Expert Witness Profiler

Tag: Reliable

  • Insurance Expert’s Testimony on Legal Obligations Excluded

    Insurance Expert’s Testimony on Legal Obligations Excluded

    Plaintiff The Lucia Family Trust (“Plaintiff” or the “Trust”) and non-party Daniel Unrein had a homeowners insurance policy (the “Policy”) with Defendant American Family Mutual Insurance Company, S.I. (“Defendant” or “American Family”). The policy covered a property located in Denver, Colorado (the “Property”). A fire occurred at the property in September 2021, and Unrein submitted a claim under the policy. Unrein passed away in November 2021, leaving the Trust as the remaining insured listed in the policy.

    The repairs to the Property required asbestos abatement.The first contractor selected to perform the abatement, CAT Environmental Services, LLC (“CAT”), failed to complete the job and violated several Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment regulations, among other issues. The Trust then hired other contractors to complete the abatement and perform additional reconstruction work on the Property. Although American Family made some payments, the Trust alleged that American Family has refused to pay for approximately $112,000 of covered abatement and reconstruction work, in violation of the Policy.

    American Family filed a motion to exclude certain opinions of Plaintiff’s insurance industry standards expert, Brian Seigal, pursuant to Rule 702.

    Insurance Expert Witness

    Brian Seigal has been involved in the insurance industry throughout his career for several decades. He served as the lead supervisor and claim manager position in property and casualty claims, the senior adjuster and team manager status of property and casualty claims at Liberty Mutual Group, in which capacity he adjusted, audited, and led multi-disciplinary claim teams.

    Seigal is engaged as a consultant in a wide variety of insurance related cases, which include evaluation of first and third-party property claims.

    In 1998 he earned and obtained the Associate Insurance Claims (AIC) Designation from the Insurance Institute, which is a nationally recognized insurance claims designation.

    Get the full story on challenges to Brian Seigal’s expert opinions and testimony with an in-depth Challenge Study. 

    Discussion by the Court

    I. Motion to Exclude

    A. Qualifications

    American Family first attacked Seigal’s qualifications as an expert under Rule 702(a). American Family argued that Seigal “has not worked in the insurance industry since 2018″—focusing instead on consulting work—and that his industry experience “did not involve property damage claims.”

    To the extent American Family contended that Seigal must have specific experience in “homeowners property damage claims involving asbestos abatement,” that is an “overly narrow” test of Seigal’s qualifications. Rather, Seigal’s report reflected a familiarity with the applicable industry and statutory standards for handling property claims in Colorado.

    Seigal has “passed the licensing exams for a Colorado Property & Casualty and Life Producer.” And his curriculum vitae and report describe over 20 years of experience at various stages of the claim-shandling process, including “reviewing and auditing thousands of open and closed claim files from 50+ claims departments for the adherence to company standards and practices.” Seigal’s more recent pivot to consulting work does not undermine his extensive industry experience.

    The Court accordingly found that Seigal’s opinions regarding American Family’s handling of Plaintiff’s claim are “within the reasonable confines of his subject area” and will assist the jury in evaluating American Family’s conduct.

    B. Methodology

    American Family next attacked Seigal’s methodology. American Family faults Seigal for failing to analyze American Family’s conduct based on the information it had at the time it handled Plaintiff’s claim.

    Seigal’s methodology essentially involved reviewing the facts of the case and relevant documents and then analyzing them based on his knowledge and experience of insurance industry standards. Courts routinely find that such a methodology is reliable for an insurance industry expert.

    In light of Seigal’s methodology, the Court respectfully disagreed with American Family that Seigal failed to evaluate American Family’s conduct based on the information available at the time. Seigal’s report spends more than 50 pages detailing the timeline of the claim and specifically references the statements and communications made to and by American Family’s employees during the claim adjustment process. 

    American Family next argued that Seigal failed to set forth a methodology to support his statement that “liability was reasonably clear.” 

    In full, the relevant statement in Seigal’s report is:

    “Liability was reasonably clear in this matter and the claim was accepted by [American Family]. Nonetheless, [American Family] put [Plaintiff] into a situation where they had to file multiple reports for the abatement process and proof of loss. [American Family] understood the impact on the personal property claim under Coverage B. The process [American Family] used put the Coverage B claim in jeopardy for [Plaintiff]. This influenced the settlements under the insurance policy.”

    The Court did not understand this statement to opine that “[l]iability was reasonably clear” for Plaintiff’s claimed reconstruction costs, or that American Family was obligated to automatically pay every dollar demanded by Plaintiff. This portion of Seigal’s opinion exclusively discussed abatement costs and personal property losses, not reconstruction.

    C. Specific Opinions

    American Family also challenged several specific opinions in Seigal’s report that it contended are ipse dixit, subjective beliefs, legal conclusions, or impermissible statements about litigation conduct.

    1. Ipse Dixit

    American Family contended that five of Seigal’s opinions are inadmissible ipse dixit. First, American Family challenged Seigal’s description of American Family’s investigation and denial of coverage for Unrein’s and his dog’s injuries as “a heavy-handed approach for an insured who AMF knew was unfamiliar with the insurance process.”

    The Court respectfully disagreed that this statement is ipse dixit. Seigal reviews the applicable industry standards in earlier portions of his report, including Colorado’s good faith standard.

    The Court likewise found that another challenged opinion is not ipse dixit for substantially the same reasons. This opinion involved Seigal’s criticism of American Family’s “negotiating tactic” of offering Unrein a “lowball” amount to cover his living expenses in order to “force a settlement at a compromised value to [American Family’s] benefit.”

    The remaining three challenged opinions relate to Seigal’s references to how other insurers might handle similar claims. The opinions are (1) “In my opinion, [American Family] did not manage this claim in accordance with industry standards regularly embraced by carriers in cases like this one,” (2) “[American Family’s] claim handling fell short of how claims like [Plaintiff’s] are typically investigated,” and (3) “[American Family] offered [Plaintiff] substantially less than the amounts of insureds in these types of matters.”

    The Court agreed with American Family that these opinions are unsupported to the extent they imply that Seigal has expertise in the specific type of claim at issue. Seigal’s report and curriculum vitae reflect that he does not specialize in or have particular experience with property damage claims.  Nor does his report discuss any comparator cases involving claims “like” Plaintiff’s, let alone how such claims would be investigated, adjusted, and settled. 

    2. Subjective Beliefs or Opinions

    American Family next challenged five more opinions as based only on Seigal’s subjective beliefs. Plaintiff conceded that three of these opinions are inadmissibly speculative. Those opinions involved Seigal’s statements that American Family “utilized a strategy designed to limit its claim costs,” was “more concerned with lowering [its] claim costs,” and possessed “preconceived thoughts and bias” during the claim-handling process. The Court agreed that, as stated in Seigal’s report, these opinions lack foundation and must be excluded as speculative. 

    The remaining two opinions asserted that American Family’s employees were “focused on reducing [American Family’s] exposure” and hired certain vendors “for this purpose in mind.” In Plaintiff’s view, = Seigal’s conclusion that American Family sought to reduce its exposure is grounded in factual observations. Plaintiff appeared to concede, however, that claiming American Family had a certain “purpose in mind” is improper speculation.

    The Court agreed with American Family that, as presented in Seigal’s report, these statements improperly assigned a motive to American Family and its employees. Seigal did not adequately provide a factual basis for his opinions about the “purpose” of certain actions or what certain employees were “focused on.”

    3. Legal Conclusions

    American Family asked the Court to exclude several of Seigal’s statements that American Family believes are legal conclusions. In these statements, Seigal opined that American Family’s conduct was “unreasonable,” violated the “standards of good faith and fair dealing,” and “occurred intentionally or with reckless disregard.”

    The Court will permit Seigal to testify about insurance industry standards and why he believes American Family deviated from those standards in this case. He may also “testify generally about his understanding of the law and how it impacts his understanding of the standards that govern the insurance industry.”

    But Seigal may not testify about whether American Family acted unreasonably, in bad faith, or knowingly or recklessly. Nor may he opine about American Family’s legal obligations and whether it complied with them.

    4. Opinions About Litigation Conduct

    Finally, American Family sought to exclude opinions in Seigal’s report about American Family’s conduct during this litigation. For instance, Seigal stated that American Family’s “claim manual was provided on the eve of the Plaintiff’s expert report being due.” Seigal also opined that based on his review of the Parties’ discovery disclosures, “there appears to be redactions that were taken which are routinely disclosed in cases like this one.” American Family contended that Plaintiff has not shown sufficient facts to permit admission of these opinions under Rules 702 and 403. 

    However, Plaintiff only made the cursory argument that Seigal’s opinions about American Family’s litigation conduct are based on industry standards and grounded in factual obligations. This does not explain why American Family’s attorneys’ discovery practices are probative of American Family’s alleged bad faith in handling Plaintiff’s claim. Nor is it clear to the Court that Seigal’s discovery-related opinions are based on industry standards.

    Held

    The Court granted in part and denied in part American Family’s motion to exclude or limit the testimony of Brian Seigal pursuant to Rule 702.

    Key Takeaway:

    Seigal’s methodology boils down to explaining the applicable industry standards, reviewing the facts of the case, and analyzing whether American Family’s claim-handling practices complied with Seigal’s understanding of the industry standards. Consequently, courts routinely find that such a methodology is reliable for an insurance industry expert. 

    Courts also routinely preclude experts from opining about whether an insurer acted reasonably or unreasonably in the handling of an insured’s claim. As a result, Seigal may not testify about whether American Family acted unreasonably, in bad faith, or knowingly or recklessly. Nor may he opine about American Family’s legal obligations and whether it complied with them.

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Lucia Family Trust V. American Family Mutual Insurance Company S.I.
    Docket Number: 1:23cv2156
    Court Name: United States District Court, Colorado
    Order Date: September 25, 2025
  • The Psychiatry Expert Was Allowed to Opine on the Absence of Sexual Trauma

    The Psychiatry Expert Was Allowed to Opine on the Absence of Sexual Trauma

    Defendant Wendy’s International, LLC operates a multinational fast food restaurant chain specializing in hamburgers and French fries. M.B. was a minor female employee of a Wendy’s restaurant in Lutz, Florida. M.B. alleged that from September until December 2023, she was subjected to sexual harassment at Wendy’s by Jamaya Clemmons, a 25-year-old male Wendy’s employee. She testified in deposition to several non-consensual sexual encounters with Clemmons at work.

    Plaintiff filed this lawsuit asserting claims for sexual harassment and hostile work environment. According to defense expert Eric M. Kaplan, M.D., a psychiatrist, Plaintiff did not suffer from PTSD arising from her experience with Clemmons at Wendy’s.

    Plaintiff filed a motion to exclude Kaplan’s opinions, arguing that he is unqualified to offer them and that his testimony failed the requirements for expert testimony imposed by Rule 702. Kaplan opined that she suffered from other conditions caused by factors that largely pre-date her employment at Wendy’s. 

    Psychiatry Expert Witness

    Eric Michael Kaplan, M.D.  is a board-certified psychiatrist with 35 years of experience treating adults and adolescents with a variety of conditions.

    Kaplan has worked as a forensic psychiatrist for over 25 years, and has been board certified by the American College of Forensic Examiners and American Board of Forensic Medicine for almost 30 years.

    Want to know more about the challenges Eric Kaplan has faced? Get the full details with our Challenge Study report.

    Discussion by the Court

    Plaintiff argued that Kaplan is a general and forensic psychiatrist who is not “subspecialty trained” in adolescent or child psychiatry and has only limited experience in his clinical practice with adolescents who have suffered sexual trauma. Plaintiff further argued that Kaplan is unqualified to administer a psychological test he used as part of his evaluation of Plaintiff, and that his testing methods were unreliable.

    However, the Court found that Kaplan is sufficiently qualified and that his approach was sufficiently reliable to be admitted under Rule 702.

    Kaplan based his opinions on an examination of Plaintiff, including but not limited to an interview and psychological testing, and on his medical and psychiatric training and 35 of years of experience. In addition, he reviewed medical and other records, including records relating to previous treatment for emotional problems, and he reviewed depositions of Plaintiff, Clemmons, and Plaintiff’s parents. Moreover, he compared Plaintiff’s information to the diagnostic criteria in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders or DSM, a standard reference work published by the American Psychiatric Association.

    Plaintiff’s motion did not argue that Kaplan’s overall methodology was inappropriate. Instead, Plaintiff offered specific criticisms of how Kaplan performed various aspects of the evaluation and the conclusions he reached. These criticisms go to the weight to be accorded to Kaplan’s testimony, not its admissibility.

    The Court also found that, contrary to Plaintiff’s argument, Kaplan was sufficiently qualified to administer the MMPI-2-RF psychological test he gave Plaintiff. Scoring such tests is a matter typically within the expertise of psychologists rather than psychiatrists, but Kaplan has had training in using such tests and he did not score the results himself but sent them to the test’s creator for scoring and interpretation.

    Held

    The Court denied the Plaintiff’s motion to exclude the testimony of defense expert Eric Kaplan.

    Key Takeaway:

    While expert qualifications in a general area do not necessarily qualify an expert to offer any specific opinion within the area, by the same token, specific training or certification in a particular subspecialty area (such as, here, adolescent psychiatry) is not necessarily required to offer opinions in that area.

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: M.B. Et Al V. The Wendy’s Company Et Al
    Docket Number: 8:24cv1116
    Court Name: United States District Court, Florida Middle
    Order Date: October 17, 2025
  • Compliance Expert’s Testimony on the Marketability of the Olivetol Excluded

    Compliance Expert’s Testimony on the Marketability of the Olivetol Excluded

    Noramco and Dishman entered into a contract (“the Supply Agreement”) under which Dishman agreed to provide Noramco with a large amount of olivetol, an ingredient used in the manufacture of pharmaceutical products. 

    The Supply Agreement required Dishman to supply Noramco with olivetol manufactured at Dishman’s facilities in India. The Agreement represented that those facilities were “c-GMP compliant,” i.e., compliant with the current Good Manufacturing Practice standards set by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration.

    In February 2020, the European Directorate for the Quality of Medicines & HealthCare (“EQDM”) inspected Dishman’s facility in India where the olivetol was manufactured. The EQDM subsequently informed Dishman on March 19, 2020, that the facility had failed the inspection and was not compliant with cGMP. 

    The batches of olivetol at issue in this case were manufactured by Dishman after the failed inspection. The were shipped by Dishman on March 26, 2020, and received by Noramco on April 2, 2020. After an exchange of emails between the parties regarding the effect of the failed inspection, Noramco rejected the olivetol and sought a refund of the amount Noramco had paid for the product. When Dishman refused to accept the return of the olivetol and to return the funds Noramco had paid for the olivetol, Noramco brought this action seeking damages for breach of contract.

    The Plaintiff, Noramco LLC (“Noramco”), has filed a motion to exclude the opinion testimony of Dr. Rino C. Coladangelo, an expert witness for the Defendant, Dishman USA, Inc. (“Dishman”).

    Compliance Expert Witness

    Dr. Rino Casmira Coladangelo MB BS MRCP is a medical doctor with experience in the field of pharmaceutical compliance.

    He led the global consultancy company Rephine which provided a world class compliance and regulatory service to pharmaceutical companies. His expertise includes regulatory and quality aspects of pharmaceutical manufacture and covers all major global markets.

    Want to know more about the challenges Rino Casmira Coladangelo has faced? Get the full details with our Challenge Study report.

    Discussion by the Court

    To begin with, Noramco challenged Coladangelo’s qualifications as an expert and argued that his reports “lack reliable methodology, are based on unsupported speculation, offer legal conclusions, opine on Plaintiff’s state of mind, and do not establish the expert’s qualifications in the relevant subject matter.” 

    The Limits of Coladangelo’s Qualifications

    From April 2009 until October 2021, Coladangelo served as Chief Executive Officer of Rephine Ltd., a global pharmaceutical consultancy specializing in quality compliance in manufacturing, and regulatory affairs.In that capacity, Coladangelo “led the training and development of the staff and consultants, as well as accreditation of specialty staff.”

    Based on Coladangelo’s experience at Raphine Ltd., the Court found that Coladangelo was qualified to testify as an expert on matters of quality compliance and regulatory affairs in the pharmaceutical industry. However, Coladangelo’s expertise in the field of pharmaceutical quality compliance and regulatory affairs did not qualify him to testify on legal issues or the state of mind of representatives of the opposing party, which are the subjects of much of his expert report.

    In his report, Coladangelo stated that “[t]he supply agreement makes clear that any rejection of material must be made within 30 working days of receipt” and that the actions taken by Noramco “contravene the terms of the agreement.” According to the Court, Coladangelo lacked the qualifications to provide an opinion interpreting the contract in this case, and even if he were qualified to give such an opinion, it would be improper for him to express a legal opinion as to whether Noramco failed to comply with the terms of the Supply Agreement, which is an ultimate issue in this case.

    To the extent Coladangelo purports to offer legal opinions or speculate as to the Noramco representatives’ state of mind, his testimony will be excluded.

    The Reliability of Coladangelo’s Testimony

    First, Coladangelo’s report contains a list of 24 manufacturers of medicinal THC and asserted that “[s]ome of these might have been interested in acquiring the Olivetol batches.” However, aside from the list of THC manufacturers, the report contained no other facts, data, or methodology supporting Coladangelo’s conclusion that all or some number of the listed manufacturers might have been willing to purchase the non-compliant olivetol.

    Second, Coladangelo’s report points to Noramco’s failure to promptly reject the olivetol and its act of sampling the product as causing a reduction in the shelf life and marketability of the olivetol. According to Coladangelo, “[n]on-conformity with the proper protocol would make the material unusable by others.” However, the Court concluded Coladangelo’s naked assertion that non-conformity would make the olivetol unusable by others lacked sufficient support in facts, data, or methodology.

    Third, Coladangelo asserted in his report that the non-cGMP compliant olivetol “could still be used if a Risk Assessment Analysis (RAA) is undertaken.” In support of that assertion, Coladangelo cited certain guidelines from the EQDM and noted that certain other pharmaceutical products have been accepted by Belgian, German, and Brazilian manufacturers following an RAA. 

    Without some reasoning or methodology to connect the use of an RAA to the olivetol at issue beyond an “implication” or speculation, the Court held that Coladangelo’s conclusion regarding olivetol’s potential use after an RAA lacked the scientific support that Daubert demands.

    The Fit of Coladangelo’s Testimony

    Coladangelo’s expert testimony must help the trier of fact decide (1) the timeliness of Noramco’s rejection and (2) the mitigation of Dishman’s damages.

    On the issue of timely rejection, the Court held that Coladangelo’s opinions, as expressed in his report, are of limited value to the trier of fact. Specifically, the timely rejection issue is primarily a question of contract interpretation as applied to the series of events and correspondence that unfolded between Noramco and Dishman. Moreover, the testimony that Coladangelo is qualified to give on pharmaceutical compliance and regulatory affairs did little to help resolve whether Noramco timely rejected the olivetol at issue.

    On the issue of mitigation of damages, however, the opinions offered by Coladangelo may offer some assistance to the finder of fact in determining whether Noramco’s actions constituted reasonable steps to mitigate Dishman’s damages under the circumstances. In other words, Coladangelo may be able to help the finder of fact understand industry customs and practices for regulatory compliance testing and for opening and resealing tested materials.

    Held

    The Court granted in part and denied in part Noramco’s motion to exclude opinions and testimony of Dr. Rino Casmira Coladangelo.

    Key Takeaway:

    While there are portions of Coladangelo’s report (and, thus, his proposed testimony) that are legitimately within his expertise, much of his report reads like the first closing argument for the Defendant. It appears to be an example of the increasingly common practice of allowing the presentations of expert witnesses to bleed over from expert testimony on discrete factual issues into legal argument on the merits of their proponent’s case. That is decidedly not the role of expert witnesses.

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Noramco LLC V. Dishman USA, Inc.
    Docket Number: 1:21cv1696
    Court Name: United States District Court, Delaware
    Order Date: October 16, 2025
  • Trucking Expert’s Testimony on the Preventability of the Accident Excluded

    Trucking Expert’s Testimony on the Preventability of the Accident Excluded

    This case arises from a fatal automobile accident that occurred on September 22, 2017. Blake Haddox was traveling southbound on a motorcycle as Defendant Nicholas Roshon Moore drove a semi-truck in a northbound lane and turned left across traffic. The two collided, and Haddox died as a result.

    Defendants Central Freightlines, Inc. and Nicholas Roshon Moore (collectively, “Defendants”) filed a motion to strike Plaintiffs’ expert Lewis J. Grill, a motion in limine with respect to anticipated testimony by Grill and a motion to strike his supplemental expert report.

    Defendants argued that Grill is not qualified to provide expert testimony in this case, and that his opinions are neither relevant nor reliable.

     His proffered testimony relates to “four overarching areas” that include: (1) “general trucking industry customs, practices, and standards”; (2) the “operating performance” of Moore; (3) CFL’s “management practices”; and (4) “accident preventability from a commercial trucking industry standpoint.”

    Trucking Expert Witness

    Lewis Joseph Grill has extensive experience as a commercial truck driver, training instructor, training program director, safety director, and trucking consultant. 

    He is licensed as a commercial driver and has logged approximately 2 million miles driving tractor-trailers in the United States, Canada, Mexico, and Central America. Grill has published books and articles and spoken on the subject of commercial trucking, in general, and driver standards, in particular.

    Want to know more about the challenges Lew Grill has faced? Get the full details with our Challenge Study report.

    Discussion by the Court

    A. Motion to Strike Supplemental Report

    Plaintiffs provided Defendants with Grill’s original expert report by the applicable deadline. In accordance with an Amended Scheduling Order, Defendants timely filed a Daubert motion, requesting the Court strike Grill’s expert testimony. Over two months later, on December 4, 2020—well after the deadline to exchange expert reports had passed—Plaintiffs provided Defendants with a supplemental report prepared by Grill. Defendants filed a motion to strike Grill’s supplemental report as untimely.

    The Court understood Defendants’ position. However, a review of the supplemental report indicated that the main change is the addition of two new opinions. These new opinions are apparently offered as a result of information gleaned from the deposition of Defendant Central Freightlines, Inc.’s Corporate Representative Thomas Weeks, taken September 16, 2020. Plaintiffs provided notice in their October 2020 response to Defendants’ motion to strike that Grill had “not had a reasonable opportunity to review the transcript and update his opinions accordingly.”

    Grill also does not appear to have substantively changed his opinions in any meaningful way. At the time Defendants received the supplemental report, trial was scheduled for April 19, 2021. Defendants still had over four months to review the supplemental report and prepare for trial. Further, on March 9, 2021, the Court struck the scheduling order due to the Covid pandemic and the Court’s excess criminal case load. The Court acknowledged the importance of scheduling order deadlines and complying with the Court’s orders and procedures. However, the Court cannot ascertain any prejudice Defendants suffered as a result of the delayed supplemental report. Defendants have not requested leave to take Grill’s deposition out of time; nor have they filed a rebuttal report.

    B. Motion to Strike Grill’s Testimony

    I. Grill is qualified to testify about general trucking industry customs, practices and standards

    Defendants argued that Grill is unqualified because “none of Grill’s background and experience concerns issues to be determined in this matter.” Defendants asserted that Grill is not an expert in matters of “accident reconstruction, traffic signals or human factors.” However, Defendants never contended that Grill is unqualified as an expert in the areas of general trucking industry customs, practices, and standards.

    Plaintiffs responded that Grill is qualified as an expert in the field of commercial trucking based on his experience as a commercial truck driver, training instructor, training program director, safety director, and trucking consultant. Plaintiffs also contended that Grill has been qualified in numerous cases as an expert. The Court found that Grill has decades of experience and involvement in the trucking industry. Therefore, he possessed the necessary training, experience, knowledge and skill to testify in the areas of general trucking industry customs, practices and standards.

    II. Some of Grill’s proffered testimony is relevant and reliable

    Defendants contended that Grill’s testimony will not aid the jury because the jury can make a liability determination in this case without the aid of an expert witness.

    As an initial matter, although not specifically raised by Defendants, the Court had concerns about representations in Grill’s report. It appeared Grill held opinions that elevated the standard of care applicable to commercial truck drivers. For example, Grill states, “in my opinion, the performance standards to accomplish this standard of care are much different for truck drivers than operators of smaller vehicles.” The Court will instruct the jury as to the proper standard of care. Therefore, Grill is prohibited from testifying about any opinion he holds concerning the standard of care applicable to commercial truck drivers.

    Further, Plaintiffs proposed Grill will provide opinions “regarding the hiring, retention and safety management of Central.” However, the Court already granted Defendant CFL summary judgment as to Plaintiffs’ negligent hiring, retention, supervision and training claims.

    Moreover, the Court found Grill’s proffered testimony about the accident and Moore’s actions leading up to the accident conclusory without underlying factual support. 

    Defendants specifically challenged Grill’s opinion that the accident was avoidable or preventable. The Court similarly found this opinion an impermissible conclusion. Any testimony that Moore violated law, regulations, procedures, or policies are likewise impermissible legal conclusions.

    Grill’s report provided that “Moore, because of failing to perceive a hazard in time, and failing to make proper safety decisions when he ultimately chose risk over safety by intruding into the approaching traffic stream, caused this collision.” However, causation is an issue of fact for the jury.

    Held

    • The Court denied the Defendants’ motion to strike Plaintiffs’ expert Lew Grill.
    • The Court granted in part and denied in part the Defendants’ motion in limine with respect to anticipated testimony by Plaintiffs’ expert Lew Grill. Grill is prohibited from testifying about the topics identified by the Court in this order. Any other concerns possessed by Defendants may be addressed by a contemporaneous objection at trial or through cross-examination.
    •  The Court denied the Defendants’ motion to strike Lew Grill’s supplemental report.

    Key Takeaway:

    Grill’s knowledge, skill and experience in the trucking industry will help the jury understand the evidence and determine the factual issues of this case.

    However, much of Grill’s proffered testimony was excluded because it reached unsupported conclusions and invaded the province of the jury. The jury is more than capable of reaching their own conclusions as to the ultimate issues in this case.

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Haddox Et Al V. Central Freightlines, Inc. Et Al
    Docket Number: 4:18cv266
    Court Name: United States District Court, Oklahoma Northern
    Order Date: September 25, 2025
  • Emergency Medicine Expert’s Testimony on Jail Policies Admitted

    Emergency Medicine Expert’s Testimony on Jail Policies Admitted

    Jeff Trevillion, as Special Administrator for the Estate of Louis Perales,
    deceased (“the Estate”), filed a claim for cruel and unusual punishment against the arresting officer and the jail staff in their individual capacities, and Sheriff Scott Owen (“Owen”) in his official capacity as Sheriff of Washington County, Oklahoma.

    The Estate alleged that the Defendants’ policy of placing intoxicated inmates into holding cells until they “sobered up” constituted a deliberate indifference to Louis Perales’ serious medical needs.

    Owen filed a motion to exclude the testimony of Michael Jobin, M.D., an expert witness called by by the Estate.

    Emergency Medicine Expert Witness

    Michael J. Jobin, M.D., has been employed as a board-certified emergency room physician throughout his career, during which he has evaluated intoxicated patients and provided medical clearance examinations for patients in law enforcement custody. In that role, Jobin regularly decided whether arrestees who were intoxicated with alcohol or other drugs were fit for incarceration. 

    Want to know more about the challenges Michael Jobin has faced? Get the full details with our Challenge Study report.  

    Discussion by the Court

    Jobin is qualified to testify as an expert

    Owen argued that Jobin is not qualified to testify as an expert about either Perales’ medical needs or the jail staff’s actions and policies regarding intoxicated inmates because Jobin lacked specialized training in cardiovascular diseases or drug intoxication and has never worked in a jail or provided medical care in a jail setting. 

    However, Jobin is a board-certified emergency room physician who has provided medical clearances for patients in law enforcement custody throughout his career. 

    Jobin served on the Colorado Board of Medical Examiners, where he reviewed complaints made by prisoners about the medical care they received while in prison. 

    Jobin has previously served as an expert witness in cases in which he testified about inmates and medical care. In those instances, he was asked to review the basic emergency care policies of jail facilities, which he evaluated relative to the jail’s medical capabilities. In this case, he intended to offer his opinion that adequate medical evaluation procedures and emergency medical treatment for acute intoxication would have prevented Perales’ death by ensuring he was treated and monitored in a hospital.

    Further, while Jobin has not worked in a jail and is not trained regarding jail policies, his proposed testimony covers only whether the jail’s policies followed “normal medical practice” for an emergency setting, one which he compares to a “low-level emergency department.”

    The Court held that Jobin’s testimony on the jail’s policies is limited to his opinions about proper emergency medical policies and practices, and is therefore within the reasonable confines of his forty-five years of expertise in emergency medicine, including working as an emergency medicine professor and physician in multiple hospitals’ emergency departments and evaluating the medical needs of arrestees.

    Jobin’s opinions are reliable

    Owen argued that the expert opinions Jobin offered are unreliable because they are not based on sufficient facts or data and because some of the materials that he considered were unreliable.

    Jobin reviewed the following facts to reach his opinion: Perales’ medical records, which included the Oklahoma State Bureau of Investigation report, ambulance records, and autopsy report; Perales’ jail records; the jail’s general policies; the jail’s policies relating to Perales; the police body camera footage from Perales’ arrest showing the EMTs attempting to take Perales’ blood pressure; the officers’ deposition testimony that Perales was cleared in the field for transport to the jail but without formal paperwork; and the jail video showing Perales flailing his arms in the holding cell. From these materials, Jobin concluded that adequate emergency medical care and procedures likely would have prevented Perales’ death. 

    The Court is persuaded that the facts that Jobin examined to develop his expert opinion are sufficient, even if not exhaustive. Jobin relied on his decades of experience in emergency medicine in assessing whether the facts showed that adequate procedures were in place to care for Perales.

    Jobin may not render legal opinions

    Owen argued that Jobin’s statement in his deposition that Perales’ death was caused by “deliberate indifference” is a legal opinion that Jobin is not qualified to offer.

    During his deposition, Jobin testified that he thought there was “deliberate indifference” in the jail’s actions in this case because the jail staff did not show proper regard to Perales’ well-being. Jobin admitted that he did not know an exact legal definition of “deliberate indifference,” and that he learned this phrase from another case in which he served as an expert.

    “Deliberate indifference” is an ultimate issue of law in this case, and its use by a witness would likely confuse the jury as to its role.

    As a result, the Court precluded Jobin from using the phrase “deliberate indifference” in his testimony.

    Held

    The Court granted in part and denied in part the Defendant Scott Owen’s motion to exclude the testimony of witness Dr. Michael Jobin.

    Key Takeaway:

    Jobin’s opinions are within the “reasonable confines of his subject area” of emergency medicine. His experience as an emergency room physician means that he is familiar with standard emergency medicine procedures and how to treat common conditions. Even if Jobin is not an expert in cardiology or drug intoxication specifically, he has made assessments about whether arrestees are fit for incarceration or need medical treatment outside of the place of incarceration. This necessarily involves assessing whether an arrestee’s medical condition will become dangerous if not treated in an acute care setting.

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Trevillion V. Owen Et Al
    Docket Number: 4:22cv473
    Court Name: United States District Court, Oklahoma Northern
    Order Date: October 10, 2025
  • Anesthesiology Expert’s Testimony on Unprofessional Conduct Excluded

    Anesthesiology Expert’s Testimony on Unprofessional Conduct Excluded

    This is an employment discrimination case brought by a former employee of the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs (“VA”). The Plaintiff, Dr. Elizabeth Schacht, was employed by the VA as an anesthesiologist from 2015 until August 20, 2018, when her supervisors revoked her clinical privileges and removed her from federal service. Schacht claimed the VA discriminated against her based on her sex (female and pregnancy) and national origin (Colombian), in violation of Title VII. She further alleged that the VA discriminated against her based on her disability (pregnancy-related complications) in violation of the Rehabilitation Act, and in retaliation for her statutorily protected activities.

    Schacht initially appealed her termination and the revocation of her clinical privileges to the VA Disciplinary Appeals Board (the “DAB”). In December 2019, the DAB heard Schacht’s appeal and upheld the VA’s decision. 

    Schacht appealed the DAB’s decision to the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. On August 11, 2022, after remand, the D.C. District Court found that the DAB provided a “sufficient, reasonable explanation” for its evidentiary decisions. On March 20, 2023, Schacht filed this case. Schacht asserted four claims arising out of her employment with the VA: (1) a disparate treatment claim and hostile work environment claim under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”) for discrimination based on sex, pregnancy, and national origin; (2) a retaliation claim under Title VII; (3) a disability discrimination claim under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and the Rehabilitation Act; and (4) a retaliation claim under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act. 

    Schacht endorsed Mercedes Susan Mandell, a highly qualified and well-respected anesthesiologist and academician, to testify as to her expert opinion regarding pretext evidence in this case. Defendant filed a motion to exclude each and every one of Mandell’s opinions.

    Anesthesiology Expert Witness

    Mercedes Susan Mandell, M.D., Ph.D. served as the Director of the Liver Transplant Program at the University of Colorado for 30 years. She received her medical degree from University of Toronto Faculty of Medicine. She has a long history of supervising anesthesiologists.

    Fortify your strategy by reviewing a Challenge Study detailing grounds for excluding Mercedes Susan Mandell’s expert testimony.

    Discussion by the Court

    Mandell’s report has four “objectives;” (1) “to determine if Schacht met the standard of care and if the cases supported the VA’s claims of unprofessional behavior;” (2) “if the disciplinary investigation and actions followed policy published by the VA;” (3) “the quality and reliability of the claims made against Schacht;” and (4) “if the actions taken against Schacht were consistent with the standards of clinical care and professional conduct enforced by state organizations responsible for medical licensing (Medical Board)”. 

    The Court first turned to the VA’s argument that Mandell’s report should be excluded because her opinions are barred by collateral estoppel, also known as issue preclusion. 

    The VA argued that Mandell’s opinions should be excluded on the basis of issue preclusion because “Mandell addresses an issue already decided; the DAB action has now been finally adjudicated on the merits; Plaintiff was a party in the DAB and the appeals; and she had a full and fair opportunity to litigate.” 

    The Court found that the DAB proceedings have been fully adjudicated because the D.C. District Court affirmed the DAB’s findings and the D.C. Circuit affirmed the D.C. District Court’s judgment. Furthermore, Schacht was a party to the DAB proceedings.

    Therefore, the Court will determine, for each of Mandell’s opinions, whether the issue that is the subject of her opinions was identical to the issue presented in the DAB proceedings, and whether she had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the DAB proceedings. 

    Mandell’s Report

    In a section entitled “Objective 1: Specifications,” Mandell’s report first examined the claims described in the specifications to determine whether Schacht met the standard of care and whether the cases supported the VA’s claims of unprofessional behavior.

    Subsequently, the Court found that Mandell’s opinions—that the specifications did not support the VA’s claims that Schacht engaged in unprofessional conduct—were identical to the issues already decided in the DAB proceedings.

    Furthermore, Mandell’s report attempted to resurrect these issues by opining that Schacht did not breach the standard of care and by providing additional facts that allegedly showed that Schacht’s conduct was not unprofessional.

    Finally, for each specification, Mandell’s report conducted a similar analysis that effectively relitigated the issue of whether there was substantial evidence to support the specifications and, by extension, the VA’s charge of unprofessional conduct.

    Schacht did not have a full and fair opportunity to litigate her discrimination claims

    The Court turned to Schacht’s argument that she did not have “a full and fair opportunity to litigate her discrimination claims . . . because the Board refused to admit evidence pertaining to Schacht’s discrimination case.”

    Whether Schacht had a full and fair opportunity to litigate her discrimination claims, while relevant to claim preclusion, is not relevant to the inquiry under issue preclusion. 

    To the extent that Schacht argued that she did not have a full and fair opportunity to litigate whether substantial evidence supported the specifications because she could not introduce supplemental evidence in the DAB proceedings, the Court rejected that argument. 

    The DAB explained that it excluded Schacht’s supplemental evidence because it was untimely and the evidence was not relevant.

    The Court turned to Mandell’s opinions that the evidence supporting the specifications “lacked credibility” and that “there were not enough facts to support the deficiency claims.”

     In upholding the charge of unprofessional conduct against Schacht, the DAB necessarily decided that the evidence supporting the specifications was credible. 

    Therefore, Mandell’s opinions relitigated credibility determinations that were already made by the DAB and which were upheld on review in federal court.

    The Court found that Schacht had a full and fair opportunity to litigate these issues in the DAB proceedings.

    Because Mandell’s opinions are barred by issue preclusion, the Court granted the VA’s motion to exclude the opinions in her report.

    Held

    The Court granted the Defendant’s motion to exclude the opinions of Dr. Mercedes Susan Mandell. 

    Key Takeaway:

    The consideration of a party’s prior full and fair opportunity to litigate an issue often will focus on whether there were significant procedural limitations in the prior proceeding, whether the party had the incentive to litigate fully the issue, or whether effective litigation was limited by the nature or relationship of the parties.

    The Court did not find, and Schacht did not point to, any significant procedural limitations in the DAB proceedings, a lack of incentive to litigate the issue fully, or that the nature or relationship of the parties limited effective litigation. 

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Schacht V. Collins
    Docket Number: 1:23cv709
    Court Name: United States District Court for the District of Colorado
    Order Date: September 24, 2025
  • Law Enforcement Expert’s Testimony on the Officers’ Tactics Admitted

    Law Enforcement Expert’s Testimony on the Officers’ Tactics Admitted

    Plaintiffs Michael Gomez (“Gomez”), Joseph Lowe (“Lowe”), Ian Joi, and Alejandro Baez and Josephine Cartagena, as co-representatives of the Estate of Jayden Baez (“Baez”) (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) filed an Amended Complaint against Defendants Scott Koffinas (“Koffinas”), Ramy Yacoub (“Yacoub”), and Chris A. Blackmon (collectively, “Defendants”).

    Plaintiffs alleged that Defendants Koffinas and Yacoub—members of the Osceola County Sheriff’s Department (“OCSD”)—exhibited “excessive and unreasonable force” in responding to Plaintiffs’ suspected petty theft at a Target store in Kissimmee, Florida.

    To support their allegations, Plaintiffs offered the expert testimony of Jeronimo “Jerry” Rodriguez (“Rodriguez”), a law enforcement practices expert. Defendants filed a motion to exclude certain portions of Rodriguez’s testimony, specifically, his opinions on the OCSD officers’ tactical approach to apprehend Plaintiffs. 

    Law Enforcement Expert Witness

    Jeronimo “Jerry” Rodriguez spent 26 years with the Los Angeles Police Department, retiring in 2013 at the rank of Captain.

    For years Rodriguez consulted and guided municipalities on high profile police-involved incidents as a member of the agency. However, in retiring as a Law Enforcement Expert in 2021, he has been recruited to work on high-profile and sensitive cases.

    Rodriguez is a graduate of the FBI National Academy Class 234 and holds a master’s degree in Leadership from St. Mary College of California, as well as a bachelor’s degree in Business Management.

    Want to know more about the challenges Jeronimo Rodriguez has faced? Get the full details with our Challenge Study report. 

    Discussion by the Court

    Reliability

    Defendants first argued that the Court should exclude certain portions of Rodriguez’s testimony because the lack of a national standard for apprehending subjects makes his criticisms of the officers’ tactics unreliable. 

    As shown in his expert reports, depositions, and curriculum vitae, Rodriguez used his law enforcement experience and knowledge, and training in police practices, to evaluate the facts of the instant case and form his opinions. Therefore, the Court found Rodriguez’s methodology sufficiently reliable. 

    Therefore, the lack of an express national standard did not make Rodriguez’s testimony unreliable. Defendants cited no authority for this proposition, nor is the Court aware of any.

    Assistance to the Trier of Fact

    Defendants next contended that Rodriguez’s inability to cite to a national standard rendered his testimony unhelpful to the jury, noting that it would risk misleading jurors into confusing his criticisms with constitutional norms.

    The Court held that Rodriguez’s testimony is relevant and would be helpful to the jury. Specifically, his testimony would help the jury understand why a score of deputies, using a vehicle blocking maneuver, found it necessary to shoot 31 times into a vehicle containing four shoplifting suspects, killing Baez and injuring the other Plaintiffs. Moreover, the lack of an express national standard for police practices did not diminish the testimony’s helpfulness. There is no risk that jurors will confuse his opinions with constitutional norms. While Rodriguez’s testimony embraces an ultimate issue, it did not tell the jury what result to reach—the jury will decide how much credibility to give his opinions when making that determination.

    Held

    The Court denied the Defendants’ motion to exclude portions of Rodriguez’s opinion testimony except for the portion of the Defendants’ motion that sought to exclude Rodriguez’s testimony regarding the officers’ use of a vehicle block to practice their training, which was denied as moot.

    Key Takeaway:

    Defendants’ arguments regarding the unhelpfulness of Rodriguez’s testimony are simply meritless. The necessary and appropriate use of force by law enforcement is beyond the understanding of an average lay person and would therefore assist a jury. 

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Gomez Et Al V. Koffinas Et Al
    Docket Number: 6:23cv1824
    Court Name: United States District Court, Florida Middle
    Order Date: October 09, 2025
  • Product Development Expert Was Not Allowed to Opine that the Fan is Not Defective

    Product Development Expert Was Not Allowed to Opine that the Fan is Not Defective

    Allstate insured L&J Home Improvements, LLC (“L&J”), which was owned and operated by Julie and Luis Hernandez. In or around 2003, L&J purchased a two-story, wood frame residence built in 1888 that is located at 231 N. Walnut St. in Colorado Springs, Colorado (the “residence”). After the purchase, L&J performed a remodel on the residence in or around 2006. The remodel included an updated electrical system and fixtures. 

    As part of the remodel, an electrical contractor installed three identical bathroom exhaust/ventilation fan/lights (“fan units”). One fan unit was installed in the upper-level half bath, one fan unit was installed in the lower-level bathroom, and one fan unit was installed in the upper-level bathroom. 

    A resident, who shared the upper-level bathroom where the fan was located, said that the fan was often left on after bathroom use and the fan had begun to make a noise when turned on several weeks before the incident.

    A fire occurred in the residence the evening of February 25, 2021 (the “incident”). The Colorado Springs Fire Department (the “CSFD”) conducted an investigation. The CSFD considered the fan as an ignition source.

    Defendant Broan-Nutone manufactured and sold the fan. When the fan was manufactured in the fall of 2005, Broan-Nutone considered itself subject to the following certification requirements created by Underwriters Laboratories (“UL”).

    Allstate brought claims against Broan-Nutone for strict product liability, negligence, breach of the implied warranty of merchantability, and breach of the implied warranty of fitness.

    On February 9, 2024, Broan-Nutone provided Allstate with its expert disclosures. It listed David Farchione as a non-retained expert who did not need to provide an expert report. Plaintiff filed a motion to exclude the testimony of Farchione.

    Product Development Expert Witness

    David Farchione has a bachelor’s in engineering from the Milwaukee School of Engineering, where he graduated and entered the workforce in 1996 working for UL in relation to UL product certifications.

    Farchione gained experience in product development, design, manufacture, and failure analysis during his four years working for UL and approximately fifteen years working for Broan. During his career, he has worked in engineering and consulting regarding certifications obtained from UL, which includes certifications specific to exhaust fans, like the Model Fan.

    Fortify your strategy by reviewing a Challenge Study detailing grounds for excluding David Farchione’s expert testimony.

    Discussion by the Court

    Qualification

    Allstate challenged Farchione’s qualifications to provide an expert opinion that the fan was not defective. Allstate argued that Farchione’s only basis for opining that the fan is not defective is that it is UL certified and that it was designed, built, and evaluated by engineers.

    Broan-Nutone did not assert that Farchione was involved in the design, manufacturing, or evaluation of the fan, either through Farchione’s work at UL or his work at Broan-Nutone.

    Allstate did not contest Farchione’s qualifications to testify about the UL certification process and how it works, given his experience working at UL and his experience at Broan-Nutone with UL product certification. However, the issue is whether Farchione’s experience with UL certifications allows him to express opinions, drawn only from the UL certification process, that the fan was not defective. The Court found that for Farchione to testify that the fan at issue in this case was not defective would go beyond the “reasonable confines of his subject area.” 

    Neither Broan-Nutone in its response, or Farchione in his deposition, has explained why Farchione’s UL knowledge allowed him to opine that the fan at issue in this case had no defect. For instance, Farchione did not state that the UL documentation for the fan involved testing for design defects or manufacturing defects. 

    The Court found that Broan-Nutone has not explained why Farchione is qualified, solely based on his knowledge of the UL certification process, to bridge the gap between a product being “UL certified” and the product being “not defective” without any examination or testing of the fan at issue.

    Methodology

    Allstate also argued that Farchione’s opinion that the fan was not defective should be excluded because he lacked a reliable methodology for his conclusion.

    As the Court has already noted, Farchione did not conduct any testing or evaluation of the fan. As a result, he applied no testing methodology in opining that the fan is not defective. Moreover, neither Farchione nor Defendant identified any methodology that he applied in concluding that, because the fan was UL certified and was designed by engineers, it is not defective.

    Allstate challenged the basis for Farchione’s opinion that the fan was “fit for sale,” a conclusion which Farchione reached based on the fact that “[t]here’s been ultimately millions of these [fans] sold over the years. And there’s not any huge issues with these particular problems — or these particular products.”  When Allstate asked Farchione to provide more specific figures regarding the number of problems with this model of fan, he stated that “I don’t know how many exactly, but it’s, you know, tens.”

    As a result, the Court found that Farchione’s testimony about sales data is not admissible. First, Broan-Nutone failed to establish that data given to Farchione by his (or the Defendant’s) attorneys constitutes the kind of data that would reasonably be relied upon by experts on product defects. Second, Farchione did not identify any other source of data he relied upon. Thus, Farchione’s opinion that the fan is fit for sale, insofar as that opinion relied on sales data, lacked a factual basis. 

    Held

    The Court granted in part and denied in part the Plaintiff’s motion to exclude the testimony of David Farchione.

    Key Takeaway:

    Farchione was not allowed to testify that the fan was not defective based on the fan’s UL certification or because sales data showed that there were few complaints about the fan.

    The Court is not required to admit opinion evidence that is connected to existing data only by the ipse dixit of the expert and may conclude that there is simply too great an analytical gap between the data and the opinion proffered.

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Allstate Indemnity Company V. Broan-Nutone, LLC
    Docket Number: 1:23cv743
    Court Name: United States District Court, Colorado
    Order Date: October 09, 2025
  • Hotel Security Expert Was Not Allowed to Opine on the Adequacy of Training

    Hotel Security Expert Was Not Allowed to Opine on the Adequacy of Training

    Jane Doe K.R. sued Defendants, Choice Hotels, Choice Hotels International, Inc., and Choice Hotels International Services Corp. under the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act (TVPRA).

    Plaintiff alleged that between March and May 2013, she was the victim of sex trafficking at an Orlando, Florida hotel owned and operated by WHG, a franchisee of the Choice Hotels Defendants.

    According to Plaintiff’s hotel security expert, Salvatore Caccavale, “the incident involving Plaintiff was foreseeable and predictable. Inconsistent documented staff training and the failure to adhere to corporate policies contributed to the ease of [the] trafficking of [Plaintiff] at the subject hotel location.  Hotel ownership [i.e., Defendants] and their employees should have recognized the correlation between drug use and trafficking at their hotel and collaborated with local law enforcement. It is reasonable to conclude that the hotel management and staff knew that [Plaintiff] was being trafficked.”

    Defendants challenged Caccavale’s qualifications and the overall reliability of his methodology before making reliability and helpfulness arguments against each of his opinions.

    Hotel Security Expert Witness

    Salvatore Caccavale has over 40 years of experience as a hospitality business and security executive, both at the property level, and subsequently with oversight for the Americas for Hilton branded hotels.

    Presented by HospitalityLawyer.Com, Caccavale is the recipient of the Thomas G. Davis Loss Prevention Lifetime Award, and the beneficiary of Hilton Hotel’s 2001 Global Spirit of Pride Award. Caccavale has been recognized and honored by many levels of local, state, and federal law enforcement agencies over the years for his assistance in executing their duties.

    Want to know more about the challenges Salvatore Caccavale has faced? Get the full details with our Challenge Study report.

    Discussion by the Court

    Qualification

    Defendants did not dispute that Caccavale is generally qualified to opine on matters related to hotel safety and security; however, they maintained that he cannot offer opinions as to human trafficking because he is not qualified in that area of expertise. The Court notes that each of Caccavale’s opinions in this case concerns hotel safety and security. 

    Methodology

    Defendants described three ways in which Caccavale did not follow the methodology endorsed by the International Association of Professional Security Consultants. First, the Defendants asserted that Caccavale did not conduct threat and vulnerability assessments at the physical property, as required. Second, according to Defendants, Caccavale looked to calls for service without sufficiently contextualizing them with other crime records such as incident reports. Third, Defendants argued, Caccavale improperly relied on CrimeCast information postdating the alleged 2013 trafficking incident and could not provide details about how the CrimeCast report was compiled. However, regarding these points, Caccavale testified that he conducted a vulnerability assessment based on calls for service, the CrimeCast report, and online reviews of the hotel, and the CrimeCast report shows past crime risk scores for the area around the Orlando hotel in 2010.

    While Caccavale’s opinion about the predictability of the alleged sex trafficking incident may be helpful in determining whether Defendants knew or should have known about Plaintiff’s alleged sex trafficking, he was not allowed to opine on the adequacy of the training at the Orlando hotel because Caccavale admitted to not knowing what training policies were in place at the time of the alleged sex trafficking incident.

    Defendants challenged Caccavale’s statement that they “should have recognized the correlation between drug use and trafficking at their hotel.” Plaintiff responded that opining as to a correlation between drug use and trafficking does not equate to opining that drug use always indicates trafficking. The Court agreed. Moreover, the jury will be called upon to decide whether Defendants, through their management and staff, had actual or constructive knowledge of Plaintiff’s trafficking at trial. Therefore, Caccavale’s statement that “it is reasonable to conclude that the hotel management and staff knew that [Plaintiff] was being trafficked” amounts to an impermissible legal conclusion.

    Held

    The Court granted in part and denied in part Defendants’ Daubert motions concerning Salvatore Caccavale.

    Key Takeaway:

    The Court addressed Defendants’ general arguments on qualifications and methodology in addition to the opinion-specific arguments. Defendants’ opinion-specific arguments fare better than their general challenges to Caccavale’s qualifications and methodology but are not wholly persuasive. Caccavale’s testimony is helpful in determining whether Defendants knew or should have known about Plaintiff’s alleged sex trafficking. 

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Doe K.R. V. Choice Hotels Et Al
    Docket Number: 6:23cv1012
    Court Name: United States District Court, Florida Middle
    Order Date: October 09, 2025
  • Civil Engineering Expert Was Not Allowed to Opine on the Collapse of the Retaining Wall 

    Civil Engineering Expert Was Not Allowed to Opine on the Collapse of the Retaining Wall 

    This matter arises out of the collapse of a retaining wall at the home of Plaintiffs Pranav Mishra and Mamta Mishra. The Mishras sued Defendant State Farm Fire and Casualty Company for breach of contract and bad faith failure to pay their resulting insurance claim. State Farm filed a motion to exclude the testimony of Scott Skipper because (1) it is not based on reliable methodology, (2) it does not assist the trier of fact, and (2) the Mishras did not comply with the obligations of the Scheduling Order or Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(2)(B).

    On February 3, 2023, Skipper wrote a letter to Pranav offering several theories as to the retaining wall’s collapse. Skipper agreed there was inadequate drainage behind the retaining wall and the wall was structurally unsound. 

    Skipper issued a report on June 21, 2024, which State Farm received just one day before Skipper’s deposition. His report noted that the February 2023 letter “was not intended to be a technical analysis. It was intended to convey an alternative theory only.” Skipper’s June 2024 report stated that on the night the wall collapsed, 1.55 inches of rain fell and he was “of the opinion that with the shallow footing of the failed wall and its position on the side of the sloping terrain, groundwater would likely migrate beneath the wall, and we would be doubtful impoundment of water behind the wall would be a major issue.”

    Skipper concluded that the retaining wall, even with the deficiencies noted, has held fast for more than 17 years.

    Civil Engineering Expert Witness

    Scott Skipper is a registered engineer and land surveyor. He obtained his Bachelor of Science in civil engineering in 1986 from the University of Alabama.

    Fortify your strategy by reviewing a Challenge Study detailing grounds for excluding Scott Skipper’s expert testimony.

    Discussion by the Court

    State Farm challenged the reliability of the methodology underlying Skipper’s expert report. It argued (1) Skipper initially visited the Property to determine how to repair it, not to determine the cause of the collapse, and (2) Skipper did not investigate the cause of the failure but instead relied on his familiarity with the Property based on his visits in early 2023 to determine how to repair the retaining wall. 

    The record before the Court did not reflect that Skipper’s opinion was reached through a methodology that satisfied the Daubert factors. Instead, it appeared that Skipper’s testimony was based primarily on his general experience with the geography surrounding the Mishras’ residence. The Court cannot discern what, if any, scientific methodology Skipper applied to either his initial letter or June 2024 report. Notably, Skipper testified that his February 3, 2023 letter was not intended to be a technical analysis but instead was meant to convey a “possibly plausible theory.” This is the type of “subjective belief [and] unsupported speculation” prohibited by Daubert.

    The June 21, 2024 report is similarly deficient because he apparently arrived at his conclusions based on “just living on the river my whole life.” 

    Because Skipper’s testimony is due to be excluded on reliability grounds, the Court did not reach State Farm’s arguments regarding Skipper’s alleged lack of opinions or the Mishras’ alleged failure to comply with the Scheduling Order and Rule 26(a)(2)(B).

    Held

    The Court granted State Farm’s motion to exclude the expert testimony of Scott Skipper.

    Key Takeaway:

    Unlike a lay witness, an expert may offer an opinion, including one that is not based on firsthand knowledge or observation. This relaxation of the usual requirement of firsthand knowledge “is premised on an assumption that the expert’s opinion will have a reliable basis in the knowledge and experience of his discipline.”

    The Mishras have not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that Skipper’s causation opinion is reliable because it is testable, peer reviewed, or generally accepted. Nor does the record reflect the known error rate for Skipper’s opinion. 

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Mishra Et Al V. State Farm Fire And Casualty Company
    Docket Number: 4:23cv1537
    Court Name: United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama, Middle Division
    Order Date: September 25, 2025