Insurance Expert Witness' Testimony Limited Because it is Needlessly Cumulative

Insurance Expert Witness’ Testimony Limited Because it is Needlessly Cumulative

This lawsuit stems from claims of breach of contract and statutory and common-law bad faith.

It all started when Plaintiff, Paul Schulz, was injured when his motorcycle struck an oil spill in the roadway, causing the front tire to slide out and the motorcycle to overturn. Shortly thereafter, Schulz filed a claim with his insurer, Shelter Mutual Insurance Company (“Shelter”), for uninsured/underinsured motorist (“UIM”) coverage. After speaking with Schulz about the accident and the injuries he sustained, the claims adjuster determined Schulz was 100% at fault for the accident and denied coverage. When Schulz hired an attorney, Shelter agreed to consider any other information that might bear on the claim and ordered the police report. Nine days later, Shelter again denied the claim on the basis that Schulz was more than 50% at fault.

Defendant filed a motion to strike certain opinions of Plaintiff’s industry standard expert Brian Seigal.

Insurance Expert Witness

Brian Seigal has been involved in the insurance industry throughout his career since 1995, working in and being responsible for claims departments. He has a multi-line background in P & C and Health Insurance. He has managed claims departments for carriers and TPAs, with experience spanning primary, excess, and reinsurance levels. Over the years, he has managed and trained hundreds of adjusters and has been involved with thousands of claims. He has also held department reserve and settlement authority.

Get the full story on challenges to Brian Seigal’s expert opinions and testimony with an in-depth Challenge Study. 

Discussion by the Court

Seigal should be precluded from relying on averments in Shelter’s amended answer to the complaint

Shelter first argued Seigal should be precluded from relying on averments in Shelter’s amended answer to the complaint to draw conclusions about the adequacy vel non of Shelter’s investigation. Essentially, in response to a series of allegations regarding the cause of the crash, the nature of Schulz’s injuries, and Shelter’s initial investigation, Shelter responded that it was without sufficient information to admit or deny those allegations. Seigal opined these answers demonstrate Shelter’s investigation was inadequate because they suggest Shelter was unclear as to the basic facts of the accident, the nature and extent of Schulz’s damages, and the results of its own investigation.

The Court held that the relevant facts regarding Shelter’s initial investigation are recited in Shelter’s claim file notes and were the subject of inquiry at the 30(b)(6) depositions of the corporate representatives. Expert testimony regarding Shelter’s pleadings about these same matters therefore also would be needlessly cumulative and wasteful of limited trial time.

Seigal’s opinion suggests Shelter’s investigation was unreasonable for failing to engage experts to vet Schulz’s claim prior to the initiation of litigation

Seigal stated there exist a variety of tools of which a carrier may take advantage to fulfill its duty of reasonable investigation, and while there is no formulaic approach, not pursuing a particular investigative avenue may indicate a lack of good faith in particular circumstances. Seigal suggests this case presented a circumstance in which the adjuster should have engaged one or more experts as part of the investigation of the claim.

Shelter points out that the insured bears the initial burden of producing sufficient evidence to suggest his damages were caused by an event that comes within the coverage of the policy.

The Court held that it is not objectionable for Seigal to opine that Schulz’s case was one which warranted the retention of one or more experts as part of Shelter’s investigation.

Seigal testified that Shelter’s attempt to condition payment of Schulz’s policy limits on his execution of a release was impermissible and unreasonable

Shelter sought to preclude Seigal from testifying that Shelter’s attempt to condition payment of Schulz’s policy limits on his execution of a release was impermissible and unreasonable.

Shelter attached a Release and Trust Agreement to his settlement letter which, inter alia, would have required Schulz to release Shelter from “all liability under any Uninsured Motorist/Underinsured Motorist/Uninsured Motorist Property Damage policy provisions for bodily injury, sickness, disease, or property damage (collectively “damages”) arising from the accident.”

The Court denied the motion to exclude this portion of Seigal’s testimony because the insurer breaches its duty not to unreasonably delay or deny payment of undisputed benefits, even if additional benefits remain in dispute. Shelter’s recommendations with regard to the payment of benefits suggested that Shelter acknowledged Schulz was entitled to a payment of more than $138,000, but suggested withholding the remainder of the policy limits until he signed a release.

Seigal opined, in regard to the withholding of the Fisher payment, that “other courts in Colorado have dealt with similar issues and provided orders against carriers who utilized these practices”

Lastly, and relatedly, Shelter objected to Seigal testifying, in regard to the withholding of the Fisher payment, that “other courts in Colorado have dealt with similar issues and provided orders against carriers who utilized these practices.” Seigal’s supplemental report suggested that he will provide these cases in a further supplemental appendix, and Schulz claims by his response that they have been provided to Shelter in discovery (although Shelter disputes that suggestion).

Critically, however, these cases are nowhere to be found in the record before the court. It therefore is impossible for the court to determine whether these cases are indeed analogous, as Seigal suggests. Even if they were, the Court held that allowing Seigal to discuss these other cases at trial runs too great a risk of confusing and misleading the jury, as well as wasting time on matters that can be, at best, merely tangential to the issues this jury will be asked to decide.

Held

The Court granted in part and denied in part Defendant’s motion to strike certain opinions of Plaintiff’s industry standard expert Brian Seigal.

Key Takeaway:

  • The insured bears the initial burden of producing sufficient evidence to suggest his damages were caused by an event that comes within the coverage of the policy. As a result, Shelter’s investigation was unreasonable for failing to engage experts to vet Schulz’s claim prior to the initiation of litigation.
  • According to Shelter’s recommendations with regard to the payment of benefits, Shelter was aware that Schulz was entitled to a payment of more than $138,000, but suggested withholding the remainder of the policy limits until he signed a release. However, the insurer breaches its duty not to unreasonably delay or deny payment of undisputed benefits, even if additional benefits remain in dispute.

Case Details:

Case Caption:Schulz V. Shelter General Insurance Company
Docket Number:1:23cv1657
Court:United States District Court, Colorado
Order Date:September 12, 2024

Comments

Leave a Reply

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *