly departed from the established standards. Thus, the Court found that Jardini’s opinion is not only unhelpful, it is irrelevant as it does not have “a valid connection to the pertinent inquiry.”

    Held

    The Court granted SVO’s motion to exclude the testimony of André Jardini.

    Key Takeaway

    Expert testimony which does not relate to any issue in the case is not relevant and, ergo, non-helpful. Nothing in either Daubert or the Federal Rules of Evidence requires a district court to admit opinion evidence that is connected to existing data only by the ipse dixit of the expert.

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Navigators Specialty Insurance Company V. SVO Building One, LLC
    Docket Number: 3:22cv7102
    Court Name: United States District Court, California Northern
    Order Date: April 30, 2026
  • Civil Engineering Expert Allowed to Opine on Speed Bumps

    Civil Engineering Expert Allowed to Opine on Speed Bumps

    Plaintiff Luz Query tripped and fell over a speed bump located in the parking lot of the Costco warehouse in New Orleans, Louisiana.

    Plaintiffs, Luz Query and Lance Query brought this negligence action seeking damages for Luz’s past and future medicals, pain and suffering, mental anguish, and loss of enjoyment of life, and for Lance’s loss of consortium.

    Defendant asked the Court to exclude Plaintiffs’ expert, Neil B. Hall, PhD because his testing methods cannot be reproduced and he did not base his opinions on applicable safety standards. 

    Civil Engineering Expert Witness

    Neil Bradley Hall is a licensed professional engineer, architect, landscape architect and interior designer with 20 years of design/build experience with the Army Corps of Engineers and Navy Civil Engineer Corps, in addition to more than 30 years of experience in the field and courtroom as a forensic engineer in private practice.

    Want to know more about the challenges Neil B. Hall has faced? Get the full details with our Challenge Study report. 

    Discussion by the Court

    First, Defendants did not challenge the legitimacy of the ASTM standards nor their general acceptance in the community as a reasonable set of standards upon which to base one’s opinions. Defendant argued that Hall’s opinions should be excluded because he did not reference any other set of safety standards. But Defendant cited no case where a Court has excluded an expert because they referenced only one widely accepted set of safety standards. The Court will not exclude Hall on that basis.

    Costco also presses that the opinions are irrelevant because the City of New Orleans does not require Costco to adhere to the ASTM safety standards. That the City of New Orleans did not require Costco to have ASTM-compliant speed bumps in its parking lots did not mean that the ASTM standards are illegitimate, unaccepted in the broad community of experts, or are otherwise unfit to be referenced as a standardized suggestion of recommended safety practices. Overall, the Court will not exclude Hall just because he relied upon the ASTM.

    Second, Defendant suggested that Hall’s report did not rest on reliable principles and methods because, for example, he did not perform any “testing.” But replicable tests, for example, are not a black letter requirement under Rule 702 nor Daubert.

    Third, Costco separately challenged the report as irrelevant because his proffered observations are within the common experience and understanding of jurors.  Here, because the ASTM standards purportedly do not apply to Costco, Hall is in a unique position to explain the benefits and risks of Costco deciding to follow the guidelines suggested in a general set of safety standards, like those offered in the ASTM. Hall’s assistance to the trier of fact is further supported by his years of experience studying urban planning, architecture, and as a licensed civil engineer. 

    Held

    The Court denied Defendant’s motion to exclude Plaintiffs’ expert Neil B. Hall.

    Key Takeaway

    True, the common juror is capable of observing a photograph of a speed bump and making their own determination about its relative safety. But Hall’s testimony can add additional beneficial layers and, importantly, “bring to the jury more than the lawyers can offer in argument.” Hall relied on his extensive experience in opining on whether Costco should have taken additional safety measures with respect to its speed bumps.

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Query V. Costco Wholesale Corporation
    Docket Number: 2:24cv2082
    Court Name: United States District Court, Louisiana Eastern
    Order Date: May 04, 2026
  • Civil Engineering Expert Was Not Allowed to Opine on Housekeeping Standards

    Civil Engineering Expert Was Not Allowed to Opine on Housekeeping Standards

    On April 29, 2024, Helen Olenik and John Olenik were passengers aboard Carnival Corporation’s ship, M/V Carnival Pride. Helen Olenik fell on an exterior tile floor after walking through sliding glass doors leading from the interior of the ship to the Serenity pool deck.

    Defendants filed a motion to strike and exclude the opinions of Plaintiff’s experts, Francisco De Caso Basalo and Nicholas D. A. Suite, and a separate motion to strike Plaintiff’s supplemental Rule 26 expert disclosure for Nicholas Suite, as well as the untimely supplemental disclosure concerning Victoria Maria-Sekunda.

    Civil Engineering Expert Witness

    Francisco Jose De Caso Y Basalo has over fifteen years of experience conducting slip resistance evaluations in maritime and other environments, has testified as an expert in numerous slip-and-fall cases, and participates in the Advancing Standards Transforming Markets (“ASTM”) F13 Committee on Pedestrian/Walkway Safety and Footwear Standards Development.

    De Caso is also the founder of The Integrated Built Infrastructure Group LLC, which specializes in pedestrian walkway safety and slip resistance evaluation. He is a Certified XL Tribometrist, has completed the Walkway Safety Certification program at the University of North Texas College of Engineering, and has earned the Walkway Auditor Certificate from the National Floor Safety Institute.

    Discover more cases with Francisco De Caso as an expert witness by ordering his comprehensive Expert Witness Profile report. 

    Neurology Expert Witness

    Nicholas David Alexander Suite received his M.D. from The Johns Hopkins University School of Medicine and completed postgraduate training in neurology (including chief residency) at The New York Hospital–Cornell University Medical Center, with an additional year of neurology residency at the University of Miami School of Medicine. He is the Owner and Director of Neurology Diagnosis & Applied Solutions (NDAS) and has served in academic teaching roles including Clinical Assistant Professor of Neurology at Nova Southeastern University’s Dr. Kiran C. Patel College of Allopathic Medicine.

    Get the full story on challenges to Nicholas D.A. Suite’s expert opinions and testimony with an in-depth Challenge Study.

    Neuropsychology Expert Witness

    Victoria-Maria S. Sekunda, PsyD is a board certified clinical neuropsychologist who conducts neuropsychological evaluations and diagnostic assessments, primarily with older adults on an outpatient basis. 

    Want to know more about the challenges Victoria-Maria Sekunda has faced? Get the full details with our Challenge Study report.

    Discussion by the Court

    i. Dr. Francisco De Caso

    Carnival contended that De Caso is not qualified to opine on human factors or housekeeping standards. Also, Carnival avers that the majority of De Caso’s opinions are speculative and unsupported by a reliable methodology.

    The Court noted that Carnival did not contest De Caso’s qualifications as a slip resistance expert but challenged his qualifications to opine about human factors and housekeeping standards.

    Carnival did not contest the reliability of De Caso’s slip index measurements of the subject floor but challenged his opinions as lacking any identifiable methodology. These included his opinions that the floor was more likely than not to become wet at the time of the incident, as well as his later observations—made approximately one and a half years afterward—of a grease film, which he inferred was present on the day in question. With respect to De Caso’s opinions beyond his slip index testing, Plaintiff failed to establish any reliable methodology.

    It should be noted that Plaintiff has agreed to redact all legal conclusions from the expert report and limit the testimony of De Caso to opinions related to his slip index testing. 

    ii. Dr. Nicholas Suite and Dr. Victoria-Maria Sekunda

    After the filing of the motion, on February 4, 2026, Plaintiff served Carnival a supplemental Rule 26 expert witness disclosure which included a report from Suite. Thereafter, on February 6, 2026, Plaintiff served Carnival a second supplemental disclosure which disclosed a new witness, Dr. Victoria-Maria Sekunda, and a copy of her report concerning neuropsychological evaluations conducted of Helen Olenik.

    Carnival argued that discovery closed on January 6, 2026, and the deadline for the Parties to file dispositive pre-trial motions was January 28, 2026. As such, Carnival contended that the late disclosure of those reports is neither substantially justified nor harmless, and the reports should be excluded. Carnival also sought to exclude the testimony of Suite and Sekunda.

    Carnival pointed out that even though Suite evaluated Helen Olenik and prepared a report dated September 22, 2025, the report was not served until four months later, after discovery closed and the deadline for filing dispositive motions passed. Basically, Carnival contended that this report is the first time it has been asserted that Helen Olenik’s post-incident mental decline was caused by a head injury. Likewise, Carnival pointed out that Sekunda first evaluated Helen Olenik on November 25, 2025, yet the February 6, 2026, supplemental notice was the first time Sekunda’s role as a treating doctor was disclosed.

    The Court found that Plaintiff has not satisfied his burden of showing that the failure to comply with Rule 26 was substantially justified or harmless.

    As Plaintiff acknowledged, Suite’s report was not provided until February 4, 2026, well after the close of discovery and after the deadline to exchange expert witness reports. Similarly, Sekunda was not disclosed as an expert until February 6, 2026.

    As for Suite, Plaintiff has offered no explanation for why he did not seek an extension of the Court’s deadlines.

    Held

    • The Court granted the Defendant’s motion to strike and exclude the opinions from the Plaintiff’s experts, Francisco De Caso Basalo.
    • The Court also granted the Defendant’s motion to strike the Plaintiff’s supplemental Rule 26 expert witness disclosure for Nicholas Suite and untimely supplemental disclosure of Victoria Maria-Sekunda.

    Key Takeaway

    In determining whether a failure to disclose was substantially justified or harmless, the Court considers the non-disclosing party’s explanation for the failure, the importance of the information, and any prejudice to the opposing party if the information were admitted.

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Olenik V. Carnival Corporation
    Docket Number: 1:25cv20901
    Court Name: United States District Court, Florida Southern
    Order Date: April 03, 2026
  • Accounting Expert Was Not Allowed to Opine on Damages to Uninsureds

    Accounting Expert Was Not Allowed to Opine on Damages to Uninsureds

    This case centers on a landslide that occurred in May 2017 in the Cincinnati neighborhood of Mount Adams. At the time of the landslide, Plaintiff Metropolitan Design & Development, LLC (“MDD”) was insured under a commercial liability policy with Defendant Frankenmuth Mutual Insurance Company (“Frankenmuth”). MDD performed construction work in the vicinity of the landslide prior to the event, and several lawsuits alleged that MDD’s negligence caused the landslide, resulting in damage to nearby properties.

    MDD immediately notified Frankenmuth of the lawsuits and provided documentation, but Frankenmuth declined to defend MDD in these actions.

    Plaintiffs alleged that, in failing to defend MDD in the prior landslide lawsuits, Frankenmuth breached the terms and conditions of its insurance policy with MDD.

    Plaintiffs proffered two expert witnesses in support of their case: Charles M. Miller and Rebekah A. Smith.

    Insurance Expert Witness

    Charles Murray Miller is a former insurance claims adjuster and manager, as well as a lawyer practicing insurance law. He has held several insurance claims positions, including senior adjuster, branch office general adjuster, and claims manager.

    Discover more cases with Charles Miller as an expert witness by ordering his comprehensive Expert Witness Profile report.

    Accounting Expert Witness

    Rebekah Anne Smith is a Certified Public Accountant who specializes in forensic accounting. She has over 29 years of relevant business and analytical experience.

    Want to know more about the challenges Rebekah Smith has faced? Get the full details with our Challenge Study report.

    Discussion by the Court

    Charles Miller

    Frankenmuth contended that Miller’s opinions and analysis offered legal conclusions based on the National Association of Insurance Commissioners’ Model Unfair Claims Settlement Practices Act and Regulations, which are encoded in Ohio law and enforced through Ohio regulations.

    Frankenmuth also argued that the Court should exclude Miller’s testimony due to their unreliability, as “Miller’s opinions merely amount to criticisms of Frankenmuth’s claims handling processes without grappling with the reality of this case and the facts in the record.”

    Miller’s opinions are based on general insurance standards that mirror relevant statutes and regulations. Thus, while “Miller’s opinions may verge on legal conclusions,” this “does not mean his entire testimony should be excluded” — instead, Frankenmuth “can object at trial to any questions that it believes would invite an improper response.”

    Frankenmuth’s argument here centers around its contention that Miller ignored countervailing facts, and because Frankenmuth does not identify omissions significant enough to render Miller’s opinions unreliable, the Court declined to exclude Miller’s testimony on this basis.

    Rebekah Smith

    Frankenmuth contended that Smith’s opinions (1) consisted of “simple math,” (2) were calculated using information about MDD’s financials provided by Plaintiff Matthew Fenik, one of MDD’s principals, that Smith failed to independently verify, (3) omitted consideration of MDD’s working capital during the relevant period, and (4) violated the standards of objectivity that Smith herself outlined in professional publications.

    As to Frankenmuth’s characterization of Smith’s opinions as “simple math,” the Court disagreed. Because this type of financial analysis is grounded in Smith’s specialized knowledge as a forensic accountant, it qualifies as expert testimony.

    The Court is unpersuaded by Frankenmuth’s argument contesting the reliability of Smith’s testimony. Frankenmuth asserted that Smith’s opinions are speculative because she should have considered more than just MDD’s financial representations, but Frankenmuth pointed to no other sources of information that she could have examined. This argument does not suffice to exclude Smith’s testimony. As it seems Smith did in fact consider MDD’s working capital during the relevant period, the Court is also unwilling to exclude her report and testimony on this basis. 

    Frankenmuth also pointed out that Smith considered damages to non-insured persons in conducting her analysis, and it argued that such considerations are “plainly irrelevant.” Under Ohio law, only insured persons can recover for bad-faith denial of insurance coverage. Therefore, because Smith’s opinions as to damages to non-insureds would not help the trier of fact to determine any damages amount in this case, which would exclude damages to non-insureds, Smith’s opinions about damages suffered by non-insured persons and entities are irrelevant.

    Held

    • The Court denied the Defendant’s motion to exclude the testimony of Charles Miller.
    • The Court granted in part and denied in part the Defendant’s motion to exclude the testimony of Rebekah A. Smith.

    Key Takeaway

    Expert testimony must help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue. Expert testimony which does not relate to any issue in the case is not relevant and, ergo, non-helpful.

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Metropolitan Design & Development, LLC V. Frankenmuth Mutual Insurance Company
    Docket Number: 1:25cv38
    Court Name: United States District Court, Ohio Southern
    Order Date: April 29, 2026
  • Neurology Expert’s Legal Theories Excluded

    Neurology Expert’s Legal Theories Excluded

    J. M. was diagnosed with epilepsy in sixth grade. His condition was treated with multiple medications, but he continued to have breakthrough seizures. Sam’s Law (HB 684) requires all Texas public school personnel to be trained in the recognition of seizures and providing seizure first aid.

    On August 24, 2022, J. M. had a seizure while running on the school’s track. The school called his mother Apryl Mendoza to notify her that J. M. was seizing and that emergency medical services were in route. Apryl called Gabriel Mendoza, and when he arrived at the scene, J. M. had been seizing for approximately seventeen minutes and had not received his prescribed dose of nasal midazolam. Emergency medical personnel arrived and began performing CPR on J. M. before transporting him to the hospital. He died the following day at the age of fourteen.

    In this disability discrimination case, Plaintiffs sought to recover for injuries allegedly resulting from the prolonged seizure of fourteen-year-old J.M. while he was at school, and who later died as a result. Defendant is the school district where the alleged events took place.

    Defendant filed three motions to exclude Plaintiffs’ retained experts Dr. Dave Shahani, Ms. Monica Porras, and Dr. Francis Sheboy.

    Neurology Expert Witness

    Dr. Dave Naresh Shahani is a licensed and practicing physician, board-certified by the American Board of Psychiatry and Neurology with special qualification in Child Neurology and Epilepsy. His practice is focused on the diagnosis and management of children and adolescents with neurologic conditions and intractable epilepsy.

    Discover more cases with Dave Shahani as an expert witness by ordering his comprehensive Expert Witness Profile report.

    Nursing Expert Witness

    Monica Porras, MSN, RN, NCSN has been an active licensed nurse since 2006 and specializes in pediatrics with a focus in school nursing. She has served as a school nurse for the last 9 years of her career. She is a Nationally Certified School Nurse.

    Want to know more about the challenges Monica Porras has faced? Get the full details with our Challenge Study report.

    Education Expert Witness

    Francis N. Sheboy has 33 years of professional experience in public education. As an educator, she served as a high school social studies teacher; high school assistant principal and principal; assistant superintendent for curriculum, instruction, personnel, and technology; and superintendent of schools.

    His educational background included a bachelor’s degree in social studies education, a master’s degree in social studies education, a certificate program in educational administration with a focus on supervision and evaluation, and a doctoral degree in educational leadership, management, and policy from Seton Hall University in South Orange, New Jersey.

    Get the full story on challenges to Francis Sheboy’s expert opinions and testimony with an in-depth Challenge Study.

    Discussion by the Court

    Dave Shahani

    Defendant argued that Shahani’s November 2025 expert report “transforms previously uncertain factual points into definitive assertions,” and introduced “legal theories of ‘intentional discrimination’ and ‘deliberate indifference’” that were not in his previous June 2024 report.

    The Court agreed with Defendant that these are legal conclusions and should be excluded as irrelevant and unhelpful to the trier of fact.

    Defendant also asserted that Shahani’s discussion of Sam’s Law, found in both the June 2024 and November 2025 reports, should be excluded because “whether school personnel complied with statutory training requirements or internal policies is a legal and factual question for the Court and jury.”

    Shahani may discuss Sam’s Law in the context of his medical expertise, and may provide his opinion as to the facts of the case within that context. This includes how the law might relate to his testimony regarding the guidelines set out by the American Epilepsy Society or J. M.’s seizure action plan. However, Shahani cannot testify that “[J. M.] was not treated per the standard of care outlines by Sam’s Law.” First, because this is an impermissible legal conclusion, and second, because Defendant is correct that Sam’s Law does not provide a standard of care, such testimony would confuse and mislead the jury.

    Monica Porras

    Defendant also moved to exclude the testimony of Monica Porras, arguing that Porras’ testimony ‘substitutes legal conclusions and advocacy for expert analysis” and would “improperly instruct the jury on the law.” Porras’ November 2, 2025 report included testimony that a “knowing refusal to administer medication” constitutes “intentional discrimination or deliberate indifference under Title II of the ADA.” She then concluded that J. M. was “denied an ADA-protected accommodation” and “died as a result.”

    The Court agreed with the Plaintiffs that experts can opine as to industry standards and discuss whether conduct is consistent with those standards.

    As a result, testimony that a “knowing refusal to administer medication” constitutes “intentional discrimination or deliberate indifference under Title II of the ADA,” that J. M. was “denied an ADA-protected accommodation,” or any similar legal conclusions relating to the ADA was excluded.

    However, the Court refused to exclude testimony simply because it mentions the ADA within the context of Porras’ discussion of industry customs or practices related to her experience as a school nurse.

    Francis Sheboy

    Defendant moved to exclude the testimony of Plaintiffs’ expert Dr. Francis Sheboy because he “purports to offer opinions regarding the school’s compliance with federal disability laws and its alleged deliberate indifference.” Experts cannot offer legal conclusions in their testimony. As a result, any testimony by Sheboy containing legal conclusions, such as above, will be excluded. 

    Defendant also argued that Sheboy should not be able to opine as to J. M.’s disability status and eligibility under the ADA because he is not a medical doctor.

    Although Sheboy may discuss J. M.’s condition within the context of his experience in education administration, the Court held that statements like J. M.’s epilepsy and accompanying seizures “clearly constituted qualifying impairments that substantially limited major life activities” and “entitled him to protections under federal disability law” are legal conclusions that must be excluded.

    Held

    The Court agreed with Defendant that portions of each challenged expert’s testimony contain impermissible legal conclusions, are irrelevant, and risk confusing the jury. However, the Court also agreed with Plaintiffs that the appropriate remedy is limitation, not wholesale exclusion of the witnesses.

    Accordingly, the Court granted Defendant’s motions insofar as Plaintiffs’ experts will not be permitted to include any legal conclusions in their testimony, as explained above. This includes any testimony that states or applies ADA legal standards, or otherwise uses legal labels such as “deliberate indifference” or “intentional discrimination.” The Court denied Defendant’s motions to the extent they sought to exclude Plaintiffs’ experts and their opinions in their entirety.

    Key Takeaway

    Qualified experts are permitted to offer opinion testimony as to industry standards or norms and whether or not they were followed in a particular case, as long as such opinions involves questions of fact rather than purely legal matters.

    This could include the discussion of statutes, such as the ADA, in relation to how they relate to industry standards or practices, but cannot include legal conclusions relating to those statutes.

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Mendoza V. Amarillo Independent School District
    Docket Number: 2:24cv169
    Court Name: United States District Court, Texas Northern
    Order Date: March 19, 2026
  • Transportation Expert Allowed to Opine on Aluminum Loading

    Transportation Expert Allowed to Opine on Aluminum Loading

    This is a personal injury case arising from the death of Asa Eugene Parnell (“Parnell”). On July 8, 2024, Parnell and his co-worker picked up a pre-loaded flatbed trailer from Defendant Tower Extrusions, LLC’s (“Defendant”) facility in Wylie, Texas. Plaintiffs, relatives of Parnell, alleged that the trailer was illegally overloaded with thousands of pounds of aluminum, alleging negligence and negligence per se against Defendant.

    Defendant filed a motion to exclude the report of Brooks Rugemer, a commercial trucking specialist retained by the Plaintiffs. Basically, Defendant argued that some of Rugemer’s opinions lacked a factual foundation, that Rugemer is unqualified, and that Rugemer’s opinions are unreliable or irrelevant.

    Transportation Expert Witness

    Brooks Rugemer has twelve years of experience as a professional tractor trailer driver, thirty years of experience with transportation-related accident investigations, and he is a Certified Director of Safety recognized by the North American Transportation Management Institute.

    Get the full story on challenges to Brooks Rugemer’s expert opinions and testimony with an in-depth Challenge Study.

    Discussion by the Court

    A. Rugemer’s Opinions Regarding the Trailer Axle and Overweight Load

    Defendant argued that no factual foundation supported Rugemer’s statement that “it was discovered” that Defendant overloaded the trailer. Defendant also argued that Rugemer applied the wrong weight formula because different axle configurations have different weight regulations.

    As to the first concern, the Court found that the challenge goes to the weight of Rugemer’s testimony, rather than admissibility. The second concern also goes to weight, particularly in light of the Court’s decision to grant summary judgment on the negligence per se theory of breach.

    B. Rugemer’s Qualifications

    Defendant also argued that Rugemer’s report and resume “did not demonstrate he is qualified to offer expert testimony on nuanced aluminum extrusion loading standards.” Defendant further argued that Rugemer’s reliance on “blogs” demonstrated his “lack of expertise in this area.”

    Even though his experience did not specifically relate to aluminum loading, after reviewing Rugemer’s qualifications, the Court found that he is qualified to testify as an expert in this case. Whether his lack of experience with aluminum casts doubt on his testimony is a matter for cross-examination.

    C. Rugemer’s Methodology

    The main methodology challenge is that Rugemer did not sufficiently discuss Parnell’s potential role in the accident, and that this deficiency
    demonstrated that Rugemer did not apply a reliable methodology.

    The Court has already ruled that, notwithstanding Parnell’s duty to secure the cargo, Defendant had a duty to exercise reasonable care in loading the cargo—at least to prevent hidden and latent defects. The Court is not convinced that Rugemer and Defendant’s disagreements about which party had a duty or what regulations should have been followed warrant excluding Rugemer’s
    testimony.

    Defendant also argued that “unreliable methodology aside, Rugemer’s report is devoid of any independent or verifiable analysis supporting his conclusion; he merely assumes that Defendant loaded heavier bundles on top lighter bundles.” The Court found that these concerns go to the weight of Rugemer’s opinions.

    D. Relevance of Failure to Warn Opinion

    Defendant took issue with Rugemer’s statement that Parnell was not warned of the potential hazard of removing the belly straps that were securing the load. In Defendant’s view, the opinion is not relevant because “this is not a workplace injury.” The Court found that it is more likely than not that Rugemer’s testimony will be relevant and helpful for the jury.

    Held

    In short, the Court is persuaded that Brooks Rugemer is qualified as an expert under Rule 702, and that Rule 702’s prongs are established by a preponderance of the evidence.

    Key Takeaway

    An independent investigation is not required for an expert to pass muster under Rule 702 (particularly here, when the cargo at issue was delivered by the time Plaintiffs retained him), and whether Rugemer should have looked at different pictures or the characteristics of more loads is a matter for cross-examination.

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Smith V. Extrusions
    Docket Number: 4:24cv811
    Court Name: United States District Court, Texas Eastern
    Order Date: April 30, 2026
  • Construction Management Expert Allowed to Opine on Project Delays

    Construction Management Expert Allowed to Opine on Project Delays

    This action concerns insurance claims arising from water inundation events at the McCook Reservoir Tunnel Project in Hodgkins, Illinois.

    Walsh filed a motion to exclude the declaration and expert reports of Lexington’s expert, Rachel Domingo.

    Construction Management Expert Witness

    Rachel Domingo has more than 10 years of experience specializing in project controls, project scheduling, delay damages, productivity and performance damages, change order negotiations, litigation support, and the development or defense of construction claims.

    Domingo earned a Bachelor of Science degree in Construction Management from Polytechnic Institute of New York University.

    Get the full story on challenges to Rachel Domingo’s expert opinions and testimony with an in-depth Challenge Study.

    Discussion by the Court

    Walsh argued that Domingo’s declaration and reports should be excluded because: (1) her testimony is irrelevant and her opinions are not tied to the Policy’s language nor the facts of the case; and (2) they are inadmissible.

    A. Expert Testimony

    On August 10, 2022, Domingo issued a report which concluded that delays in the project were driven by delays in the fabrication of the gate system rather than the Floods. Because Domingo’s opinion directly informs why Lexington denied the claims, it is undoubtedly relevant to the issues in this case.

    Walsh further contended that Domingo’s declaration and report should be excluded because her opinions are not tied to the terms of the Policy. Specifically, Walsh argued that Domingo’s analysis is tied to the project’s completion date instead of the construction schedule in place at the time of the alleged loss, as required by the Policy. However, Domingo is opining on whether Walsh actually incurred the costs claimed and whether either Flood actually caused the alleged Expediting Expenses and Extra Expenses. The Court found that Domingo’s failure to ground her opinions in the Policy language did not mean her testimony is irrelevant or unhelpful to the factfinder; indeed, it is relevant to causation.

    Walsh also disagreed with Domingo’s determination that in the absence of either Flood, Walsh would have had months of downtime due to delays unrelated to the Floods, such that Walsh did not incur Expediting Expenses or Extra Expenses. But Walsh’s disagreement with Domingo’s conclusion is not a basis for exclusion, it is a basis for cross-examination.

    B. Admissibility

    Next, Walsh argued that the Court should not consider Domingo’s declaration or expert reports because they are inadmissible hearsay. Expert reports and declarations, themselves, are generally not admissible at trial.

    However, Domingo’s declaration summarizes her reports, her reports are sworn to in her declaration, and the reports reflect what she would testify to at trial. 

    Moreover, Domingo stated that she “reviewed documents provided by Walsh during the claim adjustment and additional documents produced in this litigation,” and that the documents she considered are identified in the footnotes of her Rule 26 expert report. 

    Held

    The Court denied Walsh’s motion to exclude the declaration and reports of Rachel Domingo.

    Key Takeaway

    The Court’s primary concern is “the validity of the methodology employed by an expert, not the quality of the data used in applying the methodology or the conclusions produced.”

    Additionally, expert testimony must be tied to the case’s facts and issues. A Court should not exclude expert testimony that speaks on a relevant issue that the factfinder must decide.

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Walsh Construction Company II, LLC V. Lexington Insurance Company
    Docket Number: 1:22cv6842
    Court Name: United States District Court, Illinois Northern
    Order Date: April 28, 2026
  • Railroad Expert Was Not Allowed to Opine on Hand Brake

    Railroad Expert Was Not Allowed to Opine on Hand Brake

    Plaintiff Justin W. Hedden brought suit against Toledo Peoria & Western Railway, Corp. and its corporate parent Genessee & Wyoming Railroad Services, Inc. for injuries he sustained while working on the railroad.

    Defendants sought an order excluding the opinions of Hedden’s expert, John David Engle.

    Railroad Expert Witness

    John David Engle worked in the railroad industry for decades. Engle has a long history of working in the railroad industry and testifying as an expert witness in FELA matters. He has worked as a carman, technical instructor, training officer, and air brakes superintendent for Norfolk Southern.

    Get the full story on challenges to John David Engle’s expert opinions and testimony with an in-depth Challenge Study.

    Discussion by the Court

    1. Opinion 1: The Hand Brake was Inefficient

    Engle’s first opinion relates to whether the hand brake was “efficient.” The Court found that Engle’s expert report is devoid of any explanation of the methodology he used in reaching his opinion that the hand brake was inefficient. Engle did not inspect the hand brake at issue in this case. Moreover, he did not have a clear theory as to what made the hand brake fail to release when Hedden pulled on it with the brake stick.

    Not only did he lack a sufficiently reliable methodology for this opinion, but what methodology he did have reveals that his testimony would not be helpful to the jury. Engle admitted that his opinion as to the “condition of the hand brake at the time of the incident” relies “solely on Hedden’s description of the hand brake.”

    With no analysis of the hand brake, nor a clear theory as to why it was defective and thus inefficient, Engle’s opinion here boils down to “his belief that Plaintiff’s account of the incident is true.”

    2. Opinion 2: TPW Failed to Inspect and Maintain the Railcars

    In his second opinion, Engle asserted that TPW failed to inspect and maintain the railcars “because the freight car hand brake did not function as intended.”

    First, there is literally no explanation or analysis in Engle’s report as to how he arrived at that opinion. In other words, it is entirely conclusory. He simply stated that, because the hand brake did not function as intended, TPW must have been failing to inspect and maintain the railcars. There is no discussion, for example, of what would constitute proper and regular inspections or an analysis of TPW’s maintenance protocol.

    Second, like the previous opinion, this opinion appears to be wholly based on Hedden’s account of the Incident. It includes no mention or citation to any further investigation by Engle of additional sources, such as TPW’s regular inspection or maintenance practices for railcars. Since his opinion here rests “solely on his acceptance of Plaintiff’s account, the testimony amounted to nothing more than an invitation to the jury to believe his assessment of Plaintiff’s truthfulness” and is thus inadmissible. Third, since the Court has already found that he cannot testify as to whether the brake was efficient or had a defect, and this opinion builds directly on that premise, this opinion now has no admissible support and is thus itself inadmissible.

    3. Opinion 3: The Railcar Involved in the Incident Was Not Properly Identified and Therefore Not Properly Inspected

    Engle’s third opinion is that the freight car involved in the Incident was not properly identified and therefore could not have been properly inspected.

    Engle primarily relied on two key data points in arriving at this opinion. The first is that Hedden and Cardine were told to move the train to the lift, which required them to finish building the train after the Incident and then moved it to its next destination, which made it difficult to figure out which railcar was involved in the Incident. Indeed, he cited to Meyer’s deposition where Meyer admitted that, because he was uncertain as to which railcar was involved, he had to narrow it down to five cars and inspect all of them. The second was that the railcar involved in the Incident was a lighter color than any of the ones Meyer inspected.

    Starting with his methodology, Engle’s reasoning relies on a few different sources, as well as his experience in railyard operations. Engle has experience in building and moving trains in railyards and can testify as to how this can make identifying a particular railcar difficult. While he partially walked back his second reason for this opinion, the opinion still finds support in his first reason: that the continued building and movement of the train made Meyer’s identification of the correct railcar questionable.

    A railcar could match the description and still be the wrong car, and Engle is qualified to explain why. A railyard is a complicated and complex environment. It will be helpful to jurors to have testimony about that environment so the jury can assess whether Defendants did in fact inspect the wrong railcar.

    4. Opinion 4: The Inspection of the Hand Brake was Deficient because Meyer did not use a Brake Stick on It

    Engle’s fourth opinion is that the inspection of the railcar was deficient because Meyer did not use the brake stick Hedden was using, or indeed, any brake stick, on the hand brake as part of the inspection.

    Defendants alleged that Engle lacked sufficient expertise specifically about brake sticks to make this opinion that a proper inspection would have used one.

    Engle’s opinion relates primarily to what constitutes a proper inspection. Engle asserts that a proper inspection would have recreated the conditions of the Incident, which, in this case, would have meant using a brake stick on the hand brake. Even if Defendants are right that Engle is not sufficiently experienced with brake stick usage specifically, that does not mean his opinion that a proper inspection would have used one to recreate the conditions of the Incident is invalid. He has sufficient expertise in railyard operations to testify as to what he believes would have constituted a proper inspection and has provided sufficiently reliable reasoning for this opinion.

    5. Opinion 5: TPW failed to Properly Train Its Employees

    Engle’s last opinion is that TPW failed to properly train certain employees, including Hedden, on how to perform interchange inspections, including specifically on the hand brake and air brake systems and the associated riggings.

    Defendants asserted that Engle’s opinion here is essentially insisting that transportation employees like Hedden be trained on brake systems like mechanical employees and that, in any event, Hedden was not following the safety rules in the events leading up to the Incident.

    Unlike Engle’s opinion regarding the hand brake, his opinion on training “does not require Engle’s physical examination of the hand brake” and Defendants’ arguments do not suggest that his “methodology is unreliable.” Instead, they focus more on his outcome, asserting that the high level of training Engle asserts is necessary is “a nonsensical proposition.” But the Court, as gatekeeper, is “primarily concerned with methodology, not conclusions.”

    Held

    The Court granted in part and denied in part Defendants’ motion to exclude the testimony of John David Engle.

    Key Takeaway

    The Court focuses on principles and methodology, not on the conclusions they generate. The goal of the Rule 702 inquiry “is to assure that experts employ the same ‘intellectual rigor’ in their courtroom testimony as would be employed by an expert in the relevant field.”

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Hedden V. Toledo Peoria & Western Railway Corp.
    Docket Number: 4:22cv24
    Court Name: United States District Court, Indiana Northern
    Order Date: April 10, 2026
  • Forensic Accounting Expert Not Allowed to Opine on Household Services

    Forensic Accounting Expert Not Allowed to Opine on Household Services

    This is a medical malpractice action which arises from care provided by Defendant Richard Bellon, M.D. (“Dr. Bellon”) to Plaintiff Lauren Bern a/k/a Lauren Britton (“Ms. Bern”) in February 2021 at Defendant HCA-HealthONE LLC d/b/a Swedish Medical Center (“SMC”) after Bern suffered a stroke following the procedure, resulting in injuries.

    In support of their alleged damages, Plaintiffs Bern and her husband, Joshua Britton disclosed several experts while Defendants, in turn, disclosed rebuttal experts, including a forensic accountant, Alison Wise, CPA and a physical medicine and rehabilitation doctor, Kara E. Flavin, M.D. Plaintiffs filed motions to strike certain opinions of Wise and Flavin.

    Forensic Accounting Expert Witness

    Alison Wise is a forensic accountant in the CPA firm of Matson, Driscoll & Damico, LLP (“MDD”). She has eleven years of experience in evaluating forensic accounting cases and measuring damages claims, including those relating to injuries, lost earnings or profits, and future medical care.

    Discover more cases with Alison Wise as an expert witness by ordering her comprehensive Expert Witness Profile report.

    Brain Injury Expert Witness

    Kara Eunice Flavin is a board-certified physiatrist who specializes in brain injuries, regularly works with stroke patients as part of her practice.

    Get the full story on challenges to Kara Flavin’s expert opinions and testimony with an in-depth Challenge Study.

    Discussion by the Court

    Alison Wise

    Plaintiffs filed a motion to strike and preclude three of Wise’s categories of opinions regarding Bern’s: (1) salary and benefits; (2) future wage loss; and (3) needed household services.

    A. Opinions on Bern’s Salary and Benefits

    Wise opined about Bern’s past and future lost earnings and benefits based on Bern’s employment at the time of the incident. As part of that opinion, Wise calculated Bern’s lost past and future benefits.

    Wise opined that because there has been “no evidence or testimony to support which benefits Bern was actually participating in,” the fringe benefit percentage should be 11.3% of her salary, “which approximates the amount of Bern’s salary allocable to legally required benefits.”

    Plaintiffs contended that this opinion should be stricken because “Wise did not consider Bern’s specific benefits provided through her employer” and the 11.3% rate “only included calculations for Social Security and Medicare.”

    Indeed, when asked at her deposition, Wise admitted that if Bern participated in other benefits, such as health insurance, a 401(k) plan with a match, and disability, the fringe benefits would increase by 13-15%.

    It appears that Wise knew of the appropriate methodology to use but inexplicably failed to ask for any of the underlying data that would allow her to employ such methodology.

    B. Opinions on Bern’s Future Wage Loss

    Wise also opined in her report regarding Bern’s future wage loss, and Plaintiffs raised three distinct challenges to that opinion: first, they argued that Wise’s admission that there is a calculation error in her report “provided adequate evidence that calls the totality of Wise’s opinions in question.” Second, they contended that Wise’s reliance on the “Markov Model” to calculate Bern’s work-life expectancy is unreliable, because “she has not researched the model to see any validation or verification of the data,” is “unaware of the data the Markov Model uses to generate their reports,” and cannot “explain the statistical analysis underlying the data.”

    Third, Plaintiffs argued that Wise’s reduction of Bern’s future wage loss based on Flavin’s life expectancy opinion has no grounding in any generally accepted forensic accounting methodology and additionally should be precluded because Flavin’s life expectancy opinion should be excluded.

    The Court was not persuaded by Plaintiffs’ first two arguments—for which Plaintiffs cited no authority in support. At threshold, a “simple math error” in an expert’s calculation is not grounds to strike an expert opinion that is otherwise based on sound methodology.

    Regarding the Markov Model, Plaintiffs did not argue that the model itself is unreliable. Indeed, Plaintiffs acknowledged that Wise testified that she has been using the Markov Model throughout her entire career as a forensic accountant, as has her supervisor.

    Rather than take issue with the economic model’s reliability, Plaintiffs attacked Wise’s usage of the model on the grounds that, essentially, she does not understand how it works and has not independently verified the data it uses. But these issues go to the weight of the evidence and can be addressed through cross-examination.

    C. Opinions on Bern’s Needed Household Services

    Plaintiffs urged the Court to strike Bern’s opinion on household services  because ” Wise did not complete any evaluation of Bern’s necessary household services and did not employ any analysis to review the household service loss for Bern.” Further, Plaintiffs argued that Wise admitted that she was speculating that these household replacement costs would be covered by the costs in the Life Care plans.

    Without the benefit of a response from Defendants, the Court respectfully agreed with Plaintiffs. Wise admitted in her deposition that she did not conduct any investigation into whether home healthcare agencies—i.e. what Bern’s life care plan accommodates for—provide household services such as mowing the lawn, housekeeping, and grocery shopping. Nor is there any evidence that Wise relied on her expertise to come to this conclusion, either in her report or her deposition. On the contrary, Wise admitted that she was “speculating that the home healthcare agencies would actually provide the essential/home services.”

    D. Testimony Regarding Bern’s Current Medical Condition or Medical Needs

    Plaintiffs requested that the Court “exclude any testimony from Wise on Bern’s current medical condition or medical needs, as Wise is admittedly not qualified to offer medical, mental health, or other healthcare opinions.”

    Plaintiffs did not provide any additional information and did not point the Court to any portions of Wise’s report or deposition where Wise opined on ” Bern’s current medical condition or medical needs.” To the extent that Plaintiffs are concerned about Wise testifying about matters not included in her report, this issue is not properly before the Court and can be addressed if it arises during trial.

    Kara Flavin

    Flavin was retained by Defendants to “conduct an independent medical examination of Bern and opine on her future needs.” In her report, Flavin offered a range of opinions regarding Bern’s medical care needs, including, that Bern has a life expectancy of 18 years from the date of the report.

    Plaintiffs argued that Flavin’s opinion regarding Bern’s life expectancy should be stricken for four reasons: (1) it is not grounded in the method of science, and is therefore unreliable; (2) Flavin is not a statistician and does not have the education, training, or experience to conduct the statistical extrapolation needed for her life expectancy opinion; (3) the method used by Flavin to extrapolate Bern’s life expectancy is not grounded in accepted scientific principles; and (4) the study that Flavin used for her calculations is not meant to estimate the life expectancy of a person who suffers a stroke.

    The Court respectfully found Flavin’s extrapolation methodology unreliable considering Flavin acknowledged during her deposition that she does not know whether her extrapolation method is generally accepted. She did not offer any supporting scientific literature or precedent, any accepted practice of extending survival data to younger cohorts, or any explanation for why extending a certain pattern observed across three age intervals would hold true for a patient a decade younger than anyone studied.

    It should be noted that the Court granted Plaintiffs’ motion to exclude Wise’s opinion regarding Bern’s future wage loss to the extent it relied on Flavin’s life expectancy calculation.

    Held

    • The Court granted in part and denied in part Plaintiffs’ motion to strike certain opinions of Alison Wise, CPA.
    • The Court granted Plaintiffs’ motion to strike certain opinions of Kara Flavin.

    Key Takeaway

    This Court does not require an expert to have an in-depth knowledge of all the algorithms underlying their technological tools to reliably testify about the outputs of those tools.

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Bern V. HCA-Healthone, LLC
    Docket Number: 1:23cv304
    Court Name: United States District Court, Colorado
    Order Date: March 24, 2026