Expert Witness Profiler

Tag: Reliable

  • Biomechanics Expert Was Allowed to Opine on the Source of Bullet Wounds

    Biomechanics Expert Was Allowed to Opine on the Source of Bullet Wounds

    This suit involves the unnecessary use of excessive force by police officers against a black man suffering from a mental health crisis.

    On November 21, 2021, during a mental health crisis, Jabari Asante-Chioke encountered Louisiana State Police (“LSP”) Officer Nicholas Dowdle and East Jefferson Levee District (“EJLD”) Officers Jonathon Downing and Gerard Duplessis (collectively referred to herein as “Officer Defendants”

    Plaintiff, Malikah Asante-Chioke, individually, and on behalf of her father, Jabari Asante-Chioke, herein filed this action against the Defendants, accusing them of failure to use less-than-lethal methods in accordance with training and state and federal law, to subdue Mr. Asante-Chioke.

    LSP Defendants argued that the Court should exclude Plaintiff’s expert John C. Gardiner, along with his testimony and opinions, because he is unqualified, his methodology is unreliable, and his testimony is irrelevant.

    EJLD Defendants made similar arguments, but they also argued that Gardiner’s testimony will not help the factfinder.

    Biomechanics Expert Witness

    Dr. John Carter Gardiner, PhD PE holds a Bachelor of Science in Mechanical Engineering and a Doctor of Philosophy in Bioengineering. He is a Senior Biomechanical Engineer who conducts biomechanical analysis of a variety of events including shootings.

    Gardiner is a principal and senior biomechanical engineer at MEA Forensic. He joined the firm in 2002 and leads the Biomechanics Group in the Los Angeles office.

    Get the full story on challenges to John Gardiner’s expert opinions and testimony with an in-depth Challenge Study.

    Discussion by the Court

    I. Gardiner’s Qualifications

    LSP Defendants argued that Gardiner is unqualified to opine on the likely source of the shots fired because, apart from his expert reviews, he lacked specific training, education, or experience analyzing bullet trajectory “based on gunshot wounds.”

    Gardiner estimates that he has performed biomechanical analyses in “50 different cases involving” gunshot wounds.

    LSP Defendants offered no authority which requires Senior Biomechanical Engineers to have specific training, experience, or education in bullet trajectory analysis to opine on the source of each bullet wound. Further, courts have allowed biomechanical engineers, including Gardiner, to opine on the source of wounds in a shooting.

    Accordingly, the Court found that Gardiner is qualified to opine on the likely source of Mr. Asante-Chioke’s gunshot wounds.

    II. Reliability of Gardiner’s Methodology

    LSP Defendants also argued that Gardiner’s methodology is unreliable because he did not calculate or quantify the officers’ exact shooting angles.

    Plaintiff contended that Gardiner did not merely “eyeball” the footage and instead considered “the relative positions of each of the three officers to Asante-Chioke, the gunshot wound entrances and exits, the gunshot wound trajectories, and the anatomical postures and positions of Asante-Chioke during the shooting incident.”

    This Court agreed with Plaintiff. LSP Defendants offered no authority which requires an expert to quantify or calculate exact shooting angles to opine on shooting source and position.

    LSP Defendants also argued that Gardiner’s methodology is unreliable due to alleged inconsistencies and contradictions concerning the timing of certain wound in his report termed as Gunshot Wounds #14 and #15 and his conclusions concerning how many gunshot wounds were consistent with coming from Dowdle during the final 1.1 seconds of the shooting. However, as Plaintiff correctly pointed out, LSP Defendants primarily disputed Gardiner’s conclusions, not his methodology.

    III. Relevance of Gardiner’s Opinions

    Defendants argued that Gardiner’s opinions are irrelevant to the issue of qualified immunity at this stage of the litigation. LSP Defendants also suggested that Gardiner opined on ultimate causation and damage issues regarding Gunshot Wound #15.

    This Court found that most of Gardiner’s opinion is relevant. In his report, Gardiner opines on the likely source of Asante-Chioke’s bullet wounds and when the shooting officers, including Dowdle, likely fired them. Such opinions are relevant to the pertinent qualified immunity issues of “whether Dowdle fired any shots; how many if so; and when, in relation to Asante-Chioke’s actions and death.”

    Still, in his report Gardiner also references Chief Forensic Pathologist Dr. Dana Troxclair’s conclusion that the “bullet causing Wound #15 killed Mr. Asante-Chioke.” Opinions and references thereto concerning which bullet killed Asante-Chioke are irrelevant to the limited issue of whether the shooting officers are entitled to qualified immunity when they continued to fire upon him. Accordingly, the Court excluded such opinions and references from Gardiner’s report.

    IV. Helpfulness of Gardiner’s Opinions

    EJLD Defendants also argued that Gardiner’s testimony will not assist the factfinder because video captures the incident.

    Plaintiff argued that neither of EJLD Defendants’ cited cases mention the use of experts or hold that experts cannot assist the factfinder in interpreting facts depicted on video. The Court agreed with Plaintiff.

    By opining on the likely source and timing of each gunshot wound, Gardiner will help the factfinder determine whether each of the shooting officers acted unreasonably when they continued to fire upon Asante-Chioke.

    Held

    • The Court granted in part and denied in part the LSP Defendants’ motion to exclude the testimony and opinions of John Gardiner.
    • The Court denied the EJLD Defendants’ motion to exclude the testimony of Plaintiff’s expert John C. Gardiner.

    Key Takeaway:

    While  Gardiner will be allowed to testify as an expert in this case, but he will not be able to opine or reference opinions on which wound likely killed Asante-Chioke.

    Opinions and references thereto concerning which bullet killed Asante-Chioke are irrelevant to the limited issue of whether the shooting officers are entitled to qualified immunity when they continued to fire upon him.

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Asante-Chioke V. Dowdle Et Al
    Docket Number: 2:22cv4587
    Court Name: United States District Court, Louisiana Eastern
    Order Date: November 12, 2025
  • Cybersecurity Expert Allowed to Opine on the Functionality of the Software Tools

    Cybersecurity Expert Allowed to Opine on the Functionality of the Software Tools

    This case arises from Plaintiff Cox Automotives, Inc’s (“Cox”) allegations that Defendant Super Dispatch Inc. (“Super Dispatch”) has committed false advertising, unfair competition, and other business torts against Cox.  Super Dispatch denied the allegations.

    Cox retained an expert in computer security, Dr. Micheal Bailey (1) to evaluate the cybersecurity measures Cox employed to protect its Central Dispatch platform; and (2) to analyze the functionality of the software tools that Super Dispatch uses to interact with Central Dispatch. Super Dispatch filed a motion to strike the first category of testimony on the basis that it will not be helpful to the jury, is based on insufficient facts, and his evaluation is conclusory. With respect to the second category, Super Dispatch argued that the functionality of the software tools is “a factual inquiry” that did not require expert testimony.

    Defendant Super Dispatch Inc. filed a motion to exclude the testimony of Bailey.

    Cybersecurity Expert Witness

    Micheal Donald Bailey currently serves as a Professor and School Chair in the School of Cybersecurity and Privacy at the Georgia Institute of Technology.

    He received a Ph.D. in Computer Science from the University of Michigan, a Master of Science degree in Computer Science from DePaul University, and a Bachelor of Science in Computer Science from the University of Illinois.

    Get the full story on challenges to Micheal Bailey’s expert opinions and testimony with an in-depth Challenge Study.

    Discussion by the Court

    With respect to Bailey’s testimony about Cox’s cybersecurity measures, one of the issues in this case is whether Super Dispatch violated Missouri
    Uniform Trade Secrets Act (“MUTSA”).

    As an expert in computer security, Bailey’s testimony will help the jury understand industry practices for protecting electronic data and the
    types of controls put in place by Cox. Moreover, Bailey’s evaluation was guided by three widely recognized cybersecurity frameworks and included interviews with a knowledgeable Cox witness, direct interaction with the Central Dispatch platform, and review of relevant documentation. Based on those assessments, Bailey evaluated whether the cybersecurity measures in place for Central Dispatch are consistent with recognized guidelines and industry expectations.

    Analysis

    The Court held that his testimony is not conclusory in any sense of the word. It is based on substantive analysis as demonstrated by his report. However, Bailey may not testify that Cox’s efforts to maintain the secrecy of information in the Central Dispatch were reasonable under MUTSA—an issue reserved for the jury—but he may testify that they were consistent with respect to industry expectations, standards, and guidelines.

    Moreover, the functionality of the tools Super Dispatch used to interact with Central Dispatch, e.g., the digital “scraper” that Super Dispatch allegedly used to mine information behind Central Dispatch’s paywall without authorization, underlies all of Cox’s claims. The Court held that Bailey’s testimony will help the jury understand how these tools operate. Thus, his testimony is relevant.

    His analysis includes source code where available (i.e., scraper and Chrome extension), direct interaction where available (i.e., Chrome extension), and review of relevant documentation and testimony.

    Finally, the Court rejected Super Dispatch’s suggestion that its access of the Central Dispatch platform is a “factual inquiry” that should only be presented to the jury through “fact witnesses with personal knowledge.” This argument misconstrues one of the roles of expert testimony: to help the trier of fact understand the evidence.

    Held

    The Court granted in part and denied in part the Defendant Super Dispatch Inc.’s motion to exclude the testimony of Dr. Michael Bailey. 

    Key Takeaway:

    Evidence regarding the software tools that Super Dispatch used to access Central Dispatch will involve highly technical subject matter, including source code, the operation of browser extensions, the use of an App to extract data from a third-party website, and two techniques for using automated means to post information to a third-party website. Expert testimony on these complex technical issues will be helpful to the jury.

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Cox Automotive Inc. V. Super Dispatch Inc.
    Docket Number: 4:24cv292
    Court Name: United States District Court, Missouri Western
    Order Date: November 11, 2025
  • Mechanical Engineering Expert’s Testimony on Patents Admitted

    Mechanical Engineering Expert’s Testimony on Patents Admitted

    Plaintiffs Spartan Composites, LLC d/b/a FODS and Spartan Mat, LLC accused Defendant Signature Systems Group, LLC of misappropriating trade secrets after Signature allegedly obtained FODS’ trade secret on how to design, manufacture, market and distribute the FODS trackout mat.

    Plaintiffs retained Dr. William S. Howard (“Dr. Howard”), a mechanical and electrical engineer and the owner and president of Stability Technology, Inc., to opine on the existence of two trade secrets: (a) the manner in which Plaintiffs’ FODS Trackout mat is constructed; and (b) the combination of the shape, size, structure, composition, and placement of certain mechanisms in Plaintiffs’ FODS Trackout mat.

    Plaintiffs responded that Howard presented a sufficient analysis of available patents and of the potential public exposure of Plaintiffs’ alleged trade secrets.

    Defendant filed a motion to strike and exclude Howard’s statements contained in his expert report under Federal Rule of Evidence 702.

    Mechanical Engineering Expert Witness

    Dr. William Stamps Howard holds multiple reputable degrees in and related to the subject of mechanical engineering, is a practicing design engineer specializing in industrial machinery, and is a seasoned mechanical and electrical engineer with decades of experience.

    Get the full story on challenges to William Howard’s expert opinions and testimony with an in-depth Challenge Study.

    Discussion by the Court

    I. Admissibility under Rule 702

    A. Howard is qualified.

    Defendant did not challenge Howard’s credentials directly but argued that the expert incorrectly applied his experience by ignoring and selectively utilizing pieces of evidence to arrive at his conclusions. The Court concluded that Howard’s background, certifications, and current practices establish that he is qualified under Rule 702 to provide opinions on trade secrets relating to mechanical engineering.

    B. Howard’s specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact.

    The Court found that Howard’s testimony may assist the jury by explaining why he believes Plaintiffs are in possession of multiple “trade secrets.”

    This issue involves consideration of a variety of technical and legal factors extending far beyond one’s innate “common sense and knowledge,” and Howard’s opinion is admissible under Rule 702 because it attempted to bridge that gap with his unique specialization.

    C. Howard’s testimony is based on sufficient facts or data.

    Howard relied upon in-person analysis, interviews with designers, consideration of the mechanical engineering design of the relevant equipment, and review of patents and legal literature on trade secrets to arrive at his conclusions.

    Defendant argued that Howard’s testimony is critically flawed because it failed to analyze the effect that certain patents have on the existence of Plaintiffs’ alleged trade secrets.

    Plaintiffs responded that Howard reviewed a sufficient number of patents and addressed the issue of public exposure at various points in his report.

    The Court found that Defendant’s challenge to the depth or scope of Howard’s consideration spoke to the weight of the testimony, not its admissibility. In this context, the Court was convinced that Howard’s testimony was admissible at trial, as it is sufficiently grounded in: (a) his consideration of the problem of public disclosure; (b) his specialized experience; and (c) his varied interactions with the “trade secrets” and their related legal documentation.

    D. Howard’s testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods reliably applied to the facts of the case.

    Defendant believed that Howard inadequately explained how certain patents or products have not critically jeopardized the potential “secret” status of Plaintiffs’ alleged trade secrets. Plaintiffs, on the other hand, highlighted Howard’s comprehensive analysis of a relevant patent and his repeated consideration of the issue of public disclosure.

    The Court found that the existence of certain patents and alternative products have not precluded Howard’s expert opinion. Nor has the personal interpretation of a patent by Plaintiffs’ corporate representative rendered Howard’s conclusions inadmissible at trial. Rather, Howard’s methodology is reliable and suitable for the purpose it serves. Moreover, the Court found that Howard applied his methodology consistently and transparently to all the facts he examined.

    II. Admissibility under Rule 403

    Defendant argued that Howard’s “counterfactual opinion” should not be permitted to reach the ears of the jury.

    The Court found that Howard’s testimony is the result of purposeful and
    diligent action, imbuing it with probative value wherever Plaintiffs’ alleged “trade secrets” are concerned. As noted above, concerns about Howard’s due diligence or the extent of his analysis should be addressed at trial, not exclusion under Rule 403.

    Held

    The Court denied Defendant Signature Systems Group, LLC’s Daubert motion to exclude the expert opinions of Dr. William Howard.

    Key Takeaway:

    While Howard did not specifically address a wide array of patents or products that might have undermined his analysis, the Court is confident that counsel will, by skillful cross-examination, illuminate for the jury each error and omission in his analysis.

    The factual bases and considerations of Howard’s opinions are issues of credibility, not admissibility, and to the extent Defendant believes Howard should have conducted a more thorough or complete analysis, those criticisms should be raised at trial.

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Spartan Composites LLC, Et Al. V. Signature Systems Group, LLC
    Docket Number: 4:24cv609
    Court Name: United States District Court, Texas Eastern
    Order Date: November 10, 2025
  • Insurance Expert’s Testimony on Overhead and Profit Calculations Admitted

    Insurance Expert’s Testimony on Overhead and Profit Calculations Admitted

    Plaintiff Nirangtar LLC (d/b/a Red Roof Inn Cave City) (“Red Roof”) alleged that a storm caused damage to its property. At the time of the loss, Red Roof had an insurance policy with Defendant Navigators Specialty Insurance Company (“Navigators”). Because Navigators has not paid Red Roof for its claimed losses, Red Roof filed suit in Barren Circuit Court (Kentucky), which Navigators removed to Federal Court.

    Red Roof has recently disclosed expert witnesses, including Deanna Ramsey (“Ramsey”) and Dennis James Kurttila (“Kurttila”). Ramsey, a certified public accountant, was disclosed to express opinions regarding Red Roof’s lost revenue; Navigators contended that Red Roof provided her with the necessary information, then she “simply multiplied (the number of rooms) times (the number of nights they were allegedly unavailable) times (the average rental rate).” Kurttila, a public insurance adjuster, was offered to provide his cost estimate for Red Roof’s repairs and losses resulting from the storm.

    Navigators filed motions to exclude the testimony of these two experts.

    Insurance Expert Witness

    Dennis James Kurttila has been in the construction and general contracting business since 1996. He has gained substantial work experience since 2007 in the claims industry and submitting/ parent damage claims. He is licensed as a Public Insurance Adjuster in the following states: Kentucky, Tennessee, Indiana and Mississippi.

    Get the full story on challenges to Dennis Kurttila’s expert opinions and testimony with an in-depth Challenge Study.

    Accounting Expert Witness

    Deanna Ramsey, CPA, is a certified public accountant. She has a master’s in accounting. She has prepared individual and business tax returns involving several issues related to trusts, estates, adoptions, independent contractors, education trusts, farming (business and sale), and other variations of business issues.

    Want to know more about the challenges Deanna Ramsey has faced? Get the full details with our Challenge Study report.

    Discussion by the Court

    Red Roof did not object to the exclusion of Ramsey’s testimony. Certainly, a jury would be capable of performing simple multiplication without the aid of an expert, so that motion was granted. Red Roof did, however, contest the exclusion of Kurttila’s testimony. Navigators argued that Kurttila’s testimony should be excluded because it is unreliable and unhelpful, but did not question Kurttila’s qualifications.

    A. Reliability

    Navigators argued that Kurttila’s proffered testimony is unreliable. Navigators asserted that Kurttila is biased and contested the reliability of his methods and the factual basis of Kurttila’s report.

    1. Bias

    It is not uncommon for employees of parties—and sometimes the parties themselves—to testify as experts. Thus, though Kurttila may have just “switched hats” from public adjuster to expert witness, that is not sufficient reason to exclude his testimony.

    2. Methods

    a. Overhead and Profit

    Navigators asserted that Kurttila’s testimony relating to his overhead and profit (“O&P”) calculations was unreliable because Kurttila did not know whether Red Roof had retained a contractor nor whether Red Roof could be paid for O&P under Kentucky law. He did testify that, in his opinion, Red Roof should be paid for O&P, that this is standard practice in the insurance business, that this is the case in Tennessee, and two Kentucky hotels damaged in the same storm received settlements that included O&P. Thus, Kurttila had a reasonable basis in his knowledge and experience to include O&P in his estimate.

    b. Professional Standards

    Navigators noted that Kurttila was unable to articulate the professional standards he used in preparing the estimate.

    Red Roof did not contradict this assertion. Though unable to name any specific professional standards, Kurttila testified that he used his “years of contracting and public accounting and working with Xactimate” to come to his conclusions.

    Courts have held that Xactimate, a program used by insurance companies and public adjusters to develop estimates, is a reliable method for creating estimates.

    However, Kurttila’s inability to name any “professional standards” used does not make his estimate unreliable per se—Red Roof has demonstrated that Kurttila’s estimate has a basis in his knowledge of and experience with these sorts of estimates.

    c. Date

    Navigators highlighted the fact that Kurttila did not know why he used the month reflected in the estimate.

    The Court was convinced that Kurttila’s use of November of 2023 in his estimate did not make his testimony so unreliable that it should be excluded.

    November 2023 is after the storm loss occurred, and, on a practical note, the use of November 2023 rather than October 2024 is likely favorable for Navigators, as Kurttila believes prices would have only increased, resulting in a higher estimate.

    3. Factual Basis

    Navigators argued that Kurttila’s testimony should be excluded because he relied on questionable facts and figures provided by Red Roof. In many cases, Kurttila did not know how Red Roof acquired or calculated that underlying data. Additionally, Navigators avers that the claimed damages exceed the scope of Red Roof’s causation expert’s testimony.

    However, Kurttila has remedied some of the inaccuracies. Even where Kurtilla’s estimate may be inaccurate, however, it was based on information supplied to him by Red Roof or from his own observation. Kurttila may rely on Red Roof’s data in his estimate without independently verifying it, under the assumption that it was caused by the storm. Navigators may challenge that data and any assumptions at trial; any weakness in the factual support for Kurttila’s estimate goes to weight, not admissibility.

    B. Helpfulness

    Navigators argued that Kurttila only performed multiplication and addition to construct his estimate. However, Kurtilla did more than just “basic math.” He generated estimates for several line items using Xactimate, relying on his own professional experience and, in one case, own measurements.

    Held

    The Court granted the Navigators’ motion to exclude the testimony of Deanna Ramsey but denied the Navigators’ motion to exclude the testimony of Dennis Kurttila.

    Key Takeaway:

    Some courts have held that, because jurors can perform basic math, expert testimony that can be reduced to a simple calculation violates the principle that an expert’s testimony must involve “specialized knowledge” that “will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue” and is therefore inadmissible. However, courts “have also treated public claims adjusters and their use of Xactimate as within the realm of expert testimony.” Thus, Kurtilla’s preferred testimony will not be excluded on the basis that it is unhelpful.

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Nirangtar LLC V. Navigators Specialty Insurance Company
    Docket Number: 1:23cv184
    Court Name: United States District Court, Kentucky Western
    Order Date: November 10, 2025
  • Credit Reporting Expert’s Testimony on Emotional Harm Excluded

    Credit Reporting Expert’s Testimony on Emotional Harm Excluded

    This case involves alleged violations of the Fair Credit Reporting Act. The Plaintiff, Fabian Huizar, claims that Experian Information Solutions repeatedly reported inaccurate information on his credit report relating to a car loan that was the subject of a judgment rendered in state court. Huizar hired experts, Douglas Hollon and Evan Hendricks to help him prove his case, and Experian filed a motion to exclude or limit their testimony.

    Consumer Credit Expert Witness

    Douglas A. Hollon holds a Bachelor of Science in Business Finance. He has received FCRA certifications from the Consumer Data Industry Association, and he has earned additional certifications.

    He has worked in the consumer finance reporting industry since 2005, when he began working for Experian. His work for Experian spanned 14 years from 2005 through 2019 in the National Consumer Assistance Center—Experian’s main dispute processing center—where he helped consumers “resolve their issues” and “[p]rovid[ed] leadership advice to current supervisors.”

    He handled “escalated credit report disputes” submitted on consumers’ behalf by attorneys and government entities. He has also received “specialized training involving fraud (identity theft) disputes” and testified on Experian’s behalf as a Rule 30(b)(6) witness. In addition to his experience at Experian, he has studied “regulatory agency publications, case law, deposition transcripts, company manuals or publications, and other related documents,” contributing to his “extensive knowledge of other Consumer Reporting Agencies’ (CRAs) and Data Furnishers’ credit dispute operations.” Since 2020, Hollon has been the owner of Credit Experts of North Texas, LLC. Over the course of his career, he has “assisted tens of thousands of customers.”

    Want to know more about the challenges Douglas Hollon has faced? Get the full details with our Challenge Study report. 

    Credit Reporting Expert Witness

    Evan D. Hendricks has worked in the field of data privacy and credit reporting for over forty years. He was the Editor and Publisher of Privacy Times from 1981-2013.

    He has consulted on FCRA cases for over 30 years and has served as an expert witness well over 100 times. Hendricks has testified before Congress and the Federal Trade Commission dozens of times on issues relating to credit reporting and the importance of credit scores. He is the author of a book on how credit scores work and credit reports work.

    Want to know more about the challenges Evan Hendricks has faced? Get the full details with our Challenge Study report.

    Discussion by the Court

    A. Douglas Hollon

    First, Experian stated that Hollon is unqualified to provide his opinion on the correct interpretation of the Tippecanoe Circuit Court orders which are the subject of this litigation. The Court held that Hollon’s decade-plus experience working on credit reporting at Experian qualifies him to opine on how Experian would have read and understood the legal orders as well as how reporting should have been conducted following a review of the orders.

    Experian next argued that Hollon is unqualified to opine on whether Experian’s processes and procedures resulted in inaccurate, damaging information remaining in Huizar’s Experian file. Because the jury can assess Huizar’s own damages testimony and Hollon adds no specialized knowledge or experience related to damages, he will not be allowed to provide expert testimony on Huizar’s damages, emotional or otherwise. Accordingly, any statements concerning damages, emotional or otherwise, included in Hollon’s report will not be considered by the Court.

    Experian’s motion to exclude also attacked Hollon’s methodology and argued that the Hollon Report “totally failed to outline any reliable principles or methods.” However, Hollon drew on his decade of experience working on credit reporting at Experian to review the materials in this case and form an expert opinion on Experian’s alleged actions. Although his methodology was not highly technical, the Court considered it reliable for forming an expert opinion.

    B. Evan Hendricks

    Experian argued that Hendricks is unqualified to provide expert opinion on several topics for which he opined. First, Experian argued that, like Hollon, Hendricks was unqualified to provide his opinion regarding how Experian should have interpreted the Tippecanoe Circuit Court orders.

    However, the Court held that Hendricks’ extensive knowledge of credit reporting and credit reporting agencies will be helpful to the trier of fact. And while Experian is correct that Hendricks does not have a specialized background in law, he is qualified to opine as to how Experian, a consumer reporting agency, should have viewed the legal orders at issue in this case.

    Hendricks’ experience and expertise also qualify him to provide his opinion on how Experian’s reporting would have impacted Huizar. In 2003, Hendricks provided testimony to the House Financial Services Subcommittee on Financial Institutions & Consumer Credit regarding “The Role of FCRA in the Credit Granting Process.”

    While Hendricks will be allowed to offer his opinion on how creditors would have viewed Experian’s reporting, he will be prohibited from offering opinions on any emotional or psychological harm suffered by Huizar.

    As for the reliability of Hendricks’ methodology, the Court found Hendricks’ methodology of applying his experience to the facts and evidence reliable. However, Hendricks was not permitted to provide testimony about prior cases, administrative actions, and consent decrees because an information dump from long ago cases will more likely confuse the jury than
    provide helpful information relevant to this case.

    Finally, Experian argued that Hendricks should be precluded from testifying about Experian’s knowledge, motivations, intentions, objective state of mind, and subjective beliefs. As the parties agreed that Hendricks should not testify as to the CRAs’ state of mind, Hendricks will not be permitted to provide testimony on that topic.

    Held

    The Court granted in part and denied in part Experian’s motion to exclude or limit the testimony of Plaintiff’s expert witnesses, Douglas Hollon and Evan Hendricks.

    Key Takeaway:

    When a qualified expert uses their expertise and experience to arrive at an opinion based on an assumed set of relevant facts, that is a reliable methodology. An expert’s reliance upon his or her experience to assess the relevant documents has been repeatedly viewed as a reliable methodology in various settings.

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Huizar V. Experian Information Solutions Inc.
    Docket Number: 4:22cv85
    Court Name: United States District Court, Indiana Northern
    Order Date: November 05, 2025
  • Automobile Appraisal Expert’s Cost Comparison Approach Deemed Reliable

    Automobile Appraisal Expert’s Cost Comparison Approach Deemed Reliable

    This action arises from the circumstances surrounding Plaintiff Samuel Holmes’ purchase of a limited-production 2023 Dodge Challenger Black Ghost (“Black Ghost”) from Freedom, a Kentucky LLC that sells and services cars in the Commonwealth.

    This case involves a mileage dispute over a 2023 Dodge Challenger Black Ghost, a limited-production vehicle only one of 300 produced. The Black Ghost’s mileage in the contract documents stated 11, whereas the mileage upon delivery to Holmes was “24 or 25.” Two weeks after he accepted delivery of the Black Ghost, Holmes attempted to revoke his acceptance.

    The extent to which the mileage discrepancy injured Holmes remains in dispute. Holmes asserted claims for breach of contract, intentional infliction of emotional distress, intentional misrepresentation, and conspiracy against Freedom.

    Holmes argued that the mileage discrepancy reduces the Black Ghost’s value by $103,813.00. Freedom argued that there is no reduction in value because the mileage is within the range normally expected of a new car. Holmes’ expert determined the amount of loss by subtracting the Black Ghost’s sale price from the average of the 2024 auction prices of three other 2023 Black Ghosts. Freedom’s expert, Roy Theophilus Bent, Jr. used a “Cost Comparison Approach” by searching three online databases and several authorized Dodge dealers to conclude that there was no loss in value.

    Holmes filed a motion to preclude defense expert Bent from offering his report and testimony.

    Automobile Appraisal Expert Witness

    Roy Theophilus Bent, Jr. is an IACP-Certified Auto Appraiser with over 28 years of experience in the insurance industry, specializing in actual cash value, total loss, diminished value, and damage estimating.

    His expertise lies in classic cars and custom vehicles, combined with appraisals conducted in accordance with USPAP and Bureau of Certified Auto Appraisers Standards.

    Want to know more about the challenges Roy Theophilus Bent has faced? Get the full details with our Challenge Study report.

    Discussion by the Court

    The Court found that Bent possessed the requisite technical and specialized knowledge to assist the trier of fact in valuing a limited-production vehicle like the 2023 Dodge Challenger Black Ghost. He held an IACP-Certified Auto Appraiser designation, earned through training and testing, and is a J.D. Power and Associates-certified New and Used Passenger Car & Truck Valuation Expert, adhering to the Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice (USPAP).

    Holmes called into question the factual inaccuracies in Bent’s report, arguing that the sales date was misstated, the delivery date was omitted, and the Black Ghost’s fair market value was misrepresented. Notwithstanding these facts, Holmes’ contentions did not adequately call into question the sufficiency of the data Bent relied on. The evidence in the record indicated that Bent’s report was derived from searching three different online databases and consulting with “several” certified Dodge dealers.

    Moreover, Bent’s Cost Comparison Approach is a reliable method for determining the amount of loss. Bent’s methodology searched three online databases and several authorized Dodge dealers to conclude that there was no loss in value. This approach, grounded in USPAP and Bureau of Certified Auto Appraisers Standards, aligned with industry practices and reliably applies available sales data to the unique circumstances of a limited-production vehicle.

    Finally, Bent’s report did not risk prejudice and confusion. Holmes argued that Bent’s report, which found no loss in value, risked confusing the jury by contradicting the opposing expert’s $103,813 valuation. This objection concerned the weight of Bent’s testimony, not its admissibility.

    Holmes also argued that the parole evidence rule prohibits Bent’s testimony. However, Freedom is not trying to contradict or alter the terms of the contract. Rather, the purpose of Bent’s report is to assess the amount of damages caused by the mileage discrepancy.

    Held

    The Court denied Plaintiff Samuel Holmes’ motion in limine to exclude certain testimony of Defendants’ expert, Roy Theophilus Bent, Jr. 

    Key Takeaway:

    Given the limited sales information, the Bent report sufficiently analyzed the available data. Bent’s calculations aligned with industry standards, and he reliably applied the sales numbers and data using his Cost Comparison Approach. As such, Bent’s testimony met the requirements of Rule 702.

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Holmes V. Lexington-Cjd, LLC
    Docket Number: 5:23cv249
    Court Name: United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky, Central Division
    Order Date: October 27, 2025
  • Economics Expert’s Testimony on Lost Earning Potential Admitted

    Economics Expert’s Testimony on Lost Earning Potential Admitted

    On May 22, 2021, Keith Anderson (“Anderson”) and Lorena McCaigue (“McCaigue”) (“Plaintiffs”) brought this action against Pasadena Police Chief John E. Perez (“Perez”) and the City of Pasadena (“City”). The action arises out of Defendants’ alleged retaliation against Plaintiffs in response to the following actions: (1) bringing a civil action against the City of Pasadena and certain Pasadena police officers in which violations of the California Tort Claims Act were alleged; and (2) making a request under California’s Public Records Act (“CPRA”) to obtain copies of police body camera footage.

    To begin with, McCaigue is a federal law enforcement agent who was based in the Los Angeles area. On July 22, 2019, Pasadena police responded to a call reporting a supposed suicidal person. Thereafter, McCaigue’s identity was publicized in such a way that it was no longer safe for her to continue her work in the Los Angeles area. McCaigue applied for and was granted a transfer to a new locality that has not been disclosed. However, in this new locality McCaigue  lacked the same opportunities for meaningful advancement, thus negatively affecting her lifetime total earnings.

    Defendant argued that the opinions of Phillip D. Sidlow, Plaintiff’s expert, were insufficient to prove that Defendant’s conduct caused McCaigue’s lost wages because his testimony was unreliable and based on “assumptions.”

    Economics Expert Witness

    Phillip D. Sidlow has a Master’s Degree in Applied Economics from Johns Hopkins University and is employed as a vocational economics analyst. Moreover, he has published articles about earning capacity loss, and has served as an expert in calculating lost economic opportunities suffered by parties in hundreds of lawsuits. 

    Get the full story on challenges to Phillip Sidlow’s expert opinions and testimony with an in-depth Challenge Study.

    Discussion by the Court

    Defendant argued that Sidlow’s testimony should have been excluded because it “lacked foundation and was based on pure speculation,” including assumptions he and Plaintiff McCaigue made, rather than Sidlow’s independent “research,” “review,” or consultation with Plaintiff McCaigue’s supervisors.

    Based on Sidlow’s experience, education, and specialized knowledge, the Court determined that Sidlow was qualified to provide expert testimony as to Plaintiff McCaigue’s lost earning potential, based on information provided by Plaintiff McCaigue.

    In other words, Defendant’s challenge to Sidlow concerned the weight, not admissibility, of his testimony.

    Held

    The Court denied the Defendant’s motion to exclude the testimony of Phillip Sidlow.

    Key Takeaway:

    Although Defendant asserted that Sidlow’s testimony must be excluded because it was based on “pure speculation and assumptions,” the assumptions of an expert go to the probative weight, rather than the admissibility, of the evidence.

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Anderson V. Perez
    Docket Number: 2:21cv4290
    Court Name: United States District Court for the Central District of California
    Order Date: September 29, 2025
  • Education Expert’s Testimony on School Procedures Excluded

    Education Expert’s Testimony on School Procedures Excluded

    Haverford School identified concerns with a student James’ behavior and asked his parents to withdraw him from the school mid-year. While James’ parents, the Does, acknowledged their son’s behavioral issues, they nevertheless disputed the school’s narrative of his behavior during that period.  They concluded that the school asked for James’ withdrawal because he reported racial discrimination.

    Haverford objected to the admission of testimony from the Does’ proffered expert, Raymond De Sabato, claiming that he lacks the requisite expertise or comprehensible methods to opine on issues in this case.

    Education Expert Witness

    Raymond De Sabato holds a bachelor’s degree in reading education and psychology and a master’s degree in education, with a teaching certification in reading and language arts and a focus on administration. He worked in the education field from approximately 1977-2022 as a teacher, coach, assistant principal, principal, and assistant head of school at private schools at the middle-and-high-school levels. 

    Fortify your strategy by reviewing a Challenge Study detailing grounds for excluding Raymond De Sabato’s expert testimony.

    Discussion by the Court

    In his report, De Sabato concluded that Haverford breached its duty and the professional standard of care with respect to James by failing to (1) “reasonably investigate and address the allegations of racial harassment and discrimination of James” and (2) “acting unreasonably in the manner in which it disciplined James by removing him from the School in the middle of the third grade year.”

    According to Haverford, De Sabato’s purported expertise is based solely upon his career as an educator, rather than any specialized training or education.

    Plaintiffs opposed Haverford’s motion, highlighting De Sabato’s discussion of best practices for dealing with struggling students, from the perspective of the private school experience.

    Analysis

    Despite De Sabato’s expertise as a teacher and administrator at private schools for 50 years, the Court held that De Sabato did not articulate a reliable method through which he reached his opinions in this case.

    He described his expert methodology as “including the gathering, review, and analysis of all available and relevant documents, evidence, information, and testimony” based upon his “education, training, and professional experience in the field of education administration.” De Sabato further explained that his analysis focused on Haverford’s maintenance and implementation of racial harassment and abuse procedures, its investigation into such alleged harassment, and its disciplinary process for James.

    This is not a methodology in the Rule 702 sense, but is rather a description of how thinking works: collect and assess the relevant information and use experience to reach a conclusion. The Court did not find any indication of how the jury will be able to follow along with that thought process if challenged – a critical safeguard of Rule 702.

    Held

    The Court granted the Defendants’ motion to exclude the testimony of Raymond De Sabato.

    Key Takeaway:

    Sabato spoke in broad strokes about his focus on school procedures for racial harassment and abuse and investigations into such allegations, without providing any details as to what an effective or ineffective system looks like. Nor did he offer any insight into what an appropriate disciplinary process would be for a student exhibiting James’ behaviors.

    It is simply not enough to say, “I reviewed the relevant documents, based upon my experience in this space, and reached my conclusions by focusing on the things I was asked to assess.”

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Doe V. Haverford School
    Docket Number: 2:24cv618
    Court Name: United States District Court, Pennsylvania Eastern
    Order Date: October 27, 2025
  • Psychology Expert’s Opinion on Social-Media-Facilitated Sex Trafficking Admitted

    Psychology Expert’s Opinion on Social-Media-Facilitated Sex Trafficking Admitted

    This case arises under the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act (TVPRA), which provides victims of sex trafficking a civil remedy against the perpetrators and beneficiaries of their trafficking.

    Plaintiff Doe (C.L.F.) filed this action to recover for alleged harm she experienced from being trafficked at a Motel 6 in Wichita, Kansas, that she claims was owned and operated by the Defendants.

    Defendant Kisan, Inc. filed a motion to exclude the testimony of Dr. Katy Fowler Sutton, one of C.L.F.’s designated expert witnesses. 

    Psychology Expert Witness

    Kathryn Fowler Sutton graduated with a Master of Science in Clinical Psychology and in 2004 received her Doctor of Clinical Psychology (PsyD). She has been a Licensed Specialist in School Psychology (Texas) since 2005 and a Licensed Clinical Psychologist (Texas) since 2006. In her twenty years of clinical practice, approximately 15% of her patients have been survivors of sex trafficking. As part of her annual license renewal requirements, she has to complete mandatory training in human trafficking.

    She also has fourteen years of experience being an expert witness and has never before been struck. In addition to being an expert witness, she also currently continues to see patients, some of whom are sex trafficking survivors.

    Want to know more about the challenges Katy Fowler Sutton has faced? Get the full details with our Challenge Study report. 

    Discussion by the Court

    Kisan and the G6 Defendants sought to exclude Sutton’s opinions that

    (1) C.L.F. meets the criteria of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) and other specified trauma-and-stressor-related disorders; and

    (2) C.L.F.’s PTSD is caused by her having been sex-trafficked rather than any other previous traumatic experiences.

    Defendants claimed that these opinions should be excluded because they are both irrelevant and unreliable.

    A. Relevance

    Defendants argued that the testimony of Sutton is inadmissible because it is irrelevant.

    According to Defendants, the fatal flaw in Sutton’s report is that “the word ‘motel’ does not appear.” Worse yet, the report stated that C.L.F.’s alleged trafficking was “facilitated by social media platforms.” In this case, the alleged trafficking occurred only at motels owned and operated by Defendants, and C.L.F. “met her trafficker at a gas station,” not on social media. This might be problematic as expert testimony must be connected to “the facts of the case.” 

    While a report based on social-media-facilitated sex trafficking at no specific locations may not be tied to the facts of this case, Sutton’s report is. Sutton interviewed C.L.F. for 5 hours and 12 minutes. During that time, Sutton and C.L.F. discussed C.L.F.’s early life in detail, C.L.F.’s experiences during the alleged trafficking, and C.L.F.’s recovery in recent years. They specifically talked about her “thoughts and feelings” associated with the alleged trafficking, and Sutton collected enough information to provide diagnoses of and recommended treatments to C.L.F.

    Further, in her deposition Sutton explicitly confirmed that she tied her interview with C.L.F. to the facts of this case. Sutton used the complaint during the interview to “refer specifically to the incident[s] in question” at the motels in issue. When asked if they discussed the relevant motels “where [C.L.F.] had a traumatic experience,” Sutton responded: “Yes.” During the interview, Sutton ensured to “very specifically explain to C.L.F. what events [she was] referring to.” In the Court’s view, Sutton’s methodology was “sufficiently tied to the facts of the case.”

    The Court held that her testimony was relevant under Rule 702.

    B. Reliability

    Defendants asserted that the two opinions they want stricken should be excluded because they are unreliable. To Defendants, Sutton’s opinions are not the product of a reliable methodology and do not reflect a reliable application of psychology to the facts of the case.

    1. Sutton’s Diagnosis of C.L.F.’s PTSD and Other Trauma Disorders

    Defendants objected to Sutton’s opinion that C.L.F. met the criteria for PTSD and other specified trauma-and-stressor-related disorders.

    First, Defendants argued that Sutton’s diagnosis is unreliable because she “did not follow accepted medical practice in selecting or administering tests” for PTSD in her interview of C.L.F.

    The Court understood Defendants’ stance, but ultimately their attacks are best left for “[v]igorous cross-examination.” To admit Sutton’s testimony, C.L.F. “need not prove to th[is court] that the expert’s testimony is correct;” she simply must “prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the testimony is reliable.” Even with its alleged flaws, Sutton’s opinion that C.L.F. met the criteria for PTSD is reliable by a preponderance of the evidence.

    Defendants also found fault with Sutton’s administration of the CAPS-5, specifically her failure to use the Life Events Checklist (LEC-5) during CAPS-5 Step 1. They said that because Sutton did not use the LEC-5 for the Step 1 inquiry, her opinions are unreliable to the point of inadmissibility. But CAPS-5 allows the practitioner to administer the LEC-5 or some “other structured trauma screen” to begin. Sutton’s report, as noted, details information about C.L.F.’s history of trauma gleaned from the hours-long interview Sutton conducted of C.L.F., which in the Court’s view qualifies as a structured trauma screen.

    Second, Defendants argued that Sutton’s diagnosis of C.L.F. with PTSD is unreliable because Sutton’s conclusion contains conflicting diagnoses. However, the Court did not accept that Sutton’s “conflicting diagnoses” are so unreliable that they defy the “methods and procedures of science.” 

    2. Sutton’s opinion that sex-trafficking, not other traumatic experiences, caused C.L.F.’s PTSD

    Defendants took issue with Sutton’s opinion that C.L.F.’s “history of trafficking,” not any of her other previous traumatic experiences, caused her PTSD.

    As Sutton noted in her report (and as Defendants state in their motion), the stressors with potential to cause PTSD for C.L.F. other than her trafficking experiences are the death of her grandmother, her placement in foster care, the incarceration of her first child’s father, her abusive relationship circa 2020, and apparent substance abuse. Defendants claimed that Sutton only ruled out C.L.F.’s grandmother’s death and her placement in foster care before declaring that C.L.F.’s trafficking experiences were the sole cause of her PTSD. Sutton certainly did rule those stressors out; she concluded “within a reasonable degree of scientific certainty” that C.L.F.’s PTSD responses are associated with her history of trafficking, not the “grief” she experienced from her grandmother’s death or foster care.

    Now Sutton did not explicitly rule out all potential causes, but her report evidences that she was aware of these other stressors when opining on the cause of C.L.F.’s PTSD. While the Court felt that Sutton should improve her recordkeeping and notetaking as it pertains to conducting diagnoses for litigation, her extensive experience with evaluations, her five-hour interaction with C.L.F., her deposition testimony, and the conclusions in her report all favor reliability here.

    C. Scope

    Though Sutton can testify as to her opinion that C.L.F.’s PTSD was caused by the trafficking-related trauma discussed during the evaluation, the Defendants pointed out that Sutton may not characterize any incidents C.L.F. experienced as “sex trafficking.” Sutton’s report and testimony is rife with her calling the incidents C.L.F. discussed “sex-trafficking.” The Court agreed. Defendants are right to point out that Sutton is not permitted to opine on ultimate legal issues. 

    In other words, Sutton may provide her opinion that C.L.F. suffers from PTSD and other trauma disorders, and she may provide her opinion as to what caused C.L.F.’s PTSD. But in describing these causes, she must keep her descriptions within certain limitations.

    Held

    The Court denied in part the Defendant Kisan, Inc.’s motion to exclude the proposed testimony of Plaintiff’s expert Dr. Kathryn Sutton.

    Key Takeaway:

    Sutton is free to discuss the trauma-causing incidents concerning C.L.F., but only in permissible ways. The Court is aware that these incidents necessarily involve sex or even commercial sex, but the testimony is permissible so long as it does not characterize any experiences or incidents as sex trafficking or trafficking.

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Doe C.L.F. V. G6 Hospitality, LLC
    Docket Number: 1:23cv303
    Court Name: United States District Court, Texas Eastern
    Order Date: August 20, 2025
  • Radiology Expert’s Appropriateness of Treatment Opinions Admitted

    Radiology Expert’s Appropriateness of Treatment Opinions Admitted

    Plaintiff Sabrina Solomon was involved in a motor vehicle accident (“MVA”) in April 2021 that left her with “a permanent injury to the body as a whole” leading to this underinsured motorist benefits and loss of consortium case.

    One of Defendant’s expert witnesses, Dr. Richard A. Ofstein, emphasized that Plaintiff Sabrina Solomon’s brain imaging was “most consistent with, if not diagnostic for, an incidental cavernous angioma,” rather than a TBI. As for her spine and shoulder injuries, Ofstein opined these were consistent with aging or “degenerative” changes or disease, rather than an acute trauma.

    In reaching the opinions outlined in his report, Ofstein consulted the medical records for Plaintiff Sabrina Solomon that were provided to him, including numerous diagnostic images (MRIs and angiograms).

    Plaintiffs filed a motion to exclude Ofstein from testifying at trial. According to them, “ Ofstein is not qualified to give such opinions,” “his opinions are not based on sufficient facts and data,” and “his opinions are not based on a reliable scientific methodology.”

    Radiology Expert Witness

    Richard Alan Ofstein is a radiologist with over forty years of experience. He is board certified in Diagnostic Radiology and has a Certificate of Added Qualifications in Neuroradiology. He is currently an Adjunct Assistant Professor of Radiology at the University of Utah and previously worked as an Assistant Clinical Professor of Radiology at the UCLA School of Medicine. Additionally, Ofstein worked in private practice for most of his career.

    Get the full story on challenges to Richard Ofstein’s expert opinions and testimony with an in-depth Challenge Study.

    Discussion by the Court

    Qualifications

    Plaintiffs argued that Ofstein is not qualified to give the opinions from his report. According to them, “although Ofstein might be qualified to give radiology opinions, i.e., what he sees on Plaintiff’s diagnostic imaging, he is not qualified to give opinion testimony on the specific causation of injury that might arise as a result of a motor vehicle accident, nor the appropriateness or relatedness of any treatment incurred or to be incurred by Plaintiff Sabrina Solomon.”

    The Court disagreed. A radiologist may opine on the likely cause of an injury observed in radiological imaging, such as whether an injury results from an acute trauma or degeneration. Furthermore, Ofstein made clear in his deposition that he was not opining on the medical appropriateness of Plaintiff Sabrina Solomon’s spinal and shoulder surgeries. Rather, Ofstein clarified that he was “addressing the relationship of the need for surgery and the accident at issue.”

    In other words, Ofstein’s opinion on the surgeries was appropriately limited to the fact that the injuries addressed by those surgeries were not caused by the motor vehicle accident. This opinion falls within the expertise of a radiologist.

    Methodology

    According to Plaintiffs, Ofstein’s methodology in reaching his opinions was unreliable. They complained that “Ofstein’s opinions are not founded on any established scientific method” because “he solely relies on the deposition of the Plaintiff in performing his clinical correlation and coming to his opinions.” Plaintiffs also contended that Ofstein’s “opinions are not based on sufficient facts or data”: “Ofstein’s deposition testimony shows that his opinions on causation and relatedness or appropriateness of treatment were based only on him looking at the radiological studies and medical records from [Plaintiff Sabrina Solomon’s] treating providers after the subject accident.” Thus, in Plaintiffs’ view, “Ofstein’s opinion in this case lacks the proper informational foundation to opine on causation and relatedness or appropriateness of medical treatment.”

    Again, the Court disagreed. Ofstein used a trustworthy methodology in reviewing Plaintiff Sabrina Solomon’s radiological images in reaching his conclusions.

    The fact that Ofstein “did not review any of Plaintiff’s medical records outside of the radiology reports produced by Plaintiff’s treating physicians” did not render his methodology unreliable. Ofstein’s review of the radiological imaging, the radiology reports from Plaintiff Sabrina Solomon’s treating physicians, as well as the police report from the accident and Plaintiff Sabrina Solomon’s deposition, supports that he applied a sufficiently trustworthy methodology in reaching his opinions.

    Held

    The Court denied the Plaintiffs Sabrina and Stanford Solomon’s Daubert motion to exclude causation and appropriateness of treatment opinions of Defendant’s expert, Dr. Richard Ofstein.

    Key Takeaway:

    The methodology used by Ofstein is standard and consistent with the literature and methodology used by radiologists in the United States. The fact that the expert radiologist did not review Plaintiff’s complete medical
    records did not render his methodology unreliable. In fact, it is consistent with the way that radiologists interpret films every day.

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Solomon Et Al V. Aig Property Casualty Company
    Docket Number: 8:24cv2650
    Court Name: United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida, Tampa Division
    Order Date: October 23, 2025