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  • Mechanical Engineering Expert’s Testimony on Patents Admitted

    Mechanical Engineering Expert’s Testimony on Patents Admitted

    Plaintiffs Spartan Composites, LLC d/b/a FODS and Spartan Mat, LLC accused Defendant Signature Systems Group, LLC of misappropriating trade secrets after Signature allegedly obtained FODS’ trade secret on how to design, manufacture, market and distribute the FODS trackout mat.

    Plaintiffs retained Dr. William S. Howard (“Dr. Howard”), a mechanical and electrical engineer and the owner and president of Stability Technology, Inc., to opine on the existence of two trade secrets: (a) the manner in which Plaintiffs’ FODS Trackout mat is constructed; and (b) the combination of the shape, size, structure, composition, and placement of certain mechanisms in Plaintiffs’ FODS Trackout mat.

    Plaintiffs responded that Howard presented a sufficient analysis of available patents and of the potential public exposure of Plaintiffs’ alleged trade secrets.

    Defendant filed a motion to strike and exclude Howard’s statements contained in his expert report under Federal Rule of Evidence 702.

    Mechanical Engineering Expert Witness

    Dr. William Stamps Howard holds multiple reputable degrees in and related to the subject of mechanical engineering, is a practicing design engineer specializing in industrial machinery, and is a seasoned mechanical and electrical engineer with decades of experience.

    Get the full story on challenges to William Howard’s expert opinions and testimony with an in-depth Challenge Study.

    Discussion by the Court

    I. Admissibility under Rule 702

    A. Howard is qualified.

    Defendant did not challenge Howard’s credentials directly but argued that the expert incorrectly applied his experience by ignoring and selectively utilizing pieces of evidence to arrive at his conclusions. The Court concluded that Howard’s background, certifications, and current practices establish that he is qualified under Rule 702 to provide opinions on trade secrets relating to mechanical engineering.

    B. Howard’s specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact.

    The Court found that Howard’s testimony may assist the jury by explaining why he believes Plaintiffs are in possession of multiple “trade secrets.”

    This issue involves consideration of a variety of technical and legal factors extending far beyond one’s innate “common sense and knowledge,” and Howard’s opinion is admissible under Rule 702 because it attempted to bridge that gap with his unique specialization.

    C. Howard’s testimony is based on sufficient facts or data.

    Howard relied upon in-person analysis, interviews with designers, consideration of the mechanical engineering design of the relevant equipment, and review of patents and legal literature on trade secrets to arrive at his conclusions.

    Defendant argued that Howard’s testimony is critically flawed because it failed to analyze the effect that certain patents have on the existence of Plaintiffs’ alleged trade secrets.

    Plaintiffs responded that Howard reviewed a sufficient number of patents and addressed the issue of public exposure at various points in his report.

    The Court found that Defendant’s challenge to the depth or scope of Howard’s consideration spoke to the weight of the testimony, not its admissibility. In this context, the Court was convinced that Howard’s testimony was admissible at trial, as it is sufficiently grounded in: (a) his consideration of the problem of public disclosure; (b) his specialized experience; and (c) his varied interactions with the “trade secrets” and their related legal documentation.

    D. Howard’s testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods reliably applied to the facts of the case.

    Defendant believed that Howard inadequately explained how certain patents or products have not critically jeopardized the potential “secret” status of Plaintiffs’ alleged trade secrets. Plaintiffs, on the other hand, highlighted Howard’s comprehensive analysis of a relevant patent and his repeated consideration of the issue of public disclosure.

    The Court found that the existence of certain patents and alternative products have not precluded Howard’s expert opinion. Nor has the personal interpretation of a patent by Plaintiffs’ corporate representative rendered Howard’s conclusions inadmissible at trial. Rather, Howard’s methodology is reliable and suitable for the purpose it serves. Moreover, the Court found that Howard applied his methodology consistently and transparently to all the facts he examined.

    II. Admissibility under Rule 403

    Defendant argued that Howard’s “counterfactual opinion” should not be permitted to reach the ears of the jury.

    The Court found that Howard’s testimony is the result of purposeful and
    diligent action, imbuing it with probative value wherever Plaintiffs’ alleged “trade secrets” are concerned. As noted above, concerns about Howard’s due diligence or the extent of his analysis should be addressed at trial, not exclusion under Rule 403.

    Held

    The Court denied Defendant Signature Systems Group, LLC’s Daubert motion to exclude the expert opinions of Dr. William Howard.

    Key Takeaway:

    While Howard did not specifically address a wide array of patents or products that might have undermined his analysis, the Court is confident that counsel will, by skillful cross-examination, illuminate for the jury each error and omission in his analysis.

    The factual bases and considerations of Howard’s opinions are issues of credibility, not admissibility, and to the extent Defendant believes Howard should have conducted a more thorough or complete analysis, those criticisms should be raised at trial.

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Spartan Composites LLC, Et Al. V. Signature Systems Group, LLC
    Docket Number: 4:24cv609
    Court Name: United States District Court, Texas Eastern
    Order Date: November 10, 2025
  • Insurance Expert’s Testimony on Overhead and Profit Calculations Admitted

    Insurance Expert’s Testimony on Overhead and Profit Calculations Admitted

    Plaintiff Nirangtar LLC (d/b/a Red Roof Inn Cave City) (“Red Roof”) alleged that a storm caused damage to its property. At the time of the loss, Red Roof had an insurance policy with Defendant Navigators Specialty Insurance Company (“Navigators”). Because Navigators has not paid Red Roof for its claimed losses, Red Roof filed suit in Barren Circuit Court (Kentucky), which Navigators removed to Federal Court.

    Red Roof has recently disclosed expert witnesses, including Deanna Ramsey (“Ramsey”) and Dennis James Kurttila (“Kurttila”). Ramsey, a certified public accountant, was disclosed to express opinions regarding Red Roof’s lost revenue; Navigators contended that Red Roof provided her with the necessary information, then she “simply multiplied (the number of rooms) times (the number of nights they were allegedly unavailable) times (the average rental rate).” Kurttila, a public insurance adjuster, was offered to provide his cost estimate for Red Roof’s repairs and losses resulting from the storm.

    Navigators filed motions to exclude the testimony of these two experts.

    Insurance Expert Witness

    Dennis James Kurttila has been in the construction and general contracting business since 1996. He has gained substantial work experience since 2007 in the claims industry and submitting/ parent damage claims. He is licensed as a Public Insurance Adjuster in the following states: Kentucky, Tennessee, Indiana and Mississippi.

    Get the full story on challenges to Dennis Kurttila’s expert opinions and testimony with an in-depth Challenge Study.

    Accounting Expert Witness

    Deanna Ramsey, CPA, is a certified public accountant. She has a master’s in accounting. She has prepared individual and business tax returns involving several issues related to trusts, estates, adoptions, independent contractors, education trusts, farming (business and sale), and other variations of business issues.

    Want to know more about the challenges Deanna Ramsey has faced? Get the full details with our Challenge Study report.

    Discussion by the Court

    Red Roof did not object to the exclusion of Ramsey’s testimony. Certainly, a jury would be capable of performing simple multiplication without the aid of an expert, so that motion was granted. Red Roof did, however, contest the exclusion of Kurttila’s testimony. Navigators argued that Kurttila’s testimony should be excluded because it is unreliable and unhelpful, but did not question Kurttila’s qualifications.

    A. Reliability

    Navigators argued that Kurttila’s proffered testimony is unreliable. Navigators asserted that Kurttila is biased and contested the reliability of his methods and the factual basis of Kurttila’s report.

    1. Bias

    It is not uncommon for employees of parties—and sometimes the parties themselves—to testify as experts. Thus, though Kurttila may have just “switched hats” from public adjuster to expert witness, that is not sufficient reason to exclude his testimony.

    2. Methods

    a. Overhead and Profit

    Navigators asserted that Kurttila’s testimony relating to his overhead and profit (“O&P”) calculations was unreliable because Kurttila did not know whether Red Roof had retained a contractor nor whether Red Roof could be paid for O&P under Kentucky law. He did testify that, in his opinion, Red Roof should be paid for O&P, that this is standard practice in the insurance business, that this is the case in Tennessee, and two Kentucky hotels damaged in the same storm received settlements that included O&P. Thus, Kurttila had a reasonable basis in his knowledge and experience to include O&P in his estimate.

    b. Professional Standards

    Navigators noted that Kurttila was unable to articulate the professional standards he used in preparing the estimate.

    Red Roof did not contradict this assertion. Though unable to name any specific professional standards, Kurttila testified that he used his “years of contracting and public accounting and working with Xactimate” to come to his conclusions.

    Courts have held that Xactimate, a program used by insurance companies and public adjusters to develop estimates, is a reliable method for creating estimates.

    However, Kurttila’s inability to name any “professional standards” used does not make his estimate unreliable per se—Red Roof has demonstrated that Kurttila’s estimate has a basis in his knowledge of and experience with these sorts of estimates.

    c. Date

    Navigators highlighted the fact that Kurttila did not know why he used the month reflected in the estimate.

    The Court was convinced that Kurttila’s use of November of 2023 in his estimate did not make his testimony so unreliable that it should be excluded.

    November 2023 is after the storm loss occurred, and, on a practical note, the use of November 2023 rather than October 2024 is likely favorable for Navigators, as Kurttila believes prices would have only increased, resulting in a higher estimate.

    3. Factual Basis

    Navigators argued that Kurttila’s testimony should be excluded because he relied on questionable facts and figures provided by Red Roof. In many cases, Kurttila did not know how Red Roof acquired or calculated that underlying data. Additionally, Navigators avers that the claimed damages exceed the scope of Red Roof’s causation expert’s testimony.

    However, Kurttila has remedied some of the inaccuracies. Even where Kurtilla’s estimate may be inaccurate, however, it was based on information supplied to him by Red Roof or from his own observation. Kurttila may rely on Red Roof’s data in his estimate without independently verifying it, under the assumption that it was caused by the storm. Navigators may challenge that data and any assumptions at trial; any weakness in the factual support for Kurttila’s estimate goes to weight, not admissibility.

    B. Helpfulness

    Navigators argued that Kurttila only performed multiplication and addition to construct his estimate. However, Kurtilla did more than just “basic math.” He generated estimates for several line items using Xactimate, relying on his own professional experience and, in one case, own measurements.

    Held

    The Court granted the Navigators’ motion to exclude the testimony of Deanna Ramsey but denied the Navigators’ motion to exclude the testimony of Dennis Kurttila.

    Key Takeaway:

    Some courts have held that, because jurors can perform basic math, expert testimony that can be reduced to a simple calculation violates the principle that an expert’s testimony must involve “specialized knowledge” that “will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue” and is therefore inadmissible. However, courts “have also treated public claims adjusters and their use of Xactimate as within the realm of expert testimony.” Thus, Kurtilla’s preferred testimony will not be excluded on the basis that it is unhelpful.

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Nirangtar LLC V. Navigators Specialty Insurance Company
    Docket Number: 1:23cv184
    Court Name: United States District Court, Kentucky Western
    Order Date: November 10, 2025
  • Structural Engineering Expert’s Testimony on Roof Failure Admitted

    Structural Engineering Expert’s Testimony on Roof Failure Admitted

    Plaintiffs Laura Kotelman and Paul Kotelman (the Kotelmans) filed a Complaint against Defendant Farm Bureau Financial Services (Farm Bureau) following a dispute over insurance coverage for residential property roof damage.

    Farm Bureau moved to exclude the expert testimony of the Kotelmans’ structural engineering expert, Keith Stroh and to strike the rebuttal report of Stroh.

    Structural Engineering Expert Witness

    Keith M. Stroh holds three degrees from South Dakota State University: two bachelor’s degrees in agricultural and civil engineering, and a master’s degree in structural engineering. He has worked as an engineer since 1986, a structural engineer since 1996, and an engineering consultant, including doing forensic engineer work, since 2003. Stroh has completed at least twenty-one forensic engineering analyses to date.

    Get the full story on challenges to Keith Stroh’s expert opinions and testimony with an in-depth Challenge Study.

    Discussion by the Court

    A. Motion to Exclude Expert Testimony

    Farm Bureau argued that the Kotelmans have failed to demonstrate that Stroh has the qualifications to render the proposed testimony or that the proposed testimony of Stroh met the requirements of Rule 702.

    The Kotelmans argued that (1) it is premature for this Court to decide whether to exclude this expert, (2) Stroh has the appropriate qualifications to render his opinion whether the roof met applicable construction standard and what caused damage to the roof, and (3) Stroh’s analysis followed engineering industry standards.

    Discovery, as mentioned earlier, is still ongoing in this case. As of now, it appears “more likely than not” that Stroh’s testimony could aid a fact finder in understanding issues within the expertise of a structural engineer with forensic engineering experience relating to design, construction and causes of the failure of the Kotelmans’ roof. Once discovery is done, this Court anticipates Farm Bureau will renew its motion for summary judgment and perhaps challenge Stroh’s expertise then or later in a motion in limine. At this time, the Court denied Farm Bureau’s motion to exclude the expert testimony of Stroh.

    B. Motion to Strike Rebuttal Report

    Farm Bureau also requested that this Court strike Stroh’s rebuttal report. Stroh’s expert report and opinions were disclosed on March 31, 2025. Farm Bureau’s experts and expert reports were disclosed on June 30. On August 26, Farm Bureau moved for summary judgment. On August 28, the Kotelmans disclosed Stroh’s rebuttal report, which was fifty-nine days after Farm Bureau disclosed its expert reports.

    Farm Bureau argued that the rebuttal report should be struck because (1) the scheduling order does not expressly permit rebuttal reports; (2) Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(2)(D)(ii) requires that rebuttal reports be disclosed thirty days after the opposing parties’ expert reports; and (3) Farm Bureau is prejudiced by the Kotelmans’ ambushing of Farm Bureau “with this untimely disclosure.”

    Considering the particular circumstances of this case, the Court found that this is not one of the rare cases where the “harsh penalty” of excluding the report is appropriate.

    First, Stroh’s rebuttal testimony is important for the Kotelmans to respond to Farm Bureau’s experts. Second, the Kotelmans have explained their reasoning for not disclosing the rebuttal report earlier. In addition, at the time the rebuttal expert report was filed, the most recent scheduling order had extended the discovery deadline, “including expert discovery,” to October 15, 2025, without specifying a rebuttal expert report deadline. Third, allowing the Kotelmans to use Stroh’s rebuttal report would not unfairly prejudice Farm Bureau. Farm Bureau has its own engineering expert who can address and refute Stroh’s rebuttal report. Fourth, the discovery deadline in the case effectively has been extended until at least January 2, 2026.

    Held

    • The Court denied Farm Bureau’s motion to exclude the testimony of Keith Stroh.
    • The Court denied Farm Bureau’s motion to strike the rebuttal report of Keith Stroh.

    Key Takeaway:

    The exclusion of evidence is a harsh penalty and should be used sparingly. When a party does not fully comply with the expert-disclosure rules, the district court has wide discretion to fashion a remedy or sanction as appropriate for the particular circumstances of the case.

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Kotelman V. Farm Bureau Financial Services
    Docket Number: 4:24cv4066
    Court Name: United States District Court, South Dakota
    Order Date: November 05, 2025
  • Police Practices Expert’s Testimony About Baton Technique Admitted

    Police Practices Expert’s Testimony About Baton Technique Admitted

    Plaintiffs Lazendra Collins, Lawrence Teague, and Willie Teague alleged that various officers of the Chicago Police Department (“CPD”) violated the U.S. Constitution and Illinois state law during a confrontation in May 2020.

    The City identified Paul Amelio as a proposed expert witness on police practices. Amelio, an active-duty CPD officer, serves as “Team Leader” and “lead trainer” for the CPD SWAT Team. Plaintiffs filed a motion to exclude Amelio’s testimony. They contended that admitting Amelio’s opinions would improperly intrude on the fact-finding role of the jury.

    Plaintiffs have filed a motion to exclude Amelio’s testimony. They contended that admitting Amelio’s opinions would improperly intrude on the fact-finding role of the jury.

    Police Practices Expert Witness

    Paul Amelio as an active-duty CPD officer, serves as “Team Leader” and “lead trainer” for the CPD SWAT Team.  In this position, Officer Amelio “develops curricula and provides training for SWAT Team members” for multiple law enforcement agencies across several jurisdictions.

    Want to know more about the challenges Paul Amelio has faced? Get the full details with our Challenge Study report.

    Discussion by the Court

    Officer Amelio is an expert on police practices who planned to testify about the proper use of force, particularly the use of a baton, by police officers.

    Plaintiffs argued that Amelio’s testimony is inadmissible because it (1) invades the province of the jury and (2) renders an improper legal conclusion.

    In their words, “Amelio’s testimony is not proffered to aid the jury in determining the facts, but to add the ‘gloss of an expert opinion’ to the Defendants’ disputed version of events.”  The Court largely agreed that Amelio’s testimony is not necessary and will not be of assistance to the jury in determining the reasonableness in general of actions by the CPD officers, relevant legal standards, or CPD policy governing the use of force.

    Analysis

    In this case, the core conclusion that Amelio offered is that the CPD officers’ use of force was “reasonable” and “in line with nationally recognized and generally accepted police practices.” In the Court’s view, this is a case involving straightforward facts: because blunt contact is the “most primitive form of force,” the reasonableness of using the baton, given the context, is likely within the everyday experience and understanding of lay jurors.

    To the extent Amelio proposed to offer an opinion on the policies or training practices of the Chicago Police Department, the Court has a further concern:  As courts in this circuit have repeatedly explained, excessive force is a question of constitutional law, not department policy.

    If the City contends that a police expert is required to explain how a “reasonable officer” would conduct himself, the Court disagrees. Expert testimony on complex police practice or other forms of “specialized knowledge” may be helpful to the jury in some contexts, but the legal standard in this case is governed not by a police officer‘s understanding of what a reasonable police officer would do, but instead by a juror‘s understanding of the actions of a reasonable police officer.

    The Court is thus inclined to grant Plaintiff’s motion to exclude this testimony, with one potential limited exception: Amelio’s testimony about baton technique might be helpful to the jury. In his report, he claimed that the video shows officers waving their batons in an “Xpattern,” noting that “officers are trained that swinging the baton in an ‘X’ motion in circumstances such as these helps them create a ‘zone of safety’ for everyone involved.” To the untrained eye, the officers’ use of the baton might come across as random, disorganized swings designed to strike a suspect.

    Held

    The Court granted in part the motion to exclude Paul Amelio’s testimony and strike his expert report.

    Key Takeaway:

     A lay witness (or, indeed, the officers themselves) would be in a position to competently testify to CPD policy and training practices, and there is no indication that these policies and practices are complex enough to necessitate an explanation or independent application by an expert witness.

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Collins V. City Of Chicago
    Docket Number: 1:21cv2913
    Court Name: United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division
    Order Date: November 07, 2025
  • Legal Expert’s Testimony on Life Insurance Investor Practices Excluded

    Legal Expert’s Testimony on Life Insurance Investor Practices Excluded

    Stranger originated life insurance (“STOLI”) policies, specifically, “involve speculators collaborating with an individual to obtain a life insurance policy in the name of that individual and then selling some or all of the death benefit payable upon the death of the insured to stranger investors.”

    On March 3, 2023, Plaintiff Ameritas Life Insurance Corp. (“Ameritas” or “Plaintiff”) filed its complaint, requesting that the Court declare that the $3 million policy at issue on the life of Marvin Flaks (the “Policy”) constitutes a STOLI policy and, thus, is void for lack of an insurable interest.

    Defendant Wilmington Savings Fund Society, FSB’s (“Wilmington Savings” or “Defendant”) filed a Daubert motion to exclude the testimony of Plaintiff and Counter-Defendant Ameritas Life Insurance Corp.’s expert Michael L. Vild under Federal Rule of Evidence 702.

    Law And Legal Expert Witness

    Michael L. Vild obtained his Juris Doctor from Notre Dame Law School in 1991 and his Bachelor of Music from Ohio State University in 1988.

    Since January 2019, Vild has been a partner at the law firm of Cross & Simons, LLC (“Cross & Simmons”). His practice at the firm “primarily involves corporate and commercial litigation in state and federal courts in Delaware.”

    Aside from his bar memberships, Vild served as “board member of captive insurance companies in the SCOR family of companies; . . . as member of the Board of Directors of Scottish Re (U.S.) and related life reinsurance entities and as Delaware resident director of several small captive insurance companies.”

    Want to know more about the challenges Michael Vild has faced? Get the full details with our Challenge Study report.

    Discussion by the Court

    Wilmington Savings requested that the Court exclude Vild’s opinions and testimony with respect to four issues: (1) the choice of law inquiry; (2) the insurable interest issue; (3) the reasonableness of Ameritas’ investigation conduct; and (4) life insurance investor practices.

    A. The Court Excludes-in-Part and Does Not Exclude-in-Part Vild’s Opinions and Testimony Concerning the Choice-of-Law Analysis

    Wilmington Savings contended that the Court should exclude Vild’s opinions and testimony concerning the choice-of-law analysis because, according to Wilmington Savings, Vild is not qualified to opine on this issue and, separately, because his opinions and testimony are not helpful.

    First, while Vild cannot testify on the ultimate answer to the choice-of-law analysis, Vild is qualified to opine and testify, as the former Deputy Insurance Commissioner of the Delaware Department of Insurance, on whether Delaware has an interest in its insurance law being applied to the insurance policy at issue in this action. Likewise, as the former Deputy Insurance Commissioner of the Delaware Department of Insurance, Vild is qualified to opine and testify on how the need to regulate STOLI arose and STOLI principles generally.

    Second, Vild’s opinions and testimony on these topics would be helpful because this action and Delaware’s interest in its law being applied to the insurance policy in this action involves complex issues of insurance, including as they relate to STOLI, that can be simplified or clarified by an expert with relevant experience in insurance, such as Vild.

    Thus, the Court excluded-in-part and did not exclude-in-part Vild’s opinions and testimony concerning the choice-of-law analysis.

    B. The Court Excludes Vild’s Opinions and Testimony Concerning STOLI and Insurable Interests

    Wilmington Savings contended that the Court should exclude Vild’s opinions and testimony concerning STOLI and insurable interests because, according to Wilmington Savings, Vild is not qualified to opine on these issues and, separately, because his opinions and testimony are not helpful.

    First, Vild, as an expert witness, cannot testify on the legal conclusion as to whether the insurance policy in this action constitutes STOLI.

    Second, Vild’s opinions and testimony on these topics would be helpful because this action involves complex issues of insurance, including as they relate to STOLI, that can be simplified or clarified by an expert with relevant experience in insurance, such as Vild.

    The Court acknowledged that much of Vild’s experience did not concern insurance or even STOLI specifically and that Vild has many years of experience and expertise in other subjects from his time at various institutions (for example, his nine years of in-house counsel experience from two different casinos). However, that a person has expertise deriving from many years of experience in a particular subject does not foreclose that person from also being qualified in another subject and, thus, able to provide helpful testimony on that subject.

    Thus, the Court excluded-in-part and did not exclude-in-part Vild’s opinions and testimony concerning STOLI and insurable interests.

    C. The Court Excludes the Opinion and Testimony of Vild Concerning the Reasonableness of Ameritas’ Conduct

    Wilmington Savings contended that “Vild is not qualified to opine on whether Ameritas acted reasonably.”Wilmington Savings provided several grounds in support of this contention, including, but not limited to, that “Vild has admitted he is ‘not a claims administration expert.’

    Ameritas merely contended that “Vild offered opinions grounded in decades of regulatory and advisory experience evaluating insurer conduct under comparable conditions” and that courts “regularly admit such testimony from experts with regulatory or legal backgrounds.” However, even if courts regularly admit such testimony, the Court is unable to discern the purportedly “comparable conditions” that have purportedly informed Vild’s experience since Ameritas fails to cite anything in the record to evince as much.

    The Court determined that Vild was able to opine and testify on whether Delaware has an interest in its law being applied to the insurance policy at issue in this action, how the need to regulate STOLI arose, and STOLI principles generally. As the former Deputy Insurance Commissioner of the Delaware Department of Insurance, Vild has direct and substantial experience on these insurance issues from the enforcement and regulatory perspective, thereby qualifying him and rendering his testimony helpful.

    Here, however, Ameritas has failed to demonstrate that Vild has any relevant experience on the process by which insurers complete their investigations, including with respect to STOLI and insurable interests. For example, Vild never worked at an insurer and, in his private practice experience, he never litigated or provided any counsel on STOLI issues.

    D. The Court Excludes the Opinion and Testimony of Vild Concerning Life Insurance Investor Practices

    In his rebuttal report, Vild opined on several investor practices, including whether (1) it is “the industry practice for investors to rely upon the underwriting and diligence performed by insurance companies,” (2) it is reasonable for investors to rely on letters from legal counsel concerning whether an insurance policy is “valid under the insurable interest laws of various states,” and (3) “investors reasonably expect that an insurer will disclose a suspicion that a policy is potential STOLI.”

    Wilmington Savings contended that “Vild is not qualified to opine on [these] life insurance investor practices.” Wilmington Savings provided several grounds in support of this contention, including, but not limited to, that Vild “has no experience working for an investor or participating in a transaction to buy or sell life insurance in the secondary or tertiary markets.” In response, Ameritas failed to cite anything in the record evincing the purported qualifications of Vild to opine on life insurance investor practices. Instead, Ameritas resorts to, for example, generically contending that what “STOLI investors …. customarily do is wrong.”

    However, generic contentions about industry custom and attempted explanations of legal precedent are irrelevant to the question of Vild’s qualifications to opine on life insurance investor practices. For these reasons, the Court found that Ameritas failed to show that Vild has any experience as an insurance investor, working for or regulating an insurance investor, participating in a transaction to buy or sell life insurance in the secondary or tertiary markets, or otherwise is qualified to opine on life insurance investor practices. Thus, the Court excluded Vild’s opinion and testimony concerning life insurance investor practices.

    Held

    The Court granted-in-part and denied-in-part the Defendant’s Daubert motion to exclude the testimony of Plaintiff and Counter-Defendant Ameritas Life Insurance Corp.’s expert Michael L. Vild.

    Key Takeaway:

    It is not necessary that the expert have expertise in the precise subject matter at issue, and an expert should not be excluded simply because the trial court does not deem the proposed expert to be the best qualified or because the proposed expert does not have the specialization that the Court considers most appropriate.

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Ameritas Life Insurance Corp. V. Wilmington Savings Fund Society FSB
    Docket Number: 1:23cv236
    Court Name: United States District Court for the District of Delaware
    Order Date: November 07, 2025
  • Construction Expert’s Testimony on Project Delays Admitted

    Construction Expert’s Testimony on Project Delays Admitted

    Plaintiff ZP No. 332, LLC hired Defendant Huffman Contractors, Inc. as the general contractor on a real estate development project. Huffman allegedly failed to complete the work adequately, and ZP eventually declared a default on the construction contract. That gave the parties’ surety, Travelers Casualty and Surety Company of America, several options under a performance bond. From those options, Travelers chose to take over Huffman’s contract, hire subcontractors, and finish the project. ZP claimed that Travelers did not fulfill the construction contract adequately after it took over and sued both Huffman and Travelers for breach of contract.

    ZP promised to prove the cause of the property’s lost value (i.e., Huffman and Travelers’s alleged delays) through a forensic scheduling expert, Kevin Coyne. Huffman filed a Daubert motion to exclude Coyne’s testimony.

    Construction Expert Witness

    Kevin Coyne, P.E., PSP has more than 20 years of construction management, project controls and construction claims experience. He has been invited to speak throughout North America on a variety of engineering and construction topics and has served as a guest lecturer in the Department of Civil, Environmental, and Infrastructure Engineering at George Mason University.

    Want to know more about the challenges Kevin Coyne has faced? Get the full details with our Challenge Study report.

    Discussion by the Court

    Coyne is a ‘forensic scheduler’ who purports to have performed a “detailed causation analysis” regarding alleged construction delays. Huffman lodged three categories of complaints about Coyne’s expected testimony: (1) He does not use what Huffman claims is the best available method; (2) his analysis disregards facts in Huffman’s favor, such as evidence that ZP itself may have been responsible for some delays; and (3) his opinions are too favorable to ZP. 

    First, Huffman argued that Coyne “did not cite” “the most recognized industry standard” for the form of analysis he used. After reviewing his report and the opinions of Huffman’s rebuttal expert, the Court found that the principles and methods Coyne used are more likely than not reliable. Huffman is welcome to argue to the jury that Coyne should have taken a different approach.

    Coyne discussed at length how he validated the data sources he relied on, and the Court finds that the facts that underlie his opinions are more likely than not sufficient. Therefore, cross-examination—not exclusion—is the solution to Huffman’s concerns about how Coyne handled facts allegedly unfavorable to ZP’s position. 

    Huffman also asserted that Coyne’s “one-sided opinions” made his testimony “inadmissible.” To the extent that argument is about Coyne allegedly ignoring evidence that ZP itself may have contributed to project delays, it is simply the same contention addressed above, wearing a different mask, and the Court has already concluded that Huffman’s concern goes to weight, not admissibility. Insofar as Huffman raises a new issue here, it fails because credibility is a question for the jury, not a matter for a Daubert motion or summary judgment. 

    Held

    The Court denied Huffman’s motion to exclude the testimony of Kevin Coyne.

    Key Takeaway:

    While an expert’s testimony must be based on “good grounds” and constitute “more than subjective belief or unsupported speculation,” neither Fed. R. Evid. 702 nor Daubert requires an expert to use the method opposing counsel would select or even the best or most recommended method. 

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Zp No. 332, LLC V. Huffman Contractors, Inc.
    Docket Number: 2:24cv611
    Court Name: United States District Court, Virginia Eastern
    Order Date: November 04, 2025
  • Expert Testimony on the Functions of a County Attorney Admitted

    Expert Testimony on the Functions of a County Attorney Admitted

    Defendant Howard Keith Hall is the former County Attorney of Pike County, Kentucky. Hall is a current Pike County Circuit Court Judge. The United States charged Hall with two counts of mail fraud and one count of theft of government funds. The charges stem from an alleged scheme in which Hall hired Attorney A1 as an Assistant County Attorney and paid this attorney approximately $440,587 in state salary and benefits despite the attorney performing little to no work for the Pike County Attorney’s Office (“PCAO”).

    While Attorney A served as an Assistant County Attorney, Hall participated in the private practice of law at Attorney A’s law firm and received various payments described as “Distributions” totaling $505,900. The United States alleged that Hall committed mail fraud by signing and mailing false payroll certifications indicating that Attorney A fulfilled his duties as a part time assistant county attorney despite doing no work.

    The United States filed this motion to exclude in response to Hall’s disclosure noticing Harold Mac Johns, the former County Attorney of Todd County. Hall’s disclosure anticipated that Johns will testify and offer opinions on several topics, including the various responsibilities of a county attorney’s office; the full-time and part-time system used in Kentucky for county attorney offices; the statutory duties of an assistant county attorney; the ability of county attorneys and assistant county attorneys to participate in the private practice of law; the private relationship between Hall and Attorney A; the particular allegations of the Indictment; and other topics or issues that may arise from the government’s case-in-chief.

    United States filed a Daubert motion to exclude the testimony of Harold Mac Johns.

    Law and Legal Expert Witness

    Harold Mac Johns served as the Todd County Attorney for 28 years from January 1990 until September 2018. He served on the Prosecutors Advisory Council for seven years from 1997 until 2004.

    Want to know more about the challenges Harold Mac Johns has faced? Get the full details with our Challenge Study report.

    Discussion by the Court

    The United States raised four arguments in support of its motion to exclude the testimony of Johns. First, the government charged that the Court should exclude Johns’ testimony as untimely. Second, that the Court should exclude Johns’ testimony for making inadequate disclosures. Third, that Johns’ testimony does not meet any provision of Rule 702. Fourth, that Johns’ testimony invaded the province of the Court and jury. Indirectly, the government also argued that Johns did not meet the definition of a lay opinion witness under Fed. R. Evid. 701.

    The United States argued that the Court should exclude the noticed expert testimony because it is (1) untimely and because (2) the notice failed to state what Johns’ opinion will be on several of the subjects.

    Late Notice

    Hall’s initial appearance and arraignment took place on May 16, 2025, before Magistrate Judge Matthew A. Stinnett. Per the Court’s order, Hall should have provided the government with notice of expert testimony on or before May 26, 2025. This Court continued Hall’s trial to November 10, 2025, after holding a telephonic scheduling question with counsel for Hall and the United States. Hall produced the disclosure noticing Johns on October 14, 2025, roughly one month before the start of the jury trial on November 07, 2025.

    Basically, Hall submitted this disclosure several weeks before the start of trial, giving the United States ample notice of an anticipated witness. Hall did not submit this witness in an effort to throw sand into the gears of the judicial process, but to provide context and testimony about the inner workings of a county attorney’s office, an issue that cuts to the heart of the case. The Court does not find that Hall acted in bad faith, and the reasons for the delay appear to be related to the case’s complexity and the accompanying number of motions filings, hearings, and orders. Nor is the Court convinced that the late notice of this witness prejudices the government.

    The government has had time to raise its motion to exclude with this Court. None of Johns’ proposed testimony raises novel issues or arguments that the government is unfamiliar with as it pertains to Hall’s defense. This is particularly true where any prejudice to the government can be cured with a less severe course of action.

    Inadequate Disclosures

    The Court turned next to the government’s second procedural argument: that Johns’ testimony should be excluded for inadequate disclosures.

    Hall’s disclosure included Johns’ qualifications as the Todd County Attorney, a member of the Prosecutors Advisory Council, and as a private practitioner. The disclosure listed several topics, but the government argued that “the disclosure failed to address what Johns’ opinion would be on several of the subjects noticed.” Several of the topics did not include an opinion statement. Thus, the Court faces a situation where Hall has included opinion statements as to some topics but has not provided opinion statements for others.

    The Court is not convinced that the deficiencies require the exclusion of Johns’ entire testimony. The government has not claimed in its motion that the lack of detail affects their ability to counter the evidence. Excluding the witness is not the only remedy available to the Court since the government is not burdened by an “undue surprise” that prevents their “adequate opportunity to prepare” to prepare for trial.

    The Court may appropriately set boundaries on Johns’ admissible testimony and issue other orders that are “just under the circumstances.”

    Rule 702

    Hall submitted that Johns can provide testimony about how an elected county attorney runs their office and the functions of the county attorneys in general.

    The government argued that “the number of years someone has served as a county attorney does not translate to facts or data that this Court can evaluate for reliability under Rule 702 or Daubert.”

    However, the Court was convinced that Johns’ 28 years as a county prosecutor and seven years as part of the Prosecutors Advisory Council support the reliability determination that he is qualified to opine on the ways in which a Kentucky county attorney runs their office.

    Moreover, Johns’ testimony would assist the jury in understanding the inner workings of a county attorney’s office, the procedures by which county attorneys hire staff, and the ways in which the individual attorney’s offices work with the Prosecutors Advisory Council and other offices within the Commonwealth’s state government.

    Legal Conclusions

    Johns can testify as to the statutory duties of an assistant county attorney but under no circumstances could Johns offer an opinion as to whether Hall’s actions were legal or sanctioned under the laws of the Commonwealth of Kentucky.

    Johns similarly cannot testify as to whether there are or are not legal requirements for assistant county attorneys to work a minimum number of hours. He cannot testify to Hall’s willfulness to commit any act or that Hall did or did not have the requisite intent to defraud.

    Plainly, the Court held that much of Johns’ proposed testimony violated the prohibition against a witness testifying about legal requirements or interpretations of statute. By way of example, Johns can testify to the day-to-day operations of a county attorney’s office. Johns can testify that it is common to hire assistant county attorneys and describe how that process works. But Johns cannot testify that Hall’s acts were legal or sanctioned by Johns’ own interpretation of Kentucky’s statutes. This is not an exhaustive analysis of what Johns may or may not say on the witness stand. But this much is clear — any testimony suggesting that Hall’s actions were legal or appropriate under the laws of the Commonwealth or that the interpretation of the statutes requires a certain outcome is inadmissible.

    The bulk of Johns’ testimony as to the functions of a county attorney’s office will fall under Rule 702 because Johns never served in the Pike County Attorney’s office. Moreover, it is not clear from the record before the Court that Johns was ever personally involved in any of the facts at issue in this case.

    Held

    The Court granted in part and denied in part the United States’ motion to exclude the testimony of Harold Mac Johns.

    Key Takeaway:

    Johns’ extensive experience as a county prosecutor and his personal knowledge as to the responsibilities, duties, and discretion of a county attorney meet both the reliability and relevance elements required by Rule 702.

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: USA V. Hall
    Docket Number: 3:25cr5
    Court Name: United States District Court, Kentucky Eastern
    Order Date: November 06, 2025
  • Mechanical Engineering Expert Allowed to Opine on Hand Placement

    Mechanical Engineering Expert Allowed to Opine on Hand Placement

    This action arises from an explosion and resulting injuries Dawn Clary incurred while using a Power Quick Pot model Y6D-36 pressure cooker (the “pressure cooker”), marketed and distributed by Defendant Tristar Products, Inc. (“Tristar”).

    Clary brought this action against Tristar for her injuries from the explosion, alleging defective design, negligence, breach of express warranty, breach of implied warranty of merchantability, and failure to warn.

    Also, Clary filed a motion to exclude Tristar’s expert witness, Robert S. Giachetti’s “opinions as to the placement of Plaintiff’s arms at the time of the explosion.”

    Mechanical Engineering Expert Witness

    Robert Salvatore Giachetti is a licensed professional engineer who holds a Ph.D., M.S. and B.S. in Mechanical Engineering. He has participated in numerous joint examinations of pressure cookers and performed independent research on the trajectory of expulsed contents from a pressurized pressure cooker and its potential for scald injuries, which was published in the Journal of Burns.

    Get the full story on challenges to Robert Giachetti’s expert opinions and testimony with an in-depth Challenge Study.

    Discussion by the Court

    Based on his analysis and the materials provided to him, Giachetti opined at his deposition that Clary “should have substantial burns on both forearms, which are not recorded in the medical records” if Clary had her hands on the lid as she claims.

    However, Clary asserted that Giachetti’s expertise as a biomechanical engineer and his methodology did not enable him to render a reliable opinion on burn injuries or a derivative opinion on the placement of Clary’s hands based on her burn injuries.

    The issue before the Court was not whether Giachetti is qualified to testify as an expert generally, but whether his proffered opinion on Clary’s hand placement is within his expertise.

    First, Clary contended that Giachetti relied on inconsistent evidence to develop his opinion because the photograph of Clary’s injuries “clearly demonstrates” Clary had burns on her forearms. Second, Clary contended that Giachetti failed to adequately consider or test the effect of Clary’s clothing at the time of the incident on the severity of her burns. Finally, Clary contended that the Giachetti conducted did not account for the trajectory of the lid and the pressure cooker’s contents when the user had her hands on the lid, like Clary has repeatedly testified.

    Analysis

    The Court agreed that Giachetti was qualified to testify as to the trajectory of the pressure cooker’s expulsed contents based on burn placement. His analysis based on burn placement is based on sufficiently reliable methodology. As Giachetti outlined, his analysis was premised on two scientific facts (1) hot fluids burn skin, and (2) fluids cannot permeate the solid walls of a pressure cooker. Based on his scientific study, which was peer-reviewed, Giachetti determined the trajectory of the expulsed fluids would have contacted Clary’s hands had they been on the lid at the time of the explosion. Because Clary’s shirt was not protective of other areas of skin, whether the shirt was long-sleeved or short-sleeved was irrelevant to Giachetti’s analysis.

    Giachetti premised his opinion on the placement of Clary’s hands during the incident on the location of “severe burns” on her body.

    As a result, the Court found that Defendant has shown that it is more likely than not that Giachetti’s expert knowledge will help the jury understand the evidence and help them determine how this accident happened.

    However, the Court is not satisfied that Giachetti’s expertise in biomechanical engineering enables him to make any burn diagnoses additional to those made by the medical professionals at University of Nebraska Medical Center, even if to diagnose the burns to Clary’s forearms as minor. In sum, Giachetti’s background and experience does not indicate that he has the qualifications or experience to diagnose burns.

    Held

    The Court granted in part and denied in part the Plaintiff’s motion to exclude the testimony of Robert Giachetti, Ph.D.

    Key Takeaway:

    Any testimony about Giachetti’s diagnosis of Clary’s injuries was excluded because Giachetti’s background and experience did not indicate that he had the qualifications or experience to diagnose burns.

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Clary V. Tristar Products, Inc.
    Docket Number: 4:22cv3230
    Court Name: United States District Court, Nebraska
    Order Date: November 05, 2025
  • Credit Reporting Expert’s Testimony on Emotional Harm Excluded

    Credit Reporting Expert’s Testimony on Emotional Harm Excluded

    This case involves alleged violations of the Fair Credit Reporting Act. The Plaintiff, Fabian Huizar, claims that Experian Information Solutions repeatedly reported inaccurate information on his credit report relating to a car loan that was the subject of a judgment rendered in state court. Huizar hired experts, Douglas Hollon and Evan Hendricks to help him prove his case, and Experian filed a motion to exclude or limit their testimony.

    Consumer Credit Expert Witness

    Douglas A. Hollon holds a Bachelor of Science in Business Finance. He has received FCRA certifications from the Consumer Data Industry Association, and he has earned additional certifications.

    He has worked in the consumer finance reporting industry since 2005, when he began working for Experian. His work for Experian spanned 14 years from 2005 through 2019 in the National Consumer Assistance Center—Experian’s main dispute processing center—where he helped consumers “resolve their issues” and “[p]rovid[ed] leadership advice to current supervisors.”

    He handled “escalated credit report disputes” submitted on consumers’ behalf by attorneys and government entities. He has also received “specialized training involving fraud (identity theft) disputes” and testified on Experian’s behalf as a Rule 30(b)(6) witness. In addition to his experience at Experian, he has studied “regulatory agency publications, case law, deposition transcripts, company manuals or publications, and other related documents,” contributing to his “extensive knowledge of other Consumer Reporting Agencies’ (CRAs) and Data Furnishers’ credit dispute operations.” Since 2020, Hollon has been the owner of Credit Experts of North Texas, LLC. Over the course of his career, he has “assisted tens of thousands of customers.”

    Want to know more about the challenges Douglas Hollon has faced? Get the full details with our Challenge Study report. 

    Credit Reporting Expert Witness

    Evan D. Hendricks has worked in the field of data privacy and credit reporting for over forty years. He was the Editor and Publisher of Privacy Times from 1981-2013.

    He has consulted on FCRA cases for over 30 years and has served as an expert witness well over 100 times. Hendricks has testified before Congress and the Federal Trade Commission dozens of times on issues relating to credit reporting and the importance of credit scores. He is the author of a book on how credit scores work and credit reports work.

    Want to know more about the challenges Evan Hendricks has faced? Get the full details with our Challenge Study report.

    Discussion by the Court

    A. Douglas Hollon

    First, Experian stated that Hollon is unqualified to provide his opinion on the correct interpretation of the Tippecanoe Circuit Court orders which are the subject of this litigation. The Court held that Hollon’s decade-plus experience working on credit reporting at Experian qualifies him to opine on how Experian would have read and understood the legal orders as well as how reporting should have been conducted following a review of the orders.

    Experian next argued that Hollon is unqualified to opine on whether Experian’s processes and procedures resulted in inaccurate, damaging information remaining in Huizar’s Experian file. Because the jury can assess Huizar’s own damages testimony and Hollon adds no specialized knowledge or experience related to damages, he will not be allowed to provide expert testimony on Huizar’s damages, emotional or otherwise. Accordingly, any statements concerning damages, emotional or otherwise, included in Hollon’s report will not be considered by the Court.

    Experian’s motion to exclude also attacked Hollon’s methodology and argued that the Hollon Report “totally failed to outline any reliable principles or methods.” However, Hollon drew on his decade of experience working on credit reporting at Experian to review the materials in this case and form an expert opinion on Experian’s alleged actions. Although his methodology was not highly technical, the Court considered it reliable for forming an expert opinion.

    B. Evan Hendricks

    Experian argued that Hendricks is unqualified to provide expert opinion on several topics for which he opined. First, Experian argued that, like Hollon, Hendricks was unqualified to provide his opinion regarding how Experian should have interpreted the Tippecanoe Circuit Court orders.

    However, the Court held that Hendricks’ extensive knowledge of credit reporting and credit reporting agencies will be helpful to the trier of fact. And while Experian is correct that Hendricks does not have a specialized background in law, he is qualified to opine as to how Experian, a consumer reporting agency, should have viewed the legal orders at issue in this case.

    Hendricks’ experience and expertise also qualify him to provide his opinion on how Experian’s reporting would have impacted Huizar. In 2003, Hendricks provided testimony to the House Financial Services Subcommittee on Financial Institutions & Consumer Credit regarding “The Role of FCRA in the Credit Granting Process.”

    While Hendricks will be allowed to offer his opinion on how creditors would have viewed Experian’s reporting, he will be prohibited from offering opinions on any emotional or psychological harm suffered by Huizar.

    As for the reliability of Hendricks’ methodology, the Court found Hendricks’ methodology of applying his experience to the facts and evidence reliable. However, Hendricks was not permitted to provide testimony about prior cases, administrative actions, and consent decrees because an information dump from long ago cases will more likely confuse the jury than
    provide helpful information relevant to this case.

    Finally, Experian argued that Hendricks should be precluded from testifying about Experian’s knowledge, motivations, intentions, objective state of mind, and subjective beliefs. As the parties agreed that Hendricks should not testify as to the CRAs’ state of mind, Hendricks will not be permitted to provide testimony on that topic.

    Held

    The Court granted in part and denied in part Experian’s motion to exclude or limit the testimony of Plaintiff’s expert witnesses, Douglas Hollon and Evan Hendricks.

    Key Takeaway:

    When a qualified expert uses their expertise and experience to arrive at an opinion based on an assumed set of relevant facts, that is a reliable methodology. An expert’s reliance upon his or her experience to assess the relevant documents has been repeatedly viewed as a reliable methodology in various settings.

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Huizar V. Experian Information Solutions Inc.
    Docket Number: 4:22cv85
    Court Name: United States District Court, Indiana Northern
    Order Date: November 05, 2025
  • Automobile Appraisal Expert’s Cost Comparison Approach Deemed Reliable

    Automobile Appraisal Expert’s Cost Comparison Approach Deemed Reliable

    This action arises from the circumstances surrounding Plaintiff Samuel Holmes’ purchase of a limited-production 2023 Dodge Challenger Black Ghost (“Black Ghost”) from Freedom, a Kentucky LLC that sells and services cars in the Commonwealth.

    This case involves a mileage dispute over a 2023 Dodge Challenger Black Ghost, a limited-production vehicle only one of 300 produced. The Black Ghost’s mileage in the contract documents stated 11, whereas the mileage upon delivery to Holmes was “24 or 25.” Two weeks after he accepted delivery of the Black Ghost, Holmes attempted to revoke his acceptance.

    The extent to which the mileage discrepancy injured Holmes remains in dispute. Holmes asserted claims for breach of contract, intentional infliction of emotional distress, intentional misrepresentation, and conspiracy against Freedom.

    Holmes argued that the mileage discrepancy reduces the Black Ghost’s value by $103,813.00. Freedom argued that there is no reduction in value because the mileage is within the range normally expected of a new car. Holmes’ expert determined the amount of loss by subtracting the Black Ghost’s sale price from the average of the 2024 auction prices of three other 2023 Black Ghosts. Freedom’s expert, Roy Theophilus Bent, Jr. used a “Cost Comparison Approach” by searching three online databases and several authorized Dodge dealers to conclude that there was no loss in value.

    Holmes filed a motion to preclude defense expert Bent from offering his report and testimony.

    Automobile Appraisal Expert Witness

    Roy Theophilus Bent, Jr. is an IACP-Certified Auto Appraiser with over 28 years of experience in the insurance industry, specializing in actual cash value, total loss, diminished value, and damage estimating.

    His expertise lies in classic cars and custom vehicles, combined with appraisals conducted in accordance with USPAP and Bureau of Certified Auto Appraisers Standards.

    Want to know more about the challenges Roy Theophilus Bent has faced? Get the full details with our Challenge Study report.

    Discussion by the Court

    The Court found that Bent possessed the requisite technical and specialized knowledge to assist the trier of fact in valuing a limited-production vehicle like the 2023 Dodge Challenger Black Ghost. He held an IACP-Certified Auto Appraiser designation, earned through training and testing, and is a J.D. Power and Associates-certified New and Used Passenger Car & Truck Valuation Expert, adhering to the Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice (USPAP).

    Holmes called into question the factual inaccuracies in Bent’s report, arguing that the sales date was misstated, the delivery date was omitted, and the Black Ghost’s fair market value was misrepresented. Notwithstanding these facts, Holmes’ contentions did not adequately call into question the sufficiency of the data Bent relied on. The evidence in the record indicated that Bent’s report was derived from searching three different online databases and consulting with “several” certified Dodge dealers.

    Moreover, Bent’s Cost Comparison Approach is a reliable method for determining the amount of loss. Bent’s methodology searched three online databases and several authorized Dodge dealers to conclude that there was no loss in value. This approach, grounded in USPAP and Bureau of Certified Auto Appraisers Standards, aligned with industry practices and reliably applies available sales data to the unique circumstances of a limited-production vehicle.

    Finally, Bent’s report did not risk prejudice and confusion. Holmes argued that Bent’s report, which found no loss in value, risked confusing the jury by contradicting the opposing expert’s $103,813 valuation. This objection concerned the weight of Bent’s testimony, not its admissibility.

    Holmes also argued that the parole evidence rule prohibits Bent’s testimony. However, Freedom is not trying to contradict or alter the terms of the contract. Rather, the purpose of Bent’s report is to assess the amount of damages caused by the mileage discrepancy.

    Held

    The Court denied Plaintiff Samuel Holmes’ motion in limine to exclude certain testimony of Defendants’ expert, Roy Theophilus Bent, Jr. 

    Key Takeaway:

    Given the limited sales information, the Bent report sufficiently analyzed the available data. Bent’s calculations aligned with industry standards, and he reliably applied the sales numbers and data using his Cost Comparison Approach. As such, Bent’s testimony met the requirements of Rule 702.

    Case Details:

    Case Caption: Holmes V. Lexington-Cjd, LLC
    Docket Number: 5:23cv249
    Court Name: United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky, Central Division
    Order Date: October 27, 2025