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Category: Accident Reconstruction Expert Witness

  • Accident Reconstruction Expert Witness’ Testimony About the Driver’s Speed at the Time of the Collision Admitted

    Accident Reconstruction Expert Witness’ Testimony About the Driver’s Speed at the Time of the Collision Admitted

    This lawsuit stems from a motor vehicle accident. The two-vehicle collision occurred around 12:12 P.M. on January 4, 2023 in the left northbound lane of U.S. Highway 45, a divided four lane highway.

    On the date and time in question, Plaintiff Kimberly Allcorn was driving a 2019 Kia Forte in the right lane of northbound traffic. She had been in Tupelo, Mississippi to pick up her car from a repair shop, and she intended to return to her residence in Corinth, Mississippi. Defendant Pamela Kay Beach was operating a 2023 Kenworth tractor-trailer truck that was owned by Western Express. Allcorn was traveling ahead of Beach on the roadway, both heading in the same direction.

    After her vehicle began to exhibit additional problems, Allcorn decided to return to Tupelo. She switched from the right to the left lane of northbound traffic in an effort to proceed into a turn lane so that she could turn around and drive south back to Tupelo. Prior to the collision, Beach was traveling in the left lane at a higher rate of speed than Allcorn. When Allcorn switched into the left lane, Beach applied her brakes but a collision between the vehicles nonetheless occurred with the front of Beach’s tractor impacting the back of Allcorn’s car.

    The posted speed limit in the area was 65 mph. The dash cam footage indicated that Beach was traveling 71 mph before she applied her brakes.

    Allcorn filed suit against Beach and Western Express. She brought claims for negligence and negligence per se. On June 10, 2024, Allcorn designated Soan Chau as her expert in accident reconstruction. Chau prepared two reports summarizing his conclusions about the case. Defendants contended that the Court should prevent Chau from testifying because his opinions fell below the requisite threshold for expert testimony.

    Accident Reconstruction Expert Witness

    Accident Reconstruction Expert Witness

    Soan Chau is a transportation consultant specializing in vehicular accidents with over twenty years of experience in analyzing cases involving passenger cars, tractor-trailers, motorcyclists, bicyclists, and pedestrians. He has analyzed over a thousand cases and has been intimately involved in scene preservation and documentation, surveying, reconstruction, simulation, animation, human factors and other transportation  related matters. 

    Chau is also a certified Event Data Recorder (commonly known as “black box”) analyst and retriever, for both commercial vehicles and passenger cars.

    Want to know more about the challenges Soan Chau has faced? Get the full details with our Challenge Study report.  

    Discussion by the Court

    Chau’s Expert Testimony

    In his initial report dated June 7, 2024, Chau opined that based on his calculations involving time, speed, and distance, Beach could have avoided the collision if she had been traveling 65 mph when Allcorn initiated her lane change from the right lane to the left lane.

    On July 8, 2024, the Defendants’ accident reconstruction expert witness, Benjamin Smith, prepared his written report. Smith identified errors in Chau’s calculations—namely, Smith opined that the calculations contained in Chau’s report equated to Beach’s speed being 76 mph, which is demonstrably false based on the dash cam footage indicating that she was traveling 71 mph. Smith ultimately concluded that based on his own calculations, even if Beach had been traveling at the posted speed limit of 65 mph, she could not have avoided the collision.

    After Smith pointed out the errors in Chau’s calculations, Chau prepared a supplemental report. In that report, Chau corrected the mathematical errors that Smith identified. After doing so, Chau again concluded that if Beach had been traveling at 65 mph instead of 71 mph, she could have avoided the collision.

    In the supplemental report, Chau reached the following conclusions:

    1. Based on the materials that are available at the time of this report, it is safe to conclude that, had the tractor trailer been traveling at the speed limit of 65 mph:

    a. There would have been approximately 84 feet between the tractor trailer and the Kia, when the lead vehicle (Kia) arrive [sic] at the same collision point

    b. At an 84 feet distance between the vehicles, the tractor-trailer driver would have more time to slow down, make lane change, release accelerator, or brake

    c. Kimberly Allcorn would also have entered the left turn lane by the time the tractor trailer arrive [sic] at point of collision

    2. Because the tractor trailer was over the speed limit the entire 10 seconds (1.1 second braking) leading up to the collision, the Kia was not able to clear the left travel lane

    Defendant’s Arguments

    The Defendants emphasized three distinct arguments that they contended constituted bases for the exclusion of Chau’s testimony:

    (1) that his opinions were not relevant and did not assist the trier of fact;

    (2) that his opinions had “no methodology or principles”; and

    (3) that his prior opinions in another case contradicted his opinions here.

    Analysis

    Relevance

    Defendants argued that “Chau’s opinion is that Beach would not have been at the accident scene at the same time as Plaintiff if Beach had not been traveling 70 to 71 miles per hour. Because such an opinion is not valid under Mississippi law, the opinion is irrelevant and must be excluded.” The Defendants contended that multiple Mississippi federal and state court cases supported their contention that Beach’s speed is irrelevant.

    The Court found that the Defendants mischaracterized Chau’s conclusions. The Court noted that Chau did not offer any opinion about Beach’s speed earlier in the trip. Instead, he reached conclusions as to whether Beach traveling the speed limit at the time of the collision and the seconds leading up to the collision would have enabled her to avoid the collision.

    The Court found it difficult to see how the driver’s speed at the time of the collision, along with a concomitant conclusion that a slower speed would have enabled the Defendant to avoid the accident, lacked significant relevance in a case of this nature. The argument that speed was entirely irrelevant missed the mark. The Court rejected the Defendants’ argument.

    Methodology

    Initial Report

    In his initial report, Chau provided the following information in a section described as “Video Analysis”:

    a.  currently only 10 seconds of footage before the collision was available

    b. 8 seconds after collision

    c. Impact occurred at +1.00

    d. The 18 second Video Footage does not have evenly spaced time

    e. At T= -1.80 seconds, Kia encroached into the left travel lane; the tractor-trailer was traveling at 71 mph

    f. At IMPACT T= +1.00, Kia was approximately from auxiliary lane for median break; tractor trailer V=57 mph

    g. The total distance traveled by the tractor trailer during 11 seconds (of video footage) prior to collision is approximately 1237 feet

    h. Travel distance at 65 mph for 11 seconds is 1049 feet

    Based on that information, Chau concluded that, if the tractor trailer had been traveling at the speed of 65 mph, “there would have been approximately 188 feet between the tractor trailer and the Kia, when the lead vehicle (Kia) arrive [sic] at the same collision point.” He additionally concluded that Allcorn “would also have entered the left turn lane by the time the tractor trailer arrived at point of collision.”

    Supplemental Report

    As noted above, the Defendants’ expert witness, Benjamin Smith, prepared a report that identified errors in Chau’s calculations.

    Chau then prepared a supplemental report. In that report, the “Video Analysis” section contains much of the same information listed above but sub-sections (d), (f), and (g) were slightly different and provided as follows:

    d. The 18-second video footage appeared to be at approximately 10 Hertz

    f. At IMPACT T= +1.00, Kia was approximately 50 feet from beginning of auxiliary lane for median break; tractor trailer V=57 mph

    g. The total distance traveled by the tractor trailer during 11 seconds (of video footage) prior to collision is approximately 1133 feet

    The supplemental report then goes on to provide the following additional information:

    11.  Had the tractor trailer was traveling [sic] 65 mph for 11 seconds, there would be approximately 84 feet between the tractor trailer and the Kia Forte when Allcorn arrives that [sic] the same collision point (POC)

    12. As seen in the video, this tractor trailer can decelerate from 70-57=13 mph in 1.1 second [sic], traveling a distance of approximately 102 feet

    13. At 65mph [sic], the same decelerate [sic] from 65-52=13 mph in 1.1 second [sic], tractor trailer would travel a shorter distance of 94 feet

    16. At collision, the Kia Forte’s front bumper appears to be within 20 to 30 feet of the beginning of the auxiliary lane

    17. There was approximately 40 to 50 percent overlap between the tractor trailer and the Forte at impact

    19.  For every incremental seconds [sic] Beach was traveling at 65 mph beyond the 10 seconds (before braking), the incremental increase in distance would be (71-65)1.47=8.8 feet.

    He ultimately reaches the same conclusion—that Allcorn would have been able to reach the left turn lane before the collision if Beach had been traveling at 65 mph prior to the collision..

    Defendant’s Argument

    The Defendants poked numerous holes in Chau’s conclusions. For instance, they noted that he provided no explanation for the change in his calculations from the initial report to the supplemental report. They also emphasized that in the initial report, Chau did not include a specific distance that Allcorn’s vehicle was from the turn lane at the time of the collision but that in page 3 of his supplemental report, he indicated a distance of 50 feet and then later referenced a distance of 20-30 feet. The Defendants ultimately contended that Chau was “simply putting numbers in his report to make it seem scientific.” 

    While the Court was cognizant of the Defendants’ concerns, it was noted that they concerned the weight of Chau’s testimony, not its admissibility. In his report, Chau included the formula that he used to reach his ultimate conclusion that Allcorn would have been able to reach the left turn lane ahead of Beach (and avoid the collision) if Beach had been traveling at a speed of 65 mph. The Defendants may disagree with those calculations, believe that they contain errors, and/or that they do not take into account all relevant information—the Court held that they will certainly be given an opportunity to cross-examine Chau on those topics at trial. 

    But to altogether exclude Chau at this stage of the proceedings would go too far, in this Court’s view. The Defendants have not shown that Chau failed to engage in reliable methodology in reaching his conclusions—just that they disagree with those conclusions. 

    Prior Testimony

    Lastly, the Defendants pointed to testimony that Chau provided in a previous case and contended that his testimony here is contradictory to his conclusion in that case. This Court is concerned, however, with the methodology that Chau has employed in this case and whether his methodology is sufficiently relevant and reliable to be admitted into evidence. In other words, the Defendants will be given latitude to cross-examine Chau about his prior testimony; however, this is again an insufficient basis to completely exclude his testimony.

    Held

    The Court denied the Defendants’ motion to exclude the testimony of Plaintiff’s accident reconstruction expert witness, Soan Chau.

    Key Takeaway:

    The Court concluded that Chau’s testimony was admissible, primarily because his methodology met the basic threshold for admissibility, even though there were some inconsistencies in his calculations. The Court emphasized three key points in its reasoning:

    1. Relevance: The Court rejected the Defendants’ argument that speed was irrelevant, noting that Chau’s analysis of how the speed limit would have affected the collision outcome was highly relevant to the case.
    2. Methodology: While acknowledging the Defendants’ concerns about calculation changes and inconsistencies in Chau’s reports, the Court determined these were issues of weight rather than admissibility. The Court noted that Chau had included his formula and analytical process in his reports, providing a sufficient methodological foundation.
    3. Prior Testimony: The Court found that potential contradictions between Chau’s current testimony and his testimony in a previous case were matters for cross-examination rather than grounds for exclusion.

    Please refer to the blog previously published about this case:

    1. Physical Medicine & Rehabilitation Expert Witness’ Testimony Indicating a History of Post-Concussive Syndrome Deemed Speculative

    2. Accident Reconstruction Expert Witness’ Supplemental Report Correcting Mathematical Errors Admitted

    Case Details:

    Case caption: Allcorn v. Beach
    Docket Number: 1:23cv121
    Court: United States District Court for the Northern District of Mississippi, Aberdeen Division
    Dated: January 23, 2025
  • Accident Reconstruction Expert Witness’ Testimony Admitted Despite His Failure to Calculate G-Force 

    Accident Reconstruction Expert Witness’ Testimony Admitted Despite His Failure to Calculate G-Force 

    On October 24, 2019, William Harrison Sims (Plaintiff) was driving his 2004 BMW 330Ci (the “Vehicle”) in Florida when another vehicle unexpectedly turned left in front of him, causing a minor accident. As a result of the collision, the Vehicle’s front driver-side airbag was signaled to deploy. However, the airbag inflator unexpectedly ruptured and shot metal shrapnel into Plaintiff’s face and body, leading to severe, permanent, and life-altering injuries.

    Defendants, BMW of North America (“BMW NA”) and Bayerische Motoren Werke AG (“BMW AG”), procured and installed the airbag inflator during the process of designing, manufacturing, assembly, and producing the vehicle. Plaintiff filed a lawsuit against both Defendants, alleging strict liability and negligence for procuring and installing the defective airbag.

    Defendants moved to exclude testimony from Plaintiff’s expert, Perry Ponder (“Ponder”), and two demonstrative exhibits. Defendants argued that Ponder changed his opinion regarding the lane of travel occupied by the alleged at-fault driver, non-party Tameca Harris-Jackson (“Harris-Jackson”). Ponder testified at deposition that Harris-Jackson turned from one of the through lanes instead of the left lane before colliding with Plaintiff’s vehicle. Defendants also identified two demonstrative exhibits produced before Ponder’s deposition, which depicted the placement the alleged at-fault vehicle and Plaintiff’s vehicles leading up to the collision.

    Accident Reconstruction Expert Witness

    Perry L. Ponder, P.E., holds a Bachelor of Science in mechanical engineering from Florida State University and is a licensed professional engineer in the states of Florida and Illinois. Ponder specializes in accident reconstruction, failure analysis, and designing semi-trailers, truck components, underride crash protection, and patented adjustable structures. He has significant experience reconstructing accidents of various types: trucks, cars, pedestrian and cycles. 

    Want to know more about the challenges Perry L. Ponder has faced? Get the full details with our Challenge Study report.   

    Discussion by the Court

    A. Plaintiff Failed to Meet His Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a) Expert Disclosure Obligations

    Defendants argued that Ponder, Plaintiff’s accident reconstruction expert violated Rule 26(a)(2) because he “renounced his former opinion that the Hyundai initiated its turn from the left lane of Good Homes Road while the deposition was underway.” Instead, he testified that the Hyundai turned from one of the through lanes of Good Homes Road and not from the left lane. Defendants contended that this new opinion was disclosed for the first time at the deposition.

    Plaintiff countered that Defendants misunderstood or misrepresented the opinions expressed in Ponder’s report as compared to his deposition testimony. The Plaintiff emphasized that Ponder’s report did not specify which lane Harris-Jackson was traveling in when she initiated her left turn, only stating that she started her left turn from the northbound lanes of Good Homes Road. The Court agreed with Plaintiff, stating that Ponder did not offer an opinion in his report that Harris-Jackson was traveling in the left-hand lane when she initiated the turn and collided with Plaintiff

    Moreover, Defendants failed to cite Ponder’s report to support their claim that he originally opined Harris-Jackson was traveling in the left-hand lane. Instead, Defendants cited the Crash Report created by the Orlando Police Department, a diagram of the collision prepared by a Trooper, and Harris-Jackson’s deposition. While Ponder reviewed these materials, the Court held that he did not adopt Harris-Jackson’s testimony or the police officer’s reconstruction as his opinion.

    i. Reliability of Harris-Jackson’s Testimony

    While Ponder cited Harris-Jackson’s testimony, in which she claims she stopped in the left lane and proceeded slowly after the traffic signal changed, he found Harris-Jackson’s testimony unreliable. Accordingly, Ponder did not offer a new opinion at the deposition. Even if he had, the Court held that Defendants had ample opportunity to cross-examine Ponder on the analysis employed to reach this opinion.

    Furthermore, Ponder’s relative speed calculation for each vehicle was partially offered as a rebuttal to Defendants’ expert. At his deposition, Ponder conceded that Harris-Jackson could have turned from the left lane into Plaintiff’s path. However, he opined that “her orientation is more consistent with a turn that’s a bit more mature, so to speak, getting herself westward to take the 408 west.” He concluded that if Harris-Jackson had made the turn from the left-hand lane, “you’d expect more of a nose-to-nose kind of orientation as opposed to a square orientation (indicating) that we had in this impact.”

    Regardless, the Court held that Ponder did not change his opinion at deposition, which is why the Defendants suffered no surprise or prejudice.

    B. Demonstrative Exhibits

    Defendants also challenged two demonstrative exhibits that displayed Good Homes Road intersecting with SR 408. Ponder’s report included diagrams prepared by law enforcement, as well as drone-generated top-down images of the crash scene. The Court held that the two demonstrative aids offered at the deposition are neither a surprise nor are they prejudicial because they are cumulative. Expert witnesses routinely create demonstrative exhibits on whiteboards or butcher paper at trial to drive home a point. To the extent that the demonstrative aids were untimely—which the Court does not find—their disclosure is harmless.

    C. Ponder’s Testimony is Unreliable and Unhelpful

    Defendants challenged Ponder’s accident reconstruction analysis, claiming it was unreliable and unhelpful. They argued that he failed to conduct independent testing, inspect or obtain an exemplar vehicle, drive an exemplar vehicle for work in the case, drive the intersection of the road in a Hyundai Sonata under the conditions to which he testified to or measure g-forces Harris-Jackson would have sustained had she turned from the through lane without stopping.

    However, the Court held that the Defendants’ attack on Ponder’s analysis is boilerplate and unconvincing. They listed actions Ponder could have undertaken without explaining why he would need to take these steps. Ponder’s accident reconstruction analysis followed standard procedures, including a detailed crash scene examination, review of relevant documents as well as photographs of the 2010 Hyundai. It also considered the Crash Stiffness Coefficients for BMW vehicles and the deposition testimony. He also identified the final rest location of Plaintiff’s BMW and debris field and conducted a 3D scan of the subject BMW to quantify the damage.

    Ponder then applied the General Momentum Equations to discern that Plaintiff’s BMW was traveling about 29 mph at the moment of impact, while Harris-Jackson’s Hyundai was traveling about 24 mph, with a resulting delta V, or change in velocity of 23 mph and a principle direction of force of 30 degrees counterclockwise of its longitudinal axis for the BMW. He factored in the speed and weight of the BMW to opine that the momentum was inadequate to propel the vehicle beyond the south edge of the intersection. Ponder supports this opinion with photographic evidence.

    Just because Ponder reached a conclusion that differs from a crash report prepared by a Trooper whose qualifications are unknown, the Court held that it not indicate the failure to employ “the same level of intellectual rigor that characterizes the practice of an expert accident reconstructionist.” The Court noted that Defendants did not articulate how examining or driving an exemplar vehicle would add to the analysis. It would not support the determination of the delta-V, PDOF, or relative speed of the subject vehicles. And while knowing the g-force experienced by Harris-Jackson would be interesting, the Court held that Defendants offered no support for their contention that the failure to calculate g-force undermines Ponder’s analysis.

    The Court ruled that  Ponder is a highly qualified expert whose analysis was reliable, well-supported, and helpful to the jury. His core opinions remained unchanged, and the two demonstrative exhibits did not prejudice Defendants.

    Held

    The Court denied Defendants’ motion to exclude the testimony of Perry Ponder, P.E.

    Key Takeaway:

    While the Court admitted Ponder’s testimony regarding his accident reconstruction analysis, including his calculations of the vehicles’ speeds, momentum, and impact angles, the Court did not accept Defendants’ argument that Ponder had violated Rule 26(a)(2) by changing his opinion during his deposition. The Court found no evidence that Ponder’s core opinion had changed and ruled that Defendants were not prejudiced by the introduction of the two demonstrative exhibits, as they were merely cumulative of the evidence that was already presented. Further, while Defendants challenged  Ponder’s failure to conduct independent testing and measure g-forces, the Court found these objections unpersuasive, stating that  Ponder’s methodology was consistent with standard practices in accident reconstruction. In conclusion, the Court affirmed that Ponder’s testimony was both reliable and helpful to the jury in understanding the technical aspects of the case.

    Please refer to the blog previously published about this case:

    Neurology Expert Witness’ Injury Causation Testimony Admitted

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Sims vs. Bmw Of North America Llc
    Docket Number: 6:22cv1685
    Court: United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida, Orlando Division
    Order Date: January 13, 2025
  • Accident Reconstruction Expert Witness’ Opinion Regarding Alcohol as a Possible Cause of the Collision Excluded

    Accident Reconstruction Expert Witness’ Opinion Regarding Alcohol as a Possible Cause of the Collision Excluded

    The dispute in this matter arose from a collision that occurred in Greene County, Tennessee on May 25, 2021, at or around 2:45 p.m., involving two tractor trailers and a service vehicle. At the same time that Darryl Jerome Packer was attempting to re-enter the right lane of travel, Ronald Forsyth was driving his truck northbound on Interstate 81.

    Forsyth’s vehicle violently struck Packer’s vehicle in the rear, pushing it into Wayne Honeycutt’s wrecker. Forsyth’s vehicle then became engulfed in flames. Forsyth was airlifted from the scene to Johnson City Medical Center where he received treatment for his injuries.

    Forsyth alleged deviations from the standard of care and negligence per se for Packer and a deviation from the standard of care for Honeycutt.

    K. Scott Reiling specifically opined that Plaintiff “could easily have slowed down to avoid collision” and that “Forsyth made little to no attempt to slow his vehicle.” Reiling ultimately concluded that “the crash was caused by the failure of Forsyth to react to the presence of vehicle 1 [driven by Packer] and vehicle 3 [driven by Honeycutt] by braking and slowing vehicle 2.” Then, as his very last conclusion, Reiling opined that “alcohol may have been a contributing factor in the accident.” Reiling said that he has based this conclusion on a statement made by Forsyth to medical personnel, which a state trooper captured on his body camera video.

    Plaintiff sought only to preclude Reiling from opining that alcohol may have been a contributing factor in causing the accident at issue.

    Accident Reconstruction Expert Witness

    K. Scott Reiling currently serves as a professional engineer and project manager on numerous matters for Engineering Forensics Group, Inc. and has training and experience to assist clients in a variety of forensic matters involving vehicle accident investigation and reconstruction. His experience includes projects involving various types of vehicles, pedestrian accidents, motorcycle accidents, roadway issues, retrieval and analysis of vehicle event data recorders and other engineering analysis.

    Reiling earned a bachelors degree in mechanical engineering and he is a registered professional engineer. He is accredited by the Accreditation Commission for Traffic Accident Reconstruction (ACTAR) and has provided expert witness testimony related to accident investigation and reconstruction in circuit, criminal and U.S. district courts.

    Discover more cases with K. Scott Reiling as an expert witness by ordering his comprehensive Expert Witness Profile report.

    Discussion by the Court

    Plaintiff asserted that Reiling’s opinion regarding alcohol is speculative, and that any probative value in permitting him to offer the opinion is outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice to Plaintiff.

    Defendants appeared to suggest that Reiling’s conclusion that alcohol might have been a factor in causing the collision is properly supported because alcohol is known to slow reaction time and Reiling had opined earlier in his report that Plaintiff had failed to timely react. Defendants argued that Reiling’s opinion that alcohol was a possible factor in causing the collision has a proper foundation and is reliable because Reiling was entitled to rely on Plaintiff’s statement to medical personnel about having alcohol in his system, which was recorded by a trooper at the scene.

    Analysis

    The Court held that Reiling’s report did not indicate that he did in fact rely on alcohol as a factor in forming his conclusions regarding the cause of the collision at issue. Although Defendants’ counsel understandably seeks to connect Reiling’s conclusions regarding “the failure of Forsyth to react” to Forsyth’s comment that “he had alcohol in his system,” the report itself does not connect those dots. Moreover, in opining that alcohol may have been a factor, Reiling does not explain how he used his expertise to form that conclusion, i.e., the Court cannot determine what, if any, principle or method he used in reaching this conclusion.

    However, even if the Court found that Reiling was entitled to rely on Plaintiff’s statement about having alcohol in his system, and that he had used his expertise to reach this conclusion, applicable law would still prohibit Reiling from offering his opinion at the trial of this cause. In stating that “[a]lcohol may have been a contributing factor,” Reiling has provided the type of speculative opinion that applicable law prohibits because it fails to provide anything more than a commonsense conclusion about what is or is not possible.

    Finally, in determining that Reiling’s opinion regarding alcohol as a possible cause of the collision should be excluded, the Court noted that the statement appears to be a gratuitous add-on at the end of his report which is out-of-step with the other well-formulated conclusions he renders therein. In rendering his other opinions, Reiling walks through the steps he took to formulate each opinion, provides supporting data for those opinions, and offers them with a degree of certainty that is lacking with his opinion addressing alcohol.

    Held

    The Court granted Plaintiff’s motion to exclude the testimony of Defendant’s expert K. Scott Reiling.

    Key Takeaway:

    Reiling’s opinion regarding alcohol as a possible cause of the collision is precisely the type of speculative opinion that applicable law prohibits. Reiling does not explain how he used his expertise to form that conclusion; i.e., the Court cannot determine what, if any, principles or methods he relied on in reaching this conclusion.

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Forsyth V. Big L Express Trucking, Llc Et Al
    Docket Number: 2:22cv37
    Court: United States District Court, Tennessee Eastern
    Order Date: December 30, 2024
  • Accident Reconstruction Expert Witness’ Supplemental Report Correcting Mathematical Errors Admitted

    Accident Reconstruction Expert Witness’ Supplemental Report Correcting Mathematical Errors Admitted

    Plaintiff Kimberly Allcorn filed a lawsuit to recover damages for injuries from a collision with a tractor-trailer. Defendant Kay Beach, driving the tractor-trailer, worked for Western Flyer Express, LLC at the time.

    Both vehicles traveled northbound on a four-lane highway with a 65-mph speed limit. Allcorn was in the right lane ahead of Beach, who was in the left lane at 71 mph. As Allcorn changed lanes, moving slower than Beach, the tractor-trailer struck the rear of Allcorn’s vehicle despite applying the brakes.

    There was a fact dispute as to whether Beach, had she been driving the speed limit, could have avoided the collision. On June 10, 2024, Allcorn designated Soan Chau as an accident reconstruction expert witness. Chau’s report concluded that if Beach had driven 65 mph, she could have avoided the crash.

    On July 9, 2024, the Defendants provided the testimony of their own accident reconstruction expert witness, who found errors in Chau’s calculations. It was alleged that Chau’s report misrepresented Beach’s speed as 76 mph instead of 71 mph and claimed that even at 65 mph, the crash would have been unavoidable.

    On August 7, 2024, the Plaintiff submitted a corrected report from Chau. Chau maintained that Beach could have avoided the crash at 65 mph.

    The Defendants requested the Court strike the report, arguing it was untimely and exceeded the scope for revisions. The Plaintiff claimed the report was both proper and timely.

    Accident Reconstruction Expert Witness

    Accident Reconstruction Expert Witness

    Soan Chau is a transportation consultant specializing in vehicular accident analysis, with over 30 years of experience in cases involving passenger vehicles, tractor-trailers, motorcycles, bicycles, and pedestrians. Throughout his career, Chau has analyzed over a thousand cases, contributing expertise in scene preservation, documentation, surveying, reconstruction, simulation, animation, and other transportation-related matters.

    Soan Chau earned a Bachelor of Science in Civil Engineering from the University of Florida in 1993. He further pursued advanced studies at the University of Florida, completing all required coursework for a Master of Science in Traffic Engineering between 1997 and 1999.

    He is also a certified Event Data Recorder (EDR or “black box”) analyst and retriever for both commercial vehicles and passenger cars.

    Want to know more about the challenges Soan Chau has faced? Get the full details with our Challenge Study report.  

    Discussion by the Court

    Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(e) requires timely supplementation if a prior disclosure is materially incomplete or incorrect, and the information has not otherwise been provided during discovery. Additionally, under the present Court’s Local Uniform Civil Rule 26(a)(5), such supplementations must be made at appropriate intervals “and in no event later than the discovery deadline established by the case management order.”

    The Court found no merit in the Defendants’ argument that supplementation is only required when based on new information unavailable at the time of the initial disclosure. Instead, Rule 26(e) clearly requires supplementation when a party learns of an error or omission, as occurred here.

    The Defendants also argued that Chau’s supplemental report was unnecessary because their expert had already identified the errors. The Court held that this argument undermined the Defendants’ request for relief. If the corrections were already known, Chau had no obligation to provide them, and his supplemental report would have been gratuitous. However, the Plaintiff did not advance this position.

    The Court concluded that once Chau learned of the errors in his calculations, he had a duty to correct them promptly. Chau complied with this duty by submitting a supplemental report within 30 days, well before the discovery deadline. The Court emphasized that Chau did not offer a new opinion disguised as a supplement. Instead, he corrected mathematical errors in his calculations without altering his opinion.

    The Court found nothing improper in Chau’s actions, as his supplemental report adhered to both the letter and spirit of Rule 26(e).

    Held

    The Court denied the Defendants’ motion to strike the supplemental report of Plaintiff’s accident reconstruction expert witness Soan Chau.

    Key Takeaway:

    The Court admitted Soan Chau’s supplemental report, emphasizing the importance of timely corrections when an expert discovers errors in their calculations. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(e), experts are required to correct any material inaccuracies in their disclosures, even if no new information is introduced.

    The Court found that Chau’s corrected report, submitted within the required timeframe, was a necessary and appropriate response to the identified errors. Importantly, the Court noted that Chau’s supplemental report did not offer any new opinions but merely corrected mathematical errors without altering his original conclusions. In conclusion, the Court held that Chau’s actions complied with the letter and spirit of the Rule, denying the Defendants’ motion to strike the report.

    Please refer to the blog previously published about this case:

    Physical Medicine & Rehabilitation Expert Witness’ Testimony Indicating a History of Post-Concussive Syndrome Deemed Speculative

    Case Details:

    Case caption: Allcorn V. Beach Et Al
    Docket Number: 1:23cv121
    Court: United States District Court for the Northern District of Mississippi, Aberdeen Division
    Dated: December 12, 2024
  • Court Rejects Accident Reconstruction Expert Witness’ Attempt to Springboard OSHA Regulations Outside of the Work Environment

    Court Rejects Accident Reconstruction Expert Witness’ Attempt to Springboard OSHA Regulations Outside of the Work Environment

    On September 19th, 2021, Co-Plaintiff Cándida Cabrera visited the restaurant called Romano’s Macaroni Grill, located at Las Catalinas Mall in Caguas, Puerto Rico. At a certain point, Co-Plaintiff Cándida Cabrera was in the process of exiting the seating booth, and one of her feet slightly tripped on one of the spikes under the table. Given the elevation of the surface (step), Cabrera fell off the booth as she was trying to step outside, suffering the grave damages alleged in this complaint.

    Plaintiffs Cándida Cabrera Escobar and her husband Osvaldo Cabrera sought to recover damages for the alleged negligence of Co-Defendants International Restaurant Services, Inc., owner and operator of a franchise which runs “Romano’s Macaroni Grill,” and its insurer, American International Insurance Company of Puerto Rico.

    Defendants filed a motion in limine to preclude the testimony of Plaintiffs’ expert, engineer Otto González Blanco. 

    In their motion in limine to exclude Plaintiffs’ expert, Defendants argued that González’s testimony should be excluded because he did not base his opinion or testimony in appropriate scientific data, facts, or analysis and further that he did not review or consider all the evidence available in the case.

    Accident Reconstruction Expert Witness

    Otto González Blanco received training in accident reconstruction for fall and traffic accidents and has served as an expert in hundreds of fall cases. He has been working as an engineer since 1977. From 2008 to 2012, he enrolled in the Public Safety Program at University of North Florida, Jacksonville to become an expert in the field of accident reconstruction.

    Get the full story on challenges to Otto González Blanco’s expert opinions and testimony with an in-depth Challenge Study. 

    Discussion by the Court

    Defendants sought to exclude González’s testimony pursuant to Federal Rules of Evidence 702 and 703, as well as pursuant to Daubert and its progeny, on grounds that it is speculative, unreliable, and insufficiently grounded in appropriate scientific data, facts, or analyses. Defendants discussed González’s failure to review all the evidence of record, including architect Arch. Otheguy report and statement under penalty of perjury, as well as Cabrera’s deposition testimony. Specifically, Defendants argued that González’s opinions are based on “speculation and conjecture” because he did not review the aforementioned information. 

    Knowledge of the circumstances of the fall is relevant to González’s ability to offer his expert opinion

    Defendants’ claim that González has “no knowledge of how the accident occurred according to Plaintiff Cabrera” because González did not read her deposition testimony, though relevant for vigorous cross examination, is not in and of itself sufficient to strike him as an expert.

    The Court held that the knowledge of Cabrera’s account of how she fell can come from more than one source, although González should have clearly spelled out the source in his report or deposition testimony.

    González’s unawareness or, at a minimum, lack of specificity in his report as to which foot of Cabrera got tangled with the table and where exactly her other foot landed leaves much to be desired for purposes of an accident reconstructionist. The Court held that it was not until González submitted a statement under penalty of perjury in support of an opposition to a motion for summary judgment that the details of the fall seemed to perfectly align with the details of Cabrera’s deposition testimony.

    Nevertheless, in writing his report, it is clear that González was made aware of certain facts, data, and allegations in the case. Further, Eng. González visited the restaurant facilities personally on September 22, 2023, to take measurements and observe the scene of the accident.

    Therefore, the Court refused to exclude González’s expert opinion on foundational grounds.

    González need not have discussed every claim in Plaintiffs’ complaint in order to testify as to how the accident occurred

    Defendants also argued that González has “no experience or training in the design of restaurant interiors,” and while he was involved in structural and site design of restaurants in the past, he has not “taken part in any such designs during the last fifteen (15) years.” The Court held that González’s educational background and professional experience qualify him to render an opinion in this case as an accident reconstructionist.

    Defendants also argued that González’s report did not address every claim in Plaintiffs’ complaint; specifically, his report did not state “any opinion relative to the platform and/or the height of the same; the recessed lighting and/or lack of adequate warnings” and whether “these factored into Cabrera’s fall.”

    The Court held that González does discuss both the platform height and the lack of warnings of the height in his report. It is true that González did not address Plaintiffs’ claim as to dimmed or recessed lighting; however, González need not have discussed every claim in Plaintiffs’ complaint in order to testify as to how the accident occurred.

    González points to no codes, regulations or restaurant industry standards to support his report conclusions

    González points to no codes, regulations or restaurant industry standards to support his report conclusions that tripod style tables are unacceptable for restaurant booths, that post square table bases should be used instead, and that platforms where booths rest must rise at least 4 inches from the floor. He also invoked OSHA safety standards which are applicable to workers, not guests such as Cabrera.

    The only hint left of scientific reliability to a standard is González’s references in his report to two American National Standards Institute (ANSI)  codes to justify the placement of a tape on a platform’s edge, the existence of which Cabrera admitted in her deposition she was aware as she stepped into the booth without any difficulties. However, as previously discussed, despite given multiple opportunities to explain whether, why or how those codes made the absence of a visual marking on the booth platform’s edge an unreasonably dangerous condition for guests at Romano’s Macaroni Grill, at his deposition González insisted that he did not come to testify about deviations from codes and regulations, but instead about deviations from the original design.

    There is a clear contradiction between González’s deposition testimony and the statement under penalty of perjury submitted to defeat Defendants’ motion for summary judgment

    In support of Plaintiffs’ opposition to Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, however, González sings a different tune from the one heard at the deposition and now suddenly feels compelled to make statements in his statement under penalty of perjury about deviations from codes and regulations.

    Basically, there is a clear contradiction between González’s deposition testimony and the statement under penalty of perjury submitted to defeat Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. In the statement under penalty of perjury, González opined that the ANSI code was a standard “that was violated by the restaurant.” However, as previously explained in detail, González’s prior deposition testimony strayed far away from ANSI regulations or standards. This is in stark contrast to his statement under penalty of perjury, where he makes it clear that Defendants violated the ANSI standard.

    Second, Defendants objected to several of González’s statements under penalty of perjury as they contain new information not included in his expert report or deposition. In his expert report, González does not specify or discuss the specifics of Cabrera’s fall but in his statement under penalty of perjury, González specifies exactly how Cabrera fell.

    Therefore, if while under oath at his deposition González adopted his report as containing the entirety of his opinions, and his report he says that “her feet” (in plural) slightly tripped on one of the spikes under the table, he cannot now say that Cabrera’s right foot (in singular) got tangled with one of the spikes.

    Analysis

    The Court held that González does not cite any standards as to the type of table to be used or the required height of the platform where the booth rests. His attempt to springboard OSHA regulations outside of the work environment and impose them on restaurant guests is not admissible, particularly as there is not even evidence on the record that waiters at Romano’s Macaroni Grill actually go in and out of restaurant booths to do their jobs (as opposed to simply standing in front of the booth to take an order).

    He was unable to answer with specificity questions at his deposition about the ANSI codes cited in his report and the OSHA standards. His assertions regarding said standards in his statement under penalty of perjury issued post deposition have been stricken. González cannot testify about recessed lighting because he is completely silent about that topic in his expert report.

    Moreover, he – who has been retained as an accident reconstructionist – will not be able to even say what Cabrera has said under oath, namely that it was her right foot, not both of her feet, which allegedly got tangled with a leg of the table. Under these circumstances, it cannot be said that González’s conclusions were made “in a scientifically sound and methodologically reliable fashion.”

    Held

    The Court granted Defendants’ motion in limine to strike Otto González Blanco’s testimony.

    Key Takeaway:

    • González’s attempt to springboard OSHA regulations outside of the work environment and impose them on restaurant guests is not admissible, particularly as there is not even evidence on the record that waiters at Romano’s Macaroni Grill actually go in and out of restaurant booths to do their jobs (as opposed to simply standing in front of the booth to take an order). 
    • González points to no codes, regulations or restaurant industry standards to support his report conclusions that tripod style tables are unacceptable for restaurant booths, that post square table bases should be used instead, and that platforms where booths rest must rise at least 4 inches from the floor.

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Cabrera Et Al V. International Restaurant Services, Inc. Et Al
    Docket Number: 3:22cv1449
    Court: United States District Court, Puerto Rico
    Order Date: November 27, 2024
  • Accident Reconstruction Expert Witness’ Testimony Admitted Despite His Failure to Visit the Accident Scene

    Accident Reconstruction Expert Witness’ Testimony Admitted Despite His Failure to Visit the Accident Scene

    Sheila Harper’s vehicle was struck by a Ford F-350 driven by Michael LaBeau at an intersection on the Naval Construction Battalion Center in Gulfport, Mississippi on August 10, 2021.

    Michael LaBeau was acting within the course and scope of his employment with the United States Navy when the accident took place. Harper filed an administrative complaint under the Federal Tort Claims Act, before filing this lawsuit against the United States. 

    She designated her treating physician, Dr. George Salloum, as an expert witness. The United States asked the Court to exclude Salloum’s opinion that the surgeries he performed on Harper’s shoulders were causally connected to the accident. Harper asked the Court to strike the expert testimony of the United States proposed expert witness, Evan McConnell, who was designated as an expert in the fields of accident reconstruction and biomechanical engineering.

    Harper argued that McConnell provides medical opinions that are outside his field of expertise. She further asserts that his opinions are unreliable because he did not visit the accident scene, inspect the parties’ vehicles, conduct interviews concerning the accident, or “perform any physical or virtual crash reproductions.”

    The United States argued that Salloum’s causation opinion should be excluded because he did not rule out other possible causes of Harper’s shoulder injuries, and he did not know that she had undergone two rotator cuff surgeries on her right shoulder prior to the accident at issue. It was further asserted that Salloum was not aware of “Harper’s significant history of serious falls requiring various treatments.”

    Accident Reconstruction Expert Witness

    Evan McConnell holds a B.S. degree in Bioengineering and an M.S. degree in Biomedical Engineering, and he is a registered professional engineer in the states of Georgia, Alabama, and Tennessee. He is also an Accredited Traffic Accident Reconstructionist through the Accreditation Commission for Traffic Accident Reconstruction (ACTAR #3600) and a certified XL Tribometrist. McConnell has extensive experience in analyzing the dynamics and biomechanics involved in numerous accidental events, including low- and high-speed auto accidents, slip and fall events, and workplace injuries, among others.

    Get the full story on challenges to Evan McConnell’s expert opinions and testimony with an in-depth Challenge Study. 

    Orthopedic Surgery Expert Witness

    George Salloum joined Bienville Orthopaedic Specialists in 2001. He specializes in sports medicine along with reconstructive surgery of the shoulder and knee. Salloum uses an arthroscopic and muscle sparing approach to the knee and shoulder, resulting in shorter hospital stays and more rapid rehabilitation. He has been at the forefront of the latest techniques in balancing knee replacements, including consulting with implant companies on both techniques and devices as well as teaching and lecturing other surgeons on the newest balancing techniques. He has extensive experience in robotic knee replacements.

    Salloum is board certified by the American Board of Orthopaedic Surgery with a Certificate of Added Qualification in Orthopaedic Sports Medicine. He completed his internship and residency at the University of Mississippi Medical Center, Department of Orthopaedic Surgery and Rehabilitation in 2001. Salloum sees patients at the Biloxi and Gulfport locations and is accepting new patients.

    Want to know more about the challenges George Salloum has faced? Get the full details with our Challenge Study report. 

    Discussion by the Court

    Harper’s motion to strike the United States’ expert witness Evan McConnell

    McConnell prepared a seventeen-page report supported by numerous citations to peer-reviewed literature, a simulation of the angle of impact, photographs he reviewed, and two charts depicting compressive loads on the spine. He explained that he did not visit the scene of the accident because his review of the accident report and “Google Earth overviews of the accident site” revealed that “there were no specific roadway factors at this location that would influence the dynamics of the contacting vehicles in such a way as to affect the subsequent biomechanical analysis.”

    He researched vehicles similar to Harper’s Chevrolet using the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration’s Crash Investigation Sampling System.

    Using the data he retrieved, he “concluded that the subject Chevrolet likely experienced a primarily rearward-directed delta-V of up to but no more than 7 mph in the accident.” The lack of airbag deployment further supported this determination.

    Harper claimed that she suffered injuries to her head, arms, wrists, neck, and shoulders in the accident. While reviewing Harper’s medical records to determine injuries diagnosed in her medical records, he concluded that “the contact between the left-rear of the Ford [driven by LaBeau] and the left-front of the Chevrolet [driven by Harper] would have been expected to result in a primarily rearward-directed change in speed (delta-V) of up to 6 miles per hour (mph) for the Chevrolet.”

    Whether McConnell Offers Inappropriate Medical Opinions

    Most courts that have addressed this issue have determined that biomechanical engineers are qualified “to render an opinion as to the forces generated in a particular accident and the general types of injuries those forces may generate,” but they are not qualified to offer opinions as to specific causation, i.e., “the precise cause of a specific injury.”

    The Court held that McConnell’s opinions pertain to general causation, such as the forces that an occupant of a Chevrolet would be subjected to in the car accident at issue. He has not issued any specific opinions concerning the cause of Harper’s injuries.

    Whether McConnell’s Opinions Are Reliable And Relevant

    Harper argued that McConnell’s opinions are unreliable and unhelpful due to his failure to visit the scene of the accident, interview witnesses, inspect the parties’ vehicles, or “perform any physical or virtual crash reproductions.”

    McConnell has explained that an inspection of the scene of the accident was not necessary due to the road conditions and nature of the accident. He has also testified that the use of photographs in the field of accident reconstruction “is a well-accepted, repeatable, and reliable methodology supported by peer-reviewed literature,” and he cited peer-reviewed articles supporting this methodology in his report. The Court found that McConnell’s opinions are supported by sufficient facts and data as well as an accepted peer-reviewed methodology. Furthermore, his testimony will assist the Court in determining the amount of force generated by the accident. 

    The United States’ Motion To Exclude Salloum’s Causation Testimony

    Salloum offered the following opinion: “Within a reasonable degree of medical probability, I feel that the motor vehicle collision caused the left shoulder rotator cuff tear and the recurrent rotator cuff tear to the right shoulder and aggravated. Likely pre-existing carpal tunnel syndrome bilaterally. I anticipate no future medical costs with regards to these injuries at this point.”

    He further opined that she reached maximum medical improvement for both of her shoulder surgeries on October 13, 2022. 

    During his deposition, Salloum testified that he did not have access to Harper’s medical records and treatment history when formulating his opinion, so he could only rely on the medical history provided by Harper. Salloum testified that he was aware Harper had previous surgery on her right rotator cuff, and his medical records reflect that she informed him of that prior surgery. 

    The Court has not found any basis in the record for excluding Salloum’s opinion that the accident caused Harper’s left shoulder injury. Furthermore, there is testimony and evidence before the Court indicating that Salloum was aware of Harper’s pre-existing right shoulder injury when he determined that the right shoulder injury that he surgically repaired was caused by the accident. Finally, while there is some confusion regarding Salloum’s treatment and opinions concerning Harper’s right shoulder, there is no danger of confusing or providing prejudicial information to a jury in the present case, and the Court will be in a better position to consider the United States’ arguments concerning Salloum’s testimony at trial. 

    Held

    • The Court denied the motion to strike expert witness Evan McConnell filed by Plaintiff Sheila Harper.
    • The Court denied the motion to exclude causation testimony of George Salloum filed by Defendant United States of America.

    Key Takeaways:

    • McConnell’s opinions pertain to general causation, such as the forces that an occupant of a Chevrolet would be subjected to in the car accident at issue. He has not issued any specific opinions concerning the precise cause of Harper’s injuries.
    • The United States has not identified any record of prior injury to Harper’s left shoulder that Salloum should have considered before opining as to the causation of Harper’s left shoulder injury. Harper’s other accidents and injuries appear unrelated to her shoulder injuries; thus, at this time, the Court cannot fault Salloum for failing to consider them.

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Harper V. The United States Of America Et Al
    Docket Number: 1:23cv197
    Court: United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi, Southern Division
    Order Date: September 23, 2024
  • Forensic Psychiatry Expert Witness’ Report on Plaintiff’s Mental Health Admitted 

    Forensic Psychiatry Expert Witness’ Report on Plaintiff’s Mental Health Admitted 

    On a foggy night in November 2015, Plaintiff Kedron Gaston, a minor at the time, was heavily injured in a car accident. The car, driven by her aunt, collided with the back of a semi-truck, resulting in her aunt’s death. The Plaintiff’s mother, seated in the front passenger position, suffered severe injuries that made her unable to care for the Plaintiff and her sister. Consequently, Plaintiff entered foster care. She subsequently sued the semi-truck driver, Defendant Jackie Hazeltine (“Hazeltine”) and his employer, Defendant Royal Paper Stock Co., Inc. (“RPS”), for negligence and for causing emotional distress. The Plaintiff also filed a lawsuit against RPS and Hazeltine’s insurer, Defendant Grange Mutual Casualty Co. (“Grange”), for spoliation related to testing performed on the semi’s rear lighting in July 2016 by Grange’s expert Adam Hyde. 

    Key issues include the functionality and activation of the semi’s rear lighting system at the time of the accident; the handling of the lighting system after the accident, especially the right rear taillight; and the nature and extent of Plaintiff’s loss and injuries as the result of the accident.  

    The Defendants hired expert witnesses to provide insights on these matters. Forensic psychiatry expert witness Stevan Weine concluded in his expert report dated March 2, 2023, that the Plaintiff did not exhibit any psychiatric condition during her February 2023 interview, despite previous psychiatric diagnoses. Automotive engineering expert witness Erik Anderson determined that the semi’s rear-facing light assembly was well preserved and capable of being tested to determine whether the bulbs were energized at the time of the accident. Accident reconstruction expert witness, Steven Grundhoefer confirmed that the semi’s taillights were functional and illuminated at the time of the accident. 

    The Plaintiff moved to exclude all testimony from these expert witnesses based on Fed. R. Evid. 702 and the Daubert standard. Alternatively, she argued for exclusion based on the evidentiary balancing test in Federal Rule of Evidence 403. 

    Forensic Psychiatry Expert Witness 

    Stevan M. Weine is the Professor of Psychiatry at the UIC College of Medicine, where he’s also the Director of Global Medicine and Director of the Center for Global Health. For 30 years he has been conducting research both with refugees and migrants in the U.S. and in post-conflict countries, focused on mental health, health, and violence prevention.  

    His work has been supported by multiple grants from the NIMH, NICHD, DHS, NIJ, and other state, federal, and private funders, all with collaboration from community partners. This work has resulted in more than 130 publications and three books. He has been awarded two Career Scientist Awards: “Services Based Research with Refugee Families” from the National Institute of Mental Health and “Labor Migration and Multilevel HIV Prevention” from the National Institute of Child Health and Human Development.  

    Weine is the 2020 recipient of the Abraham L. Halpern Humanitarian Award of the American Association for Social Psychiatry and the 2023 recipient of the Piergiorgio L.E. Uslenghi Global Engagement Faculty Award. 

    Get the full story on challenges to Stevan Weine’s expert opinions and testimony with an in-depth Challenge Study.  

    Automotive Engineering Expert Witness 

    Erik Selmer Anderson is an automotive engineer with nearly twenty years of professional experience, fourteen of which were spent working directly for automotive manufacturers. He has direct design and testing experience in vehicle structures, crashworthiness, and closure systems engineering. Erik applies his expertise to expert witness investigations pertaining to vehicle crashworthiness, crash reconstruction, vehicle systems performance, and exterior/interior upper body mechanisms. 

    Upon completion of his degree in Mechanical Engineering, Erik worked for eight years with Nissan. There, he held positions in Body Design, Closures Design, and Crash Safety. As a Crash Safety engineer, he was responsible for ensuring the achievement of dynamic safety targets, both on a component basis and for complete vehicle performance. This included work in both the virtual design phase through simulation analysis, as well as overseeing and analyzing physical crash testing. Erik performed design/test work on sedans, pickup trucks, crossovers, and cargo vehicles throughout the entire development lifecycle and into mass production. 

    Continuing his automotive career, Erik then worked at Honda Research & Development for six years, where he was responsible for closures design engineering as a design team chief. At Honda, Erik led a team of design engineers in developing all aspects of minivan slide doors. He also served as design chief for minor-model updates on pickup truck door and tailgate closures. Erik has expertise in all elements of upper body design, including structures, dynamic and static crash safety, sealing, NVH, power-door systems, latches, and exterior/interior components, among others. 

    Erik earned his Engineering degree from the University of Michigan, one of the nation’s most respected programs. Throughout his career, he has accumulated a multitude of patents for key innovations in upper body design. His education and deep industry experience designing and testing vehicles qualify Erik to investigate a broad range of vehicle topics. 

    Want to know more about the challenges Erik Anderson has faced? Get the full details with our Challenge Study report.    

    Accident Reconstruction Expert Witness 

    Steven Grundhoefer has 20 years of experience in traffic accident reconstruction. In addition to being ACTAR certified, he is a licensed Professional Engineer in Indiana, Kentucky, Ohio, and Illinois. He possesses extensive trial and deposition experience. He holds a Bachelor’s Degree in Civil Engineering from Purdue University and has approximately 10 years of experience in roadway and site design. 

    Get the full story on challenges to Steven Grundhoefer’s expert opinions and testimony with an in-depth Challenge Study.    

    Discussion by the Court 

    I. Stevan Weine  

    A. Qualifications 

    Plaintiff argued that Weine lacked expertise regarding adolescents impacted by traumatic events like car crashes. She pointed out that his CV highlighted experience in global health and refugee issues, but it lacked specific trauma experience related to car accidents involving children. One reference in his CV mentioned “Forensic Psychiatry Practice,” but it did not provide dates to indicate his experience in this area. 

    However, the Court found that Weine’s CV showed significant experience in analyzing and treating adolescents affected by trauma. He held a fellowship at Yale focused on college students’ mental health and worked as an attending psychiatrist in their Adolescent Partial Hospital. He co-authored articles related to psychiatric care for child and adolescent patients. 

    In an affidavit, Weine stated he had extensive experience with children and adolescents in traumatic situations. He explained that diagnosing PTSD due to various traumatic events followed a similar approach. His forensic psychiatric practice spanned over 20 years, including cases involving trauma from motor vehicle accidents. 

    Plaintiff also claimed Weine lacked experience in forensic interviews, citing a failure to discuss informed consent extensively during their interview. However, the transcript along with Weine’s affidavit shows that he discussed the elements of informed consent, including the limits of confidentiality, the extent of his intended disclosures, and the purpose of the interview, with Plaintiff before she agreed to proceed with the interview. 

    Grange successfully demonstrated that Weine’s qualifications allowed him to address the effects of the Plaintiff’s injuries on her development. The Court held he was qualified to testify as an expert witness under Rule 702. 

    B. Reliability 

    The Plaintiff argued that Weine’s opinions from his March 2023 report lacked reliability for two reasons. First, she claimed he did not review enough facts or data before reaching his conclusions about her mental health and history. Second, she criticized his methodology for its inconsistency with ethical guidelines followed in the practice of forensic psychiatry. Based on these points, Plaintiff asserted that Weine’s opinions did not reflect reliable principles in the mental health field. 

    1. Collateral Information 

    AAPL Forensic Guideline 5.3 emphasizes the importance of reviewing collateral information in forensic assessments. The Plaintiff claimed Weine violated this guideline by excluding collateral information. However, the argument failed for two reasons. 

    First, Forensic Guideline 1 clarified that the guidelines do not dictate standards for evaluations. Psychiatrists must use professional judgment to determine appropriate methods of performing a forensic evaluation based on unique circumstances. 

    Second, the Court found that Weine did consider collateral information. Plaintiff defined collateral information as data obtained from sources other than the subject but did not specify what collateral information Weine excluded from his analysis. According to his report, he reviewed “a variety of documents and videos, including Gaston’s school records from elementary school to present, her employment and training records, medical records, video footage of her deposition, and video footage of the depositions of her guardians, Matthew and Tamara Cochran” in addition to collateral information listed in his report. 

    Despite these claims, any potential non-compliance with Rule 26(a) was harmless. Courts assess harmlessness based on factors like prejudice to the opposing party and whether the omission disrupted the trial. The Court held that prejudice to Plaintiff is minimal and has been remedied to a degree with Weine’s recent affidavit, which discloses his sources. 

    2. Context, Frequency, Intensity of Symptoms 

    The Plaintiff further argued that Weine’s assessment failed to address the context, frequency, and intensity of her symptoms. However, Weine’s notes and report showed he investigated her experiences at school and work. Disagreements between Weine and Westcott about the adequacy of this context relate to substance rather than reliability, making it an issue for the factfinder. 

    Regarding the frequency and intensity of her symptoms, the Court found that Weine had asked about these aspects during the interview. Though he and Westcott employed different styles, he adequately explored the necessary details. 

    Plaintiff also contended that Weine did not follow accepted methodologies for diagnosing her potential psychiatric disorders. However, he reported her scores on relevant diagnostic tests consistent with best practices. 

    The Plaintiff criticized Weine’s report for presenting her history through unattributed quotations, alleging many inaccuracies and typographical errors. However, Weine explained he relied on his notes during the report’s preparation. The discrepancies between his report and the interview transcript were minor and did not undermine his reliability. 

    Finally, the Plaintiff disputed Weine’s assessment of her quality-of-life post-accident, alleging he manipulated facts. The Court observed that such factual disputes should be explored through cross-examination rather than exclusion of evidence. The evidence showed that Weine’s testimony was admissible under Rule 702 and Daubert. 

    C. Federal Rule of Evidence 403 

    Federal Rule of Evidence 403 allows Courts to exclude evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice or confusion. The Plaintiff further argued that Weine’s report could mislead the jury due to alleged mishandling of facts. However, her previous challenges to his reliability had been dismissed, and she presented no further arguments of undue prejudice. 

    There was no indication that Weine’s testimony would evoke irrational behavior from the jury. His report clearly explained the Plaintiff’s history and his conclusions. Given the central nature of her damages to the case, Weine’s opinions held significant probative value. Therefore, his testimony remained admissible under Rule 403. 

    II. Erik Anderson

     Erik Anderson was retained by Grange to assess whether the rear right trailer taillight bulb could be analyzed for energization during the crash. In forming his conclusions, Anderson reviewed evidence, including video footage and photographs from a visual inspection conducted on November 29, 2022 which he did not attend. This inspection was notice by RPS and Hazeltine on November 17, 2022. The notice aimed to confirm the condition of the light assembly previously inspected by Grange’s expert, Adam Hyde, in July 2016. 

    The notice outlined a protocol for the inspection. This protocol restricted all contact with the light assembly to Hyde and required electronic recording by an identified individual. It also mandated a certification process for attendees. 

    In response, the Plaintiff reiterated her stance that Hyde had destroyed the light assembly in 2016, calling the visual inspection a “sham.” However, she did not object to any part of the inspection protocol but repeated her argument that Hyde’s actions precluded further analysis. Neither she nor her representatives attended the inspection.  

    Plaintiff argued that Anderson’s opinions should be excluded under Fed. R. Evid. 702 and Daubert due to unreliability. She claimed he relied on evidence from an improperly conducted inspection and disregarded conflicting evidence. Alternatively, she contended that his testimony could confuse the jury and should be excluded under Fed. R. Evid. 403. 

    A. Reliability 

    The Plaintiff argued that Anderson’s opinions were unreliable because they stemmed from his review of the November 2022 visual inspection, conducted without an agreed protocol or Court order. She claimed RPS and Hazeltine violated local rules by proceeding without proper certification of a discovery dispute. However, their notice did not demonstrate any unresolved dispute that required her involvement. 

    Moreover, the Plaintiff’s response to the notice did not request any relief regarding the inspection. She did not question the protocol or seek to halt the visual inspection. Instead, she expressed skepticism about RPS and Hazeltine’s motivations. Consequently, her response did not raise any legal issues for the Court. Later, she aimed to undermine Anderson’s reliability based on her previous response, yet she provided no authority to connect her concerns to his methods. Therefore, the Court allowed Anderson’s testimony under Rule 702 and Daubert. 

    B. Federal Rule of Evidence 403 

    The Plaintiff’s alternative argument for excluding Anderson’s opinions under Fed. R. Evid. 403 also failed. She focused on this Court’s acceptance of findings from her mother’s case against RPS and Hazeltine regarding spoliation of the light assembly. The Court confirmed that the findings on spoliation applied here and stated that while RPS and Hazeltine could not relitigate the spoliation issue, Grange could. 

    The Plaintiff suggested that Anderson’s differing opinions would confuse the jury about how the same event could represent spoliation for one party but not another. However, her concern lacked merit. The condition of the light assembly was crucial to the spoliation claim against Grange, making Anderson’s insights highly relevant. 

    The Plaintiff merely implied that the differences between his opinions and those of other experts would confuse the jury. Yet, the jury’s role is to weigh competing evidence to resolve factual questions. She failed to provide substantial support for her claim that Anderson’s opinions would confuse the jury regarding spoliation. 

    Thus, the Court determined that the probative value of Anderson’s opinions outweighed any risk of undue prejudice or confusion. Consequently, his opinions and testimony remained admissible under Fed. R. Evid. 403. 

    III. Steven Grundhoefer 

    Steven Grundhoefer was hired by RPS and Hazeltine to study and survey the November 2015 collision site. His work aimed to assist in analyzing and reconstructing the accident. Grundhoefer summarized his findings in 43 bullet points. The Plaintiff challenged one of these opinions and requested to exclude Grundhoefer’s entire opinion as unreliable under Fed. R. Evid. 702 and Daubert, or as potentially confusing under Fed. R. Evid. 403. 

    The Plaintiff contested Grundhoefer’s assertion that the four rear taillights on the semi-trailer were illuminated during the collision. She argued that he based this conclusion on police photographs taken after the crash. Additionally, she claimed this opinion conflicted with Hyde’s expert testimony from her mother’s case before the Wabash Court, which stated the lights were off at the time of the accident. The Plaintiff also pointed to conflicting testimonies from officers present at the scene, suggesting that Grundhoefer selectively used evidence to support his preferred conclusion. She argued that the differing expert opinions indicated Grundhoefer’s findings were unreliable. 

    The Plaintiff’s arguments highlighted that this case might require a “battle of the experts” to resolve the issue of the lights’ illumination during the crash. Expert testimony would likely help the factfinder assess the conflicting evidence regarding illumination, crucial for determining the Plaintiff’s negligence and spoliation claims. The Plaintiff attempted to undermine Grundhoefer’s opinion without solid support, which did not diminish its relevance to the factfinder. 

    Moreover, RPS and Hazeltine demonstrated that Grundhoefer considered more than one set of police photographs in forming his opinion about the lights. His amended report and affidavit revealed he reviewed photographs and videos from inspections of the taillights and bulbs, alongside police scene images. 

    The Plaintiff argued that Grundhoefer selectively ignored key evidence. Specifically, he overlooked the deposition testimony from Detective Sergeant Mike Davis and Trooper Swisher. Officer Davis had testified about the flashers’ illumination while at the scene. The Plaintiff suggested that his testimony contradicted Grundhoefer’s conclusions regarding the lights, but she did not clarify this alleged contradiction. 

    In contrast, RPS and Hazeltine argued that Officer Davis’s testimony did not contradict Grundhoefer at all. Trooper Swisher noted that he believed the taillight was not functioning before the crash. While this testimony might seem to contradict Grundhoefer, the Plaintiff failed to provide evidence showing that an expert must align with every witness’s account to be deemed reliable. Her concerns highlighted the necessity for the factfinder to consider all evidence, including Grundhoefer’s opinion. 

    Therefore, Grundhoefer’s opinion about the lights’ illumination and his entire expert report were sufficiently reliable for admission under Rule 702 and Daubert. The Plaintiff’s unsupported claim that Grundhoefer’s opinion could confuse the jury did not justify the exclusion his testimony under Fed. R. Evid. 403. 

    Held 

    The Court denied the Plaintiff’s motions to exclude the testimony of Defendants’ expert witnesses Stevan Weine, Erik Anderson, and Steven Grundhoefer.  

    Key Takeaways: 

    The Court allowed the testimony of Defendants’ expert witnesses based on their qualifications and the reliability of their methodologies.  

    The Court determined that each expert witness had extensive relevant experience—Weine in forensic psychiatry concerning trauma, Anderson in automotive engineering with a focus on vehicle safety, and Grundhoefer in accident reconstruction. 

    The Court also determined that the expert witnesses employed established methods appropriate for their fields. Weine reviewed adequate collateral information, Anderson followed an inspection protocol, and Grundhoefer considered multiple sources in his analysis. 

    The Court concluded that the probative value of the expert witnesses’ testimonies outweighed any potential for confusion or prejudice, reinforcing the need for juries to assess conflicting evidence in determining facts. 

    In conclusion, the Court upheld the admissibility of the expert testimony under Federal Rules of Evidence 702 and 403. 

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Gaston V. Hazeltine
    Docket Number: 3:21cv896 
    Court: United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana, South Bend Division 
    Order Date: September 18, 2024 
  • Accident Reconstruction Expert Barred From Testifying Due to Surprise Opinions

    Accident Reconstruction Expert Barred From Testifying Due to Surprise Opinions

    Elmedin Tinjak has been a life-long cyclist. On June 20, 2020, the carbon fiber fork of his brand-new Bianchi bicycle failed, causing him to crash face-first on the pavement. Tinjak was taken to Riverside Methodist Hospital, where he was treated for a concussion, chest contusions, a fractured vertebra, and multiple complex facial lacerations. 

    The injuries Tinjak sustained that day continue to affect him. He struggles to do things he was once able to do, such as ski and play golf. He can no longer ride his bike for long periods of time, play sports with his kids for long periods of time, or stand for more than 30-45 minutes. The Tinjaks filed suit against the against the bike’s manufacturer, Cycleurope USA, Inc. dba Bianchi USA., seeking damages for economic and non-economic loss suffered as a result of the crash.

    The Tinjaks sought to exclude Greg Dubois as an expert witness for failure to comply with the expert disclosure requirements. 

    Accident Reconstruction Expert Witness

    Greg DuBois manages the Materials and Product Testing Department of CTL Engineering and provides consulting services in the areas of failure analysis, accident reconstruction and product testing.

    Want to know more about the challenges Greg DuBois has faced? Get the full details with our Challenge Study report. 

    Discussion by the Court

    Courts within the Sixth Circuit consider five factors to determine whether a party’s noncompliant disclosure was harmless or substantially justified:

    (1) Surprise to the party against whom the evidence would be offered;

    (2) Ability of that party to cure the surprise;

    (3) Extent to which allowing the evidence would disrupt the trial;

    (4) Importance of the evidence; and

    (5) Non-disclosing party’s explanation for its failure to disclose the evidence.

    Bianchi does not address any of the above mentioned factors; instead, it stresses that the Tinjaks knew Dubois had been retained as an expert as early as August 2020.  Although Bianchi asserted that its counsel “was of the impression that [Dubois’s December 18, 2020 report] had been supplied to Plaintiff counsel prior to [his] involvement in the litigation,” it offered no facts that would justify counsel’s mistaken impression.

    The Court’s own consideration of the five factors leads it to conclude that Bianchi’s noncompliance with the expert disclosure requirements of Rule 26(a) and the Court’s Preliminary Pretrial Order was neither harmless nor substantially justified. First, the Tinjaks were surprised by the substance of Dubois’ opinions, even if they were not surprised by his identity. Second, because the opinions were disclosed after the discovery period closed, the Tinjaks were unable to cure the surprise. Third, allowing Dubois’ opinions would fairly require the Court to re-open discovery in this years-old case. Fourth, although the underlying facts are such that expert testimony would likely be very important, Bianchi offers the Court no insight into the substance of Dubois’ primary opinions. And finally, Bianchi’s earlier-discussed explanation for its failure to comply is grossly insufficient.

    Held

    The Court excluded Greg Dubois as an expert witness for failing to comply with the expert disclosure requirements. 

    Key Takeaway:

    Expert disclosures go beyond just the expert’s identity; a party must also disclose the expert’s written report. When a party fails to comply with Rule 26(a)’s expert disclosure requirements, Rule 37(c) precludes the noncompliant party from using the “information or witness to supply evidence on a motion, at a hearing, or at a trial, unless the failure was substantially justified or is harmless.” The party seeking to avoid the Rule 37(c) sanction—here, Bianchi—bears the burden of showing that its failure to comply with the expert disclosure requirements was harmless or substantially justified. However, Bianchi’s explanation for its failure to comply is grossly insufficient.

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Tinjak Et Al V. Bianchi Usa Inc/Cycleurope Usa Incs Et Al
    Docket Number: 2:22cv2853
    Court: United States District Court, Ohio Southern
    Order Date: September 16, 2024
  • Accident Reconstruction Expert Witness’ Testimony Admitted Because He Relied on Peer-Reviewed Studies

    Accident Reconstruction Expert Witness’ Testimony Admitted Because He Relied on Peer-Reviewed Studies

    This is an automobile negligence case alleging that the Plaintiffs, Fred Young and Jeff Firman were permanently injured in a rear-end collision by an employee of the Defendant, Panera, LLC. The Defendant has retained and plans to call biomechanical engineer Ming Xiao, Ph.D., in its case-in-chief.

    Plaintiffs requested the Court to exclude certain testimony of Defendant’s biomechanical engineering expert, Dr. Ming Xiao. Plaintiffs argued that Xiao did not cite any scientific study to support his testimony that the forces Plaintiffs experienced in the collision were analogous to those resulting from certain activities of daily living, such as running, jumping, plopping in a chair, and picking up an object. In the alternative, Plaintiffs stated, “Assuming that these specific analogies were not simply made up by Xiao, a review of the studies listed in the report’s appendix revealed a likely source for their insertion in his report.”

    Accident Reconstruction Expert Witness

    Dr. Ming Xiao holds a B.S. degree in Mechanical Engineering and a Ph.D. in Biomechanics. He is a registered professional engineer, an Accredited Traffic Accident Reconstructionist (ACTAR), and a Certified Playground Safety Inspector (CPSI). His primary areas of consulting expertise include injury consistency biomechanics, accident reconstruction, and playground safety.

    Get the full story on challenges to Ming Xiao’s expert opinions and testimony with an in-depth Challenge Study. 

    Discussion by the Court

    Plaintiffs noted that one study cited by Xiao, the Allen 1994 study, was excluded by a judge in the Middle District of Florida because the results of the study were found not to have been generally accepted by the scientific community and because the study’s probative value was outweighed by its potential to mislead or confuse the jury.

    The Court disagreed with Plaintiffs’ characterization of Xiao’s report. While Xiao did not provide citations for each statement in the report analogizing the mechanical loads Plaintiffs allegedly experienced to those experienced in daily activities, Xiao cited several peer-reviewed studies that supported his analogies, four of which Xiao summarized in his affidavit.

    Additionally, contrary to Plaintiffs’ concern that Xiao’s conclusions are based solely on the Allen 1994 study, which Plaintiffs allege is unreliable because the study was based on a sample size of only young, healthy adults, Xiao explains in his report, “Occupant motions in response to motor vehicle accidents have been extensively studied by biomechanical engineers through staged crash tests using human volunteers, post-mortem human surrogates, and anthropomorphic test devices. To this date, published peer-reviewed literature has over 2,000 human volunteer exposures subjected to rear-end and frontal collision tests. The volunteers varied in age (up to 68 years old), gender, height, weight, and medical conditions.”

    The Court observed that Defendant summarized several additional studies upon which Xiao relied that were published within the last 10 years and showed that comparisons of forces in motor vehicle collisions and those in daily activities were generally accepted in the scientific community.

    Held

    The Court permitted Xiao to testify regarding his comparisons of the mechanical loads Plaintiffs would have experienced to those experienced when engaging in activities such as running, jumping, plopping in a chair, and picking up an object. As Defendant noted, this testimony will relate the impact Plaintiffs experienced to “activities with which the jury has experience and can relate to.”

    Key Takeaway:

    When Plaintiffs argued that Xiao did not cite any scientific study to support his testimony, the Court found that the Allen 1994 study was originally published in a journal with a rigorous peer-review process and has been cited 130 times by other peer-reviewed scientific articles. Xiao also cited 98 other peer-reviewed studies. These studies are examples of biomechanical engineers and scientists using similar methodology regarding comparison of activities of daily living. Defendant summarized several additional studies upon which Xiao relies that were published within the last 10 years and show that comparisons of forces in motor vehicle collisions and those in daily activities are generally accepted in the scientific community.

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Young Et Al V. Panera, LLC
    Docket Number: 8:22cv2894
    Court: United States District Court, Florida Middle
    Order Date: August 1, 2024
  • Testimony by Accident Reconstruction Expert Witness Regarding Missouri Statute Violation Limited

    Testimony by Accident Reconstruction Expert Witness Regarding Missouri Statute Violation Limited

    A district judge in Missouri partly excluded the testimony of an expert accident reconstructionist retained to opine on the safety of the crossing.

    The case began with a train-vehicle collision near Mineral Point, Missouri, on August 19, 2019. Anthony Courtois drove a 2007 Freightliner dump truck westward toward North Oak Road’s railroad crossing. As he approached, an Amtrak train travelled southbound on Union Pacific-owned tracks. Courtois claimed he didn’t see the train due to excessive vegetation along the tracks until it was too late, leading to the collision.

    The Plaintiff sued Union Pacific and Amtrak, alleging negligence. He claimed they did not maintain the crossing or warn of danger. They had also failed to issue slow orders, sound the train’s horn in a timely and safe manner, or adjust speed safely.

    During discovery, the Plaintiff disclosed James Loumiet as an expert witness. The Defendants jointly sought to limit or exclude Loumiet’s testimony under Daubert grounds. They argued his opinions on the crossing’s danger should be excluded under Federal and Missouri law. They also claimed Loumiet’s opinions were flawed for considering irrelevant factors, applying the wrong standard of care, and lacking an adequate foundation.

    Accident Reconstruction Expert Witness

    James Loumiet holds a degree in mechanical engineering. He possesses over 37 years of professional experience, including 34 years specializing in accident reconstruction. He conducted a personal inspection of the North Oak Road crossing, taking precise measurements and photographs. Additionally, he reviewed various documents, such as crash reports, photographs, and a video of the collision recorded from the locomotive.

    Get the full story on challenges to James Loumiet’s expert opinions and testimony with an in-depth Challenge Study. 

    Discussion by the Court

    A. Expert Report of James Loumiet

    James Loumiet prepared an expert report in which he highlighted several critical observations about the North Oak Road crossing. He noted the presence of sight-restricting trees and vegetation in all four quadrants of the crossing. Further, he analyzed the road’s grade leading to the crossing, identifying a humped profile and a steep uphill grade on the east approach, the direction from which the Plaintiff approached. He also examined the topography of the crossing, noting the road was curved west of the crossing and the tracks were curved through and around the crossing on both sides. Furthermore, Loumiet observed that the grade crossing traffic control consisted of stop signs and private crossing signs.

    In his expert report, Loumiet concluded the North Oak Road crossing was extrahazardous at the time of the collision. Additionally, the Plaintiff disclosed Loumiet so as to testify about the crossing’s extrahazardous nature as a causative factor in the collision.

    B. Defendant’s Argument

    In their motion, the Defendants did not contest Loumiet’s qualifications. Instead, they argued that relevant case law prohibited experts from testifying about the dangerousness of a railroad crossing, thus his opinions should be excluded. Furthermore, the Defendants contended that Loumiet’s opinions were inadmissible as they would usurp the jury’s role as the factfinder. Additionally, the Defendants claimed that Loumiet mischaracterized the duties of a Missouri driver, made improper legal conclusions, and relied on factors irrelevant to the collision, as well as materials not adopted under Missouri law.

    An expert could not testify that a crossing was unusually dangerous or extrahazardous

    Defendants argued that Courts consistently recognized an expert could not testify that a crossing was unusually dangerous or extrahazardous. They asserted that Loumiet tried to increase the railroad’s legal duties while diminishing those of the driver. Additionally, Defendants claimed that Loumiet’s reliance on a sight distance table from the American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials (AASHTO) was inappropriate because Missouri law had not adopted this standard for railroad crossings, and it applied to new, not existing, crossings.

    Lastly, Defendants argued that they should bar Loumiet from testifying that Union Pacific violated Missouri Revised Statutes Section 389.665(2), which concerned the clearing of vegetation at public crossings.

    Loumiet was being offered to testify as to the safety of the crossing

    The Court disagreed with Defendants’ characterization of the incident as a mere “car accident.” It involved a collision between a dump truck and a passenger train at a rural railroad crossing. The Court noted average jurors lack experience in dump truck driving, train operation, or railroad crossing maintenance. Federal Rule of Evidence 702 allows qualified experts to offer opinion testimony to aid jury comprehension or fact determination.

    Moreover, the Court held that Loumiet was not being offered to testify about whether the Plaintiff met his legal duties as a driver on the day of the collision. Instead, he was supposed to testify about the crossing’s safety. The Court decided not to exclude Loumiet’s testimony based on Defendants’ argument that the expert allegedly minimized or ignored Plaintiff’s duty of care.

    The Court found that Section 389.665(2) did not apply to this case as the North Oak Road crossing was not a public crossing within the meaning of the statute. Consequently, the Court granted Defendants’ Daubert motion to the extent that Loumiet would be prohibited from testifying that Union Pacific violated Missouri Revised Statutes Section 389.665(2). In all other respects, the Court denied Defendants’ motion to exclude or limit the testimony of James Loumiet.

    Held

    The Court partially granted the Defendant’s Motion to Exclude the expert testimony of James Loumiet.

    Key Takeaway:

    The Court found that the expertise of Loumiet would assist the jury in understanding complex issues surrounding railroad crossings, such as maintenance and safety standards. Additionally, the Court clarified that Loumiet’s testimony was focused on the safety of the crossing rather than opining on the Plaintiff’s legal duties as a driver. However, the Court partially granted the Defendants’ motion regarding Loumiet’s testimony on a specific statute violation, noting that it did not apply to the case.

    Case Details:

     Case Caption: Courtois v. Union Pacific R.R. Co.
     Docket Number: 4:22cv133
     Court: United States District Court, Missouri Eastern
     Order Date: May 30, 2024