Expert Witness Profiler

Blog

  • Class Action Expert Was Allowed to Opine on the Notice Procedure

    Class Action Expert Was Allowed to Opine on the Notice Procedure

    The Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA) prohibited robocalls to cellphones except in emergencies or with the recipient’s consent. Jason Saggio and Jude Furr, on behalf of a proposed nationwide class, alleged that Defendant Medicredit, a medical debt collector, erroneously and unlawfully placed robocalls to their cellphones to collect debts they didn’t owe. Plaintiffs proposed a class consisting of persons and entities in the United States to whom Defendant placed a robocall, between September 26, 2018, and the date of certification, to a cellphone number that was not assigned to a person with past-due medical debt.

    Plaintiffs retained Carla Peak as an expert in class action notice and administration. In discovery, Defendant produced spreadsheets of phone numbers designated as wrong numbers robocalled during the class period. Plaintiffs retained Peak to describe the notification process that Verita would undertake to effectuate notice to potential class members if this Court were to certify the proposed class.

    Defendant sought to exclude Peak’s testimony because (1) she is unqualified in data analytics and class member identification, (2) her proposed method for generating a notice list is unreliable for purposes of demonstrating ascertainability, and (3) her expertise in class notice after certification has no relevance to ascertainability as a prerequisite for class certification.

    Class Action Expert Witness

    Carla A. Peak served as the Vice President of Legal Notification Services for Verita Global, which specializes in comprehensive class action administration services.

    Peak has more than 20 years of industry experience and has been involved in all aspects of the design and implementation of class action notice planning. She has served as an expert in over one hundred cases involving class action notice plans. Peak has a bachelor’s degree in sociology and an MBA.

    Want to know more about the challenges Carla Peak has faced? Get the full details with our Challenge Study report.

    Discussion by the Court

    Verita would provide Defendant’s list of wrong numbers to a database aggregator and identity verification service provider such as PacificEast, Nexxa, or Lexis Nexis. That company would perform a reverse look-up search to locate names and addresses associated with the cellphone numbers that received Defendant’s robocalls during the class period. If one search leaves some numbers unidentified, the list could be provided to another company for another search, as their databases can vary. Addresses are checked against a database maintained by the United States Postal Service. The results of the searches can be cross-referenced with Defendant’s collection records to verify that debtors are excluded from the mailing list.

    Notice was sent to all potential class members identified through the search process. Any notices returned undeliverable are re-sent to forwarding addresses if available, or further searches can be conducted using other databases. When necessary, Verita can undertake additional notification methods, such as paid media campaigns and messages to social media accounts of the targeted numbers.

    Peak opined that this methodology “is consistent with other notice plans that have been utilized in similar court-approved TCPA class actions and has been deemed to provide the best notice practicable under the circumstances in those matters.” She noted that a success rate of at least 70% is considered high, according to the Judges’ Class Action Notice and Claims Process Checklist published by the Federal Judicial Center. Peak cautioned that she offered no opinion or certainty of Verita’s ability to precisely identify individual bona fide members of the class; she opined only on how to best effectuate optimal notice to potential class members. When asked how individual members would be identified, she explained that they would self-identify by responding to the notice.

    Analysis

    Defendant centrally argued that Peak isn’t an expert on ascertainability, and her opinions on post-certification notice aren’t reliable or relevant when analyzing ascertainability as a criterion for certification.

    On the merits of ascertainability, Defendant postulates several scenarios where a person who received a robocall might not be the registered subscriber (i.e., owner) of the number as identified by a search.

    Put simply, Defendant sought to exclude Peak’s testimony because she can’t guarantee perfectly accurate identification of every class member. Here, Defendant has already produced call logs identifying wrong numbers and the date reported as such. The Court has ordered additional production of more detailed logs specific to each phone number, including the dates of each call. Peak proposes to use Defendant’s data to identify potential class members, with cross-referencing and verification steps to optimize accuracy.

    The Court found that Peak’s expert opinion is relevant to assist the Court in its evaluation of ascertainability. Separately, the Court finds Peak’s opinion relevant to manageability as a component of superiority under Rule 23(b)(3). Further, the Court found Peak’s methodology reliable, as demonstrated through its wide acceptance and implementation by district courts throughout the country.

    Finally, Defendant contended that Peak isn’t qualified to opine on class member identification because she doesn’t conduct the searches herself. Rather, Verita’s operations team performs the technical work and Peak merely “runs a media team.” This argument discounts Peak’s experience and advancement in the industry and ignores the structural realities of the workplace. The Court finds it entirely reasonable that an expert at Peak’s executive level would collaborate with technical staff to effectuate database queries of this nature.

    Held

    The Court denied the Defendant’s motion to exclude the testimony of Plaintiff’s class notice expert, Carla Peak.

    Key Takeaway

    The Court found expert Peak qualified to opine on the best process and procedures to identify potential class members and ensure optimal notice using Defendant’s call logs and reverse look-up searches. According to Eighth Circuit precedent, Defendant’s call logs provide objective criteria to ascertain the proposed class.  Accordingly, the Court found Peak’s opinions relevant to assist the Court in evaluating whether the class is ascertainable. Separately, the Court finds Peak’s opinions relevant to the question of class manageability. The Court found Peak’s methodology reliable in that it has been widely utilized and recognized to identify potential class members and provide the best possible notice practicable in numerous class actions, including TCPA wrong number cases.

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Saggio V. Medicredit, Inc.
    Docket Number: 4:22cv1005
    Court Name: United States District Court, Missouri Eastern
    Order Date: December 09, 2025
  • Infectious Disease Expert Was Allowed to Opine on Masking and Testing

    Infectious Disease Expert Was Allowed to Opine on Masking and Testing

    Eight former Redmond firefighters sued the City of Redmond (“City”) after being terminated for refusing COVID-19 vaccinations on religious grounds. They argued the City should have let them continue working with masking and testing rather than requiring vaccination.

    Plaintiffs filed a Daubert motion to exclude the testimony of the City’s expert, Dr. John Lynch.

    Infectious Disease Expert Witness

    Dr. John B. Lynch is a board-certified physician in infectious disease, Professor of Medicine at the University of Washington, and Associate Medical Director of Harborview Medical Center.

    Moreover, he led UW Medicine’s COVID-19 Emergency Operations Center from February 2020 through December 2023, overseeing PPE and testing policies, and has authored 82 peer-reviewed publications, including 15 on COVID-19.

    Get the full story on challenges to John Lynch’s expert opinions and testimony with an in-depth Challenge Study.

    Discussion by the Court

    Plaintiffs challenged Lynch’s qualifications, arguing that he lacks expertise in masking and testing, that his opinions were irrelevant because Defendant allegedly lacked an undue hardship defense, and that his method is unreliable because he did not conduct original research. The Court disagreed.

    Basically, medical experts commonly base their opinions on clinical experience, peer-reviewed literature, and public health guidance—precisely the materials Lynch relied on here.

    Moreover, Lynch’s opinions are grounded in decades of clinical experience, extensive review of scientific literature, and his direct involvement in the public health response to COVID-19.

    Held

    The Court denied the Plaintiffs’ motion to exclude the testimony of Defendant’s expert Dr. John Lynch.

    Key Takeaway

    The Ninth Circuit has explained that expert testimony is reliable if the knowledge underlying it has a reliable basis in the knowledge and experience of the relevant discipline. If Plaintiffs wish to challenge what Lynch failed to consider or address, such critiques go to weight and credibility—subjects for cross-examination—not admissibility.

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Carlson V. City Of Redmond
    Docket Number: 2:22cv1739
    Court Name: United States District Court, Washington Western
    Order Date: December 05, 2025
  • Political Science Expert Was Allowed to Opine on Paraguay’s Legal System

    Political Science Expert Was Allowed to Opine on Paraguay’s Legal System

    On September 12, 2025, Maik Evert Ens Loblein (“Petitioner”) filed the Petition for the Return of Children to Paraguay pursuant to the Hague Convention. The Petition asserted that Roxana Andrea Alcaraz de Ens (“Respondent”) unlawfully retained in the United States two children who habitually reside in Paraguay. On September 15, 2025, Petitioner filed an Amended Verified Petition for the Return of Children to Paraguay.

    On September 18, 2025, pursuant to the Court’s order, a temporary restraining order was entered preventing the removal of the two minor children, S.I.E.A. and M.A.E.A., from their location within the jurisdiction of the Court. By stipulation of the parties in this matter, the Temporary Restraining Order was extended until further order of the Court after the Amended Verified Petition for the Return of Children to Paraguay is resolved on its merits.

    Respondent designated Dr. Aníbal Pérez-Liñánto offer expert testimony regarding Paraguay’s legal system, including its institutional capacity to protect victims of domestic violence, enforce protective orders, and maintain an effective system of criminal accountability.

    Petitioner filed a motion to exclude the testimony of Respondent’s expert Aníbal Pérez-Liñán.

    Political Science Expert Witness

    Aníbal Pérez-Liñán is a Professor of Political Science and Global Affairs at the University of Notre Dame as well as Director of the Kellog Institute for International Studies.

    He holds a doctoral degree in political science, with a specialization in Latin American Political and legal institutions.

    He has authored two books related to Latin American political systems peer-reviewed publications in the American, Journal of Political Science, Comparative Politics, and others, and served in editorial leadership on major academic journals. Additionally, his research includes Paraguay’s compliance with the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, and he has served as a consultant for the Paraguayan Supreme Court to prepare a report on Paraguay’s compliance with human rights laws, which includes domestic violence.

    Want to know more about the challenges Aníbal Pérez-Liñán has faced? Get the full details with our Challenge Study report.

    Discussion by the Court

    Whether the Specialized Knowledge of Aníbal Pérez-Liñán Will Assist the Trier of Fact

    Petitioner argued that Aníbal Pérez-Liñán’s experience is insufficient to support his opinions regarding the ability of Paraguay’s legal system to address cases of domestic violence. The Court disagreed.

    In other words, Aníbal Pérez-Liñán’s experience and knowledge are sufficient to qualify him as an expert on Paraguay’s legal system, including its institutional capacity to protect victims of domestic violence, enforce protective orders, and maintain an effective system of criminal accountability.

    While Aníbal Pérez-Liñán has conceded he would not consider himself an “expert on domestic violence in the Paraguay legal system” he would consider himself “an expert of the Paraguayan legal system more broadly.”

    The lack of specialized knowledge of domestic violence in the Paraguay legal system would go to the weight of the testimony, to be judged by the trier of fact, and not serve to disqualify Aníbal Pérez-Liñán as an expert. Therefore, Aníbal Pérez-Liñán possesses sufficient knowledge and experience such that his opinion would help the trier of fact evaluate the extent to which the minor children would be sufficiently protected by the Paraguayan legal system, which clearly informs the “grave risk” analysis under the Hague Convention.

    Whether Aníbal Pérez-Liñán’s Testimony is the Product of Reliable Principles and Methods

    Petitioner argued that Aníbal Pérez-Liñán’s opinion is not the product of reliable principles or methods.

    In support of this assertion, Petitioner claimed that Dr. Aníbal Pérez-Liñán “relies on a single, moldy study that analyzed a small handful of cases, along with two newspaper articles.”

    However, Aníbal Pérez-Liñán testified that he reviewed Paraguayan statutes and regulations governing domestic violence, analyzed institutional reforms dating back over two decades, examined NGO, government, and international data repositories, and consulted institutional actors to confirm real-world practices.

    As an experiential expert witness, Aníbal Pérez-Liñán’s methodology need not necessarily be supported with peer-reviewed journals and testable methodologies. These are all standard methodological tools of a type that would be reasonably relied upon by experts in Aníbal Pérez-Liñán’s field.

    Thus, on the record here, the Court is satisfied that methodologies employed by Dr. Aníbal Pérez-Liñán are the product of reliable principles and methods under the requirements of Daubert.

    Whether Aníbal Pérez-Liñán Has Reliably Applied the Principles and Methods to the Facts of this Case

    Petitioner raised no objection to whether Aníbal Pérez-Liñán has reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts of this case. However, this Court is satisfied that such generally accepted methodologies have been soundly applied to the facts here. In any event, the proper way to test the correctness and thoroughness of an expert’s opinions is through cross-examination and rebuttal evidence. If Aníbal Pérez-Liñán’s views are shown to be arbitrary or groundless, then the Court can give the testimony no weight.

    Held

    The Court denied the Petitioner’s motion to exclude the testimony of Respondent’s expert Aníbal Pérez-Liñán.

    Key Takeaway

    For testimony that is primarily experiential in nature as opposed to scientific, there are meaningful differences in how reliability must be examined. Inquiries into testability, peer review, and error rates may not necessarily apply. Instead, a Court may focus on whether the experiential expert “employs in the courtroom the same level of intellectual rigor that characterizes the practice of an expert in the relevant field” and whether the expert’s reasoning or methodology has general acceptance in the relevant professional community.

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Ens Loblein V. Alcaraz De Ens
    Docket Number: 3:25cv737
    Court Name: United States District Court, Virginia Eastern
    Order Date: December 03, 2025
  • Preventive Medicine Expert Was Allowed to Opine on the Clinical and Operational Duties

    Preventive Medicine Expert Was Allowed to Opine on the Clinical and Operational Duties

    On January 28, 2021, Demetrius Nichols died while incarcerated at Menard Correctional Center. Plaintiff Diane Jones, Administrator of the Estate of Demetrius Nichols, filed this action against Wexford Health Sources, Inc., Dr. Mohammed Siddique, Ali Dearmond, NP, and Dr. Stephen Ritz, asserting wrongful death.

    Plaintiff retained Ryan D. Herrington, M.D., MPH to support her claims. Defendants filed a motion to exclude the testimony of Herrington.

    Preventive Medicine Expert Witness

    Ryan Douglass Herrington, M.D., MPH received his medical degree from the University of Virginia and a master’s degree in public health from the Ohio State University. He is licensed to practice medicine and is dual board certified by the American Board of Preventive Medicine in both public health/preventive medicine and addiction medicine.

    Get the full story on challenges to Ryan Herrington’s expert opinions and testimony with an in-depth Challenge Study.

    Discussion by the Court

    Herrington opined to a reasonable degree of medical certainty that: (1) from an asthma perspective, Nichols would have benefitted from earlier referral to otolaryngology; (2) Wexford practitioners’ repeated use of steroids for Nichols amounted to customary maintenance treatment for his nasal polyps; (3) Wexford’s custom of using steroids for nasal polyps was harmful for Nichols; (4) Wexford’s custom of using steroids for Nichols made it increasingly likely that he would suffer an asthma exacerbation; and (5) Wexford’s failure to provide Nichols a higher level of care on January 25, 2021 and on January 26, 2021 was a breach of the standard of care.

    Qualification

    Defendants argued that Herrington’s opinions should be excluded because he sought to opine on matters outside of his area of expertise and failed to review sufficient facts and data to form reliable opinions. Defendants further contended that his opinions are not grounded in reliable methodology. The Court disagreed.

    Herrington had the requisite background and experience to render opinions regarding the medical care Nichols received while incarcerated. He has over a decade of experience in correctional medicine, including as a former medical director of a state prison. Herrington testified that he was either directly or indirectly involved with every patient at those correctional facilities. His experience renders him qualified to opine regarding the clinical and operational duties at issue in this case.

    Reliability

    Defendants also argued that Herrington’s opinions are unreliable. In reaching his opinions, Herrington reviewed relevant case materials, including medical records and deposition testimony. He applied his extensive experience to evaluate the facts of this case and reached his conclusions regarding the medical care provided to Nichols. Herrington’s report includes a detailed methodology section in which he outlines and explains how he grounded his analysis in the medical records and treatment chronology. Herrington referenced numerous sources he relied on in formulating his opinions.

    Defendants’ disagreements with Herrington’s ultimate conclusions are not a justifiable basis to exclude his opinions. Defendants may certainly attempt to discredit Herrington on cross-examination or in their own presentation of the evidence. But their arguments go to the weight to be given Herrington’s testimony, not to its admissibility.

    The Court held that his opinions are relevant and will assist the jury with its analysis of whether Defendants’ care fell below accepted practice and caused or contributed to Nichols’ death. 

    Held

    The Court denied the Defendants’ motion to exclude the testimony of Ryan Herrington.

    Key Takeaway

    In sum, the reliability of data and assumptions used in applying a methodology is tested by the adversarial process and determined by the jury; the court’s role is generally limited to assessing the reliability of the methodology — the framework — of the expert’s analysis.

    Defendants’ disagreements with Herrington’s ultimate conclusions are not a justifiable basis to exclude his opinions.

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Nichols V. Wexford Health Sources, Inc
    Docket Number: 3:24cv796
    Court Name: United States District Court, Illinois Southern
    Order Date: December 03, 2025
  • Infectious Disease Expert Was Allowed to Opine on the Lack of Severe Lung Damage

    Infectious Disease Expert Was Allowed to Opine on the Lack of Severe Lung Damage

    Roy Edward Ates, Jr., is a federal prisoner. He alleged that prison officials’ negligence caused him to become infected with COVID and that prison personnel were negligent in providing him medical treatment thereafter.

    Defendant retained Dr. Alysse Wurcel as an expert witness. She has assisted Massachusetts sheriffs in their response to COVID beginning in March 2020.

    Wurcel opined that the BOP’s medical treatment of Ates from December 2020 forward was “evidence-based, guideline-concordant medical care”.

    In reaching this conclusion, she further opined that she “would not classify Ates as having ‘severe debilitating lung damage.’” Considering Wurcel’s opinions, no reasonable jury could find an “intentional failure to perform a duty in reckless disregard of the consequences” with respect to the BOP’s treatment of Ates’ medical conditions from December 2020 forward.

    Ates argued that Wurcel’s expert opinion on whether Ates has lung dysfunction is not reliable and should not be considered because Wurcel is not qualified to offer such opinion.

    Infectious Disease Expert Witness

    Dr. Alysse Gail Wurcel is a physician licensed in Massachusetts to practice as an internal medicine and infectious disease specialist. She has worked in Massachusetts jails as an infectious disease specialist since 2013.  She has published over 100 articles in peer-reviewed publications, including articles on COVID.

    Want to know more about the challenges Alysse Wurcel has faced? Get the full details with our Challenge Study report.

    Discussion by the Court

    Through her training and experience, Wurcel is able to recognize symptoms of severe lung damage that would require a referral to a specialist, like a pulmonologist.

    She testified, “I know when someone has severe lung damage. I mean, in terms of their oxygenation saturation, in terms of lots of other things, an internal medicine doctor can know when someone has severe lung damage.”

    Explaining the basis for such knowledge, Wurcel testified:

    I guess, like, this is the existential infectious diseases debate that you get into, in that we are doctors of everything. And if there’s an infection of the lungs, it’s called a pneumonia, and COVID causes, in some people, an infection of the lungs. And so, like, I’m not a lung doctor, but I am a lung doctor when an infection is in it. So any infection hits the lungs, then I’m a lung doctor.

    She further explained that “you don’t send every person that believes they have something to a specialist. The internal medicine doctor has a certain level of understanding to triage.”

    Wurcel observed multiple exams when Ates’ lungs were clear and his pulse oximetry readings were good. Wurcel further opined that from these and other objective symptoms documented in the medical records, “any internal medicine doctor would look at this case and say this man does not have severe lung damage.”

    Analysis

    While Wurcel is not a pulmonologist and did not hold herself out to be a specialist on lung dysfunction, her training and experience provided sufficient foundation for her to opine that, based on her review of Ates’ deposition transcript, discovery responses, and medical records, Ates did not have severe lung damage. This opinion supported her conclusion that the BOP provided Ates “evidence-based, guideline concordant medical care.”

    Ates contended that Wurcel did not know about or did not take into consideration his claim that his medical records often failed to reflect his complaints of breathing problems. Even accepting Ates’ claim at face value, as the Court must on summary judgment, it did not warrant rejection of Wurcel’s opinions.

    Held

    The Court admitted the testimony of Defendant’s expert Dr. Alysse Wurcel because she is an experienced physician licensed to practice internal medicine and treat infectious diseases. 

    Key Takeaway

    As Wurcel aptly explained, internal medicine doctors like her regularly make the initial assessment as to whether a patient has symptom that warrant referral to a specialist, such as a pulmonologist. Wurcel unequivocally opined both in her written report and during her deposition that, based on information in Ates’ medical records, she saw no indication that he did in fact have lung damage, or any basis for referring him to an outside specialist for further evaluation.

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Ates V. United States Of America
    Docket Number: 2:21cv418
    Court Name: United States District Court, Indiana Southern
    Order Date: December 05, 2025
  • Engineering Expert Was Allowed to Opine on the Ruptured Pipe

    Engineering Expert Was Allowed to Opine on the Ruptured Pipe

    Plaintiffs, BME Fire Trucks LLC (“BME”) and 223 Roedel Avenue LLC’s (“Roedel”), brought this action against their insurer, Defendant The Cincinnati Casualty Company (“Cincinnati”), seeking damages caused by a ruptured natural gas pipeline.

    On October 31, 2022, BME submitted a claim to Cincinnati, and Cincinnati retained Brian Hansen of Northwest Investigative Engineering to inspect the property. On November 16, Hansen met with BME’s facility technician, conducted an on-site inspection, and examined the pipeline. The following day, Hansen issued an engineering report, in which he concluded a construction defect caused the pipe to corrode, resulting in the rupture.

    Plaintiffs challenged the admissibility of Hansen’s expert opinions. These challenges include that Hansen is not qualified; he did not base his opinions on sufficient facts; he failed to explain his method; and he opined on a legal conclusion.

    Engineering Expert Witness

    Brian Hansen has a Bachelor of Science degree in mechanical engineering from Brigham Young University and is a registered professional engineer in eight states, including Idaho.

    Want to know more about the challenges Brian Hansen has faced? Get the full details with our Challenge Study report.

    Discussion by the Court

    The Court disagreed that Hansen’s opinions are inadmissible. The record reflected that Hansen is qualified as an expert for purposes of opining on the issues in this case. During his deposition, he testified that he has had an Idaho professional engineering license since 1999; he has been retained thousands of times to investigate insurance claims; and he has practical experience involving utilities from his practice as a mechanical engineer and his prior work experience with Zilog where he was “in charge of chemical delivery [and] specialty gas delivery systems.”

    Further, the Court found that Hansen’s opinions are supported by sufficient facts and data and the product of a reliable method. According to Hansen’s report, he conducted an on-site inspection, interviewed the facilities technician, examined the ruptured pipe and the trench in which it was located, and took photographs.

    Additionally, the Court rejected Plaintiffs’ assertion that Hansen’s reliance on the Uniform Plumbing Code (UPC) and the National Fire Protection Association standards was inadmissible legal analysis.

    Hansen’s opinions did not address substantive legal issues. For example, he is not opining on how to interpret the Policy’s language. Rather, he is opining on the applicable industry standards for burying a gas pipeline, which is not a matter of substance law nor an issue this Court can rule on as a matter of law.

    Held

    The Court declined to rule that Cincinnati’s expert, Brian Hansen’s opinions are inadmissible.

    Key Takeaway

    While instructing the jury as to the applicable law is the distinct and exclusive province of the Court, experts may opine on industry standards.

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: BME Fire Trucks LLC V. The Cincinnati Casualty Company
    Docket Number: 1:23cv321
    Court Name: United States District Court, Idaho
    Order Date: December 01, 2025
  • Economics Expert Was Allowed to Opine on Assisted Living Facility Administration Issues

    Economics Expert Was Allowed to Opine on Assisted Living Facility Administration Issues

    Plaintiffs are the estates of three decedents, Robert W. Petersen (“Mr. Petersen”), Mary Ann Simons, (“Ms. Simons”) and Charlotte Elaine Guilford (“Ms. Guilford”) (collectively, “Plaintiffs”). Plaintiffs were residents of Canyon Creek, an assisted living facility in Billings, Montana specializing in memory care, during the height of the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020. Plaintiffs alleged that Canyon Creek was negligent in the care of Mr. Petersen, Ms. Simons, and Ms. Guilford and that its negligent care caused their deaths.

    Defendants retained Dr. John Bowblis, Ph.D “to provide an economic and regulatory analysis of the Plaintiffs’ allegations as they pertain to the staffing levels at Canyon Creek.”

    Plaintiffs sought to exclude the testimony of Bowblis, arguing that he is not qualified to opine on assisted living facility administration issues or nursing care and that his opinions are not relevant.

    Economics Expert Witness

    John R. Bowblis is an economics professor at Miami University in Ohio, where he serves as a research fellow at the Scripps Gerontology Center—a leading academic center on aging and aging policy. He is recognized as an expert on staffing levels in long-term care, with papers cited by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services. In 2022, the Department of Health and Human Services sought his consultation regarding nursing home staff and expenditures.

    Bowblis has also contributed to COVID-19 research and policy. During the pandemic, he served on a special task force in Ohio that assisted with deploying the National Guard to long-term care providers. This work eventually expanded into a federally funded grant studying the effectiveness of visitation bans in nursing homes. His expertise is further evidenced by his roles in research teams funded by Ohio’s state government, his publication and presentation record, and the citations to his work by both state and federal policymakers.

    Discover more cases with John Bowblis as an expert witness by ordering his comprehensive Expert Witness Profile report.

    Discussion by the Court

    Plaintiffs challenged Bowblis’ qualifications and the relevance of his proposed testimony. As to his qualifications, Plaintiffs argued that Bowblis has never worked in an assisted living facility, is not licensed as an assisted living administrator or nurse, and does not hold a healthcare management degree.

    They also objected to several of his rebuttal opinions, claiming those opinions exceeded the scope of his expertise. Those challenged opinions included: (1) appropriate use and availability of personal protective equipment (“PPE”), (2) whether Plaintiffs’ acuity mandated a higher level of care, and (3) the management relationship between Koelsch and Canyon Creek. As to relevance, Plaintiffs argued that Bowblis’ opinions will not assist the jury because they rely on quantitative and statistical comparisons instead of Montana’s standard of care or whether Defendants’ staffing levels met that standard in light of the residents’ acuity and specific needs.

    Analysis

    Defendants countered that Bowblis is qualified because he has significant experience analyzing staffing and regulatory issues in assisted living facilities. Defendants pointed to his Ph.D. in economics, his extensive authorship and research in the field, and his practical experience.

    The Court agreed with Defendants that Bowblis is qualified to testify as an expert and that his testimony is relevant to the disputed issues in this case.

    The Court found that his knowledge, education, and experience directly relate to the staffing analysis he offers, rendering his opinions reliable and relevant. Whether Defendants breached the standard of care and caused harm to Petersen, Simons, or Guilford is a factual issue for the jury. A central component of that inquiry is whether Defendants provided adequate staffing levels. Bowblis’ testimony will assist the jury by explaining and contextualizing Canyon Creek’s labor reports, financial and monthly operation reports, staffing level data of other assisted living facilities, and COVID-19 data.

    His testimony will also aid the jury through his rebuttal opinions. Bowblis may address PPE shortages because he worked with assisted living facilities facing such shortages in 2020 and later published research on the issue. 

    Additionally, Bowblis may testify about assisted living facilities caring for residents who require higher levels of care because of his extensive knowledge of Medicaid’s Home and Community-Based Services (“HCBS”) waiver, which allows individuals to receive long-term care outside of nursing homes.

    Finally, Bowblis may testify about the relationship between Canyon Creek and Koelsch. As noted, much of his research focuses on how health care and long- term care providers make operational decisions, and how those decisions impact staffing, quality, finance, as well as the relationship between operators and other parties.

    Held

    The Court denied the Plaintiffs’ motion to exclude the testimony of John Bowblis, Ph.D.

    Key Takeaway

    Bowblis has significant experience analyzing staffing and regulatory issues in assisted living facilities. His background, combined with his review of the facts in this case, provides a reliable and relevant foundation for his opinions.

    Please refer to the blog previously published about this case:

    Palliative Care Expert’s New and Expanded Opinions on Facility Neglect Admitted

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Estate Of Robert W. Petersen Et Al V. Koelsch Senior Communities LLC
    Docket Number: 1:22cv11
    Court Name: United States District Court, Montana
    Order Date: December 02, 2025
  • Police Practices Expert’s Testimony on Eyewitness Identifications Admitted

    Police Practices Expert’s Testimony on Eyewitness Identifications Admitted

    This litigation arises from Plaintiff Raymond Flanks’ (“Plaintiff”) wrongful conviction for first-degree murder in 1985. Plaintiff alleged that the Orleans Parish District Attorney’s Office (“OPDA”) secured his wrongful conviction in violation of his constitutional rights by withholding material exculpatory evidence.

    Plaintiff retained William Brooks as an expert in police policy and practices. Brooks makes three primary conclusions in his expert report:

    (1) In 1983, New Orleans Police Department (“NOPD”) did not have adequate written policies regarding photo arrays;

    (2) In 1983, NOPD had inadequate training and supervision, which created a risk of suggestive identification procedures that could lead to a mistaken identification and possibly a wrongful conviction; and

    (3) The identification procedure that Dillmann used in this case had two significant problems: Dillmann steered Mrs. Carnesi to identify Plaintiff and Dillmann used inappropriate “fillers” in the photo array he showed Mrs. Carnesi.

    The City Defendants contended that Brooks’ testimony should be excluded for four reasons: (1) Brooks’ opinions are outside the area of his expertise; (2) Brooks’ testimony will mislead the jury and confuse the issues; (3) Brooks’ opinions on NOPD’s policy on identification procedures are not based on any reliable methodology; and (4) expert testimony is not needed to establish that police should not tell witness who to pick in a lineup.

    Police Practices Expert Witness

    William G. Brooks III is a former Chief of Police of the Norwood Police Department in Norwood, Massachusetts. He began his career as a Patrolman from 1977 to 1985; served as a Detective Sergeant from 1985 to 2000; served as Deputy Chief of Police from 2000 to 2012; and served as Chief of Police from 2012 until he retired in 2024. He has a bachelor’s degree in criminal justice from Stonehill College and a master’s degree in criminal justice from Western New England College.

    Brooks is a state-certified instructor on eyewitness identification; he authored a model policy on eyewitness identification for the Massachusetts Chiefs of Police Association; he has been appointed to study and develop best practices for eyewitness identifications by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts and by the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit; and he has lectured about eyewitness identification procedures to numerous law enforcement agencies, law schools, bar associations, and other professional groups.

    Get the full story on challenges to William Brooks’ expert opinions and testimony with an in-depth Challenge Study.

    Discussion by the Court

    A. Whether Brooks’ Opinions are Within the Area of His Expertise

    The Court found that Brooks is qualified to testify as an expert on eyewitness identifications.

    The City Defendants asserted that Brooks’ opinions were outside the area of his expertise because during the relevant time period, 1983, he was a patrolman with no training or experience in identification procedures, policy development, or running a police department. Brooks became a Detective Sergeant in 1985, where he “supervised a team of Detectives.” Therefore, he had some supervisory experience in the 1980s.

    Moreover, the fact that he was not overseeing a police department until the 2000s did not render him unqualified. The expert report cited two widely used reference books from 1956 and 1965 to support the assertion that “eyewitness identification issues became a prominent topic in the law enforcement community” by “the mid-twentieth century.” He also discussed two U.S. Supreme Court decisions from 1968 and 1977, which discussed the risks related to misidentifications. Brooks stated that certain witness identification “principles would have been known to police departments in the 1980s,” but he also acknowledges that some of the present-day best practices he cites were not all “widely used by police departments in 1983.” Therefore, Brooks opinions appear to be based both on his experience and his review of reference materials from the relevant time period.

    Additionally, the City Defendants suggested that Brooks’ expertise did not extend to the impact of suggestive identification procedures on a witness, as Brooks did not have a background in psychology or any other scientific discipline. However, he did not opine about specific psychological impacts for which scientific qualifications would be necessary. Therefore, the proposed testimony is within the area of Brooks’ expertise.

    B. Whether Brooks’ Testimony Will Mislead the Jury or Confuse the Issues

    The City Defendants argued that Brooks’ testimony will mislead the jury and confuse the issues because it references best-practices that were not all widely used by police departments in 1983.

    To the extent Brooks cited some best-practices that were not widely used in 1983, the City Defendants was free to cross-examine Brooks on this issue. It is not a basis for outright exclusion of his testimony.

    The City Defendants also contended that Brooks’ discussion regarding use of inappropriate “fillers” in photo arrays will not assist the jury in determining whether Dillmann told Mrs. Carnesi which photograph to pick and whether that statement caused her to falsely identify Plaintiff as the murderer. If the jury concluded that Dillmann did not explicitly tell Mrs. Carnesi whom to pick from the photo array, Brooks’ opinion that Dillmann used at least two inappropriate “fillers” in the photo array remains relevant to Plaintiff’s argument that the photo array was suggestive.

    C. Whether Brooks’ Opinions are Based on a Reliable Methodology

    Next, the City Defendants asserted that Brooks’ opinions on NOPD’s policy on identification procedures are not based on any reliable methodology.

    Brooks’ report cited an Eyewitness Identification Model Policy. Additionally, Brooks relied on his own experience running a police department and designing training curriculum. According to the City Defendants, Brooks’ opinion that formal training on identification procedures was needed was contradicted by Brooks’ own experience. The fact that Brooks did not receive formal training on identification procedures when he began his career can be raised on cross-examination, but it does not provide a basis for exclusion of the proposed testimony.

    The City Defendants also contended that Brooks’ analysis on NOPD’s policy is equally unreliable and based entirely on his own opinion about how officers might read into the absence of an express prohibition on suggestive techniques in photographic identification procedures.

    Brooks reviewed NOPD policy, which included a specific rule against suggestive behavior for lineups but did not include a specific rule for photo arrays. Brooks opined that “by including a specific rule against suggestive behavior for one type of identification procedure and omitting that rule for the other, an officer could easily infer that making the rule apply only to lineups was intentional.”

    He appeared to base this opinion both on his experience and on the Eyewitness Identification Model Policy. To the extent the City Defendants believe this opinion is unsubstantiated, that issue is better left to cross-examination.

    D. Whether Expert Testimony is Needed

    Fourth, the City Defendants contended that the jury does not need an expert to say that police should not tell witness who to pick in a lineup. The City Defendants pointed out that Dillmann readily acknowledged such action was improper. The City Defendants contended that a jury instruction on this topic is sufficient. This argument oversimplified the issues identified in Brooks’ expert report. Brooks explained why he believed the procedure used in this case was suggestive. These issues are not common knowledge, and Brooks’ testimony will assist the jury in this case.

    Held

    The Court denied City Defendants’ motion to exclude the testimony of William Brooks.

    Key Takeaway

    Brooks is qualified to discuss the effect of suggestive identification procedures on a witness because that effect is inherently a part of studying, lecturing about, and developing model practices for, eyewitness identifications. Brooks also discussed ways that officers can ensure identification procedures are not suggestive.

    Please refer to the blog previously published about this case:

    Vocational Evaluation Expert Allowed to Opine on Lost Earning Capacity

    Legal Expert Was Barred From Opining on Good Time Credits

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Flanks V. City Of New Orleans
    Docket Number: 2:23cv6897
    Court Name: United States District Court, Louisiana Eastern
    Order Date: December 01, 2025

  • Legal Expert Was Barred From Opining on Good Time Credits

    Legal Expert Was Barred From Opining on Good Time Credits

    This litigation arises from Plaintiff Raymond Flanks’ (“Plaintiff”) wrongful conviction for first-degree murder in 1985. Plaintiff alleged that the Orleans Parish District Attorney’s Office (“OPDA”) secured his wrongful conviction in violation of his constitutional rights by withholding material exculpatory evidence.

    Plaintiff retained Robert Lancaster, a lawyer, as an expert in Louisiana parole and pardon law.

    Lancaster’s opinions concern when Plaintiff would have been released from prison on his sentence for armed robbery if he had not also been convicted of first-degree murder. Defendants contended that Lancaster’s testimony should be excluded because his expert report does not show that his opinions are reliably based on his experience or on the evidence in this case.

    Law And Legal Expert Witness

    Robert Edward Lancaster spent eleven years teaching the Parole and Reentry Clinic at the Louisiana State University Law Center and representing over 100 individuals seeking early release on parole or a reduction of sentence through clemency before the Louisiana Board of Pardons and the Committee on Parole.

    Lancaster has been a professor at LSU Law since 2009, and prior to that he taught at Yale Law School, American University School of Law, and Indiana University School of Law. Before going into academia, Lancaster worked as a public defender for seven years.

    Want to know more about the challenges Robert Lancaster has faced? Get the full details with our Challenge Study report.

    Discussion by the Court

    Defendants argued that the proposed testimony of Lancaster was unreliable because he provided no explanation for his conclusion that the Department of Corrections would have applied a 50% diminution rate to Plaintiff’s sentence for armed robbery. Defendants pointed out that Lancaster cited no laws, regulations, or authoritative sources regarding parole and calculation of good time credits.

    The Court found Lancaster’s proposed testimony to be unhelpful, as the substance of his opinion can easily be addressed by a jury instruction. This Court reviewed Lancaster’s expert report and found that it clearly invades the province of the Court to instruct the jury on any applicable law. 

    The report did not provide any explanation on how Lancaster reached this conclusion. It appeared that Lancaster may have reached this conclusion based on his experience teaching the Parole and Reentry Clinic at LSU Law for the past 11 years. The report did not cite any laws or regulations upon which Lancaster relied. 

    The Court will provide the jury with a jury instruction on the law regarding good time credits. Lancaster did not provide any additional opinions beyond that law. He stated only that Plaintiff “could have been eligible for ‘good time’ release after serving seven years and six months.” He did not opine as to any factors that the Department of Corrections may have considered in determining Plaintiff’s eligibility for release. Therefore, his opinion provided only a legal conclusion that Plaintiff could have been eligible for good time release after serving half of his sentence for armed robbery.

    Held

    The Court granted the Defendants’ motion to exclude the testimony of Robert Lancaster.

    Key Takeaway:

    Lancaster’s expert report clearly invaded the province of the Court to instruct the jury on any applicable law. An expert may never render conclusions of law that would constitute an invasion of the province of the Court to determine the applicable law and to instruct the jury as to that law.

    Please refer to the blog previously published about this case:

    Vocational Evaluation Expert Allowed to Opine on Lost Earning Capacity

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Flanks V. City Of New Orleans
    Docket Number: 2:23cv6897
    Court Name: United States District Court, Louisiana Eastern
    Order Date: December 01, 2025
  • Anesthesiology Expert’s Opinions on Life Expectancy Admitted

    Anesthesiology Expert’s Opinions on Life Expectancy Admitted

    This case arises from a motor vehicle collision between Plaintiff Marie Shante Box and Defendant William Causey in May 2023. Following the collision, Box filed suit against Causey, CTS National Corporation (Causey’s employer), and Old Republic Insurance Company (CTS’s insurer). She sought compensatory damages for her injuries, punitive damages, and attorney’s fees. To support her compensatory damages claims, Box retained Dr. Thomas Pontinen as an expert witness. Pontinen’s expert report opined that Box’s future medical and life care will cost $822,2218.55.

    The Defendants sought to exclude Pontinen’s opinions on the grounds that he is not qualified and that his methodology is not reliable.

    Anesthesiology Expert Witness

    Dr. Thomas Pontinen is a double-board certified anesthesiologist and interventional pain medicine specialist and is certified as a Life Care Planner.

    He regularly provides life care planning services through a company called LCP Pro, LLC. Pontinen has published multiple journal articles, written textbook chapters, and has presented at international conferences in the fields of surgery, anesthesiology, and pain medicine.

    Get the full story on challenges to Thomas Pontinen’s expert opinions and testimony with an in-depth Challenge Study.

    Discussion by the Court

    1. Qualifications

    The Defendants sought to exclude Pontinen’s opinions because his life care plan included an estimate of Box’s life expectancy, which they argued Pontinen was not qualified to calculate.

    The Court held that Pontinen is qualified to opine on Box’s life expectancy, as one component of Box’s life care plan. As part of the life care planning calculations, Pontinen estimated that Box would live an additional forty years.

    His life expectancy estimate was based on the Center for Disease Control’s (“CDC”) 2023 National Vital Statistics Report on life expectancy for the U.S. population.

    Pontinen is a certified life care planner who provides services through a life care planning company, which regularly provides life expectancy estimates as part of its process. Other courts have found certified life care planners qualified to rely on their life expectancy calculations as part of creating a life care plan.

    And the Defendants did not point to—and the Court is not aware of—case law that requires an expert witness to be a life expectancy expert or economist in order to rely on a life expectancy estimate.

    2. Reliability

    The Defendants argued that Pontinen (1) did not collaborate with Box’s primary treating physician and (2) his pricing model relied on proprietary data.

    The Court held that Pontinen’s methodology is reliable for Daubert purposes. There is no one required methodology in the life care planning industry. Pontinen explains that his methodology (and LCP Pro’s) is based on “peer-reviewed, published methodologies and Standards of Practice within the life care planning associations,” including the American Academy of Physician Life Care Planners, International Academy of Life Care Planners, and American Association of Nurse Life Care Planners.

    Regarding the relationship between Pontinen and Box’s primary treating physician, the Court found that the lack of formal collaboration between the two is not sufficient to render Pontinen’s methodology unreliable.

    While the record in this case indicated that collaboration with physicians is recommended within the life care planning industry, the record did not support the notion that a life care planner’s failure to collaborate renders his or her methodology unreliable

    Even if the Defendants could identify some document that expressly requires collaboration with every treating physician, that would still be insufficient.

    The Court is not persuaded that LCP Pro’s database is unreliable or unverifiable within the industry nor that Pontinen’s use of a proprietary database renders his methodology unreliable for Daubert purposes. Pontinen relied on Box’s actual bills or provider estimates where possible and costing databases, such as those by the Practice Management Information Corporation and LCP Pro, where not. He provided nineteen cost estimates based on individual future needs. Three of those estimates were derived from LCP Pro’s database. LCP Pro’s database contains data from “more than 2,000 cases” and is “based on actual provider charges and actual provider estimates for injections and surgeries.”

    Held

    The Court denied the Defendants’ motion to exclude the testimony of Thomas Pontinen.

    Key Takeaway:

    Pontinen’s methodology for employing pricing databases, including LCP Pro’s proprietary database, is consistent with standards in the life care planning industry and Daubert.

    Any further disagreement regarding the accuracy of Pontinen’s individual cost estimates speaks to the weight of the testimony rather than its admissibility, as competing expert witnesses often supply different cost estimates from one another.

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Box V. Causey
    Docket Number: 1:24cv3766
    Court Name: United States District Court, Georgia Northern
    Order Date: December 02, 2025