Expert Witness Profiler

Tag: Reliable

  • Class Action Expert Was Allowed to Opine on the Notice Procedure

    Class Action Expert Was Allowed to Opine on the Notice Procedure

    The Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA) prohibited robocalls to cellphones except in emergencies or with the recipient’s consent. Jason Saggio and Jude Furr, on behalf of a proposed nationwide class, alleged that Defendant Medicredit, a medical debt collector, erroneously and unlawfully placed robocalls to their cellphones to collect debts they didn’t owe. Plaintiffs proposed a class consisting of persons and entities in the United States to whom Defendant placed a robocall, between September 26, 2018, and the date of certification, to a cellphone number that was not assigned to a person with past-due medical debt.

    Plaintiffs retained Carla Peak as an expert in class action notice and administration. In discovery, Defendant produced spreadsheets of phone numbers designated as wrong numbers robocalled during the class period. Plaintiffs retained Peak to describe the notification process that Verita would undertake to effectuate notice to potential class members if this Court were to certify the proposed class.

    Defendant sought to exclude Peak’s testimony because (1) she is unqualified in data analytics and class member identification, (2) her proposed method for generating a notice list is unreliable for purposes of demonstrating ascertainability, and (3) her expertise in class notice after certification has no relevance to ascertainability as a prerequisite for class certification.

    Class Action Expert Witness

    Carla A. Peak served as the Vice President of Legal Notification Services for Verita Global, which specializes in comprehensive class action administration services.

    Peak has more than 20 years of industry experience and has been involved in all aspects of the design and implementation of class action notice planning. She has served as an expert in over one hundred cases involving class action notice plans. Peak has a bachelor’s degree in sociology and an MBA.

    Want to know more about the challenges Carla Peak has faced? Get the full details with our Challenge Study report.

    Discussion by the Court

    Verita would provide Defendant’s list of wrong numbers to a database aggregator and identity verification service provider such as PacificEast, Nexxa, or Lexis Nexis. That company would perform a reverse look-up search to locate names and addresses associated with the cellphone numbers that received Defendant’s robocalls during the class period. If one search leaves some numbers unidentified, the list could be provided to another company for another search, as their databases can vary. Addresses are checked against a database maintained by the United States Postal Service. The results of the searches can be cross-referenced with Defendant’s collection records to verify that debtors are excluded from the mailing list.

    Notice was sent to all potential class members identified through the search process. Any notices returned undeliverable are re-sent to forwarding addresses if available, or further searches can be conducted using other databases. When necessary, Verita can undertake additional notification methods, such as paid media campaigns and messages to social media accounts of the targeted numbers.

    Peak opined that this methodology “is consistent with other notice plans that have been utilized in similar court-approved TCPA class actions and has been deemed to provide the best notice practicable under the circumstances in those matters.” She noted that a success rate of at least 70% is considered high, according to the Judges’ Class Action Notice and Claims Process Checklist published by the Federal Judicial Center. Peak cautioned that she offered no opinion or certainty of Verita’s ability to precisely identify individual bona fide members of the class; she opined only on how to best effectuate optimal notice to potential class members. When asked how individual members would be identified, she explained that they would self-identify by responding to the notice.

    Analysis

    Defendant centrally argued that Peak isn’t an expert on ascertainability, and her opinions on post-certification notice aren’t reliable or relevant when analyzing ascertainability as a criterion for certification.

    On the merits of ascertainability, Defendant postulates several scenarios where a person who received a robocall might not be the registered subscriber (i.e., owner) of the number as identified by a search.

    Put simply, Defendant sought to exclude Peak’s testimony because she can’t guarantee perfectly accurate identification of every class member. Here, Defendant has already produced call logs identifying wrong numbers and the date reported as such. The Court has ordered additional production of more detailed logs specific to each phone number, including the dates of each call. Peak proposes to use Defendant’s data to identify potential class members, with cross-referencing and verification steps to optimize accuracy.

    The Court found that Peak’s expert opinion is relevant to assist the Court in its evaluation of ascertainability. Separately, the Court finds Peak’s opinion relevant to manageability as a component of superiority under Rule 23(b)(3). Further, the Court found Peak’s methodology reliable, as demonstrated through its wide acceptance and implementation by district courts throughout the country.

    Finally, Defendant contended that Peak isn’t qualified to opine on class member identification because she doesn’t conduct the searches herself. Rather, Verita’s operations team performs the technical work and Peak merely “runs a media team.” This argument discounts Peak’s experience and advancement in the industry and ignores the structural realities of the workplace. The Court finds it entirely reasonable that an expert at Peak’s executive level would collaborate with technical staff to effectuate database queries of this nature.

    Held

    The Court denied the Defendant’s motion to exclude the testimony of Plaintiff’s class notice expert, Carla Peak.

    Key Takeaway

    The Court found expert Peak qualified to opine on the best process and procedures to identify potential class members and ensure optimal notice using Defendant’s call logs and reverse look-up searches. According to Eighth Circuit precedent, Defendant’s call logs provide objective criteria to ascertain the proposed class.  Accordingly, the Court found Peak’s opinions relevant to assist the Court in evaluating whether the class is ascertainable. Separately, the Court finds Peak’s opinions relevant to the question of class manageability. The Court found Peak’s methodology reliable in that it has been widely utilized and recognized to identify potential class members and provide the best possible notice practicable in numerous class actions, including TCPA wrong number cases.

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Saggio V. Medicredit, Inc.
    Docket Number: 4:22cv1005
    Court Name: United States District Court, Missouri Eastern
    Order Date: December 09, 2025
  • Political Science Expert Was Allowed to Opine on Paraguay’s Legal System

    Political Science Expert Was Allowed to Opine on Paraguay’s Legal System

    On September 12, 2025, Maik Evert Ens Loblein (“Petitioner”) filed the Petition for the Return of Children to Paraguay pursuant to the Hague Convention. The Petition asserted that Roxana Andrea Alcaraz de Ens (“Respondent”) unlawfully retained in the United States two children who habitually reside in Paraguay. On September 15, 2025, Petitioner filed an Amended Verified Petition for the Return of Children to Paraguay.

    On September 18, 2025, pursuant to the Court’s order, a temporary restraining order was entered preventing the removal of the two minor children, S.I.E.A. and M.A.E.A., from their location within the jurisdiction of the Court. By stipulation of the parties in this matter, the Temporary Restraining Order was extended until further order of the Court after the Amended Verified Petition for the Return of Children to Paraguay is resolved on its merits.

    Respondent designated Dr. Aníbal Pérez-Liñánto offer expert testimony regarding Paraguay’s legal system, including its institutional capacity to protect victims of domestic violence, enforce protective orders, and maintain an effective system of criminal accountability.

    Petitioner filed a motion to exclude the testimony of Respondent’s expert Aníbal Pérez-Liñán.

    Political Science Expert Witness

    Aníbal Pérez-Liñán is a Professor of Political Science and Global Affairs at the University of Notre Dame as well as Director of the Kellog Institute for International Studies.

    He holds a doctoral degree in political science, with a specialization in Latin American Political and legal institutions.

    He has authored two books related to Latin American political systems peer-reviewed publications in the American, Journal of Political Science, Comparative Politics, and others, and served in editorial leadership on major academic journals. Additionally, his research includes Paraguay’s compliance with the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, and he has served as a consultant for the Paraguayan Supreme Court to prepare a report on Paraguay’s compliance with human rights laws, which includes domestic violence.

    Want to know more about the challenges Aníbal Pérez-Liñán has faced? Get the full details with our Challenge Study report.

    Discussion by the Court

    Whether the Specialized Knowledge of Aníbal Pérez-Liñán Will Assist the Trier of Fact

    Petitioner argued that Aníbal Pérez-Liñán’s experience is insufficient to support his opinions regarding the ability of Paraguay’s legal system to address cases of domestic violence. The Court disagreed.

    In other words, Aníbal Pérez-Liñán’s experience and knowledge are sufficient to qualify him as an expert on Paraguay’s legal system, including its institutional capacity to protect victims of domestic violence, enforce protective orders, and maintain an effective system of criminal accountability.

    While Aníbal Pérez-Liñán has conceded he would not consider himself an “expert on domestic violence in the Paraguay legal system” he would consider himself “an expert of the Paraguayan legal system more broadly.”

    The lack of specialized knowledge of domestic violence in the Paraguay legal system would go to the weight of the testimony, to be judged by the trier of fact, and not serve to disqualify Aníbal Pérez-Liñán as an expert. Therefore, Aníbal Pérez-Liñán possesses sufficient knowledge and experience such that his opinion would help the trier of fact evaluate the extent to which the minor children would be sufficiently protected by the Paraguayan legal system, which clearly informs the “grave risk” analysis under the Hague Convention.

    Whether Aníbal Pérez-Liñán’s Testimony is the Product of Reliable Principles and Methods

    Petitioner argued that Aníbal Pérez-Liñán’s opinion is not the product of reliable principles or methods.

    In support of this assertion, Petitioner claimed that Dr. Aníbal Pérez-Liñán “relies on a single, moldy study that analyzed a small handful of cases, along with two newspaper articles.”

    However, Aníbal Pérez-Liñán testified that he reviewed Paraguayan statutes and regulations governing domestic violence, analyzed institutional reforms dating back over two decades, examined NGO, government, and international data repositories, and consulted institutional actors to confirm real-world practices.

    As an experiential expert witness, Aníbal Pérez-Liñán’s methodology need not necessarily be supported with peer-reviewed journals and testable methodologies. These are all standard methodological tools of a type that would be reasonably relied upon by experts in Aníbal Pérez-Liñán’s field.

    Thus, on the record here, the Court is satisfied that methodologies employed by Dr. Aníbal Pérez-Liñán are the product of reliable principles and methods under the requirements of Daubert.

    Whether Aníbal Pérez-Liñán Has Reliably Applied the Principles and Methods to the Facts of this Case

    Petitioner raised no objection to whether Aníbal Pérez-Liñán has reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts of this case. However, this Court is satisfied that such generally accepted methodologies have been soundly applied to the facts here. In any event, the proper way to test the correctness and thoroughness of an expert’s opinions is through cross-examination and rebuttal evidence. If Aníbal Pérez-Liñán’s views are shown to be arbitrary or groundless, then the Court can give the testimony no weight.

    Held

    The Court denied the Petitioner’s motion to exclude the testimony of Respondent’s expert Aníbal Pérez-Liñán.

    Key Takeaway

    For testimony that is primarily experiential in nature as opposed to scientific, there are meaningful differences in how reliability must be examined. Inquiries into testability, peer review, and error rates may not necessarily apply. Instead, a Court may focus on whether the experiential expert “employs in the courtroom the same level of intellectual rigor that characterizes the practice of an expert in the relevant field” and whether the expert’s reasoning or methodology has general acceptance in the relevant professional community.

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Ens Loblein V. Alcaraz De Ens
    Docket Number: 3:25cv737
    Court Name: United States District Court, Virginia Eastern
    Order Date: December 03, 2025
  • Infectious Disease Expert Was Allowed to Opine on the Lack of Severe Lung Damage

    Infectious Disease Expert Was Allowed to Opine on the Lack of Severe Lung Damage

    Roy Edward Ates, Jr., is a federal prisoner. He alleged that prison officials’ negligence caused him to become infected with COVID and that prison personnel were negligent in providing him medical treatment thereafter.

    Defendant retained Dr. Alysse Wurcel as an expert witness. She has assisted Massachusetts sheriffs in their response to COVID beginning in March 2020.

    Wurcel opined that the BOP’s medical treatment of Ates from December 2020 forward was “evidence-based, guideline-concordant medical care”.

    In reaching this conclusion, she further opined that she “would not classify Ates as having ‘severe debilitating lung damage.’” Considering Wurcel’s opinions, no reasonable jury could find an “intentional failure to perform a duty in reckless disregard of the consequences” with respect to the BOP’s treatment of Ates’ medical conditions from December 2020 forward.

    Ates argued that Wurcel’s expert opinion on whether Ates has lung dysfunction is not reliable and should not be considered because Wurcel is not qualified to offer such opinion.

    Infectious Disease Expert Witness

    Dr. Alysse Gail Wurcel is a physician licensed in Massachusetts to practice as an internal medicine and infectious disease specialist. She has worked in Massachusetts jails as an infectious disease specialist since 2013.  She has published over 100 articles in peer-reviewed publications, including articles on COVID.

    Want to know more about the challenges Alysse Wurcel has faced? Get the full details with our Challenge Study report.

    Discussion by the Court

    Through her training and experience, Wurcel is able to recognize symptoms of severe lung damage that would require a referral to a specialist, like a pulmonologist.

    She testified, “I know when someone has severe lung damage. I mean, in terms of their oxygenation saturation, in terms of lots of other things, an internal medicine doctor can know when someone has severe lung damage.”

    Explaining the basis for such knowledge, Wurcel testified:

    I guess, like, this is the existential infectious diseases debate that you get into, in that we are doctors of everything. And if there’s an infection of the lungs, it’s called a pneumonia, and COVID causes, in some people, an infection of the lungs. And so, like, I’m not a lung doctor, but I am a lung doctor when an infection is in it. So any infection hits the lungs, then I’m a lung doctor.

    She further explained that “you don’t send every person that believes they have something to a specialist. The internal medicine doctor has a certain level of understanding to triage.”

    Wurcel observed multiple exams when Ates’ lungs were clear and his pulse oximetry readings were good. Wurcel further opined that from these and other objective symptoms documented in the medical records, “any internal medicine doctor would look at this case and say this man does not have severe lung damage.”

    Analysis

    While Wurcel is not a pulmonologist and did not hold herself out to be a specialist on lung dysfunction, her training and experience provided sufficient foundation for her to opine that, based on her review of Ates’ deposition transcript, discovery responses, and medical records, Ates did not have severe lung damage. This opinion supported her conclusion that the BOP provided Ates “evidence-based, guideline concordant medical care.”

    Ates contended that Wurcel did not know about or did not take into consideration his claim that his medical records often failed to reflect his complaints of breathing problems. Even accepting Ates’ claim at face value, as the Court must on summary judgment, it did not warrant rejection of Wurcel’s opinions.

    Held

    The Court admitted the testimony of Defendant’s expert Dr. Alysse Wurcel because she is an experienced physician licensed to practice internal medicine and treat infectious diseases. 

    Key Takeaway

    As Wurcel aptly explained, internal medicine doctors like her regularly make the initial assessment as to whether a patient has symptom that warrant referral to a specialist, such as a pulmonologist. Wurcel unequivocally opined both in her written report and during her deposition that, based on information in Ates’ medical records, she saw no indication that he did in fact have lung damage, or any basis for referring him to an outside specialist for further evaluation.

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Ates V. United States Of America
    Docket Number: 2:21cv418
    Court Name: United States District Court, Indiana Southern
    Order Date: December 05, 2025
  • Police Practices Expert’s Testimony on Eyewitness Identifications Admitted

    Police Practices Expert’s Testimony on Eyewitness Identifications Admitted

    This litigation arises from Plaintiff Raymond Flanks’ (“Plaintiff”) wrongful conviction for first-degree murder in 1985. Plaintiff alleged that the Orleans Parish District Attorney’s Office (“OPDA”) secured his wrongful conviction in violation of his constitutional rights by withholding material exculpatory evidence.

    Plaintiff retained William Brooks as an expert in police policy and practices. Brooks makes three primary conclusions in his expert report:

    (1) In 1983, New Orleans Police Department (“NOPD”) did not have adequate written policies regarding photo arrays;

    (2) In 1983, NOPD had inadequate training and supervision, which created a risk of suggestive identification procedures that could lead to a mistaken identification and possibly a wrongful conviction; and

    (3) The identification procedure that Dillmann used in this case had two significant problems: Dillmann steered Mrs. Carnesi to identify Plaintiff and Dillmann used inappropriate “fillers” in the photo array he showed Mrs. Carnesi.

    The City Defendants contended that Brooks’ testimony should be excluded for four reasons: (1) Brooks’ opinions are outside the area of his expertise; (2) Brooks’ testimony will mislead the jury and confuse the issues; (3) Brooks’ opinions on NOPD’s policy on identification procedures are not based on any reliable methodology; and (4) expert testimony is not needed to establish that police should not tell witness who to pick in a lineup.

    Police Practices Expert Witness

    William G. Brooks III is a former Chief of Police of the Norwood Police Department in Norwood, Massachusetts. He began his career as a Patrolman from 1977 to 1985; served as a Detective Sergeant from 1985 to 2000; served as Deputy Chief of Police from 2000 to 2012; and served as Chief of Police from 2012 until he retired in 2024. He has a bachelor’s degree in criminal justice from Stonehill College and a master’s degree in criminal justice from Western New England College.

    Brooks is a state-certified instructor on eyewitness identification; he authored a model policy on eyewitness identification for the Massachusetts Chiefs of Police Association; he has been appointed to study and develop best practices for eyewitness identifications by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts and by the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit; and he has lectured about eyewitness identification procedures to numerous law enforcement agencies, law schools, bar associations, and other professional groups.

    Get the full story on challenges to William Brooks’ expert opinions and testimony with an in-depth Challenge Study.

    Discussion by the Court

    A. Whether Brooks’ Opinions are Within the Area of His Expertise

    The Court found that Brooks is qualified to testify as an expert on eyewitness identifications.

    The City Defendants asserted that Brooks’ opinions were outside the area of his expertise because during the relevant time period, 1983, he was a patrolman with no training or experience in identification procedures, policy development, or running a police department. Brooks became a Detective Sergeant in 1985, where he “supervised a team of Detectives.” Therefore, he had some supervisory experience in the 1980s.

    Moreover, the fact that he was not overseeing a police department until the 2000s did not render him unqualified. The expert report cited two widely used reference books from 1956 and 1965 to support the assertion that “eyewitness identification issues became a prominent topic in the law enforcement community” by “the mid-twentieth century.” He also discussed two U.S. Supreme Court decisions from 1968 and 1977, which discussed the risks related to misidentifications. Brooks stated that certain witness identification “principles would have been known to police departments in the 1980s,” but he also acknowledges that some of the present-day best practices he cites were not all “widely used by police departments in 1983.” Therefore, Brooks opinions appear to be based both on his experience and his review of reference materials from the relevant time period.

    Additionally, the City Defendants suggested that Brooks’ expertise did not extend to the impact of suggestive identification procedures on a witness, as Brooks did not have a background in psychology or any other scientific discipline. However, he did not opine about specific psychological impacts for which scientific qualifications would be necessary. Therefore, the proposed testimony is within the area of Brooks’ expertise.

    B. Whether Brooks’ Testimony Will Mislead the Jury or Confuse the Issues

    The City Defendants argued that Brooks’ testimony will mislead the jury and confuse the issues because it references best-practices that were not all widely used by police departments in 1983.

    To the extent Brooks cited some best-practices that were not widely used in 1983, the City Defendants was free to cross-examine Brooks on this issue. It is not a basis for outright exclusion of his testimony.

    The City Defendants also contended that Brooks’ discussion regarding use of inappropriate “fillers” in photo arrays will not assist the jury in determining whether Dillmann told Mrs. Carnesi which photograph to pick and whether that statement caused her to falsely identify Plaintiff as the murderer. If the jury concluded that Dillmann did not explicitly tell Mrs. Carnesi whom to pick from the photo array, Brooks’ opinion that Dillmann used at least two inappropriate “fillers” in the photo array remains relevant to Plaintiff’s argument that the photo array was suggestive.

    C. Whether Brooks’ Opinions are Based on a Reliable Methodology

    Next, the City Defendants asserted that Brooks’ opinions on NOPD’s policy on identification procedures are not based on any reliable methodology.

    Brooks’ report cited an Eyewitness Identification Model Policy. Additionally, Brooks relied on his own experience running a police department and designing training curriculum. According to the City Defendants, Brooks’ opinion that formal training on identification procedures was needed was contradicted by Brooks’ own experience. The fact that Brooks did not receive formal training on identification procedures when he began his career can be raised on cross-examination, but it does not provide a basis for exclusion of the proposed testimony.

    The City Defendants also contended that Brooks’ analysis on NOPD’s policy is equally unreliable and based entirely on his own opinion about how officers might read into the absence of an express prohibition on suggestive techniques in photographic identification procedures.

    Brooks reviewed NOPD policy, which included a specific rule against suggestive behavior for lineups but did not include a specific rule for photo arrays. Brooks opined that “by including a specific rule against suggestive behavior for one type of identification procedure and omitting that rule for the other, an officer could easily infer that making the rule apply only to lineups was intentional.”

    He appeared to base this opinion both on his experience and on the Eyewitness Identification Model Policy. To the extent the City Defendants believe this opinion is unsubstantiated, that issue is better left to cross-examination.

    D. Whether Expert Testimony is Needed

    Fourth, the City Defendants contended that the jury does not need an expert to say that police should not tell witness who to pick in a lineup. The City Defendants pointed out that Dillmann readily acknowledged such action was improper. The City Defendants contended that a jury instruction on this topic is sufficient. This argument oversimplified the issues identified in Brooks’ expert report. Brooks explained why he believed the procedure used in this case was suggestive. These issues are not common knowledge, and Brooks’ testimony will assist the jury in this case.

    Held

    The Court denied City Defendants’ motion to exclude the testimony of William Brooks.

    Key Takeaway

    Brooks is qualified to discuss the effect of suggestive identification procedures on a witness because that effect is inherently a part of studying, lecturing about, and developing model practices for, eyewitness identifications. Brooks also discussed ways that officers can ensure identification procedures are not suggestive.

    Please refer to the blog previously published about this case:

    Vocational Evaluation Expert Allowed to Opine on Lost Earning Capacity

    Legal Expert Was Barred From Opining on Good Time Credits

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Flanks V. City Of New Orleans
    Docket Number: 2:23cv6897
    Court Name: United States District Court, Louisiana Eastern
    Order Date: December 01, 2025

  • Anesthesiology Expert’s Opinions on Life Expectancy Admitted

    Anesthesiology Expert’s Opinions on Life Expectancy Admitted

    This case arises from a motor vehicle collision between Plaintiff Marie Shante Box and Defendant William Causey in May 2023. Following the collision, Box filed suit against Causey, CTS National Corporation (Causey’s employer), and Old Republic Insurance Company (CTS’s insurer). She sought compensatory damages for her injuries, punitive damages, and attorney’s fees. To support her compensatory damages claims, Box retained Dr. Thomas Pontinen as an expert witness. Pontinen’s expert report opined that Box’s future medical and life care will cost $822,2218.55.

    The Defendants sought to exclude Pontinen’s opinions on the grounds that he is not qualified and that his methodology is not reliable.

    Anesthesiology Expert Witness

    Dr. Thomas Pontinen is a double-board certified anesthesiologist and interventional pain medicine specialist and is certified as a Life Care Planner.

    He regularly provides life care planning services through a company called LCP Pro, LLC. Pontinen has published multiple journal articles, written textbook chapters, and has presented at international conferences in the fields of surgery, anesthesiology, and pain medicine.

    Get the full story on challenges to Thomas Pontinen’s expert opinions and testimony with an in-depth Challenge Study.

    Discussion by the Court

    1. Qualifications

    The Defendants sought to exclude Pontinen’s opinions because his life care plan included an estimate of Box’s life expectancy, which they argued Pontinen was not qualified to calculate.

    The Court held that Pontinen is qualified to opine on Box’s life expectancy, as one component of Box’s life care plan. As part of the life care planning calculations, Pontinen estimated that Box would live an additional forty years.

    His life expectancy estimate was based on the Center for Disease Control’s (“CDC”) 2023 National Vital Statistics Report on life expectancy for the U.S. population.

    Pontinen is a certified life care planner who provides services through a life care planning company, which regularly provides life expectancy estimates as part of its process. Other courts have found certified life care planners qualified to rely on their life expectancy calculations as part of creating a life care plan.

    And the Defendants did not point to—and the Court is not aware of—case law that requires an expert witness to be a life expectancy expert or economist in order to rely on a life expectancy estimate.

    2. Reliability

    The Defendants argued that Pontinen (1) did not collaborate with Box’s primary treating physician and (2) his pricing model relied on proprietary data.

    The Court held that Pontinen’s methodology is reliable for Daubert purposes. There is no one required methodology in the life care planning industry. Pontinen explains that his methodology (and LCP Pro’s) is based on “peer-reviewed, published methodologies and Standards of Practice within the life care planning associations,” including the American Academy of Physician Life Care Planners, International Academy of Life Care Planners, and American Association of Nurse Life Care Planners.

    Regarding the relationship between Pontinen and Box’s primary treating physician, the Court found that the lack of formal collaboration between the two is not sufficient to render Pontinen’s methodology unreliable.

    While the record in this case indicated that collaboration with physicians is recommended within the life care planning industry, the record did not support the notion that a life care planner’s failure to collaborate renders his or her methodology unreliable

    Even if the Defendants could identify some document that expressly requires collaboration with every treating physician, that would still be insufficient.

    The Court is not persuaded that LCP Pro’s database is unreliable or unverifiable within the industry nor that Pontinen’s use of a proprietary database renders his methodology unreliable for Daubert purposes. Pontinen relied on Box’s actual bills or provider estimates where possible and costing databases, such as those by the Practice Management Information Corporation and LCP Pro, where not. He provided nineteen cost estimates based on individual future needs. Three of those estimates were derived from LCP Pro’s database. LCP Pro’s database contains data from “more than 2,000 cases” and is “based on actual provider charges and actual provider estimates for injections and surgeries.”

    Held

    The Court denied the Defendants’ motion to exclude the testimony of Thomas Pontinen.

    Key Takeaway:

    Pontinen’s methodology for employing pricing databases, including LCP Pro’s proprietary database, is consistent with standards in the life care planning industry and Daubert.

    Any further disagreement regarding the accuracy of Pontinen’s individual cost estimates speaks to the weight of the testimony rather than its admissibility, as competing expert witnesses often supply different cost estimates from one another.

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Box V. Causey
    Docket Number: 1:24cv3766
    Court Name: United States District Court, Georgia Northern
    Order Date: December 02, 2025
  • Psychology Expert’s Opinions About the Individual Health Impacts of PCB Exposures Admitted

    Psychology Expert’s Opinions About the Individual Health Impacts of PCB Exposures Admitted

    Plaintiffs Josepha Austin, Robin Cruz, Gordana Pobric, and Jennifer Haselman brought this action claiming harm resulting from their exposure to polychlorinated biphenyls (“PCBs”).

    Defendants Monsanto Company, Bayer CropScience, L.P., Solutia, Inc., and Pharmacia L.L.C. (collectively “Monsanto”) filed a motion to exclude the testimony of Dr. Gayle Morse. Plaintiffs intended to call Morse to testify about cognitive injuries they allegedly suffered as a result of PCB exposures.

    Psychology Expert Witness

    Gayle Morse is a licensed psychologist and neuropsychologist in New York State. She holds a doctorate in counseling psychology and is a tenured professor at Russell Sage College, where she serves as the internship director of the mental health counseling and community program. She currently teaches psychology courses and maintains a private clinical practice.

    Morse has been involved in PCB research since 1994. Her work has included multiple studies on the impacts of PCBs on members of the Akwesasne Mohawk Tribe. That work reportedly included the neuropsychological testing of hundreds of people who were exposed to PCBs. Morse has authored several peer-reviewed articles on the effects of PCB exposure on human populations, and has testified that one of her projects revealed evidence of adverse effects of PCBs on human neuropsychological functioning.

    Get the full story on challenges to Gayle Morse’s expert opinions and testimony with an in-depth Challenge Study.

    Discussion by the Court

    In her expert report, Morse concluded, “with a reasonable degree of medical/scientific certainty, that the above exposures to PCBs are consistent with [Plaintiffs’] injuries and that said PCB exposures were a significant contributing cause to their cognitive conditions.”

    Monsanto’s challenge to Morse focuses on her qualifications and the reliability of her conclusions.

    Qualifications

    With respect to her qualifications, Monsanto noted that Morse spends most of her professional time working in academia, with her clinical practice occupying only one day per week. Within her clinical practice, she generally treats people with severe psychopathology such as schizophrenia or long-term trauma. In her deposition testimony, she distinguished her practice from that of a neuropsychologist.

    She also testified that she performs neuropsychology evaluations approximately twice a year. Monsanto criticized Morse for not being board certified in neuropsychology. The Court found that board certification is only relevant in the context of an expert’s other qualifications.

    Morse concedes that she is not a neuropsychologist, and that she only conducts such testing occasionally.

    The neuropsychological tests in this case were administered by Dr. Eric Mart. Monsanto did not challenge his qualifications to perform and interpret such testing.

    The Court held that Morse is not testifying outside her area of expertise. Nor is she merely relaying the opinion of Mart. Indeed, there is no suggestion that Mart formed any sort of opinion regarding the impact of PCBs. Instead, it is Morse who independently reviewed the test results and formed an opinion about how those results align with her knowledge about the potential impacts of PCB exposure.

    Reliability

    Morse reviewed not only Mart’s test results, but also the reports of Plaintiffs’ experts Kevin Coghlan, who generated data regarding PCB levels at Burlington High School, and Dr. Paul Rosenfeld, who opined on the level of hazard resulting from those PCB levels. She further reviewed the report generated by Dr. David Carpenter, with whom she has worked in the past and who offered his opinion as to general causation. In the course of preparing her own report, Morse interviewed each Plaintiff. Applying her professional knowledge, Morse developed opinions about the individual health impacts of PCB exposures. Her report explicitly states that she considered other possible causes of Plaintiffs’ conditions, and that she reached her conclusions with a reasonable degree of medical or scientific certainty.

    Monsanto is critical of Morse’ use of Plaintiffs’ “premorbid functioning” as a tool for determining that PCBs played a role in causing their conditions.
    In her deposition, Morse explained that she was not able to rule out the impact of all other factors, such as one Plaintiff’s tuberculosis or another’s thyroid condition, since she is not a physician.

    Aside from those issues, she was able to compare the Plaintiffs’ abilities and achievements prior to their time at Burlington High School with their abilities after their respective PCB exposures, note the differences, and opine as to cause. Her caveats about certain medical conditions did not undermine her methodologies, and instead left room for cross-examination and argument regarding her conclusions.

    Monsanto’s final criticism of Morse is that she did not identify the dose at which PCBs could be expected to cause the conditions discussed in her report. However, more than one expert in this case has offered the opinion that the dose-response relationship for PCBs may be nonlinear, and even non-threshold.

    Held

    The Court denied Monsanto’s motion to exclude the testimony of Gayle Morse, Ph.D.

    Key Takeaway:

    Plaintiffs have shown by a preponderance of the evidence that Morse is qualified and that the data on which she is relying, which includes both neurological testing and PCB exposure estimates, is sufficient and reliable. Moreover, Plaintiffs have carried their burden of showing that Morse is applying reliable methodologies based on her significant experience with PCB studies, that she reliably applied accepted principles and methodologies to the facts of this case, and that her testimony will assist the trier of fact.

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Austin V. Monsanto Company
    Docket Number: 2:23cv272
    Court Name: United States District Court, Vermont
    Order Date: December 01, 2025
  • Forensic Engineering Expert’s Testimony on Brake Levers Admitted

    Forensic Engineering Expert’s Testimony on Brake Levers Admitted

    Plaintiff Matthew Hartley sued Defendants Sunbelt Rental Inc. and Custom Equipment LLC to recover for personal injuries he sustained during a jobsite incident on June 14, 2021.

    Plaintiff alleged that on June 14, 2021, he “attempted to move a Sunbelt Rentals Hy-Brid Lift HB-1030 down a ramp when suddenly and without warning it began to rapidly roll down the slope of the ramp despite no effort on his part to power the lift forward.” He further alleged that the lift, which was manufactured by Custom Equipment, LLC, “rolled uncontrollably into a concrete wall at a rapid rate of speed” causing “debilitating physical injuries” and a variety of economic and noneconomic harms.

    Plaintiff retained Craig Sylvester, a forensic engineering expert, to determine the “root cause” of the accident. According to Sylvester, “the root cause of the incident on June 14, 2021 was a mis-wired emergency stop button, as well as the placement of one or both of the parking brake levers at the rear of the machine in an intermediate position.”

    Defendant Custom Equipment filed a motion to strike certain expert opinions and limit testimony of disclosed expert Craig Sylvester.

    Forensic Engineering Expert Witness

    Craig A. Sylvester is a former U.S. Navy mustang officer and licensed mechanical engineer with more than 25 years of experience as an operator, maintainer, designer, and inspector of industrial equipment around the world. Sylvester’s expertise in industrial systems is built on his early work performing component-level repairs as an electronics technician, along with formal education in manufacturing and mechanical engineering, and naval architecture.

    Want to know more about the challenges Craig Sylvester has faced? Get the full details with our Challenge Study report.

    Discussion by the Court

    Parties’ Arguments

    Defendant requested the Court “exclude the portions of Sylvester’s opinions that are untimely, speculative and unhelpful to the jury.”

    Defendant argued that exclusion is warranted because Sylvester’s: (1) supplemental opinions on electromagnetic braking assistance, back emf braking assistance, and arc suppression circuits are untimely and unhelpful to the jury; (2) opinions on the intermediate position of the brake levers are speculative; (3) opinions on the parking brake’s holding torque are unhelpful to the jury; and (4) opinions that the pre-start inspection checklist failed to adhere to the ANSI A92.22 standards are unhelpful to the jury.

    Plaintiff contended, and Defendant accepted, that “Sylvester has no intention of testifying that the HB 1030 should have included ‘electromagnetic,’ ‘back emf’ or an ‘arc suppression circuit’ at the time of trial.” The Court thus found these admissibility questions to be moot. Plaintiff also stated that Sylvester “will not be testifying regarding [the holding torque] document” and that the “[ANSI A92.22] standards, which were adopted after the manufacture and sale of the HB 1030, would not apply to [the unit at issue.]” As Defendant did not challenge the admissibility of testimony by Sylvester that “industry standards would include a pre-start inspection of the braking system as a matter of common sense and industry standards” nor do they otherwise challenge Plaintiff’s concessions on these issues, the Court likewise found these admissibility questions moot.

    Court’s Decision

    The Court concluded that Sylvester’s opinions on the intermediate position of the brake levers “both rests on a reliable foundation and is relevant to the task at hand.”

    As for relevancy, the Court found that Sylvester’s opinions on the intermediate position of the brake levers will “assist the trier of fact” to determine the root cause of the June 14, 2021 incident. As the root cause of the incident is “a fact in issue,” Sylvester’s testimony satisfied the standard for relevancy. The Court also concluded that Sylvester reviewed numerous sources of information, utilized reliable principles and methods of forensic engineering, and reliably applied said principles and methods to the facts of the case.

    The Court noted that Sylvester “considered seven categories of evidence in reaching his conclusion, only one of which was a document generated during the course of BN Builders investigation, which occurred shortly after the incident in question.” As a result, the Court declined to exclude Sylvester’s testimony on the brake levers as “speculative.”

    Held

    The Court denied the Defendant Custom Equipment LLC’s motion to exclude the testimony of Plaintiff’s expert Craig Sylvester.

    Key Takeaway:

    The Court noted that while Defendant raised various other arguments for exclusion, none of these arguments provided a proper basis for exclusion, as they all speak to issues of fact-finding, not gatekeeping.

    For example, Defendant’s disagreement with Sylvester’s exclusion of other possible explanations for the accident and his reasons for doing so do not render his opinions inadmissible—they merely make it more likely that the trier of fact will view Sylvester’s conclusions about the root cause of the accident less credible. 

    Because the Court must act as “a gatekeeper, not a fact finder,” it cannot exclude portions of Sylvester’s testimony for any of these fact-finding based reasons.

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Hartley V. Sunbelt Rentals, Inc
    Docket Number: 2:24cv1078
    Court Name: United States District Court, Washington Western
    Order Date: November 24, 2025
  • Psychiatry Expert Was Barred From Testifying About the Abuse Allegations 

    Psychiatry Expert Was Barred From Testifying About the Abuse Allegations 

    From 2020 to 2022, Plaintiff Jane Doe was dating Defendant Aaron Tanner, who at the time was a member of the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department (“LASD”) and the alleged leader of a law enforcement gang called the “Rattlesnakes.”

    According to Plaintiff, during the course of her relationship with Tanner, Tanner physically abused her. Tanner also warned Plaintiff that, “if she told anyone” about his abuse, the Rattlesnakes would “take care of her.”

    Plaintiff alleged that, after she broke up with Tanner in 2022, he and other members of the Rattlesnakes began to stalk and intimidate her. In 2023, the LASD’s Internal Affairs Bureau interviewed Plaintiff in connection with an “investigation into Tanner and a deputy who was stopped for a DUI by Tanner.” Later that year, the LASD’s Internal Criminal Investigations Bureau formally opened an investigation on Tanner. Soon after, law enforcement officers began to surveil Plaintiff’s home and, in one instance, “the gas tank of her car was tampered with, in an apparent effort to cause her to crash her car.” The LASD has since terminated Tanner’s employment, but Plaintiff alleges Tanner continues to stalk her, and she fears further retaliation from the Rattlesnakes.

    The County filed motions to exclude the testimony of Dr. George Elias and Mr. Roger Clark, who Plaintiff has named as a psychiatric expert and as a police practices expert, respectively.

    Psychiatry Expert Witness

    Dr. George R. Elias is certified by the American Board of Psychiatry and Neurology in both Adult and Forensic Psychiatry. He is licensed to practice medicine in the states of California and Missouri.

    He is also licensed as an Out-of-State Telehealth Provider in Florida. Elias has provided expert opinion on various criminal and civil matters through written reports, testimony, and deposition. Elias is currently the President of Elias Diagnostix, a private forensic and outpatient psychiatric practice.

    Want to know more about the challenges George Elias has faced? Get the full details with our Challenge Study report.

    Law Enforcement Expert Witness

    Roger Clark has worked as a Deputy Sheriff, Sergeant, and Lieutenant in the LASD over the span of a 27-year career.

    Clark frequently spoke out about law enforcement gangs, drafted an internal memorandum addressing the topic, and spoke with various LASD executives to voice his concerns. 

    Since retiring from the LASD in 1994, Clark has worked as a police practices consultant and has been retained in over 2,600 cases.

    Get the full story on challenges to Roger Clark’s expert opinions and testimony with an in-depth Challenge Study.  

    Discussion by the Court

    A. Discovery Sanctions

    The County argued that Elias and Clark should not be permitted to testify because the Plaintiff failed to disclose either expert by the July 30, 2025, deadline set out in the Court’s December 26, 2024, Scheduling Order.

    Instead, Plaintiff disclosed Elias as an expert on August 4, 2025, and served his expert report on August 13, 2025—the deadline for either party to designate rebuttal experts. Plaintiff also identified Clark as an expert on August 4, 2025, serving Clark’s initial report the same day and a revised copy of his report on August 8, 2025.

    Here, Plaintiff disclosed both Elias and Clark as experts five days after the deadline set out in the Court’s Scheduling Order, served Clark’s report the same day, and served Elias’ report approximately nine days later, all before the close of expert discovery and more than a month before the deadline to file a motion for summary judgment.

    True, Plaintiff’s delay prevented the County from naming a rebuttal witness to Elias by the deadline set out in the Court’s Scheduling Order. However, even though expert discovery is now closed, Plaintiff has offered to enter into a stipulation that would allow the County to designate a rebuttal expert. Moreover, notwithstanding Plaintiff’s delay, Defendant designated a rebuttal expert to respond to Clark’s opinions and deposed both Elias and Clark.

    Given the minimal harm from Plaintiff’s untimely disclosure, Defendant’s opportunity to cure that harm through measures short of exclusion, the lack of any substantial impact on the trial schedule, and the absence of any indication Plaintiff acted willfully or in bad faith, the Court found Plaintiff’s untimely disclosure harmless and declined to exclude either Elias or Clark on that basis.

    B. George Elias

    Plaintiff offered Elias as an expert on “Plaintiff’s psychological condition, stress, and emotional and mental damages.”

    Elias offered proposed testimony that (1) Plaintiff “meets DSM-5 Diagnostic Criteria for Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder [(“PSTD”)], with dissociative symptoms”; (2) Plaintiff “suffered from severe emotional distress that was a result of [Tanner’s] conduct”; and (3) Plaintiff’s “Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder is attributable to the severe emotional distress she endured.”

    Analysis

    The Court disagreed that Elias’ opinions are unsupported by a reliable methodology. Elias conducted a four-hour interview of Plaintiff, during which he “obtained a longitudinal history of Plaintiff, which included the onset, course, and severity of [her] symptoms, along with any associated clinically significant dysfunction.”

    Before diagnosing Plaintiff with PTSD, Elias “considered her medical history,” “reviewed her psychotherapy records,” and “performed a differential diagnosis.” Before reaching his diagnosis, Elias screened out “bipolar spectrum disorder, a prior history of depression, and substance use issues” as possible causes of Plaintiff’s symptoms. Finally, Elias reached a diagnosis based on the diagnostic criteria set out in the DSM-5. 

    The County argued that this is not enough, because Elias “did not obtain collateral information from family members, co-workers, or treating providers” and “did not administer any standardized tests commonly used in psychiatric evaluations, such as the CAPS-5, PCL-5, or MMPI-2.”

    However, these criticisms go to the weight of Elias’ testimony, not its admissibility.

    Nevertheless, the Court agreed that Elias may not testify that Tanner’s conduct “caused” Plaintiff’s PTSD. As an expert witness, Elias has no personal knowledge of Tanner’s conduct and cannot testify as to the credibility of Plaintiff’s specific allegations of abuse.

    C. Roger Clark

    Clark offered seven opinions: (1) Tanner used “excessive force” by “choking out” Plaintiff; (2) the “Rattlesnakes are a subgroup in LASD operating out of the Lancaster Station”; (3) the “Rattlesnakes meet the definition of a deputy gang,” as determined by Clark; (4) “Tanner’s references to the [R]attlesnakes in conversation with [Plaintiff] would intimidate a witness”; (5) Clark has not seen any evidence that would justify Tanner’s use of force under Peace Officer Standards and Training (“POST”) or LASD policies; (6) the LASD tolerates deputies’ use of excessive force, fails to properly investigate excessive force complaints, and fails to properly investigate and discipline membership in law enforcement gangs; and (7) the “collective approvals by the LASD puts the general public at unnecessary future risk of death and/or injury from the Defendant Deputies” and others in the LASD.

    Analysis

    The County argued that Clark is not qualified to testify on law enforcement gangs, six of his seven opinions amount to improper legal conclusions, his fourth opinion is not supported by a reliable methodology, and his seventh opinion is subject to exclusion under Rule 403.

    As a preliminary matter, Clark is adequately qualified to testify as to law enforcement gangs within the LASD.

    However, the Court agreed that four of Clark’s seven proposed opinions are improper. To start, Clark may not testify that “Deputy Tanner’s references to the Rattlesnakes in conversations with Plaintiff would intimidate a witness.” Nothing in Clark’s experience qualifies him to testify as to what “would intimidate a witness” and, to the extent Clark proposed to testify as to whether Tanner in fact intimidated Plaintiff, his proposed testimony improperly speculated as to Plaintiff’s state of mind.

    Likewise, Clark may not testify that the “collective approvals by the LASD put the general public at unnecessary future risk of death and/or injury from the Defendant Deputies and others in the department,” because this proposed testimony would not be helpful to the jury and added nothing beyond the sixth opinion set out in his report.

    Next, Clark’s opinions addressing the use of “excessive” and “unreasonable” force amounted to legal conclusions. To the extent such testimony is relevant, Clark may only testify as to whether Tanner’s use of force conformed to POST standards and LASD policies.

    The Court rejected the County’s argument that Clark’s remaining opinions are legal conclusions. Indeed, the County has not sufficiently explained how any of the terms Clark used in those opinions “have a specialized meaning in law” or how Clark has “attempted to instruct the jury on the law” or to “apply the law to the facts of the case.”

    Held

    The Court granted in part and denied in part the Defendant County of Los Angeles’s motions To exclude Dr. George Elias and Roger Clark.

    Key Takeaway:

    While Elias did not obtain collateral information from family members, co-workers, or treating providers, Elias is an experienced medical professional, the DSM is a recognized source of authority within the psychiatric community, and the County did not argue that Elias has misapplied the DSM.

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Jane Doe V. County Of Los Angeles
    Docket Number: 2:24cv8649
    Court Name: United States District Court, California Central
    Order Date: October 28, 2025
  • Transportation Engineering Expert’s Testimony on Accident Reconstruction Admitted

    Transportation Engineering Expert’s Testimony on Accident Reconstruction Admitted

    This case arises out of injuries sustained by Brandon Jensen on his bicycle when he collided with a semi-truck who made a left turn through his lane of travel. The semi-truck was driven by Defendant Michael Beale. Beale was working for Crete Carrier at the time of the accident.

    To begin with, Defendants Michael Beale and Crete Carrier Corporation (Crete Carrier) filed three motions in limine concerning the testimony of the Plaintiffs’ accident reconstruction expert, Dr. Jay Przybyla.

    First, Defendants Michael Beale and Crete Carrier Corporation (Crete Carrier) filed a motion to exclude seven videos relied on by Przybyla in his rebuttal report that show semi-truck trailers turning into the Crete Carrier terminal. Second, the Defendants filed a motion to exclude Przybyla’s opinions about the time required for Plaintiff Jensen to stop his bicycle. Finally, the Defendants filed a motion exclude Przybyla’s reconstruction simulations on the ground that he made improper assumptions about truck weight.

    Transportation Engineering Expert Witness

    Jay J. Przybyla, Ph.D., P.E. is a licensed professional engineer and managing engineer at Focus Forensics with experience, education, and training in the fields of civil engineering, forensic engineering, and transportation safety. He also holds a Master’s and Ph.D. in transportation engineering from the University of Utah and a Bachelor’s in civil engineering from Brigham Young University.

    Want to know more about the challenges Jay Przybyla has faced? Get the full details with our Challenge Study report.

    Discussion by the Court

    The Court questioned Przybyla outside the presence of the jury on the morning of November 12, 2025. The Court cautioned the witness to avoid opining on the credibility of Beale’s testimony or the propriety of Beale’s choices, but the Court found that the methodology for his accident reconstruction analysis was otherwise reliable. To be clear, uncertainties about bicycle stopping time or the assumptions about truck weight that Przybyla used to model his simulations went to the weight of the evidence rather than its admissibility.

    Moreover, the Court found that the seven videos showing Crete Carrier trucks turning into the terminal were used in rebuttal to opinions from the Defendants’ accident reconstruction expert and were admissible for illustrative purposes. The Defendants’ concerns that the trucks were different makes and models and had different loads could be addressed during cross examination.

    Held

    • The Court denied the Defendants’ motion in limine to exclude seven videos relied on by Jay Przybyla.
    • The Court denied the Defendants’ motion in limine to exclude Jay Przybyla’s opinions on the time required for Plaintiff Brandon Jensen to stop.
    • The Court denied the Defendants’ motion in limine to exclude Jay Przybyla’s reconstruction simulations.

    Key Takeaway:

    Uncertainties about bicycle stopping time or the assumptions about truck weight that Przybyla used to model his simulations could be adequately examined during cross examination.

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Jensen V. Crete Carrier Corporation
    Docket Number: 1:23cv105
    Court Name: United States District Court for the District of Utah, Northern Division
    Order Date: November 14, 2025
  • Data Analytics Expert’s Analysis of Inmate Records Deemed Admissible

    Data Analytics Expert’s Analysis of Inmate Records Deemed Admissible

    Plaintiffs Orellana and Hernandez brought this suit against Defendants on behalf of a class of all persons who, from July 18, 2014 through November 15, 2018, were detained by the Suffolk County Sheriff’s Office (“SCSO”) pursuant to an ICE immigration detainer request after the SCSO’s detention authority had expired, alleging violations of their rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution and under the First Article of the New York State Constitution.

    Plaintiffs retained Sean M. Kruskol to calculate the duration in hours that each class member was held in custody by the Suffolk County Sheriff’s Office (“SCSO”) under a detainer and administrative warrant issued by Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”).

    He purported to do so by analyzing the file of inmate records—known as an “inmate jacket”—maintained for each class member by SCSO, and determining “a) the time when the SCSO’s records indicate an individual would have been released but for the existence of an ICE detainer; and b) the time when the SCSO’s records indicate an individual was transferred into ICE custody.”

    However, Defendants filed a motion to preclude “[Class] Plaintiffs’ expert Kruskol from offering testimony or opinions in this matter” under Rule 702 and the Daubert standard.

    Data Analytics Expert Witness

    Sean M. Kruskol is a Certified Public Accountant (‘CPA’), Chartered Global Management Accountant (‘CGMA’) and a Certified Fraud Examiner (‘CFE’) with more than a decade of experience leading complex, large-scale data analytics in litigation and investigations across industries.

    Get the full story on challenges to Sean Kruskol’s expert opinions and testimony with an in-depth Challenge Study.

    Discussion by the Court

    Defendants sought to exclude Kruskol’s expert testimony as (1) outside his area of expertise, (2) based on flawed methodology, and (3) unhelpful to the jury.

    After conducting the appropriate review under Rule 702 and under Daubert and its progeny, the Court determined that Defendants’ objections go to the weight, rather than admissibility, of Kruskol’s expert testimony. Kruskol is a qualified expert in data analytics with ample experience analyzing large datasets and deriving conclusions therefrom.

    Moreover, his expert testimony relied on sound methodology and data. Kruskol tested the reasonableness of his results by comparing the computed extended detentions intervals to how SCSO’s documents described their internal operational expectations (including the 48-hour detainer language) and performed adjustments and sensitivity checks for administrative processing time.

    To the extent Defendants disagree with Kruskol’s conclusions, Defendants will, for instance, have the opportunity to cross-examine Kruskol.

    Finally, Kruskol’s testimony is sufficiently likely to assist the jury by presenting a coherent summary of “thousands of pages of technical inmate records” and purporting to “accurately identify and reconcile timestamps across multiple record types and fields.”

    Held

    The Court denied the motion to exclude Sean Kruskol’s expert testimony.

    Key Takeaway:

    The test to admit expert testimony under Rule 702 and under Daubert requires an analysis of the following considerations: (1) whether the witness is qualified to be an expert; (2) whether the opinion is based upon reliable data and methodology; and (3) whether the expert’s testimony on a particular issue will assist the trier of fact.

    Kruskol is a qualified expert in data analytics with ample experience analyzing large datasets and deriving conclusions therefrom. His expert testimony relied on sound methodology and data. Moreover, Kruskol’s testimony is sufficiently likely to assist the jury.

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Castaneda V. County of Suffolk
    Docket Number: 2:17cv4267
    Court Name: United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York
    Order Date: October 31, 2025